It is somewhat striking that two interrelated elements of Hume's account of causation have received so little attention in the secondary literature on the subject. The first is the distinction of causation into the natural and the philosophical relations: Although many have tried to give accounts of why Hume presents two definitions of causality, it is often not clear in these accounts that the one definition is of causality as a natural relation and the other is of causality as (...) a philosophical relation, where to make the contrast between these two kinds of relations we need to give a naturalistic account of natural relations and a normative account of philosophical relations. (That Hume intends this to be the contrast will be defended in more detail below.) The second element is that, in many cases of our inferences from cause to effect, "we must follow our taste and sentiment" (A Treatise of Human Nature [T], 103), where the appeal to taste here, as in morality and aesthetics, is not to be understood as up to the individual. Rather, Hume makes it clear both in Book 3 of the Treatise and in "Of the Standard of Taste" that there are standards to which our individual judgments (in morality, aesthetics, or causality) must conform. My purpose in this paper is to attempt to provide an interpretation of Hume's account of causality that brings these two elements explicitly into the foreground. This interpretation is, to a greater extent than usual, a reconstruction of Hume's account of our causal inferences, drawing, as I have indicated above, from a range of texts not normally associated with Hume's discussion of causality. As such, this interpretation should be considered as exploratory in nature, perhaps focussing too single-mindedly on these two elements in an attempt to make out as strong a case as possible for their relevance in understanding Hume's account of causal inference. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:18 HUME AND THE STANDARD OF TASTE David Hume's critical theories, although fragmentary, have drawn increasingly serious attention in the twentieth century, yet even in 1976 Peter Jones, in reassessing Hume's aesthetics, can describe one of the most substantial of his critical essays, "Of the Standard of Taste," as underrated. Jones praises it as "subtle and highly complex," but while I agree with that judgment I also (...) find the essay quite puzzling. I am struck by certain features which look like structural weaknesses and by what seem to be inconsistencies, even contradictions, in Hume's argument. But perhaps the gravest difficulty facing interpretation of this essay is the irony which Hume seems to use, for this raises the question of just how seriously we are to take some of the more conventional views contained in "Of the Standard of Taste." I can begin to illustrate my uneasiness by considering Hume's use of a tall tale from Don Quixote, Part II, chapter xiii. Hume introduces this in a lighthearted way as part of his definition of delicacy of taste. It is the story of Sancho Panza's two kinsmen, who are such sensitive judges of wine that they can detect the taint of iron and leather imparted to a hogshead by the presence in it of a key on a thong. Now there are some interesting differences between Hume's version of this tale and the original. For example, where Hume has the two tasters deliberate over their wine before pronouncing it good, except for the slight taste of leather or iron, Cervantes says the first merely tried it with the tip of his tongue and the second just sniffed it, without tasting any at all. Further, Hume says "both 2 were ridiculed for their judgment," but there is no such 19 reaction mentioned in the original. Lastly, Hume calls the cause of the taint of iron "an old key," where 3 Cervantes describes it as "little." In short, while in the original interest is in the sensitivity of the taste of Sancho' s kinsmen for its own sake, Hume's emphasis is more on the relation of their taste to that of other people. He makes the procedure of tasting the wine as normal as possible and he gives prominence to the reactions of other people. Hume both tones down the more fabulous aspects of the story, making it less extraordinary and hence a better starting-point for a generalization about taste, and makes more explicit the conflict of opinion about the wine. He is using the story not just to define delicacy of taste but also to relate it to the problem of aesthetic judgment and the standard of taste. This is confirmed by the application Hume makes of his example. First, he uses the analogy between physical and aesthetic taste to claim that delicacy in both consists of the ability to detect minute effects and make fine discriminations. But the crucial question is what serves, like the key on the thong in the story, to confirm to outsiders that a man's aesthetic judgment is in fact more delicate than his neighbours'. Hume's answer is "the general rules of beauty... to produce these general rules or avowed patterns of composition is like finding the key with the leathern thong; which justified the verdict of Sancho' s kinsmen, and confounded those pretended judges who had condemned them" (273). But of course producing a general rule is not exactly like finding a physical key on a thong, and Hume's use of the word "avowed" here, which he repeats later, raises the difficulty of how the principles of art become accepted, and by whom. But, that apart, there is something odd about the discussion since the avowed principle is used, with support from examples, to 20 convince a bad critic that he is wrong, on the grounds that his judgment does not accord with the general judgment. This is the opposite of Sancho's story, in which his kinsmen were in a minority, derided, adds Hume, by the dull majority, and only vindicated by the discovery of the tainting key and thong. The aesthetic equivalent of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophy of Taste by Huanan GongChunpeng Hao (bio)Philosophy of Taste. By Huanan Gong. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2022. Pp. xii + 312. Paperback ¥59.00, isbn 978-7-108-07489-8. Postmodern thought in Western philosophy often criticizes the tradition of logocentrism and ocularcentrism. This tradition of philosophical observation can be found in Pythagoras' definition of the philosopher, who is a spectator as distinct from the sportsman and the (...) merchant in the Great Games. The attitude of observation reflects the logical, objective, and neutral characteristics of philosophy. Especially in Plato's philosophy we could find this objectified "observation" (p. 18). This tradition laid the foundation of Western philosophy. Since then, philosophy has developed "metaphysics," "ontology," "epistemology," "rationalism," "idealism," and other themes. However, if we examine the original meaning of the word "philosophy," it only refers to the "love" (philia) of "wisdom" (sophia). The Chinese "love of wisdom" is different from that of Western philosophers. Professor Gong Huanan's Philosophy of Taste is a work about "taste" and "Dao". It represents a different path from the ancient Greek philosophical tradition. In the book, Gong reveals how the Chinese use these three core concepts ("taste", "sense" and "xiang") to identify things, discuss nature, understand the Dao and live in the world, thus outlining a world of Chinese culture that is different from that of the West. He delves into the principles and rich meanings inherent in these fundamental concepts of Chinese philosophy, and then explores ways of reconstructing Chinese philosophy drawing on contemporary resources (p. 307). There are seven chapters in Philosophy of Taste. In Chapters 1 and 2, which offer a discussion on "taste," Gong gives a broad overview of the definition of "taste" and its scope in Chinese thought; Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the subject of "sense," which moves from taste to the relationship between the senses and the mind. Finally, in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the main discussion is on "xiang" (象, shape, appearance), where the author distinguishes between "xiang" and "form". "Xiang" in Chinese culture has no form, so it has little relevance to vision, and there is no Western ocularcentrism in China (p. 192). Gong also discusses expressions in the Chinese tradition that equate wisdom with sight and hearing, for example, cong ming 聪明 (intelligent, clever, bright), which is synonymous with wisdom, originally refers to good hearing and [End Page 1] good sight (p. 36). However, Chinese culture is diverse and not "monotheistic." There are many ways of attaining wisdom or the Dao, and Buddhism uses the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind as a method of practice to attain it (p. 19). For it is basically through the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, etc. that one receives information, and among them the sense of taste of the tongue is a viewpoint with Chinese characteristics. Chinese people are very fond of eating, but eating does not simply mean desire and unruliness--there is thought in it. As The Doctrine of the Mean or Zhongyong 中庸 says, "There is no body but eats and drinks. But they are few who can distinguish flavors" (p. 1). The Chinese word for "sense" (ganjue 感觉) has two parts, one is feel (gan 感) and another is awareness (jue 觉). Everyone has the ability to sense, but few have awareness. Only those who have both can know the truth. "Taste" seems to be closer to feeling and is an attribute of objects, of which there are several kinds, such as sour, sweet, bitter, and spicy. But it is not unrelated to the perceiver, for without the organ of perception, there would be no taste. This organ of taste reception is the tongue. In Chinese, "tongue" is also known as the root of the soul, or the opening of the mind (p. 25). The tongue and the mind work together to create the activity of the sense of taste. In short, the sense of taste is the unification of the attributes of things and the human mind in sensation. It is the same as knowing the Dao, which is in everything around us, but one needs to have a "heart" to discover it (p. 89). Gong holds that, in Chinese thought... (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgment Kant repeatedly points out that it is only the pleasure of taste that reveals to us the need to introduce a third faculty of the mind with its own a priori principle. In order to elucidate this claim I discuss two general principles about pleasure that Kant presents, the transcendental definition of pleasure from § 10 and the principle from the Introduction that connects pleasure with the achievement of an aim. Precursors of these (...) principles had been employed by Kant and others in empirical psychology. But how can such principles of empirical psychology be transferred to transcendental philosophy? I suggest that Kant accomplishes this by deriving the connection of pleasure with achievement of an aim from the transcendental definition and the assumption that faculties have interests. I finally reconstruct § 11 as a ‘regressive argument’ from the peculiarities of the pleasure of taste to the need to acknowledge a new faculty. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss Baumgarten’s neglected doctrine of taste. In particular I investigate his definition of taste as the judgment of the senses against the backdrop of the philosophical debate of his day, pointing out the biblical and classical sources of the idea of a judging aisthesis. In addition, I analyse the radical change that the definition of taste as the judgment of the senses brings about in the idea of both taste and (...) the judgment of the senses with regard to Wolff. Highlighting the link with the issue of analogon rationis and beauty, I conclude that the concept of taste is at the core of Baumgarten’s new aesthetic project. (shrink)

