Providing a precise definition of “religion”—or an analysis in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions of the concept of religion—has proven to be a difficult task, more so in light of the diverse types of practices considered religious by scholars. Here, I discuss Kevin Schilbrack’s recent definition of “religion”, elaborate it and raise several objections, one of which is based on a specific theory in philosophy of mathematics: mathematical realism.

This article counters the widespread view within the study of religion that a real definition of religion should be avoided. It argues that an essentialist approach is not necessarily as contentious as is often assumed and that alternatives to essentialist definitions are less well-founded than they may appear. The article opens with an outline of different types of definitions and a discussion of common concerns. It goes on to present a starting point for providing a real (...) class='Hi'>definition and ends with the suggestion that a real definition would be a valuable tool both academically and practically. (shrink)

In 2014, I published a proposal for a definition of “religion”. My goal was to offer a definition of this contentious term that would include Buddhism, Daoism, and other non-theistic forms of life widely considered religions in the contemporary world. That proposal suggested necessary and sufficient conditions for treating a form of life as a religious one. It was critiqued as too broad, however, on the grounds that it would include the study of math as a (...) class='Hi'>religion. How can one include forms of life based on non-theistic realities without including math? In this paper, I show the flaw in the previous definition and the weaknesses of two attempts to evade that flaw, before recommending a shift, first, to a Wittgenstein-inspired polythetic definition of “religion” and, second, to a certain kind of polythetic definition that I call “anchored”. (shrink)

In this article the author has presented several important issues regarding the sociology of religion, but primarily the issue of the sociologically acceptable definition of religion both in theoretical and empirical research. Bearing in mind the sociology of religion in former Yugoslavia the author has first discussed the possibility of a general definition of the sociology of religion, but has stated the opposite view as well. Then he has dealt with the two basic approaches (...) towards religion and two general definitions of sociology, namely substantial and functional ones. Finally the author has tried to define the religiousness in terms of sociological empirical research of human attachment to religion and church in post-socialism. U ovom clanku autor izlaze nekoliko osnovnih problema u sociologiji religije a prvenstveno problem oko socioloski prihvatljive definicije religije, i to ne samo za teorijska nego iza iskustvena istrazivanja. Imajuci na umu sociologiju religije bivse SFRJ, na prvom mestu se razmatra mogucnost opste definicije religije, ali se iznosi i suprotno stanoviste. Potom se diskutuje o dva temeljna pristupa religiji i o dve opste definicije religije supstantivnoj i funkcionalistickoj. Na kraju se definise religioznost u kontekstu socioloskog iskustvenog istrazivanja vezanosti ljudi za religiju i crkvu u post socijalizmu.. (shrink)

On the Definition of Religion in Hobbes’ Leviathan It has long been a controversial topic whether Hobbes was an atheistic philosopher or a sincere Christian. A clear understanding of the issue requires an investigation into Hobbes’ view of religion. This paper tends to provide such an examination. First, it analyses the legal point of view by which Hobbes distinguishes religion from superstition. Secondly, it examines the two elements by which Hobbes defines religion: fear and power. (...) Thirdly, it explores what true religion is for Hobbes. Fourthly, after dealing with Hobbes’ rational theology, it raises certain questions about difficulties and contradictions in Hobbes’ definition of religion and true religion. Fifthly and finally, drawing on the double teaching theory and taking the purpose of Hobbes’ political theory into account, it concludes that there is a double doctrine in Hobbes on the one hand and, on the other hand, Hobbes desires to publicize the esoteric philosophic teaching in accordance with the purpose of his political philosophy, i.e. with the pursuit of a rational and free world state. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the definition of religion. This definition is developed within a context which recognizes the impossibility of value-neutrality in the definition of words. The definition proposed is applied to three complex borderline cases: Spinozism, Marxism,and economism or free-market ideology.

This essay is concerned with the definition of religion. This definition is developed within a context which recognizes the impossibility of value-neutrality in the definition of words. The definition proposed is applied to three complex borderline cases: Spinozism, Marxism,and economism or free-market ideology.

