This chapter contains section titled: Preamble to contributive justice Justice is about contribution A conception of contributive justice Can contribution be normatively motivated? Contributive justice and coercion Contributive norms are supportable Some problems A fuller theory Marxism, race, and opportunity.

Extreme inequality of opportunity leads to a number of social tensions, inefficiencies and injustices. One issue of increasing concern is the effect inequality is having on people’s fair chances of attaining meaningful work, thus limiting opportunities to make a significant positive contribution to society and reducing the chances of living a flourishing life and developing their potential. On a global scale we can observe an increasingly uneven provision of meaningful work, raising a series of ethical concerns that need detailed examination. (...) The aim of this article is to explore the potential of a normative framework based upon the idea of contributive justice to defend a fairer provision of meaningful work. (shrink)

The dominant focus of thinking about economic justice is overwhelmingly distributive, that is, concerned with what people get in terms of resources and opportunities. It views work mainly negatively, as a burden or cost, or else is neutral about it, rather than seeing it as a source of meaning and fulfilment—a good in its own right. However, what we do in life has at least as much, if not more, influence on whom we become, as does what we get (...) . Thus we have good reason also to be concerned with what Paul Gomberg has termed contributive justice , that is, justice as regards what people are expected and able to contribute in terms of work. Complex, interesting work allows workers not only to develop and exercise their capacities, and gain the satisfaction from achieving the internal goods of a practice, but to gain the external goods of recognition and esteem. As Gomberg’s analysis of the concept of contributive justice in relation to equality of opportunity shows, as long as the more satisfying kinds of work are concentrated into a subset of jobs, rather than shared out among all jobs, then many workers will be denied the chance to have meaningful work and the recognition that goes with it. In this paper I examine the contributive justice argument, suggest how it can be further strengthened, arguing, inter alia, that ignoring contributive injustice tends to support legitimations of distributive inequality. (shrink)

In The Myth of Ownership, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel argue that achieving fairness in taxation is principally a matter of distributive justice. Distributive justice can be understood as being concerned with what is owed to people as a matter of justice. For Nagel and Murphy, fairness in tax schemes is subsumed to the question of distributive justice: fairly allocated tax liabilities are just those that are compatible with the preferred theory of distributive justice. Subsuming (...) assessments of tax fairness to distributive justice, however, overlooks the following possibility: that the question of how we ought to divvy up tax liabilities, and the burdens associated with running a society more generally, requires different, non-distributive considerations of justice. These are considerations of justice that aren’t essentially about distributive justice at all. I argue here that the division of burdens in a society is specifically a matter of contributive justice. Contributive justice is concerned with what people owe as a matter of justice, rather than what is owed to them. It makes the division of burdens itself evaluative salient in assessments of fairness. Even a comprehensive specification of distributive justice leaves indeterminate how the burdens of running a society should be fairly divided up. Each of the chapters in this dissertation develops one part of an account of contributive justice. I first make conceptual space for an account of contributive justice. By taking Murphy and Nagel’s lead, and working within the post-distribution, a distinctive need for principles of justice in contribution can be shown. Murphy and Nagel decline to introduce non-distributive principles for guiding the provision of post-distributive public goods. Instead, they favor efficiency in determining the provision of post-distributive of public goods. I show that contributive justice is genuinely distinct from both efficiency and distributive justice. I also identify one respect in which principles of contributive justice should bear: that of determining the financing and delivery and civic cultural public goods. I then argue that a principle of contribution in accordance with ability (a principle of “ability-to-pay”, or “ability-to-contribute”, for short) stands out as a candidate principle of contributive justice. The version of ability-to-pay that I defend is, in particular, a deontic principle of ability-to-pay. I show that a deontic principle of ability-to-pay is more closely allied with a view of society as a cooperative enterprise than utilitarian versions of ability-to-pay. An account of ability to contribute is developed by grafting a notion of opportunity cost onto Amartya Sen’s capability theory. Lastly, I incorporate contributive justice in an account of contributive legitimacy. Contributive legitimacy gives us a set of conditions under which the state’s use of coercive force to extract tax contributions is legitimate, and hence justified. Drawing on empirical evidence from the development and fiscal sociology literature, I show that contributive legitimacy in a state’s tax extraction practices is essential to rule of law, and the avoidance of kleptocratic authoritarianism. Contributive legitimacy supplements our understanding of conventional notions of political legitimacy and helps us identify possible failures of political legitimacy. These are failures that might be overlooked were we to focus solely on distribution. (shrink)