The paper deals with pure judgments of taste in Kant's aesthetics regarding the meaning they achieve due to the presence of the other subject. In his Critique of Judgment Kant defines the subject as a physical individual endowed with feelings, related not only to objects, but rather expanding this relation on the community of others. Therefore, the aesthetic relation to an object, which is the precondition of the pure judgment of taste, involves implicitly a recquirement on the subject (...) to renounce his narrow egoistic limitations. This is why the aesthetic relation corresponds to a whole series of ethical definitions. (shrink)

Our understanding of the sense of taste is largely based on research designed and interpreted in terms of the traditional four tastes: sweet, sour, salty, and bitter, and now a few more. This concept of basic tastes has no rational definition to test, and thus it has not been tested. As a demonstration, a preliminary attempt to test one common but arbitrary psychophysical definition of basic tastes is included in this article; that the basic tastes are unique (...) in being able to account for other tastes. This definition was falsified in that other stimuli do about as well as the basic words and stimuli. To the extent that this finding might show analogies with other studies of receptor, neural, and psychophysical phenomena, the validity of the century-long literature of the science of taste based on a few is called into question. The possible origins, meaning, and influence of this concept are discussed. Tests of the model with control studies are suggested in all areas of taste related to basic tastes. As a stronger alternative to the basic tradition, the advantages of the across-fiber pattern model are discussed; it is based on a rational data-based hypothesis, and has survived attempts at falsification. Such has found broad acceptance in many neural systems. (shrink)