In this contribution, I deal firstly with the problem of whether ‘religion’ can actually be defined. My answer is twofold. Firstly, that such a definition must indeed be deemed to be extremely un-like¬ly, if not downright impossible. Secondly, however, that definition also has more modest uses which may turn definitions of religion, that have shed this universalist ambition, into quite useful tools in the academic study of religions. In the second section, I shall address the question (...) of why, if a definition of religion turned out to be merely a useful research tool, one should bother to define ‘religion’ at all. My answer will be that one may indeed well dispense with it, but that, despite its very modest usefulness, it would still be unwise to do so. In my third section, I shall discuss these modest uses of definitions of religion, as well as their strategic implications. In the fourth and last section, I shall discuss the operational, or instrumental, definition of ‘religion’ which I have developed for my particular line of studies as an illustration of the pur¬poses which a definition of religion may serve in the academic study of religions. (shrink)

A brief handout summarizing Andrew Lang's criticisms of Frazer.

The only complete study of Buber as a political thinker. Shed new light upon Buber's I Thou, while also attempting to understand Buber's Zionist thought and activity in a new and fresh manner.

Did Chinese mysticism vanish after its first appearance in ancient Taoist philosophy, to surface only after a thousand years had passed, when the Chinese had adapted Buddhism to their own culture? This first integrated survey of the mystical dimension of Taoism disputes the commonly accepted idea of such a hiatus. Covering the period from the Daode jing to the end of the Tang, Livia Kohn reveals an often misunderstood Chinese mystical tradition that continued through the ages. Influenced by but ultimately (...) independent of Buddhism, it took forms more various than the quietistic withdrawal of Laozi or the sudden enlightenment of the Chan Buddhists. On the basis of a new theoretical evaluation of mysticism, this study analyzes the relationship between philosophical and religious Taoism and between Buddhism and the native Chinese tradition. Kohn shows how the quietistic and socially oriented Daode jing was combined with the ecstatic and individualistic mysticism of the Zhuangzi, with immortality beliefs and practices, and with Buddhist insight meditation, mind analysis, and doctrines of karma and retribution. She goes on to demonstrate that Chinese mysticism, a complex synthesis by the late Six Dynasties, reached its zenith in the Tang, laying the foundations for later developments in the Song traditions of Inner Alchemy, Chan Buddhism, and Neo-Confucianism. (shrink)

In the chapter about the religion of art Hegel differentiates between four ways of integrating the Absolute: 1. integration though statues of gods, 2. integration through language, 3. integration through a religious cult, mysteries and festivities, 4. integration through the higher language of tragedy. Integration is conducted by the artist – the spirit is an artist. Still, it was demonstrated that these attempts of integration fail. Only one using speculative philosophy can succeed where the artist cannot: unity with the (...) Absolute. Integration, which was presented by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and translated through different forms of the religion of art and the appropriation of the Absolute, leads to a point where the Absolute vanishes: at first the man uses it as a “cleaner, a house and in the feast of its victim“. Then, the inner being of the Absolute is consummated “in the mystery of bread of wine” and, finally, annihilated in the laughter of a comedy. The artist, an integrator of the Absolute in the life of the people, is at last so successful that the relationship is reversed: it is, finally, the true selfness, which rises as the master over the Absolute. The integration of the Absolute fails due to the hypocrisy of the artist’s work. The road the artist walks on, prepares the ground for uncovering an obvious religion and, thus, indirectly, for an appearance of speculative philosophy. (shrink)

It is often thought that materialism about themind can be clarified using the concept of supervenience. But there is a difficulty. Amaterialist should admit the possibility ofghosts and thus should allow that a world mightduplicate the physical character of our worldand enjoy, in addition, immaterial beings withmental properties. So materialists can't claimthat every world that is physicallyindistinguishable from our world is alsomentally indistinguishable; and this is wellknown. What is less understood are thedifferent ways that immaterial add-ons can maketrouble for supervenience-theoreticformulations (...) of materialism. In this paper, Ishall present a problematic kind of add-on thathas been ignored and look at threesupervenience-theoretic attempts to formulatematerialism in that light. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an increasing amount of studies of the history of the term “religion” and how it figures in conceptions of “the secular” and of cultural differences generally. A recurrent theme in these studies is that “religion” carries associations with Protestant Christianity and thus is not as universal a category as it might appear. The aim of this paper is to explore some resources in Wittgenstein’s philosophy to obtain greater clarity about the contexts of ascription of (...) religion-status to various phenomena and thus to gain perspective on claims made by scholars who investigate the genealogy of the term. While there is good reason to be circumspect about uncritical use of the term “religion” (no less in philosophizing about religions or conducting interreligious dialogue), I argue that instead of abandoning the term or proffering a critical theory of religion, investigation of ascriptions of religion will help philosophers to perceive more clearly the social dynamics that have led to some- one or thing being called religious and thus avoid equivocations that could obstruct the ends of philosophical inquiry or dialogue. (shrink)