This critical examination of racial equality takes a new approach to breaking down racial barriers by proposing a system of equal opportunity through shared labor and contributive justice. Focuses on how race and class inevitably structure vastly unequal life prospects Shows how human society can be organized in a way that does not socialize children for lives of routine labour Looks towards contribution, not distribution, as a way to promote racial equality Argues that by sharing routine and complex (...) labor, social relationships would be transformed, eliminating competition for limited opportunities to develop and contribute abilities A discussion board for ideas and comments relating to the book can be found at: http://howtomakeopportunityequal.blogspot.com/. (shrink)

Distributive justice, defined as justice in distribution of income and wealth, is impossible. Income and wealth are distributed either unequally or equally. If unequally, then those with less are unjustly subject to social contempt. But equal distribution is impossible because it is inconsistent with bargaining to advance our own good. Hence justice in distribution of income and wealth is impossible. More generally, societies where social relations are mediated by money are necessarily unjust, and Marx was wrong to (...) think a socialist society which retained money would lead to communism. Contributive justice proposes that each flourishes by advancing the flourishing of others. To achieve this goal all labor, both simple and complex, must be shared among all capable of doing it. The good of contributing our abilities to benefit others is then available to all non-competitively. (shrink)

Agroecology has been criticized for being more labor-intensive than other more industrialized forms of agriculture. We challenge the assertion that labor input in agriculture has to be generally minimized and argue that besides quantity of work one should also consider the quality of work involved in farming. Early assessments on work quality condemned the deskilling of the rural workforce, whereas later criticisms have concentrated around issues related to fair trade and food sovereignty. We bring into the discussion the concept of (...) contributive justice to welcome the added labor-intensity of agroecological farming. Contributive justice demands a work environment where people are stimulated to develop skills and learn to be productive. It also suggests a fairer distribution of meaningful work and tedious tasks. Building on the notion of contributive justice we explore which capabilities and types of social relationships are sustainably promoted and reinforced by agroecological farming practices. We argue that agroecological principles encourage a reconceptualization of farm work. Farmers are continuously stimulated to develop skills and acquire valuable experiential knowledge on local ecosystems and agricultural techniques. Further, generalized ecological studies recognize the significance of the farmer’s observations on natural resources management. This contributes to the development of a number of capabilities and leads to more bargaining power, facilitating self-determination. Hereby farm work is made more attractive to a younger generation, which is an essential factor for safeguarding the continuity of family farms. (shrink)

The author contributes debate to the distributive injustices such as low pay, inferior healthcare and housing, as well as diminished opportunities in schools, which continue to blight the lives of millions of urban poor in America and beyond.

The author contributes debate to the distributive injustices such as low pay, inferior healthcare and housing, as well as diminished opportunities in schools, which continue to blight the lives of millions of urban poor in America and beyond.

Several prominent cases have recently highlighted tension between the interests of individuals and those of the broader population in gaining access to health care resources. The care of Helga Wanglie, an elderly woman whose family insisted on continuing life support long after she had lapsed into a persistent vegetative state, cost approximately $750,000, the majority of which was paid by a Medi-gap policy purchased from a health maintenance organization. Similarly, Baby K was an anencephalic infant whose mother, believing that all (...) life is precious regardless of its quality, insisted that the hospital where her daughter was born provide mechanical ventilation, including intensive care, whenever respiratory distress threatened her life. Over the hospital's objections, courts ruled that aggressive care must be provided. Much of Baby K's care was covered by her mother's HMO policy. In the 1993 case of Fox v. HealthNet, a jury awarded $89 million to the family of a woman whose HMO had refused, as experimental, coverage for autologous bone marrow transplant in treating her advanced breast cancer. (shrink)