In this paper, it is argued that only in the section on dialectic in the Critique of Judgment does Kant reach a definitive and conclusive version of deduction, after discovering the concept of the supersensible. In the section on the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant does not satisfactorily explain the critical distinction between the sensible nature of humanity and the supersensible nature of human reason presupposed in the concept of universal communicability. While the concept of the supersensible illustrates this (...) distinction, it is only through this concept that Kant that can justify the specific possibility of claiming subjective validity in taste. The priority of the solution found in the dialectic is illustrated not only by a comparative analysis of the two sections, but also by a historical reconstruction of the process of the formation of the work, which shows that the first formulation of the concept of validity coincides with the use of the concept of the supersensible. (shrink)

In this paper, it is argued that only in the section on dialectic in the Critique of Judgment does Kant reach a definitive and conclusive version of deduction, after discovering the concept of the supersensible. In the section on the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant does not satisfactorily explain the critical distinction between the sensible nature of humanity and the supersensible nature of human reason presupposed in the concept of universal communicability. While the concept of the supersensible illustrates this (...) distinction, it is only through this concept that Kant that can justify the specific possibility of claiming subjective validity in taste. The priority of the solution found in the dialectic is illustrated not only by a comparative analysis of the two sections, but also by a historical reconstruction of the process of the formation of the work, which shows that the first formulation of the concept of validity coincides with the use of the concept of the supersensible. (shrink)

Many of our deepest disagreements turn on matters of definition. Philosophers discuss the definitions of knowledge, art, truth, and freedom, and social and political questions about personhood, health and disease, marriage and gender are also commonly thought of as turning in part on definitions. This book contributes to our understanding of how we engage with questions and disagreements of this kind. It argues that disputes about matters of definition are not just about the meanings of words or our (...) concepts, and they do not typically involve change of meaning. Instead, it develops a conception of definition on which engaging in an investigation or a discussion helps determine the meanings of our words without changing them; what is determined is the meaning our words had all along. This temporal externalist view—that what happens at the end of our investigation or discussion can play a role in determining what we meant and thought throughout—puts us in a position to see why typical ways we engage with questions of definition make sense, and are not confused or in need of revision. The book develops this style of view in unprecedented detail and shows how it helps make sense not only of definitional disputes, but also of disagreements about matters of taste (such as discussions of whether a particular food is delicious, or a certain film is funny.) Its defencse of temporal externalism includes powerful new criticisms of competing philosophical views about verbal dispute, metalinguistic negotiation, inconsistent concepts, conceptual engineering, and relativism. (shrink)

Past research on folk aesthetics has suggested that most people are subjectivists when it comes to aesthetic judgment. However, most people also make a distinction between good and bad aesthetic taste. To understand the extent to which these two observations conflict with one another, we need a better understanding of people's everyday concept of aesthetic taste. In this paper, we present the results of a study in which participants drawn from a representative sample of the US population were (...) asked whether they usually distinguish between good and bad taste, how they define them, and whether aesthetic taste can be improved. Those who answered positively to the first question were asked to provide their definition of good and bad taste, while those who answered positively to the third question were asked to detail by what means taste can be improved. Our results suggest that most people distinguish between good and bad taste, and think taste can be improved. People's definitions of good and bad taste were varied, and were torn between very subjectivist conceptions of taste and others that lent themselves to a more objectivist interpretation. Overall, our results suggest that the tension Hume observed in conceptions of aesthetic taste is still present today. (shrink)

The author puts forward a set of assumptions and possible context for examining the connection between the concepts of enlightenment and taste. Kant?s definition of enlightenment is accepted, with special emphasis on the sphere of religion. Applying this criterion, we may discern a powerful and influential religious current stemming from strictly speaking Church circles that denies the systematic and historical significance of the opus of Dositej Obradovic, who in his time was a protagonist of the European enlightenment. Such (...) a revaluation has been accepted by the greater portion of the younger generation, which relies predominantly on the St. Sava Myth. With a change of worldview, undoubtedly, tastes change as well. The next section of the paper discusses the approach to taste of the Scottish philosopher David Hume representative of dispositional aesthetic. Finally it is argued that music as one of the arts, might be exemplary for appraising the condition of enlightenment in a society. U ovom radu autor je izlozio nekoliko pretpostavki, te moguci kontekst za ispitivanje veze izmedju pojmova prosvecenost i ukus. Prihvaceno je Kantovo odredjenje prosvecenosti, a s narocitim naglaskom na sferu religioznosti. Na osnovu takvog kriterijuma, moze se uociti da je u igri jedna vrlo snazna i uticajna verska struja - i to iz crkvenih krugova u najuzem smislu - koja porice sistematski i istorijski znacaj dela Dositeja Obradovica, svojevremeno protagoniste evropske prosvecenosti. Takvo prevrednovanje prihvatio je i veci deo mladje generacije insistirajuci prevashodno na Svetosavskom Predanju. S promenom pogleda na svet, nesumnjivo je da se menjaju i ukusi. Izlozeno je i shvatanje o ukusu skotskog filozofa Dejvida Hjuma, zatocnika dispozicionalne estetike. Kao jedna od umetnosti, muzika bi mogla biti egzemplarna za procenjivanje stanja prosvecenosti u nekom drustvu. (shrink)