PeterKevern believes that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) provides a justification for the idea of spiritual care in the health services. In this paper, I suggest that he is mistaken on two counts. First,CSRdoes not entail the conclusionsKevern wants to draw. His treatment of it consists largely of nonsequiturs. I show this by presenting an account ofCSR, and then explaining whyKevern's reasons for thinking it rescues ‘spirituality’ discourse do not work. Second, the debate about spirituality‐in‐health is about classification: (...) what shall count as a ‘spiritual need’ and what shall count as ‘spiritual care’. It is about the politics of meaning, an exercise in persuasive definition. The function of ‘spirituality’ talk in health care is to change the denotation of ‘spiritual’, and attach its indelibly religious connotations to as many health‐related concepts and practices as possible.CSR, however plausible it may be as a theory of the origins and pervasiveness of religious belief, is irrelevant to this debate. (shrink)

The contributors to this volume were asked the following questions: The term "Humanism" is widely used, as are the terms "ethical" Humanism, "scientific" Humanism and "religious" Humanism. What is Humanism? Can you define it? If there is in your judgment no clear definition in the literature, you may wish to propose one. You may also wish to focus on the relationship of Humanism to atheism, science, its ethical position, or some other theme. Those who have contributed represent a wide (...) spectrum of Humanist opinion in the world today. They are primarily philosophers, psychologists, social scientists, ethical and religious leaders. Among the themes they discuss are historic roots of Humanism, the general problem of definition, the relationship of Humanism to ethics and morality, Humanism and religion, Humanism and atheism and Humanism on the world scene. Most of the varieties of Humanism are represented, including naturalistic Humanism, liberal Humanism, atheistic Humanism, humanistic psychology, behaviourism, Marxism, and Zen. If there is a common thread running throughout this volume, it is the conviction that Humanism is committed to the method of reason as the chief means of solving problems and the belief that mankind can survive and humans can enjoy a significant life. This conviction and this belief, however, can be realized only if men continue to have confidence in their own natural powers and abilities and the courage to use them. (shrink)

The paper presents, according to the dialectical metaphysics of choice, arguments in favor of the proposition that the biblical story of creation is a philosophical construct, within which the religious message (obedience, disobedience, sin) is abrogated in the philosophical perspective of the Absolute (equality of the subjects in the definition of good and evil); it has been stated that the story of creation contains an antinomian perception of God as a symbol of man (both a hierarchical and non-hierarchical relationship (...) between the parties, the latter being preferred and ascribed the status of a “divine image”); the paper proposes that the Old Testament is a literary work, rather than religious scripture, and contains a broad range of cultural experience, including elements of a philosophical outlook, which religion and theology subject to a simplified and biased interpretation, groundlessly universalizing a traditional culture based on domination andobedience. (shrink)

In this text, Bataille clarifies his idea of the ‘excluded part’, i.e. that which is left behind by science. Bataille seeks to create an approach that would challenge the abstracted method of science, which presents the world as idealized and homogeneous. The aim of Bataille’s ‘science of the heterogeneous’ is to shed light on the unproductive expenditure of life, which moves between the sacred and the unclean. In pursuing this, he debunks the common idea that what is profane is already (...) impure and vice versa. This text is notable for the new vocabulary that Bataille introduces in order to define heterology. Terms like heterodoxy, agiology and scatology rehabilitate the ideas of the unclean and the profane by structuring them in a new discourse, in which the excluded part is taken as the foundation for the new science of the impossible. Finally, the text shows how Bataille articulates this new science through providing examples largely from the study of religion and psychoanalysis. (shrink)