Several prominent cases have recently highlighted tension between the interests of individuals and those of the broader population in gaining access to health care resources. The care of Helga Wanglie, an elderly woman whose family insisted on continuing life support long after she had lapsed into a persistent vegetative state, cost approximately $750,000, the majority of which was paid by a Medi-gap policy purchased from a health maintenance organization. Similarly, Baby K was an anencephalic infant whose mother, believing that all (...) life is precious regardless of its quality, insisted that the hospital where her daughter was born provide mechanical ventilation, including intensive care, whenever respiratory distress threatened her life. Over the hospital's objections, courts ruled that aggressive care must be provided. Much of Baby K's care was covered by her mother's HMO policy. In the 1993 case of Fox v. HealthNet, a jury awarded $89 million to the family of a woman whose HMO had refused, as experimental, coverage for autologous bone marrow transplant in treating her advanced breast cancer. (shrink)

Engaging citizens in science projects has a number of epistemic benefits in terms of improving scientific out- comes and adjusting research to develop innovative solu- tions that are likelier to be used. Yet the emphasis on the epistemic benefits of citizen science projects and its risks, such as exploitation and a lack of benefit-sharing, a fail- ure to sufficiently inform participants of possible hazards and privacy issues, and unacknowledged authorship, which we can find in Wiggins and Wilbanks (2019), should not (...) shift to the background important justice- related interests regarding increasing participation, in particular as a prerequisite to providing the human right to participate in science (Timmermann 2014; Vayena and Tasioulas 2015). Beside the social interest in benefiting from scientific advancement—due to its major role in improving welfare—and keeping scientific practice within ethical boundaries, we need to acknowledge sci- entific participation to be very much in the interests of society. (shrink)

In December 2006, Indonesia decided to stop sending influenza virus specimens to the World Health Organization’s Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN). Indonesia justified its actions by claiming that they were in protest of the injustice of GISN. Its actions stimulated negotiations to improve the workings of GISN by developing and implementing a more just framework for ‘sharing influenza viruses and other benefits’. These negotiations eventually led to the adoption of a new framework for virus and benefit sharing in May 2011, (...) at the World Health Assembly meeting. In this article, we critically evaluate Indonesia’s claims about the unjustness of GISN. We show that arguments based on the values of ownership, contribution and reciprocity work together to support Indonesia’s claim that it was owed an equal share in the benefits of GISN and, in turn, that GISN was unjust because of its failure to ensure this. We also use these values to evaluate the newly agreed upon framework for virus and benefit sharing. We suggest the new framework fails to give proper consideration to the values of ownership, contribution and reciprocity and, as a result, that it is fundamentally unjust. (shrink)

The paper seeks to contribute to the transitional justice literature by overcoming the Democracy v. Justice debate. This debate is normatively implausible and prudentially self-defeating. Normatively, transitional justice will be conceptualised as an imperative of democratic equal concern. Prudentially, it can prevent further violence and provide an opportunity for initiating processes of democratic emotional socialisation. The resentment and indignation animating transitions should be acknowledged as markers of a sense of justice. As such, they can help the (...) reproduction of democracy. However, their public expression must be institutionally filtered through democratic norms. The consistent institutional instantiation of equal respect can educate and recuperate negative emotions for democracy. (shrink)

This article asks whether firms should contribute to the costs of procreation and parenthood. We explore two sets of arguments. First, we ask what the principle of fair play – central in parental justice debates – implies. We argue that if one defends a pro-sharing view, firms are required to shoulder part of the costs of procreation and parenthood. Second, we turn to the principle of fair equality of opportunity. We argue that compensating firms for costs they incur because (...) their employees decide to procreate or parent may undermine some of the incentives leading to (statistical) discrimination in the workplace. (shrink)

This study aimed to analyze the explanatory contribution of social responsibility and organizational justice on commitment through the setting up of a theoretical model in order to better understand the relationships that are established between these constructs. The empirical study was developed in a public higher education institution with a sample of 233 employees, professors and staff. The proposed model was estimated using a structural equation model. It was possible to observe a relationship between interactional justice perceptions and (...) social responsibility and there contribute to the explanation of organizational affective commitment. At the same time, it was possible to observe a relationship between distributive justice and social responsibility of employees. (shrink)