“There’s no disputing about taste.” That’s got a nice ring to it, but it’s not quite the ring of truth. While there’s definitely something right about the aphorism – there’s a reason why it is, after all, an aphorism, and why its utterance tends to produce so much nodding of heads and muttering of “just so” and “yes, quite” – it’s surprisingly difficult to put one’s finger on just what the truth in the neighborhood is, exactly. One thing that’s (...) pretty clear is that what’s right about the aphorism, that there’s no disputing about taste, isn’t that there’s no disputing about taste. There’s heaps of disputing about taste. People engage in disputes about which movies, music, paintings, literature, meals, furniture, architectural styles, etc. are good, beautiful, tasty, fun, elegant, ugly, disgusting, etc. all the time. This is obvious to anyone who has watched dueling-movie-critics shows, read theater reviews, or negotiated with a group or partner about which movie or restaurant to go to, or which sofa or painting to put in the living room. It takes great care and good aim to fling a brick without hitting somebody who’s engaged in a dispute about taste. (shrink)

This book traces and explores the evolution of taste from a design perspective: what it is, how it works and what it does. Karin Tehve examines taste primarily through its recursive relationship to media. This ongoing process changes the relationship between designers and the public, and our understanding of the relationship of individuals to their social contexts. Through an analysis of taste, design is understood to be an active constituent of social life, not as autonomous from it. (...) This book reclaims a term long dismissed from interior design and unveils taste's role as a powerful social and political agent within systems of aesthetics, affecting both its producers and consumers. Each chapter discusses a taste concept or definition, analyzes its reciprocal relationship with media, and explores its implications for interior design. Illustrated with 70 images, taste's relationship to media is viewed through a variety of different lenses, including books, photography, magazines, internet, social media and algorithms. Written for students and scholars of interior design and related design fields, this book will be a helpful resource for all those interested in the question of taste, and is an invitation to produce and consume all media critically. (shrink)

By the eighteenth century, the term 'sublime' was used to communicate a sense of unfathomable and awe-inspiring greatness, whether in nature or thought. The relationship of sublimity to classical definitions of beauty was much debated, but the first philosopher to portray them as opposing forces was Edmund Burke. Originally published in 1757 and reissued here in the revised second edition of 1759, this influential treatise explores the psychological origins of both ideas. Presented as distinct consequences of very separate emotional lineages, (...) beauty and sublimity are traced back through a web of human feelings, from self-preservation instincts to lust. Burke's doctrine of the sublime was to have far-reaching effects. In Britain, it informed perceptions of landscape in art and literature for years to come. Meanwhile, on the continent, Kant regarded Burke as 'the foremost author' in 'the empirical exposition of aesthetic judgments'. (shrink)

Why has the labeled line versus across-fiber pattern debate of taste coding not been resolved? Erickson suggests that the basic tastes concept has no rational definition to test. Similarly, however, taste neuron types, which are fundamental to the across-fiber pattern concept, have not been formally defined, leaving this concept with no rational definition to test. Consequently, the two concepts are largely indistinguishable.

Americans have a long history of public arguments about taste, the uses of leisure, and what is culturally appropriate in a democracy that has a strong work ethic. Michael Kammen surveys these debates as well as our changing taste preferences, especially in the past century, and the shifting perceptions that have accompanied them. Professor Kammen shows how the post-traditional popular culture that flourished after the 1880s became full-blown mass culture after World War II, in an era of unprecedented (...) affluence and travel. He charts the influence of advertising and opinion polling; the development of standardized products, shopping centers, and mass-marketing; the separation of youth and adult culture; the gradual repudiation of the genteel tradition; and the commercialization of organized entertainment. He stresses the significance of television in the shaping of mass culture, and of consumerism in its reconfiguration over the past two decades. Focusing on our own time, Kammen discusses the use of the fluid nature of cultural taste to enlarge audiences and increase revenues, and reveals how the public role of intellectuals and cultural critics has declined as the power of corporate sponsors and promoters has risen. As a result of this diminution of cultural authority, he says, definitive pronouncements have been replaced by divergent points of view, and there is, as well, a tendency to blur fact and fiction, reality and illusion. An important commentary on the often conflicting ways Americans have understood, defined, and talked about their changing culture in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Erickson's conclusion that if basic tastes are not appropriate at one level, reference to labeled lines is inappropriate at any level, depends on matters of definition and scope. His population model mirrors Young's theory of color perception. However, there is evidence for distinct pathways to the cortex for two cone-opponent and one achromatic channel. Depending on the use made of key terms, sensory systems may display both across-fiber and labeled-line features.

This is the second volume in what will be a translation with full scholarly apparatus of the entire correspondence of St. Hildegard of Bingen. The translation follows Van Acker's definitive new edition of the Latin text, which is being published serially in Belgium by Brepols. As in that edition, the letters are organized according to the rank of the addressees. The first volume included ninety letters to and from the highest ranking prelates in Hildegard's world: popes, archbishops, and bishops. Volume (...) II comprises letters 91-217, in which Hildegard addresses lower-ranking spiritual leaders offering advice and consolation, and is particularly noteworthy for the correspondence with Guilbert of Gembloux, who provides a wealth of information about the saint and her spiritual gift. (shrink)

This is the second volume in what will be a translation with full scholarly apparatus of the entire correspondence of St. Hildegard of Bingen. The translation follows Van Acker's definitive new edition of the Latin text, which is being published serially in Belgium by Brepols. As in that edition, the letters are organized according to the rank of the addressees. The first volume included ninety letters to and from the highest ranking prelates in Hildegard's world: popes, archbishops, and bishops. Volume (...) II comprises letters 91-217, in which Hildegard addresses lower-ranking spiritual leaders offering advice and consolation, and is particularly noteworthy for the correspondence with Guilbert of Gembloux, who provides a wealth of information about the saint and her spiritual gift. (shrink)