This paper understands Hodgson’s Hegel and Christian Theology not only to represent the definitive expression of a distinguished Hegel scholar’s theological interpretation, but also to mark a threshold between where Hegel studies have been on the topic of the relation between religion and philosophy in Hegel’s thought and where they are going. On the threshold, Hodgson’s text faces three essential challenges with respect to its bona fides. The first challenge is whether, even if the privileged status of the Lectures (...) on the Philosophy of Religion is granted, anything like consensus has been achieved concerning the importance of narrative and Trinity, on the one hand, and its claim to truth, on the other. The second challenge concerns method, and more specifically whether the teleological model deployed by Hodgson to underwrite the importance of the Lectures is sufficiently reflective to resist the rising authority of archeological accounts which privilege Hegel’s Phenomenology and pre-Phenomenology writings. The third challenge concerns the stability of Hodgson’s interpretation which tends to mediate between the religious and the political, on the one hand, and the non-logical and the logical, on the other. This is by far the most serious concern since it pertains to Hodgson’s act of synthesis. Here it is open to question whether Hodgson has succeeded here anymore than Fackenheim a generation earlier. (shrink)

Carol P. Christ discusses her new multi-pronged definition of patriarchy as an integral system: male dominance is enforced by violence which is a product of war; the control of female sexuality ensures the transfer private property and slaves which are the spoils of war in the male line; and the system as a whole is legitimated by religion. She argues, based on the new research on matriarchies that patriarchy is not eternal or universal, but that it arose in (...) history, and is inseparable from the rise of warfare and other forms of domination. (shrink)

In a recent article, Ireneusz Zieminski argues that the main goals of philosophy of religion are to define religion; assess the truth value of religion and; assess the rationality of a religious way of life. Zieminski shows that each of these goals are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Hence, philosophy of religion leads to scepticism. He concludes that the conceptual tools philosophers of religion employ are best suited to study specific religious traditions, rather than (...) religion more broadly construed. But it’s unclear whether the goals Zieminski attributes to philosophy of religion are accurate or even necessary for successful inquiry. I argue that an essentialist definition of religion isn’t necessary for philosophy of religion and that philosophers of religion already use the conceptual analysis in the way Zieminski suggests that they should. Finally, the epistemic standard Zieminski has in view is often obscure. And when it is clear, it is unrealistically high. Contemporary philosophers of religion rarely, if ever, claim to be offering certainty, or even evidence as strong as that found in the empirical sciences. (shrink)

List of Contributors vi Introduction vii 1 A New Definition of ”Omnipotence’ in Terms of Sets 1 Daniel J. Hill 2 Can God Choose a World at Random? 22 Klaas J. Kraay 3 Why is There Anything at All? 36 T. J. Mawson 4 Programs, Bugs, DNA and a Design Argument 55 Alexander R. Pruss 5 The ”Why Design?’ Question 68 Neil A. Manson 6 Divine Command Theory and the Semantics of Quantified Modal Logic 91 David Efird 7 Divine (...) Desire Theory and Obligation 105 Christian B. Miller 8 The Puzzle of Prayers of Thanksgiving and Praise 125 Daniel Howard-Snyder 9 A Participatory Model of the Atonement 150 Tim Bayne and Greg Restall 10 Basic Human Worth: Religious and Secular Perspectives 167 Christopher J. Eberle 11 Imperfection as Sufficient for a Meaningful Life: How Much is Enough? 192 Thaddeus Metz Index 215. (shrink)

"Spiritual well-being" was coined in 1971 and has since become a popular concept in modern psychology studies. Multidimensional investigations covering the concept's structure, theoretical foundations, interaction areas, and development, on the other hand, have been limited. In response to this scarcity, the research aims to examine the concept of "spiritual well-being" from all of these perspectives. It also seeks to provide a new definition of "spiritual well-being." Another contribution of the study to the "spiritual well-being" literature is that it (...) attempts to explain the framework and theoretical basis of the term. This study was mostly based on an analysis of relevant literature. Literature data on how the thought began and developed were gathered for this purpose. The semantical relationship between "well-being" and "spirituality" is investigated. Following that, the concept's content, areas of interaction, approaches, and theoretical foundations with which it is closely associated were defined as well as the concept's relationship with spirituality was stressed. Some works in the subject's literature have also been analytically evaluated, with a particular emphasis on their contributions to the enhanced relationship of "spiritual well-being" with other domains, as well as the conceptualization process of it. The research findings characterize spiritual well-being as the acquisition of well-being from spiritual areas to which individuals related. The contributions of spirituality to "well-being" underline the significance of "spiritual well-being" in the Psychology of Religion. "Spiritual well-being" is a concept used to determine the original reflections and good effects of these contributions on individuals, as well as to measure various types of "well-being.". (shrink)

