The electoral college is inconsistent with the underlying principles of the US constitution and the basic ideas of John Rawls' theory of justice. The college introduces an undefined variable into the basic structure and violates the Rawlsian idea of a stable society and public reason. Public reason involves constitutional essentials of the basic structure and constitutive of the overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Since the electoral college need not respect the majority vote of the citizenry nor (...) publicly justify its vote, it violates the idea of public reason of citizens as free and equal since political discourse must be public and consistent with the principles implicit in the basic structure. (shrink)

L a distribució n parlamentari a qu e ha n a r rojad o lo s resultado s d e la s pasada s elecciones generale s de l dí a 2 0 d e n o viembre , d e 2011 , h a ocasionado , sobr e tod o po r pa r t e d e la s fo r - macione s política s má s s e v erament e afectadas , tod a un a (...) cascad a d e crítica s a nuestr o sistema electoral , y pa r ticula r ment e sobr e l a fó r mul a idead a po r e l matemátic o belg a Vícto r D’Hont. Lo s distinto s pa r tido s tiende n a un a v aloració n sesgad a e n vi r tu d de l bene f ici o obtenido d e l a fó r mul a el e gid a po r e l L e gislado r e n un a etap a históric a dete r minada . ¿Cóm o afecta l a l e y D’Hon t a l a calida d d e l a democraci a española ? ¿E l pro b lem a resid e e n l a fó r mula D’Hont ? Co n l a f inalida d d e contribui r a l debat e abie r t o sobr e nuestr o sistem a electoral, m e centrar é e n alguna s modi f cacione s d e l a LORE G qu e todo s podría n acepta r , junt o a l a propuest a d e do s modelo s electorales , a cost e cero , d e do b l e pro r rate o y d e aplicación inmediata. (shrink)

Liberal democracies encourage citizen participation and protect our freedoms, yet these regimes elect politicians and decide important issues with electoral and legislative systems that are less inclusive than other arrangements. Some citizens inevitably have more influence than others. Is this a problem? Yes, because similarly just but more inclusive systems are possible. Political theorists and philosophers should be arguing for particular institutional forms, with particular geographies, consistent with justice. -/- Les démocraties libérales encouragent la participation citoyenne et protègent (...) nos libertés. Pourtant, ces régimes élisent des politiciens et décident de problèmes importants via les systèmes électoral et législatif, qui sont moins inclusifs que d’autres arrangements. Certains citoyens ont inévitablement plus d’influence que d’autres. Est-ce un problème? Oui, parce que des systèmes similairement justes, mais plus inclusifs, sont possibles. Les théoriciens et philosophes politiques devraient ainsi plaider en faveur de formes institutionnelles particulières, aux géographies précises, en cohérence avec la justice. (shrink)

Normative political theorists working in the field of linguistic justice generally believe that participation in democratic life in linguistically diverse societies requires a shared lingua franca (e.g., Patten 2009; Van Parijs 2011). Even when a shared lingua franca is present, however, there is likely to be a variety of ways in which people speak it, due to variations in accent, pitch, register, and lexicon. This paper examines the implications of intra‐linguistic diversity for democracy and political representation. More specifically, by (...) drawing on Andrew Rehfeld's (2010) work and on relevant sociolinguistics research, the paper argues that widespread unconscious linguistic prejudice constitutes a constraint on some citizens' right to run for political office that is incompatible with democratic equality. The argument is illustrated via a number of examples concerning Australian politicians. (shrink)

In this article I aim to offer a first critical assessment of the most prominent arguments in favour of restricting the voting rights of senior citizens. The first argument discussed, most thoroughly articulated by van Parijs, maintains that intergenerational justice would be improved under schemes which restrict the voting rights of senior citizens, thereby diminishing their overall electoral weight. The second argument, reconstructed from Lau's defence of child enfranchisement, maintains that the cognitive decline associated with the process of (...) aging should lead us to treat children and senior citizens identically in respect to electoral rights; thus, if we agree that children should not have the right to vote, consistency dictates that senior citizens should be disenfranchised as well. I respond to these arguments with several objections, arguing that the former relies on a number of faulty empirical premises and has deeply unattractive implications for enfranchisement once consistently applied, and that the latter fails to make empirically salient distinctions between children and senior citizens when it comes to the political domain. (shrink)

It is the intention in this article to explain the electoral stagnation of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) in the light of the 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey. Drawing on theories of voting behavior, the article uncovers the organizational shortcomings within the party and the problem of credibility that have emerged as significant impediments to the party in addressing long-term historical-structural issues, mainly the division of Turkish society between the religious periphery and the secular center. Furthermore, (...) the strong identification between the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) and its partisans have made party-switching difficult, having been achieved, above all, through the provision of economic benefits and public services and the consolidation of party identification through growing polarization and division in Turkish politics. Last but not least, the changes to the political environment between the June 7 and November 1, 2015 elections, pushed stability and security to the top of the agenda, as well as AKP’s electoral adjustments in the run-up to the November 1 elections inhibited any possible flow of votes to the CHP. (shrink)