The main aim of the thesis is to give a semantic account of implicit content – the kind of content that plays a crucial role in implicit communication. Implicit communication is a species of communication in which a speaker communicates certain contents that go over and above the contents retrievable from the linguistic meaning of the words used. The focus of the thesis is a certain kind of implicit communication involving locations (when sentences such as “It is raining” are used (...) to communicate that it is raining at a certain location) and judges (when sentences such as “Avocado is tasty” are used to communicate that avocado is tasty for a certain person, called “the judge”). The way the topic of implicit content is approached is via the notion, widespread in contemporary philosophy of language, of “unarticulated constituents”. The thesis contains an investigation of this notion, with the specific aim of disentangling the many senses it has been used and of providing a general definition of the notion. A direct product of this investigation is a partitioning of the logical space; three positions are then selected, which correspond to the main contenders in the current debate involving unarticulated constituents: truth-conditional semantics, truth-conditional pragmatics and relativism. The biggest part of the thesis is dedicated to investigating certain arguments that have surfaced in the debate between these positions, with the ultimate goal of proposing a relativist account of implicit content. The particular version of relativism offered consists in the combination of the claim that locations and judges are part of the circumstances of evaluation, rather than the content of utterances, with “the variadic functions approach” to certain natural language expressions. Also, several arguments against a truth-conditional semantic approach to predicates of personal taste are provided. (shrink)

"Alexander's commentary on Book 1 concerns the definition of Aristotelian syllogistic argument; its resistance to the rival Stoic theory of inference; and the character of inductive inference and of rhetorical argument. Alexander distinguishes inseparable accidents, such as the whiteness of snow, from defining differentiae, such as its being frozen, and considers how these differences fit into the schemes of categories. He speaks of dialectic as a stochastic discipline in which success is to be judged not by victory but by (...) skill in argument. Alexander also investigates the subject of ambiguity, which had been richly developed since Aristotle by the rival Stoic school."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

This paper challenges the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the job shows that the belief cannot be understood referentially, his ignorance of the coins in his pocket (...) shows that it cannot be understood attributively. An explanation for why Smith appeared to have justified true belief is given by distinguishing between 'belief' and 'belief in truth'. Smith believes the sentence 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' to be true (he mistakenly believes that Jones will get the job, of whom he knows that he has ten coins in his pocket) (hence his 'belief'), the sentence is true (hence 'truth'), and he has sufficient reason to assent to it (hence his 'justification'). But he does not believe the proposition expressed. Hence he does not know it either. (shrink)

This book analyses the use of the crucial concept of 'taste' in the works of five major seventeenth-century French authors, Méré, Saint Evremond, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère and Boileau. It combines close readings of important texts with a thoroughgoing political analysis of seventeenth-century French society in terms of class and gender. Dr Moriarty shows that far from being timeless and universal, the term 'taste' is culture-specific, shifting according to the needs of a writer and his social group. The (...) notion of 'taste' not only helped to shape a new dominant culture, but also registered the conflicts within that culture between a view of taste that presupposted the values of 'polite society' as an exclusive (though not necessarily aristocratic) group, and a view that stressed the value of the classical-humanist tradition as a source of standards ratified by a broader public. this study sheds light not only on the central concept, but also on the individual authors discussed and on the norms of French classical literature in general. (shrink)

The Greek astronomer and geometrician Apollonius of Perga produced pioneering written work on conic sections in which he demonstrated mathematically the generation of curves and their fundamental properties. His innovative terminology gave us the terms 'ellipse', 'hyperbola' and 'parabola'. The Danish scholar Johan Ludvig Heiberg, a professor of classical philology at the University of Copenhagen, prepared important editions of works by Euclid, Archimedes and Ptolemy, among others. Published between 1891 and 1893, this two-volume work contains the definitive Greek text of (...) the first four books of Apollonius' treatise together with a facing-page Latin translation. Volume 1 contains the first three books, with the editor's introductory matter in Latin. (shrink)

The Greek astronomer and geometrician Apollonius of Perga produced pioneering written work on conic sections in which he demonstrated mathematically the generation of curves and their fundamental properties. His innovative terminology gave us the terms 'ellipse', 'hyperbola' and 'parabola'. The Danish scholar Johan Ludvig Heiberg, a professor of classical philology at the University of Copenhagen, prepared important editions of works by Euclid, Archimedes and Ptolemy, among others. Published between 1891 and 1893, this two-volume work contains the definitive Greek text of (...) the first four books of Apollonius' treatise together with a facing-page Latin translation. Volume 2 contains the fourth book in addition to other Greek fragments and ancient commentaries, notably that of Eutocius, as well as the editor's Latin prolegomena comparing the various manuscript sources. (shrink)

The Greek astronomer and geometrician Apollonius of Perga produced pioneering written work on conic sections in which he demonstrated mathematically the generation of curves and their fundamental properties. His innovative terminology gave us the terms 'ellipse', 'hyperbola' and 'parabola'. The Danish scholar Johan Ludvig Heiberg, a professor of classical philology at the University of Copenhagen, prepared important editions of works by Euclid, Archimedes and Ptolemy, among others. Published between 1891 and 1893, this two-volume work contains the definitive Greek text of (...) the first four books of Apollonius' treatise together with a facing-page Latin translation. Volume 1 contains the first three books, with the editor's Latin introductory matter. Volume 2 contains the fourth book in addition to other Greek fragments and ancient commentaries, notably that of Eutocius. (shrink)

