This article attempts to reframe the state of research on the notion of goblet words in the Zhuangzi. Recent studies predominantly view the notion of zhiyan as referring to peculiar stylistic forms exhibited in the Zhuangzi—forms such as dilemmatic questions and paradoxes. In this article, I question the quick identification of these forms as zhiyan. I argue that zhiyan are essentially definite yet provisional simple-form utterances located on the level of everyday interaction and coexistence. On this level, the (...) peculiar stylistic forms do not play their part. However, such stylistic forms do become indispensable in discussing and recommending zhiyan. It is on this meta-level—for the Zhuangzi, the level of writing—that we find these forms employed. Based on structural similarities, we may stretch the label ‘zhiyan’ to include such forms but should keep in mind that any such extension is secondary to the use of language in coexisting with others. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on Daoist praxeology and language in order to build something of a moral realist position (the contours of which may differ from most western versions insofar as it need not commit to moral cognitivism) that hinges on the seemingly paradoxical notions of ineffable moral truths and non-transferable moral skill.

The Zhuangzi is a collection of ancient Chinese anecdotes and fables that serves as a foundational Daoist text. The style in which it is written is significant because it obscures rather than reveals the text’s philosophic positions. If the text cannot be translated into plain language while preserving its content, as the Mozi or the Mencius generally can be, then the writing style is not merely rhetorical. The style is itself indispensable to the content. In this study, I analyse a (...) linguistic device mentioned in the Zhuangzi and use it to reflect the text’s writing style—namely, “goblet words”. I argue that various logical forms of goblet words defy the act of fixing a definite answer in any conceptual distinction or disputation. The forms, which include dilemmatic questions, oxymora and double denial, all serve to preserve indeterminacy. Reading goblet words may affect readers by making them more open-minded towards distinctions. However, readers cannot ascertain that the text’s authors produced this effect intentionally. Therefore, the text may cause readers to be open-minded while the authors remain free of commitment. (shrink)