The author examines the development of the concept of justice in Arabic philosophical ethics, which culminates in the attempt by Miskawayh to harmonize Plato's concept of what it means to be just with Aristotle's concept of acting justly. Miskawayh's contribution, which draws upon Neo-Platonic and Stoic authors of late antiquity, is shown to shed light on possible modes of interpreting the ethical doctrines of Plato and Aristotle and even to point the way to the solution of some exegetical problems (...) raised by contemporary scholars. (shrink)

Background Social inequities in the healthcare system threaten global health. Efforts to establish equity in healthcare is a key goal of healthcare systems worldwide. Social justice is a basic value of the nursing profession that always merits attention. Objective This study aimed to identify and explain the processes of the nursing profession’s participation in establishing social justice in healthcare system. Research design and methods This qualitative study was conducted using the grounded theory method. Participants and research context Data (...) were collected through in-depth, semi-structured, individual interviews with 26 participants, 23 of whom were members of the nursing profession. Sampling started purposefully and, then, continued with theoretical sampling. Field notes were also taken for data collection. Data analysis was performed using Corbin and Strauss’ 2015 method. Ethical considerations The research was approved by the Ethics Committee of Urmia University of Medical Sciences in Iran. Findings The “Professional Dynamics in the Path of Justice” was the study’s core category. This theory is the result of nine main categories: “inefficient professional authority,” “social justice, a neglected component in education,” “clinical concerns, barriers to nurses’ presence in society,” “individual input reserves to facilitate social justice,” “inadequate maturity of the profession in the path of equity in health,” “promoting justice in clinical practice,” “a tendency to community-oriented profession,” “use of personal approaches for justice promotion,” and “emerging justice-expanding nursing.” These categories cover the underlying factors, strategies, and outcomes of the nursing profession’s participation in establishing social justice process in healthcare. Conclusion The theory of professional dynamics in the path of justice can be used as a practical guide to describe the role of nurses in establishing social justice. Further studies with a quantitative approach to applying this theory are recommended. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: The article discusses the ways in which sociological analyses can contribute to the problem of a just allocation of scarce donor organs.Arguments: It is argued that this contribution consists primarily in the demonstration of the ethical, rather than medical nature of the problem itself. Only if its ethical nature is acknowledged will it be possible to come to a proper understanding of the several dilemmas involved and to consider adequate means for handling them.

This paper examines whether certain workers have a moral claim to decent wages for work that contributes to the social surplus in a fundamental way. This "fundamental" way refers to work whose fruits other members of society need to live acceptably good lives (not maximally good ones). The paper argues that what is due to this type of worker is based on the nature of the benefit that her labor produces for others in society and on the returned value that (...) such labor should, by virtue of fair play considerations, command. The core of the argument in the paper is that such benefit is connected to an important dimension of human freedom, which is enabled by the absence of necessity to toil to secure subsistence in society. The paper also dwells on questions related to whose responsibility it should be to guarantee decent pay for contributions to society. (shrink)

Edmund Pellegrino has pioneered work in medical ethics calling for a reconstruction of Hippocratic ethics. In particular, he has spoken of incorporating principles that concern justice and the common good. This article traces his commitment to the common good, concern for the poor, opposition to libertarianism, acknowledgement of the necessity of rationing, and reluctance to give clinicians social allocational tasks. It asks how Pellegrino relates distributive justice to the common good. Drawing on his theory relating autonomy to patient-centered (...) beneficence (in which autonomy is one element of the good rather than a side constraint on the good), the author argues that Pellegrino appears to make justice one element of the common good rather than a distributional moral constraint on promoting the good. He suggests that Pellegrino stands in three consequentialist or teleological moral traditions: professional physician ethics, Aristotelianism, and Catholic moral theology, but that there are the makings of a more independent, more egalitarian theory of justice in his writings. Keywords: autonomy, common good, consequentialism, Edmund Pellegrino, justice CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Sustainability has become a powerful discourse, guiding the efforts of various stakeholders to find strategies for dealing with current and future social-ecological crises. To overcome the latter, we argue that sustainability discourse needs to be based on a critical-emancipatory conceptualization. Therefore, we engage two such approaches—environmental justice approaches informed by a plural understanding of justice and feminist political economy ones focusing on care—and their analytical potential for productive critique of normative assumptions in the dominant sustainability discourse. Both of (...) these approaches highlight aspects of sustainability that are particularly relevant today. First, although sustainable development was conceptualized from the outset based upon a twofold notion of justice (intra- and intergenerational), the integration of justice in the dominant sustainability discourse and praxis often manifests merely as a normative aspiration. Meanwhile, the environmental justice and care approaches offer conceptualizations of justice that can act as a powerful lever and as transformation-strategy. Second, the dominant sustainability discourse largely remains within a neoliberal economic framework that continues to promote economic growth as the means to reach prosperity while neglecting the bases of every economy: care work and nature. Its focus lies solely on paid work and the market economy. By integrating (a) social and ecological ‘reproductivity’ (unpaid care and subsistence work as well as nature) and (b) democratic processes for just distribution of environmental burdens and benefits, as well as participatory equity in relevant decision making, feminist political economy and environmental justice approaches offer substantial strategies towards building humane, just and caring societies. (shrink)