At the end of section §6 in the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant defines taste as the “faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest”. On the face of it, Kant’s definition of taste includes both; positive and negative judgments of taste. Moreover, Kant’s term ‘dissatisfaction’ implies not only that negative judgments of taste are those of the non-beautiful, but also that of the ugly, depending (...) on the presence of an actual displeasure. (shrink)

The definition of art is controversial in contemporary philosophy. Whether art can be defined has also been a matter of controversy. The philosophical usefulness of a definition of art has also been debated. -/- Contemporary definitions can be classified with respect to the dimensions of art they emphasize. One distinctively modern, conventionalist, sort of definition focuses on art’s institutional features, emphasizing the way art changes over time, modern works that appear to break radically with all traditional art, (...) the relational properties of artworks that depend on works’ relations to art history, art genres, etc. – more broadly, on the undeniable heterogeneity of the class of artworks. The more traditional, less conventionalist sort of definition defended in contemporary philosophy makes use of a broader, more traditional concept of aesthetic properties that includes more than art-relational ones, and puts more emphasis on art’s pan-cultural and trans-historical characteristics – in sum, on commonalities across the class of artworks. Hybrid definitions aim to do justice to both the traditional aesthetic dimension as well as to the institutional and art-historical dimensions of art, while privileging neither. (shrink)

Shaftesbury's Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times is a collection of treatises on interconnected themes in moral philosophy, aesthetics, literature, and politics. It was immensely influential on eighteenth-century British taste and manners, literature, and thought, and also onthe Continental Enlightenment. The author was a Whig, a Stoic, and a theist, whose commitment to political liberty and civic virtue shaped all of his other concerns, from the role of the arts in a free state to the nature of the beautiful (...) and the good.This is the first new edition of Shaftesbury's Characteristicks as a coherent collection for almost a century. A substantial Introduction discusses Shaftesbury's works and ideas in the context of his times, and traces the reception and influence of his writings through the eighteenth century andbeyond. A full and scholarly commentary is provided, as well as a complete textual apparatus. The very thorough Index is Shaftesbury's own.The text is essentially that of the first edition of 1711, as marked up with changes by Shaftesbury himself in preparation for the posthumous second edition of 1714; and the striking emblematic engravings he commissioned especially for the second edition are incorporated. (shrink)

The notion of lifestyle has recently attracted the attention of various scholars as a social science concept. For thousands of years, human beings attempted to realise and manage their lifestyles, and governments have tried to influence the lifestyles of their people. Nevertheless, the definition of lifestyle and its conceptualisation is relatively new. Lifestyle means the specific method of living of an individual, group or community. Lifestyles include a set of values, behaviours, moods and tastes that can refer to the (...) interests, opinions, behaviours and behavioural orientations of an individual, group or culture. The Islamic way of life follows a grand plan of behaviour according to which all life is a movement to get closer to God. This plan, however, is dynamic and always demands adjustment. In a desirable religious life, all actions and situations can be called worship. People's lifestyles and the path they choose for themselves are deeply related to their success in life. Therefore, the present study aimed to evaluate the effect of the Islamic lifestyle on the academic success of Russian Muslim students in 2021. In total, 2000 graduate students of Kazan, Russia were studied in this research. According to the results of mean analysis in SPSS, the academic success of the students who followed the Islamic lifestyle was reported to be higher than the mean level (more than 3 out of 5). Furthermore, according to the Structural Equation Modeling in LESREL, the Islamic lifestyle has a positive significant effect on the students' academic success (p-value: 0.83; t-value: 7.92). CONTRIBUTION: Amongst the various factors that can influence students' academic success, the current research focused on the Islamic lifestyle. The findings of the present study offered a new insight into the relationship between the Islamic lifestyle and academic success in Russia. (shrink)

The topics treated in The brain and emotion include the definition, nature, and functions of emotion (Ch. 3); the neural bases of emotion (Ch. 4); reward, punishment, and emotion in brain design (Ch. 10); a theory of consciousness and its application to understanding emotion and pleasure (Ch. 9); and neural networks and emotion-related learning (Appendix). The approach is that emotions can be considered as states elicited by reinforcers (rewards and punishers). This approach helps with understanding the functions of emotion, (...) with classifying different emotions, and in understanding what information-processing systems in the brain are involved in emotion, and how they are involved. The hypothesis is developed that brains are designed around reward-and punishment-evaluation systems, because this is the way that genes can build a complex system that will produce appropriate but flexible behavior to increase fitness (Ch. 10). By specifying goals rather than particular behavioral patterns of responses, genes leave much more open the possible behavioral strategies that might be required to increase fitness. The importance of reward and punishment systems in brain design also provides a basis for understanding the brain mechanisms of motivation, as described in Chapters 2 for appetite and feeding, 5 for brain-stimulation reward, 6 for addiction, 7 for thirst, and 8 for sexual behavior. Key Words: amygdala; brain evolution; consciousness; dopamine; emotion; hunger; orbitofrontal cortex; punishment; reward; taste. (shrink)

In theoretical work about the language of personal taste, the canonical example is the simple predicate of personal taste, 'tasty'. We can also express the same positive gustatory evaluation with the complex expression, 'taste good'. But there is a challenge for an analysis of 'taste good': While it can be used equivalently with 'tasty', it need not be (for instance, imagine it used by someone who can identify good wines by taste but doesn't enjoy them). (...) This kind of two-faced behavior systematically arises with complex sensory-evaluative predicates, including those with other appearance verbs, such as 'look splendid' and 'sound nice'. I examine two strategies for capturing these different uses: one that posits an ambiguity in appearance verbs, and one that does not. The former is in line with an approach to 'look'-statements prominent in work in philosophy of perception, and I consider how the motivation given in that tradition carries over to the present context. I then show how the data used to support the verbal ambiguity approach can equally be captured on the second strategy, which appeals only to independently-motivated flexibility in adjective meaning. I close by discussing some considerations that are relevant for choosing between the two options. (shrink)

