Although the d efinition of truth first proposed by Aristotle and maintained as the reference point for all succeeding views was situated in the intellective sphere of rationality/logos in the human unfolding, its validity, that is, the validity of the proposition fram ing it, and its verification reaches far below the logical sphere of a statement. Truth's validity reverberates down from the intellective sphere of the mind's rationality into the spheres of sense that sustain it, within the multiple spheres (...) of the network, of sense in\which; the logos of life projects its manifestation1 through living beings and whole world of life. To grasp the full significance of notions of truth we cannot stop at any one perspective or sphere, whether the cognitive, intertextual, or pragmatic. To understand what "truth" means we should elucidate it in its origin and nature, that is, in its generative significance for the entire expanse of life and in its role within the logoic schema of its dynamic manifesta tion. I propose to outline this in a succinct way in what follows. Truth will emerge as a crucial logoic device, as the regulative vortex for the ontopoietic balancing out of life's forces in their constructive course. (shrink)

According to some authors, Popper’s realism is blatantly incoherent mainly because of his commitment with the correspondence theory of truth and due to the fact that in his theory of cience is granted that, though the general aim of science is the search for truth, it might happen that a specific theory reaches that aim without us being able of knowing it. In this paper, I explain, briefly, the particularities of Popper’s realism, his views on truth as a regulative ideal (...) for science, and I show that, regardless the impossibility of establishing in a efinitive way that truth has been reached, there is no incoherence that endangers his project. In this way, I answer Cardenas and others’ criticisms against Popper’s realism and his views on the general aim of science, and I identify the sources from which this kind of misunderstanding springs. (shrink)

El autor revisa diferentes respuestas que se han dado a la definición de epistemología, destacando de ellas el proceso de reflexión del investigador, tanto individual, como en forma compartida.