This essay examines the question of whether language, knowledge, and truth are possible in a world of relativism and flux, developing along a line of comparison between the Cratylus and Theaetetus of Plato on the one hand, and the Zhuangzi 莊子 of the Daoist philosophical tradition on the other. Against Plato’s image of “leaky pots” that symbolizes the impossibility of language in a state of flux, the Zhuangzi introduces “spillover-goblet words” that resist the language of necessity and essence (...) by continually emptying themselves out, only to be filled again with the always contingent. To put the ideas and metaphors of each of these perspectives into conversation, the essay drafts a comparison between two manners of animal classification, with classical taxonomy aligning with Platonism on the one hand, and the evolutionary science of “cladistics”—taxonomy based on ancestry—allying with Daoism on the other. In the end, it is Plato who is left holding his pejorative “leaky pots,” as under conditions of essential change it is putatively unchanging categories themselves that are shown to create the worst problems for knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Index to Volume Fifty-SixArticlesBernier, Bernard, National Communion: Watsuji Tetsurō's Conception of Ethics, Power, and the Japanese Imperial State, 1 : 84-105Between Principle and Situation: Contrasting Styles in the Japanese and Korean Traditions of Moral Culture, Chai-sik Chung, 2 : 253-280Buxton, Nicholas, The Crow and the Coconut: Accident, Coincidence, and Causation in the Yogavāiṣṭha, 3 : 392-408Chan, Sin Yee, The Confucian Notion of Jing (Respect), Sin Yee Chan, 2 : (...) 229-252Chong, Kim-chong, Zhuangzi and the Nature of Metaphor, 3 : 370-391Chung, Chai-sik, Between Principle and Situation: Contrasting Styles in the Japanese and Korean Traditions of Moral Culture, 2 : 253-280The Confucian Ideal of Harmony, Chenyang Li, 4 : 583-603The Confucian Notion of Jing.(Respect), Sin Yee Chan, 2 : 229-252The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate? Jay L. Garfield, 2 : 201-228The Crisis of Knowledge in Islam (I): The Case of al-'āmirī, Paul L. Heck, 1 : 106-135The Crow and the Coconut: Accident, Coincidence, and Causation in the Yogavāiṣṭha, Nicholas Buxton, 3 : 392-408De Reu, Wim, Right Words Seem Wrong: Neglected Paradoxes in Early Chinese Philosophical Texts, 2 : 281-300The Desire You Are Required to Get Rid of: A Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the Bhaga-vadgītā, Christopher Framarin, 4 : 604-617Framarin, Christopher, The Desire You Are Required to Get Rid of: A Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the Bhagavadgītā, 4 : 604-617Garfield, Jay L., The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate? 2 : 201-228Heck, Paul L., The Crisis of Knowledge in Islam (I): The Case of al-'ā mirī, 1 : 106-135Heidegger's Comportment toward East-West Dialogue, Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel, 4 : 519-566Ho, Chien-hsing, Saying the Unsayable, 3 : 409-427Kantor, Hans-Rudolf, Ontological Indeterminacy and Its Soteriological Relevance: An Assessment of Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Interpretation of Zhiyi's (538-597) Tiantai Buddhism, 1 : 16-68Lai, Karyn, Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility, 1 : 69-83Li, Chenyang, The Confucian Ideal of Harmony, 4 : 583-603Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility, Karyn Lai, 1 : 69-83Ma, Lin, and Jaap van Brakel, Heidegger's Comportment toward East-West Dialogue, 4 : 519-566National Communion: Watsuji Tetsurō's Conception of Ethics, Power, and the Japanese Imperial State, Bernard Bernier, 1 : 84-105Ontological Indeterminacy and Its Soteriological Relevance: An Assessment of Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Interpretation of Zhiyi's (538- 597) Tiantai Buddhism, Hans-Rudolf Kantor, 1 : 16-68Right Words Seem Wrong: Neglected Paradoxes in Early Chinese Philosophical Texts, Wim De Reu, 2 : 281-300The Role of Time in the Structure of Chinese Logic, Jinmei Yuan, 1 : 136-152Sakya Pandita and the Status of Concepts, Jonathan Stoltz, 4 : 567-582Saying the Unsayable, Chien-hsing Ho, 3 : 409-427Schiltz, Elizabeth, Two Chariots: The Justification of the Best Life in the Katha Upanishad and Plato's Phaedrus, 3 : 451-468Spackman, John, The Tiantai Roots of Dōgen's Philosophy of Language and Thought, 3 : 428-450Stevenson, Frank W., Zhuangzi's Dao as Background Noise, 2 : 301-331Stoltz, Jonathan, Sakya Pandita and the Status of Concepts, 4 : 567-582The Tiantai Roots of Dōgen's Philosophy of Language and Thought, John Spackman, 3 : 428-450 [End Page 709]Two Chariots: The Justification of the Best Life in the Katha Upanishad and Plato's Phaedrus, Elizabeth Schiltz, 3 : 451-468van Brakel, Jaap, and Lin Ma, Heidegger's Comportment toward East-West Dialogue, 4 : 519-566Yuan, Jinmei, The Role of Time in the Structure of Chinese Logic, 1 : 136-152Zhuangzi and the Nature of Metaphor, Kim-chong Chong, 3 : 370-391Zhuangzi's Dao as Background Noise, Frank W. Stevenson, 2 : 301-331Book NotesFenner, David E. W., Introducing Aesthetics (note by James McRae), 3 : 515-516Introducing Aesthetics, by David E. W. Fenner (note by James McRae), 3 : 515-516McRae, James, a book... (shrink)