Can the difference among people’s contributions to the society serve as a desert-based reason for unequal distributions? John Rawls contends that it cannot, though contribution may provide an efficiency-based reason for distribution. Contrary to Rawls, luck egalitarians contend that difference in contribution that is not a result of luck may provide a desert-based reason for unequal distributions. My view contrasts with both of these views. By appealing to a fundamental moral principle, the principle of reciprocity, this paper argues that the (...) difference among people’s contributions can serve as a desert-based reason for unequal distributions, even when it is a result of luck. (shrink)

In recent years, transitional justice has become such an important field that it is believed to have become an international norm. Beginning as an initiative to help countries recovering from...

I argue that the exception must be a legitimate possibility within law as a revolutionary project, in much the same way that civil disobedience is. In this sense, the exception is not outside law if by "law" we mean not positive law as defined by extant legal documents (statutes, legislative committee reports, written judgments, etc.) but law as a living tradition consisting of both abstract norms and a concrete historical understanding of them. So construed, the exception is what can be (...) exemplary - a law unto itself that best interprets and creatively extends (and transcends) the law that already exists, in order to make it inclusive of the other. In the final analysis, immigration law forces us to consider both the concrete individuality and abstract humanity of refugees, asylum seekers and other homeless persons who have been displaced by global economic underdevelopment. When combined with the "statelessness" of desperate classes of immigrants, this fact about immigration law reveals a revolutionary possibility for future development and perfection leading to its own transcendence: from an inhospitable immigration law that is administered exclusively by the nation state to a cosmopolitan law of universal citizenship under the auspices of a global human rights regime. (shrink)

The value of autonomy is a hallmark of liberal doctrine. It would seem to follow that liberals must reject the practice of “arranged marriage” on the grounds that the “arranging” component of the practice eschews autonomy and individuality. However, in policy debates in Great Britain, the difference between “arranged marriage” and “forced marriage” has been defined as the presence of autonomy or free choice for an arranged marriage and their absence in cases of forced marriage. A paradox seems to result: (...) arranged marriage is defined as a marriage practice that both rejects autonomy and requires autonomy. In this article, I will show that the resultant paradox arises from the inadequacy of the autonomy analysis rather than from any intrinsically puzzling feature of arranged marriage. I then offer an alternative normative framework to assess arranged marriage’s potential contribution to a just society. My tri-metric analysis for arranged marriage includes the autonomy of the participants (Metric 1), as well as two societal metrics: the fairness of the distribution of care-giving labor (Metric 2) and the degree to which the society meets its members’ legitimate needs for care (Metric 3). (shrink)