There is an intimate relation between these two aspects of the judgment: the predictive judgment is certainly not a priori. It presupposes some antecedent judgment that the sugar in the spoon does taste sweet or that it did taste sweet. This does not necessarily presuppose the antecedent direct experience of tasting the sugar, for its antecedent could be an inferred judgment, or a communicated and believed judgment. But, on the other hand, neither is the produced judgment of an (...) experienced sweetness clearly a posteriori; for to determine that what was tasted is sweet involves a subtle interplay of expectation and antecedent definition of sweetness which is of the nature of the judgment event, and which is, broadly speaking, predictive. It would be terribly neat if predictions were clearly a priori and postdictions clearly a posteriori and both logical atomism and its correlate functional form, mechanism, would be able to build unassailable causal systems on such hard "givens.". (shrink)

Allison begins this book by observing that although the eighteenth century is often called the “age of reason,” it has also been called the “century of taste.” There is a clear enough connection, however, between the two names, for anyone with eyes open enough to see it. For the phenomenon of taste—of likings and dislikings conforming to sharable standards, and invited or sought from others precisely for the sake of sharing them universally—was recognized by eighteenth-century rationalists, and certainly (...) by Kant, as a necessary adjunct or perhaps even a precondition for universally valid judgments based on reason, about science or morality or politics. Taste was also seen by them as overcoming the division between reason and sensation, and thus of making human beings whole; it is a way for reason to gain access to people’s feelings and motives, hence a precondition for it to shape their conduct. For Kant, a critique of aesthetic judgment is the inquiry in which the “great gulf” between knowledge and practice, theoretical understanding and moral reason is to be overcome and philosophy itself is to be made whole. (shrink)

It has long been the habit of philosophers, and is still a common failing of ordinary playgoers, to see tragedy through the coloured spectacles of an acquired philosophical or religious outlook, and to commend or condemn rather from the standpoint of partiality for a certain view about life in general than from that of one assessing the intrinsic merits of a work of art. Because we all, whether laymen or specialists, theorize about the nature and destiny of that mysterious universe (...) which, for a brief span, our minds illumine, and because the working hypothesis so engendered is inevitably tinged by our personal idiosyncrasies of temperament and taste, there have been—and, building on such a foundation, there must be—almost as many different theoretical explanations of the tragic as theoreticians speculating on this high theme. Besides introducing that personal equation which has always been anathema to science, the distorted vision for which philosophical preconceptions are responsible brings with it minor illusions that are scarcely less injurious; the reading into a play or a novel of notions that had never entered the poet's brain, or the interpolation of history with incidents that never really occurred, the discarding of much that is genuinely tragic because it happens not to fit into the mould shaped by our own ideas, and the acceptance of much that is not merely untragic, but actually inartistic—pacifist, or communist, or feminist, or religious propaganda—because it happens to display the native hue of our own convictions. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;Kant's extensive discussion of the sublime has received scant attention. This neglect, indeed, is a general characteristic of the reception of Kant's aesthetics in the Anglo-American, and German traditions of philosophy in the twentieth century. The reasons behind it have been usefully summarised by Paul Guyer. ;My approach will be as follows. In Part One of this study , I shall first outline the sublime as it is understood (...) in sources available to Kant--notably the theories of Addison, and Burke. I will then trace how Kant adapts these approaches in his pre-Critical aesthetics, and how he goes beyond them by, in effect, stipulatively defining the sublime as a moral concept in his Critical ethics. In Part Two I will first set the scene for a consideration of Kant's mature theory of the sublime, by discussing how moral factors shape the overall strategy in The Critique of Judgement, and also figure in his account of the judgement of taste. I shall then go on to elaborate and critically review Kant's structures and sources of argument in those sections of the third Critique that deal with judgements of sublimity. In particular, I will argue that whilst his theory of sublimity does fit in well with the overall strategy of the third Critique, the pressures exerted upon it by the Critical ethics are such that he does not succeed in establishing the credentials of sublimity as an aesthetic concept. In Part Three , however, by using some of Kant's basic insights, I will hope to establish these credentials and to apply the theory so derived, to the work of art. I will then proceed to some more general conclusions. ;Considering the wide ground to be covered by this study, and the necessary limitations on its length, it will not be possible to give Kant's concepts and arguments the kind of extensive and finely detailed analysis which has been provided by Paul Guyer. I will be concerned, rather, to provide working definitions of Kant's major concepts, and to trace the broad development of his arguments. (shrink)

Definitions of terms that are central to a theoretical understanding of the Royal Government of Bhutan's policy of Gross National Happiness.