Traditional Chinese commentators rightly see that understanding Zhuangzi's way with words is the presupposition for understanding Zhuangzi at all. They are not sure, however, if Zhuangzi's words are super-effective or pure nonsense. I consider Zhuangzi's experience with language, and then turn to Heidegger's word of being to see if it may throw light on Zhuangzi's way of saying. I argue that a conversation between Heidegger and Zhuangzi on language is possible, but only by expanding Heidegger's notion of Gestell (...) (enframing) and through a destruction of the dominant Confucian discourse that obscures Zhuangzi's way of saying. (shrink)

Traditional Chinese commentators rightly see that understanding Zhuangzi's way with words is the presupposition for understanding Zhuangzi at all. They are not sure, however, if Zhuangzi's words are super-effective or pure nonsense. I consider Zhuangzi's experience with language, and then turn to Heidegger's word of being to see if it may throw light on Zhuangzi's way of saying. I argue that a conversation between Heidegger and Zhuangzi on language is possible, but only by expanding Heidegger's notion of Gestell (...) and through a destruction of the dominant Confucian discourse that obscures Zhuangzi's way of saying. (shrink)

The examination of names and words constitutes an important aspect of the philosophy of Zhuangzi. With the debate over the relationship between name and reality as its background, this examination not only involves the connection between form and meaning, but also targets at the connection between concepts and objects. The debate over the relationship between name and reality correlates with the discussion of the connection between words and meanings or ideas. For Zhuangzi, the function of names and (...) class='Hi'>words is first and foremost embodied as the classification and distinction of being, while the Dao, as the universal principle of being, is characterized by equality and throughness. This leads to an inherent disparity and tension between names, words and the Dao. Zhuangzi's thinking and argument concern the connections between name and reality, words and ideas, and the Dao and words. This displays multiple theoretical perspectives and the complexity of its thought. /// 对名与言的考察，构成了《庄子》哲学的重要方面。以名实之辩为背景，名与 育的考察既捞及语言形式与涵义的关系，也指向概念与对象的关系。与名实之辩相 关的是言意之辩，后者所指向的是言与意的关系。同时，对《庄子》而言，名言的 作用首先表现为对存在的 "分" 和 "别", 而 "道" 作为存在的普遍原理，则以 "齐" 与 "通" 为内在品格，后者使道与名言呈现内在的距离和张力。对名与实、言与意、 道与言等关系的辨析，既展示了《庄子》的多重理论视域，又表现了其思想的复杂性。. (shrink)

The examination of names and words constitutes an important aspect of the philosophy of Zhuangzi. With the debate over the relationship between name and reality as its background, this examination not only involves the connection between form and meaning, but also targets at the connection between concepts and objects. The debate over the relationship between name and reality correlates with the discussion of the connection between words and meanings or ideas. For Zhuangzi, the function of names and (...) class='Hi'>words is first and foremost embodied as the classification and distinction of being, while the Dao, as the universal principle of being, is characterized by equality and throughness. This leads to an inherent disparity and tension between names, words and the Dao. Zhuangzi℉s thinking and argument concern the connections between name and reality, words and ideas, and the Dao and words. This displays multiple theoretical perspectives and the complexity of its thought. (shrink)

In Heidegger's thinking, a language is neither words nor expressions. The discussion of a language brings not the language itself but rather us into its essence, and makes us gather unto "the genesis of the very language itself." With snows and vesper bells, Heidegger summoned both heaven and earth and gods and men, making them merge into a single world. Likewise, Zhuangzi used the words of Qixie to summon the fleeting clouds in an endless sky and a dusky (...) earth populated by living beings and dust. /// 在海德格尔看来，语言既不是词语，也不是表达。探讨语言不是把语言而是 把我们带到语言本质的处所，让我们聚集到 "成其自身" 之中。海德格尔通过雪花 和晚祷的钟声把天地神人召唤来，使其融契为一体的世界。在庄子 "齐谐" 词语的 召唤下，游气、尘埃、生物、苍茫之天以及昏黄的大地得以显现。. (shrink)