Institutions to address short-termism in public policymaking and to more suitably discharge our duties toward future generations have elicited much recent normative research, which this chapter surveys. It focuses on two prominent institutions: insulating devices, which seek to mitigate short-termist electoral pressures by transferring authority away to independent bodies, and constraining devices, which seek to bind elected officials to intergenerationally fair rules from which deviation is costly. The chapter first discusses sufficientarian, egalitarian, and prioritarian theories of our duties toward (...) future generations, and how an excessive focus on the short term in policymaking may hinder that such duties be fulfilled. It then surveys constraining and insulating devices, and inspects their effectiveness to address the epistemic, motivational, and institutional drivers of political short-termism as well as their intra- and intergenerational legitimacy. (shrink)

How do Islamists get non-Islamists to vote for them? The existing literature suggests that what drives support for Islamist parties are macro-social transformations, Islamic culture, or Islamist party moderation. These approaches do not explain the variation in Islamist electoral performance. Why do Islamists win elections in some but not in other, very similar, contexts? This article identifies the important role of local elite recruitment and organizational cohesiveness in Islamist electoral performance. It applies the subnational comparative method to demonstrate (...) the causal mechanisms linking local party organizations to Islamist electoral success. Empirical evidence is drawn from in-depth studies of the Justice and Development Party’s local branches in three closely-matched pairs of cities in Turkey. The findings bridge the literatures on political Islam and party politics with a new theory of Islamist electoral strategy and performance. (shrink)

By exploring the integral relationship between democracy and economic justice, Democratic Distributive Justice seeks to explain how democratic countries with market systems should deal with the problem of high levels of income-inequality. The book acts as a guide for dealing with this issue by providing an interdisciplinary approach that combines political, economic, and legal theory. It also analyzes the nature of economic society and puts forth a new understanding of the agents and considerations bearing upon the ethics of (...) relative pay, such as the nature of individual contributions and the extent of community in capital based market systems. Economic justice is then integrated with democratic theory, yielding what Ross Zucker calls 'democratic distributive justice'. While prevailing theory defines democracy in terms of the electoral mechanism, the author holds that the principles of distribution form part of the very definition of democracy, which makes just distribution a requirement of democratic government. (shrink)

I examine the rising tension between two Islamic movements in Turkey: The Justice and Development Party and Fethullah Gülen’s Hizmet Movement within the context of increased human rights abuses by the government in Turkey. I argue that Gülen and Hizmet are a continued concern for Recep Tayyip Erdogan and AKP because of Hizmet’s social services, primarily in the realm of education. Furthermore, their influence in public ranks further troubles Erdogan. However, it seems that because of Hizmet’s disinterest with (...) class='Hi'>electoral politics, along with an absence of other challengers to the ruling government party’s electoral success, Erdogan and the AKP will continue to hold political power, at least for the short term. Furthermore, this case illustrates Erdogan’s willingness to carry out increased authoritarian actions, as well as a willingness to violate the human rights of civil society actors in Turkey. (shrink)

Introduction. The trial; the right to a lawyer; double jeopardy; the electoral college; the senate; presidential pardon; judicial review; lifetime appointment; campaign finance reform; the right to political leave; the democratized corporation -- The right to a lawyer -- Abolish double jeopardy -- Empower the jury -- The electoral college -- Abolish presidential pardon -- Abolish the Senate -- Limit the power of the Supreme Court -- Abolish lifetime tenure of Supreme Court justices -- Reduce private money in (...) election campaigns -- Expand the right to run for political office -- Expand employee rights -- The contradictions of libertarianism. (shrink)

The entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002 establishing the International Criminal Court has signified a shift in the goals pursued by international criminal law. Due to new types of warfare dynamics, international protection is in need of new orientations, particularly with regard to conflict deterrence aims. This urgency is widely documented by the normative action framework of the Responsibility to Protect and, more recently, by the UN Secretary-General 2012–2013 Reports for the RtoP’s implementation. The scope (...) of this study is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to explore theoretical overlapping between the jus post bellum and the RtoP with regard to deterrence effects of the ICC; on the other hand, it proposes to illustrate such dynamics by reference to Kenya’s post-electoral violence during the period 2007–2013. Kenya represents an instance of a post-conflict society whereby transitional justice actions have taken place under a de facto adoption of a RtoP framework. As a result, I defend a qualified correlation between ICC’s retribution and deterrence effects. I claim that the hypothesis of the ICC’s deterring effects accounts in Kenya is constructed upon a general condition of direct compliance by self-interested rational actors as well as on unintended effects of ethnic stabilization. I further consider that this possibility is reinforced by systemic interdependencies with other national and international initiatives such as the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation mediation initiative, the Grand Coalition Government, the Panel of African Eminent Personalities led by Kofi Annan, and the findings of the Commission of Enquiry of Post-Election Violence. (shrink)

Much discussion of the ethics of participation focuses on electoral participation and whether citizens are obligated or can be coerced to vote. Yet these debates have ignored that citizens must first pay attention to politics and make up their minds about where they stand before they can engage in any form of participation. This article considers the importance for liberal democracy of citizens paying attention to politics, or attentive citizenship. It argues that the democratic state has an obligation to (...) cultivate interest in politics and that this obligation authorizes means up to and including some forms of coercion. The argument is that when citizens are inattentive to politics, it undermines political equality and social justice because it undermines what John Rawls called the fair value of the political liberties. The importance of these ends for liberal democratic states requires them to take steps to promote attentive citizenship. (shrink)