The relationship between love/care and justice was one of the key tensions from which care ethics originated; to this very day it is subject of debate between various streams of thought within care ethics. With some exceptions most approaches have in common the belief that care and justice are mutually exclusive concepts, or at least as so different that their application is situated on different levels. Hence, both are complementary, but distinct, so that there is no real interaction. (...) This paper aims to investigate whether, and if so, how, a deeper understanding of Ricoeur’s thoughts on this matter enriches the relationship between care and justice with respect to care ethics. This connection suggests itself from Ricoeur’s interpretation of the relationship as a dialectical one in which the logic of superabundance and the logic of equivalence meet. Care enables people to see the face and individuality of the one, ‘le chacun,’ within the anonymous structures of justice that tend to reduce all human beings to the anonymous each, ‘le on’; justice in its turn is the precondition for love to become incarnated and made real. What may this view—of care and justice standing in close connection, in which they correct and strengthen each other—add to the understanding of concrete practices of care? (shrink)

Justice in production is concerned with ensuring the benefits and burdens of work are distributed in a way that is reflective of persons' status as moral equals. While a variety of accounts of productive justice have been offered, insufficient attention has been paid to the distribution of work's benefits and burdens in the future. In this article, after granting for the sake of argument forecasts of widespread future technological unemployment, we consider the implications this has for egalitarian requirements (...) of productive justice. We argue that in relation to all the benefits affiliated with work, other than undertaking social contribution, the technological replacement of work is unproblematic as these benefits could in principle be attained elsewhere. But because social contribution uniquely corresponds to work (when work is understood as more than a paid job), the normative assessment of technological unemployment will turn on the value that theories of justice give to contributive activity. We then argue that despite technological replacement being plainly beneficial insofar as it relieves persons from the burdens of work, such as dangerous work or drudgery, because the nature of care work makes it less susceptible to technological replacement, egalitarian concern will require the burdens of care work to be shared equally between individuals. (shrink)

Commemorating the life and work of Dr John Bennett; his lifelong contribution to Early Childhood Education and Care, and his ongoing influence on policy, research and practice in this field, In Search of Social Justice is a tribute to a preeminent scholar and his vision for an equitable and high-quality start for all children. Working tirelessly to raise the profile of Early Childhood Education and Care, and prioritise the rights and well-being of children and families in national and international (...) policy, John Bennet played an invaluable role in improving the position of young children globally. In Search of Social Justice takes John's legacy as a starting point for critical examination of the changing discourse on Early Childhood Education, and argues for the continued relevance of his approach. Drawing on personal reflections, vignettes and testimonials from eminent authors who shared their professional lives with him, the book foregrounds John's insistence that we must continue to shape policy and provision through inquiry, high-quality evidence, passion and persistence, improving the early experiences of all young children. As much a celebration of John's work and achievements, as a call to collective action towards achieving his vision for equitable, quality early childhood education and care, this is a fascinating read for students, researchers and activists in the field of Early Childhood Education and Care. (shrink)

The aim of the study was to analyze the psychometric properties of the Social Justice Scale, composed by Representation, Recognition, and Redistribution dimensions. Likewise, the contribution of social dominance and the belief in a just world in each dimension were analyzed. A total of 471 young adults residing in Madrid participated in the online preliminary study, with an age range of 18–42 years with different genders. The main results indicated adequate psychometric properties for Social Justice Scale through its (...) three dimensions. In addition, we observed that both social dominance and belief in a just world might be psychosocial variables that modulate the levels of social justice. The main findings of the research and need for replication in future studies are discussed. (shrink)

Central to the social membership model of animal rights is the claim that relations with nonhuman animals should be reorganized such that domesticated animals are recognized as members of our shared societies. Though some elements of the membership model remain contested, the core of the membership model is that domesticated animals have a claim on, and a direct entitlement to, the benefits of cooperative relations. For many political theorists, however, distributive justice considerations apply only to a certain kind of (...) cooperative relationship. The community of justice recipients is thought to be limited by what Brian Berkey calls the Contribution/Capacity Basis of Entitlement. Accordingly, justice considerations apply to a scheme of cooperation and a conception of justice “entail[s] direct entitlements only for those who are contributors, or, alternatively, those who at least possess the capacities that are necessary to be capable of contributing to such a scheme”. This thesis – referred to as ‘contributionism’ – has typically been utilized to exclude nonhuman animals from justice considerations. The paper argues that contributionism is not fundamentally at odds with justice for domesticated animals, and conversely that contributionism remains a useful conceptual tool for explaining resource sharing with these nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Struggles for gender justice by women's movements have sought to give legal recognition to gender equality at both national and international levels. However, such society-wide goals may have little resonance in the lives of individual men and women in contexts where a culture of individual rights is weak or missing and the stress is on the moral economy of kinship and community. While empowerment captures the myriad ways in which intended and unintended changes can enhance the ability of individual (...) women to exercise greater control over their own lives, it does not necessarily lead to their engagement in collective struggles for gender justice. This paper argues that ideas about citizenship, as both legal status and potential for action, can help bridge this gulf between institutional and individual change. It draws on empirical research from Afghanistan and Bangladesh to explore the extent to which efforts to empower women by development organisations have also encompassed discourses of citizenship which allow them to articulate, and act on, their vision for a just society. (shrink)