In Heidegger’s thinking, a language is neither words nor expressions. The discussion of a language brings not the language itself but rather us into its essence, and makes us gather unto “the genesis of the very language itself.” With snows and vesper bells, Heidegger summoned both heaven and earth and gods and men, making them merge into a single world. Likewise, Zhuangzi used the words of Qixie to summon the fleeting clouds in an endless sky and a dusky (...) earth populated by living beings and dust. (shrink)

Abstract:Zhuangzi's understanding of human nature has not been extensively discussed in the English literature. The Chinese discussions of it, though many, largely tend either to be carried away into the Confucian conventional debate on the moral goodness and badness of human nature or to explain it away by overemphasizing Zhuangzi's stress on the uniqueness of the human individual. In this article, with the intention to pin down what is really meant by human nature in the Zhuangzi, it will first be (...) examined what the word xing connotes for Zhuangzi and then argued that Zhuangzi characterizes human nature in terms of the heart-mind (xin 心), understood both functionally as what animates the body and essentially as a universally significant power that enables the human being to behave in a way similar to the way that the Dao 道 acts in the universe. (shrink)

This paper begins by observing a tension in the Zhuangzi (or Chuang Tzu). On the one hand, Zhuangzi often advocates radical skepticism and relativism. On the other hand, he often makes a variety of factual claims and endorses and condemns various ways of living, in apparent disregard of any skeptical or relativist considerations. I resolve this tension by suggesting that Zhuangzi does not mean what he says when he advocates skepticism and relativism - that he aims in the apparently skeptical (...) and relativist passages not to convince anyone of the truth of these positions, but rather simply to have a certain sort of anti-dogmatic, therapeutic effect. I support this position with a variety of arguments centered around the idea that Zhuangzi does not feel the need to take seriously that which can be put into words. (shrink)

: This interpretation of Zhuangzi's Dao, particularly in the "Qi Wu Lun," as "background noise" begins from Zhuangzi's question as to whether any human statements—and human language itself—can ultimately be distinguished from the "peeps of baby birds." The essay explores a tentative model of Dao that sees it as neither fully "linguistic" nor "non-linguistic" but as "pre-linguistic," the potential ground of emergence of words, statements, and meanings. To develop this model we turn to the notion of background noise in (...) physics, especially as discussed by Michel Serres in his discussion of chaos and information theory. A crucial feature of the Serresian chaos-theory model and also, it is suggested here, of Zhuangzi's Dao is the tendency of hyper-order to return (or switch) back to the initial state of disorder. (shrink)