In this article it is argued that the apparent vagueness and broadness of the concept ‘spirituality’ and the difficulty in finding an agreeable definition for it are related to the different meanings of the concept within different intellectual and religious contexts and, subsequently, to different valuations of spirituality in relation to religion and lived religiosity. This article also examines the concept spirituality in the context of the psychology of religion’s historical entanglement with theology. On the one hand, (...) the psychology of religion has emancipated itself from theological discourse and theological institutions. On the other hand, the psychology of religion is still closely connected to a modernist theological project of founding religiousness in a province of the mind that resists religious critique of traditional contents and institutional structures in a secular era. The author pleas for more differentiation between theistic and non-theistic dimensions of the concept spirituality. (shrink)

Anselm defines free will as “the ability to keep uprightness of will for the sake of uprightness itself ” rather than as the ability to sin or not sin. I fulfill two objectives pertaining to his definition. First, I show that his definition should be interpreted as a hierarchical account of free will, one that emphasizes the idea that an agent’s will is free if she is able to have the will she wants to have. The interpretationis based (...) on Anselm’s hierarchical account of the structure of the will. Secondly, I show that Anselm’s theory of ultimate responsibility, when added to the hierarchical interpretation of his definition, provides an answer to one of the primary objections to the hierarchical approach to free will. (shrink)

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} This article aims to examine the phenomenon of social services in post-1989 Romania, underscoring the role of the religious factor in the establishment and operation of nongovernmental organisations active in the area of family and child protection/child welfare. The results are based on empirical data collected from interviews with representatives (...) of NGO-s in Iaşi that correspond to the profile of faith-based organisations and which have been included in the list of accredited providers of social services. We used an assessment grid that allowed us to highlight a number of specific characteristics to the Romanian space, found among faith-based organisations involved in the development of social and medical services. One direction that Romanian organisation took was to dilute in time the religious message and to secularise their practices under the influence of the Orthodox majority, as well as following the requirements imposed by secular donors and especially by public ones. The channelling of private resources donated to religious cults predominantly towards building and restoring establishments (churches, monasteries) rather than towards the development of social faith-based programmes aimed at vulnerable populations has caused in faith-based organisations a high level of dependency on secular donors. The process in which the practices and the discourse are secularised is accompanied by a trend towards the fragmentation of the Christian-based civil society. (shrink)

Editor's introduction to the Bulletin for the Study of Religion 44.4 (2015): -/- Specifically, this introduction presents a panel of appears responding to Caroline Schaffalitzky de Muckadell's JAAR article on essentialist definitions of religion, an Open Letter to the AAR from Kat Daley-Bailey (and comments on the problems facing adjunct faculty with regard to the AAR annual meeting), a standalone article by Joseph Laycock on the Irving, Texas controversy Ahmed Ahmed Mohamed’s homemade clock (taken as a bomb threat), (...) an interview with the editors of the Practicum blog, and finally an Editor's Corner announcement with comment on a new subscription arrangement with NAASR. (shrink)

This chapter is devoted to Liang’s discussion of religion, mostly based on the works of his early period (1919–1949). It explains first the debates about the definition of the new concept of religion in China at that time, and shows the originality of Liang’s approach, especially in distinguishing religion from the issue of national salvation. The chapter proceeds next in discussing the three types of religions, Christianity, Confucianism and Buddhism, found respectively in the three cultures of (...) the West, China and India, showing the specificity of each type: Christianity as a social religion which fulfills collective needs but is unable to answer the deepest aspiration of the individuals; Confucianism as an ethical religion which strikes a right balance between the needs of the group and the individuals; Buddhism as the true religion which through its philosophical method allows individuals to reach transcendence. In the last section, the legacy and relevance for today of Liang’s philosophy of religion are discussed. (shrink)