Over the last century, the world's urban population increased from 224 million to over 3.5 billion, and advances in manufacturing, transportation, and communication technologies brought virtually limitless lifestyle and identity options, as well as the greatest inequalities of wealth, risk, and opportunity in history. Yet, as momentous as these changes are, they are dwarfed by the fact that human activity is now affecting planetary processes like climate. Justice concerns about future generations are no longer academic curiosities; they are global (...) ethical imperatives. This talk by Dr. Peter D. Hershock builds on recent efforts to craft an ethics of global justice around the "social emotion" of compassion, making use of Buddhist conceptual resources to de-link justice from fictions of equality and conceive it, instead, as a dynamic function of relationally-achieved equity and diversity. (shrink)

In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual transactions that cannot be controlled at the individual or institutional levels. This (...) is true not only with respect to the overall distribution of such goods as income and wealth, but also with respect to the goods of testimonial and hermeneutical justice. Cognitive biases that may be difficult for even epistemically virtuous individuals to correct on their own may be more susceptible to correction if we focus on the principles that should govern our systems of testimonial gathering and assessment. Hence, while Fricker’s focus on individual epistemic virtue is important, we also need to consider what epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems would require. My paper will indicate some directions forward on this front, focusing on the need for integration of diverse institutions and persons engaged in inquiry. (shrink)

This article makes the case for a specific variety of what we call Collective Capital Institutions (CCIs), by returning to the idea of Wage-Earner Funds (WEFs) – a 1970s Swedish policy proposal designed gradually to shift ownership and control over parts of the economy to democratically controlled institutions. We identify two attractive rationales in favour of such a scheme and argue that both can fruitfully be transposed to the current worldwide economic situation. The egalitarian rationale is that WEFs could help (...) in the pursuit of equality by giving a wider set of people a stake in collectively owned companies and a right to their profits. The democratic rationale is that WEFs redistribute not only these profits, but also the power over economic decisions made within companies. We then contrast such schemes for collective capital ownership with the similar but much more privatised proposals set out in, for instance, John Rawls's idea of a ‘property-owning democracy’. We argue that CCIs ultimately are more likely to contribute to the development of the ‘sense of justice’ within society that is needed for a stable just society. We conclude that CCIs deserve a great deal more exploration in academic and political discussions of egalitarian economic systems. (shrink)

When feminist philosophers first turned their attention to traditional ethical theory, its almost exclusive emphasis upon justice, rights, abstract rationality, and individual autonomy came under special criticism. Women’s experiences seemed to suggest the need for a focus on care, empathetic relations, and the interdependence of persons.The most influential readings of what has become an extremely lively and fruitful debate are reproduced here along with important new contributions by Alison Jaggar and Sara Ruddick. As this volume testifies, there is no (...) agreement on the important questions about the relationship between justice and care, but the debate has deepened and enriched our understanding in many ways. Justice and Care is a valuable collection of readings—an essential tool for anyone studying the state of feminist thought in particular or ethical theory in general. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to develop a system of corporate ethics based on an understanding and interpretation of the ethical demand of human beings who are in relation with each other according to Emmanuel Levinas' teachings and the responsibility the human being has to and for herself and others whom she encounters based on Paul Ricoeur's teachings on human action, text and hermeneutics. While the philosophies to which we will be referring may not overtly present a normative ethic, (...) we shall convey them in such a way that is reasonably germane to the development of our system of corporate ethics that would, indeed, demonstrate why (and, perhaps, how in some instances) the human being must act in response to the demand of the other whom she encounters. -/- We must not abandon the discussion as it relates to the economy but rather include it in a broader and more comprehensive dialogue about working to promote, support and protect the human dignity of all people using the advancements of technology to improve the human condition. The broader discussion must include but not be limited to developing a working definition of corporate ethics. To engage in discussions about the economy as an indicator for human success, we must speak openly and honestly about all stakeholders that participate and are affected by the economy. Without forsaking other stakeholders, we find the corporation - the entity whose actions have the farthest reaching and, in some cases, longer lasting impact on the human condition - to be an appropriate point of departure for this endeavor. (shrink)