This interpretation of Zhuangzi's Dao, particularly in the "Qi Wu Lun," as "background noise" begins from Zhuangzi's question as to whether any human statements-and human language itself-can ultimately be distinguished from the "peeps of baby birds." The essay explores a tentative model of Dao that sees it as neither fully "linguistic" nor "non-linguistic" but as "pre-linguistic," the potential ground of emergence of words, statements, and meanings. To develop this model we turn to the notion of background noise in physics, (...) especially as discussed by Michel Serres in his discussion of chaos and information theory. A crucial feature of the Serresian chaos-theory model and also, it is suggested here, of Zhuangzi's Dao is the tendency of hyper-order to return (or switch) back to the initial state of disorder. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Zhuangzi:Personal Freedom and/or Incongruity of Names?Paul J. D'Ambrosio (bio)Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom (hereafter Origins) has sparked much scholarly debate. Already numerous presentations, various types of discussions, and reviews have appeared based on Origins. The present review focuses specifically on the Zhuangzi chapter. The entire project actually began, Jiang writes, fifteen years ago as a book on (...) the Zhuangzi. Through his research Jiang realized he needed to learn more about the objects of philosophical ridicule and critique in the Zhuangzi. Origins is the result of this decade-and-a-half study.Origins provides a somewhat novel framework for reading Warring States period philosophy. Summarizing the basic structure of his project Jiang writes: "I make the case that the philosophical dialectics between the partialist humaneness and imperialist justice formed the fundamental dynamics underlying the mainstream moral-political project during the classic period, with the musing on personal freedom as the outlier" (p. 35). As Karyn Lai puts it, Origins revolves around a "predictable set of inherited pre-Qin texts associated with key figures, traditionally called the "Masters" (zi 子) text" (Lai 2022, p. 181). Some models inherited by the "masters," such as yinyang 陰陽 thinking or ming 名 (names) and shi 實 (actualities), are nearly absent in Origins and would cast new light on the project as well [End Page 458] as the tradition. In this review I will first outline Jiang's reading of the Zhuangzi before considering how a richer appreciation of the Chinese tradition, especially its own methodological tools, frameworks, and concepts, could bolster the exciting contributions Origins stands to make. We will start with Jiang's big picture view of the Zhuangzi.In Origins the Zhuangzi is taken to be a completely unique text. It does not engage in the moral and political discourse the other "masters" texts are subsumed by, and instead of supporting either partialist humaneness or impartialist justice it "muses" on personal freedom. Jiang defines: "Personal freedom is understood as the appreciation and cultivation of personal space wherein one can be left alone and enjoy the company of like-minded friends without being entangled in the sociopolitical world" (p. 36). There are two significant points to note about Jiang's understanding of freedom. First, it is almost a word-for-character definition of how the "Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove" have been described by many. Research on these philosophical works could significantly enrich Jiang's reading, albeit from a different angle. Second, Guo Xiang's 郭象 (d. 312) emphasis on, and philosophical explorations of, du 獨 (an interconnected type of "lone") would further fill out how freedom and relationality—which are both attributed to the Zhuangzi by Jiang—are connected.In addition to a "fierce advocacy for personal freedom" Jiang classifies the Zhuangzi as a "singular outlier" for ridiculing the "misguided character of [the contestations between humaneness and justice] and warn[ing] against their potential for inhumanity and injustice" (p. 49). Indeed, the Zhuangzi does demonstrate that these discussions can elicit "the very opposite of what was intended by the participants of the mainstream discourse" (p. 49). Its criticisms are even more penetrating when we appreciate its deeper point about "names being the guests of actualities" (Zhuangzi 1:4). From this perspective the Zhuangzi is not against systems of humaneness or justice as such. It rather points out that humaneness does not have a single referent, nor could that referent be reliably distinguished. The name "humane" does not guarantee humane action, or really anything in particular. The same is true for "justice." We will return to these points below.Jiang's chapter on the Zhuangzi begins by defending moral and political readings of the text. It is an outlier from the perspective of the "humanity-justice" framework, but this only means that the moral-political discourse Zhuangists were engaged in was different. The result was that already by the early Han and by the time of Sima Qian 司馬遷 (d. 86 b.c.e.) "Zhuangzi's teachings were … of little use to contemporary political discourse" (p. 288). Jiang should be delighted to know that the Wei-Jin period, which had inestimable... (shrink)

This interpretation of Zhuangzi's Dao, particularly in the "Qi Wu Lun," as "background noise" begins from Zhuangzi's question as to whether any human statements-and human language itself-can ultimately be distinguished from the "peeps of baby birds." The essay explores a tentative model of Dao that sees it as neither fully "linguistic" nor "non-linguistic" but as "pre-linguistic," the potential ground of emergence of words, statements, and meanings. To develop this model we turn to the notion of background noise in physics, (...) especially as discussed by Michel Serres in his discussion of chaos and information theory. A crucial feature of the Serresian chaos-theory model and also, it is suggested here, of Zhuangzi's Dao is the tendency of hyper-order to return (or switch) back to the initial state of disorder. (shrink)