It is natural to suppose that honey tastes the way it does because it is sweet. Democritus, Plato and Aristotle all agree that this explanation is superficial and lacks causal depth; they attempt to explain gustatory phenomena by invoking explanatorily fundamental features of the world. As they work out their causal stories, do they give up on the common-sense explanation of why honey tastes the way it does? In other words, do they deny that sweetness and other sensible qualities are (...) causally efficacious features of the world around us? ;Our sources for Democritus' thinking on this issue present a problematic picture. On the one hand, Aristotle and Theophrastus suppose that Democritus wants to identify colors and flavors with causally efficacious features of the world around us. On the other hand, Theophrastus and others find Democritus defending the view that colors and flavors do not belong to the world around us. This tension, first pointed out by Theophrastus, is merely apparent, if, as certain texts suggest, Democritus distinguishes the colors and flavors which we experience from the colors and flavors which figure in his scientific explanations. ;In the Timaeus, Plato frequently says things like "What is capable of producing such and such effects on the gustatory region has the name 'bitter' thinspace". On Theophrastus' interpretation, Plato is offering definitions of the sensible qualities: flavors are identical with powers to produce certain physiological effects on the sense-organs. Theophrastus reasonably complains that sensible qualities will lack causal efficacy if they are identified with these powers of external objects, but Theophrastus' interpretation is mistaken: Plato is not defining the sensible qualities; he is fixing the reference of our sensible-quality terms. Recent historical work on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities has often emphasized the extent to which the authors of this distinction were motivated by an interest in supplanting prevalent, Peripatetic assumptions about the nature of sensible qualities, but Aristotle's theory does not differ significantly from that of Descartes: both identify colors with causally efficacious properties whose natures are revealed by scientific investigation. (shrink)

Plato’s definition of pleasure as perceptible replenishment of a lack has been criticized as too narrow and incapable of accounting for some of the corporeal and all the non-corporeal pleasures. Plato’s suggested reply, based on objective standards in relation to which we are to estimate the reality and degree of replenishment we experience, seems to give rise to another difficulty, concerning the legitimate diversity of our natural inclinations and tastes. I argue that Plato’sdefinition of pleasure makes perfect sense when (...) integrated in the horizon of his metaphysical presuppositions and that he is successful in reconciling the diversity of subjective tastes with his view of an ultimate objective hierarchy of value by appeal to the notion of the mean. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Communicative Implications of Kant’s Aesthetic TheoryThomas HoveIn recent discussions of aesthetic theory, critics who raise social, cultural, and political concerns have issued important challenges to the Kantian legacy. Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) continues to be widely regarded as one of the founding documents of modern aesthetic theory. But the arguments he laid out in that notoriously enigmatic work remain controversial on a variety of fronts. (...) One of those arguments concerns his distinction between pleasures that are beautiful and those that are agreeable. According to Kant’s definition, what makes experiences of the beautiful special is that they have a potentially communicable universal validity. By contrast, pleasures that are merely agreeable are incommunicable and remain confined to private sensation. Philosophers have found this distinction problematic for a variety of reasons. Their detailed commentaries have examined the intricate logical and conceptual difficulties that Kant’s theory raises (see Allison 2001; Guyer 1982, 1997, 2002; Kalar 2000; Wenzel 2005). On another front, sociologists and cultural critics—whom I will broadly refer to as “social critics”—typically raise concerns about the theory’s hidden social implications (Bourdieu 1984; Eagleton 1990; Smith 1988; Shumway 2005). Specifically, they question Kant’s proposal that judgments about the beautiful ought to have universal validity. Taking an external standpoint, they tend to regard aesthetic judgments either as the peculiar habits of [End Page 103] specific social classes, or as badges of hierarchical distinction, or as weapons in symbolic struggles for cultural dominance.To suggest why Kant’s theory is worth revisiting in the wake of such critiques, the following analysis defends his theoretical effort to distinguish the experience of the beautiful from that of the agreeable. This feature of his aesthetic theory highlights an alternative to the cognitive and practical concerns that social critics emphasize. In particular, I indicate how Kant’s aesthetic theory offers directions for the effort to explain how aesthetic experience promotes communicative sociability. By emphasizing this theme, I hope to supplement the rival emphasis that social critics place on the Kantian legacy’s elitist undercurrents. Social critiques characteristically overlook the affective type of sociability to which aesthetic experience gives rise. This oversight occurs because those critiques tend to privilege the theoretical and practical dimensions of communication. In the process, they disregard the special types of validity claims that are unique to aesthetic discourse. Following the lead of his academic precursors Meier and Baumgarten, Kant tried to define a possible third mental “faculty” that differs from cognitive and practical reason (see Henrich 1992, 31–36). But the difficulty of defining this third faculty, much less determining its existence, continues to vex both philosophers and communication theorists.Kant’s Account of Aesthetic Experience and Its CriticsIn the opening sections of the Critique of Judgment, Kant attempts to establish the independence of aesthetic judgment from theoretical and practical cognition. Those faculties are concerned with cognitive and moral concepts. By contrast, the aesthetic properties that concern taste judgments have a unique ontological and epistemological status. Kant’s argument about that status is itself enormously complex, involving as it does an intricate network of idiosyncratically defined concepts (for example, the understanding, the imagination, intuition, representations, objects, etc.). But to avoid getting lost in those intricacies, we can bracket them by simply referring to aesthetic “experience.” Also, we can concentrate on the two properties that distinguish aesthetic experience from other kinds of experience. First, aesthetic properties relate to the feelings of pleasure that are aroused by certain encounters with objects. Second, aesthetic properties are “merely subjective” (Kant 2000, 75). They do not have an objective status because we cannot associate the feelings they arouse with determinate concepts and objects. [End Page 104] As Miles Rind puts it, “in making a cognitive judgment one requires everyone to conceptualize an object in a certain way, while in making a judgment of taste one requires others to share one’s liking for an object” (Rind 2000, 83). In sum, Kant differentiates aesthetic judgment from both theoretical and practical cognition because it is radically subjective and because its unique grounding lies in feelings of pleasure and displeasure.Social critics tend to downplay the idea that there... (shrink)