By executive order, the US adopted an immigration policy that looks remarkably similar to a Muslim ban, and threatened to deport long-settled residents, such as the so-called Dreamers. Our defunct refugee system has not dealt adequately with increased refugee flows, forcing desperate people to undertake increasingly risky measures in efforts to reach safe havens. Meanwhile increased migration flows over recent years appear to have contributed to a rise in right-wing populism, apparently driving phenomena such as Brexit and Trumpism. In this (...) original and insightful book Gillian Brock offers answers and tools that assist us in evaluating current migration policy and in helping to determine which policies may be permissible and which are normatively indefensible. She offers a comprehensive framework for responding to the many challenges which have recently emerged, and for delivering justice for people on the move along with those affected by migration. (shrink)

We examine an article of Paul Ricoeur on autonomy and vulnerability. Ricoeur presents the two notions in the field of justice as intricately woven into each other. He analyzes their interdependence on three levels of human agency. Ricoeur’s exposition has a focus on judicial judgment. After presenting Ricoeur’s argument and an analysis of his main points, the author argues that Ricoeur’s reflection lines up with some essential intentions of care ethics. Ricoeur’s contribution to care ethics is given in a (...) delicate balance of autonomy and its vulnerability. (shrink)

Problems in normative ethics paradigmatically concern what it is obligatory or permissible for an individual to do. Yet sometimes, each of us ought to do something individually in virtue of what we ought to do together. Unfortunately, traversing these two different levels at which a moral obligation can arise – individual and collective – is fraught with difficulties that easily lure us into conclusions muddying our understanding of collective obligations. This paper seeks to clearly lay out a systematic problem central (...) to the relation between collective and individual duties in view of alleviating some such confusion and facilitating more concerted attempts at resolving it: Collective duties require individuals to act in order for the collective duty to be fulfilled. Yet typically, a collective duty does not entail any one set of individual duties that would prescribe such contributory actions: The work we need to do in order to fulfil a duty can be allocated differently to the individuals collectively bearing it. Much like in matters of distributive justice, then, deriving individual duties from a collective one requires us to employ a distributive scheme, which raises separate normative concerns that have rarely taken centre stage in the debate so far. (shrink)

Un milliard d'ètres humains vivant avec moins d'un dollar par jour. 270 millions de morts, entre 1990 et 2005, sous l'effet de l'extrème pauvreté. Plus que toutes les pertes des guerres du XXe siècle. 18 millions de victimes, un tiers des décès mondiaux par an dus à la misère. Ces données correspondent pour l'essentiel à la profondeur des inégalités entre les pays du Nord et ceux du Sud. Faut-il que les États riches s'emploient à remédier à la situation des États (...) pauvres, et si oui, selon quelles modalités et à quelles conditions? Cette question, qu'on désigne aujourd'hui comme celle de la « justice globale », est venue s'ajouter, depuis la fin des années 1970, à la question classique des inégalités. Quel peut ètre, au plan global ou mondial, l'analogue de ce que sont les politiques sociales au sein d'une société donnée? S'agit-il, si l'on accorde que les États riches ont à contribuer au développement des pays pauvres, de procéder, là aussi, par des transferts de ressources? Ou faut-il oeuvrer pour que les pauvres du monde accèdent à des « pouvoir-faire » les rendant capables de prendre en charge leur destin? Discutant ces options, envisageant d'autres perspectives encore, ce livre entreprend pour la première fois, en combinant approche politique et approche éthique, de construire une théorie systématique de la justice globale. (shrink)