Perceived uncertainty and anger lead people to investigate with respect to the establishment, and politicians who are seen as reckless within society. In this sense, populist discourse paved a way to respond by glorifying one group of people and scapegoating others that emerge as group differentiation. Critical moments especially illustrate mutual constructive identification through the discourse of political actors. This article explores a contextual change in the populist discourse of the Justice and Development Party leaders by observing the successive (...) elections that occurred in 2015. It argues that the leaders mainly expressed an “us–them distinction,” “in-group superiority,” and “the people” populist themes; as well as these themes, the electoral speeches made for the second election presented scapegoating and exclusionary statements even more. (shrink)

"On Sense and Reflexivity" offers the answer to a crucial question that was posed, and left without a satisfactory answer, by Gottlob Frege in "On Sense and Reference" (1892): What is the sense of a proper name? The century-long failure to answer this question has been the main motivation and support for recent nondescriptional accounts of lexical singular terms.

Frege’s claim that proper names have senses has come to seem untenable following Kripke’s argument that names are rigid designators. It is commonly thought that if names had senses, their referents would vary with circumstances of evaluation. The article defends Frege’s claim by arguing that names have word-reflexive senses. This analysis of names’ senses does not violate Kripke’s noncircularity condition, and it differs crucially from related views of Bach and Katz. That names have reflexive senses confirms Frege’s own solution to (...) his puzzle about the content of identity sentences, solves Kripke’s Pierre and Peter puzzles about belief ascription, and entails that bearerless names have meanings. Furthermore, names’ having reflexive senses explains why they designate rigidly. (shrink)

Singular-term semantics has been intractable. Frege took the referents of singular terms to be their semantic values. On his account, vacuous terms lacked values. Russell separated the semantics of definite descriptions from the semantics of proper names, which caused truth-values to be composed in two different ways and still left vacuous names without values. Montague gave all noun phrases sets of verb-phrase extensions for values, which created type mismatches when noun phrases were objects and still left vacuous names without values. (...) There is a single type of value for all noun phrases that dissolves the difficulties which have beset singular-term semantics. (shrink)

Truth Be Told explains how truth and falsity result from relations that sentences and their constituents have to the circumstances at which they are evaluated. It offers a precise analysis of truth and a diagnosis of the Liar paradox. Current semantic theory employs generalized quantifiers as the extensions of noun phrases. The book provides simpler extensions for noun phrases. These permit intuitive compositions of truth-values and a diagnosis of the Liar and Grelling paradoxes.

It is generally accepted that Mill’s classification of names as nonconnotative terms is incompatible with Frege’s thesis that names have senses. However, Milldescribed the senses of nonconnotative terms—without being aware that he was doing so. These are the senses for names that were sought in vain by Frege. When Mill’s and Frege’s doctrines are understood as complementary, they constitute a fully satisfactory theory of names.

Frege's thesis that each singular term has a sense that determines its reference and serves as its cognitive value has come to be widely doubted. Saul Kripke argued that since names are rigid designators, their referents are not determined by senses. David Kaplan has argued that the rigid designation of indexical terms entails that they also lack referent–determining senses. Kripke's argument about names and Kaplan's argument about indexical terms differ, but each contains a false premise. The referents of both names (...) and indexical terms are determined by reflexive senses. It is reflexive sense that makes these terms rigid designators. (shrink)

Frege's thesis that each singular term has a sense that determines its reference and serves as its cognitive value has come to be widely doubted. Saul Kripke argued that since names are rigid designators, their referents are not determined by senses. David Kaplan has argued that the rigid designation of indexical terms entails that they also lack referent–determining senses. Kripke's argument about names and Kaplan's argument about indexical terms differ, but each contains a false premise. The referents of both names (...) and indexical terms are determined by reflexive senses. It is reflexive sense that makes these terms rigid designators. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Every social order depends on a pathway to atonement for those who breach behavioral expectations. However, observers from a variety of fields now agree that the United States has entered an age of non-apology, where the two words “I’m sorry” simply cannot be said, particularly by powerful men facing allegations of sexual misconduct. This essay draws attention to, and comments upon, this trend. We first identify the sociopolitical factors that have inaugurated the era of non-apology, namely growing political polarization. (...) We then explain the consequences of this shift in societal expectations surrounding apology. This state of affairs, which associates genuine apology with emasculation and defeat, is harmful: it foments a toxic culture that will not allow redress for survivors of sexual assault and harassment; and it provides no answers to complex questions of how society can address the guilt of those who engage in sexual misconduct. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that Mill’s classification of names as nonconnotative terms is incompatible with Frege’s thesis that names have senses. However, Milldescribed the senses of nonconnotative terms—without being aware that he was doing so. These are the senses for names that were sought in vain by Frege. When Mill’s and Frege’s doctrines are understood as complementary, they constitute a fully satisfactory theory of names.