The Zhuangzi is perhaps the one and only work in classical Chinese philosophy that never fails to blow one's mind with its exquisite intertwining of high frivolousness, literary power, ambiguity, ambivalence, profundity and provocativeness all at once. There is urgent need of a translation able to transmit this paradoxical reading experiences as it is. Happily, all of these qualities, with the possible exception of ambiguity, are revealed in Brook Ziporyn's Zhuangzi: The Complete Writings, with both poetry and precision. Through a (...) hermeneutical approach that inter-contextualizes each line and each word of the thirty-three chapters, especially many controversial places, he makes the chaotic and unsystematic text... (shrink)

Chapter 27 of the ancient Chinese text the Zhuangzi describes three kinds of language: yuyan, zhiyan, and chongyan. Wang Fuzhi first coined the term ‘sanyan ’ or ‘tripartite-language’ to emphasize their overlapping characteristics and incorporate them into a cohesive approach to the text. Sanyan has been used consistently in interpreting the Zhuangzi since the earliest compilation of its extant version and continues to inform academic publications today. Based on descriptions found in the Zhuangzi's ‘miscellaneous chapters’ and on contemporary scholarship, I (...) will explain how this model of sanyan functions and then how it facilitates philosophical reading of the Zhuangzi. Understanding the Zhuangzi's metaphorical language through sanyan lends access into the interrelated semantic field of the pre-Qin philosophical canon and helps unravel Zhuangzi's often-cryptic philosophical expressions. (shrink)

In this essay I closely look at dialogues from the Daoist text Zhuangzi and examine their modes of reasoning. The observations, comments, and dialogues are often witty, surprising, and puzzling. Sometimes they are mystic and difficult to understand. But how “reasonable” are the answers given in these dialogues? I will focus on a dialogue from chapter 17, called “Autumn Floods.” I will closely follow and analyze the arguments and their twists. In particular, I will question the use of the word (...) “Dao.” I will also place this analysis in broader comparative frameworks regarding rationality, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and Western traditions. (shrink)

This essay examines the questions raised about debate in _Zhuāngzǐ_ 莊子 2, the practical advice this chapter offers us for dealing with debates when they arise, and some of the questions that will predictably occur about how and why to apply that advice. On the present interpretation, _Zhuāngzǐ_ 2 argues that joining any side in a verbal conflict promotes continued conflict, and that only appreciating and working along with each speaker’s distinct point of view affords us access to what is (...) “really” or “conclusively” (_guǒ_ 果) the case. In contentious situations, the text advises that we pay close attention to speakers and their ways of life—rather than to what they are supposedly speaking about—and that we abandon any immediate goal beyond preserving our own health. Along the way, it foregrounds pleasure and comfort rather than rightness as what we are most attuned to when we listen and respond to one another’s words. (shrink)

In classical Chinese wu 吾 is commonly employed as the first-person pronoun, similar to wo 我 that retains its use in modern Chinese. Although these two words are usually understood as stylistic variants of “I,” “me,” and “myself,” Chinese scholars of the Zhuangzi 莊子 have long been aware of the possible differences in their semantics, especially in the philosophical context of discussing the relation between the self and the person, as evinced by their occurrences in the much-discussed line “Now (...) I have lost myself” in the chapter “Discussion on Making All Things Equal”. In this essay, I first provide an exegesis of the proffered explanations of the semantical differences between wu and wo as an introduction to two ways of understanding them in the Zhuangzi literature, viz. the single-reference view and the double-reference view. Then I shall argue against these two views in favor of the no-reference view, meaning that both pronouns in “Now I have lost myself” do not function referentially, given the peculiarity of the verb “lose.” I believe the no-reference view has not been explicitly articulated and defended in the literature, although some scholars who want to read the no-self view into the Zhuangzi might have implied it. My argument is supported by a close reading of the targeted passage in the Zhuangzi, premised on the assumption that the part on the “piping of Heaven” immediately following the discussion of losing oneself is an indirect explanation rather than a digression. My explanation is framed within a similar discussion of “I” by the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. This comparative interpretation, I believe, not only provides the grounds for understanding Zhuangzi’s ideal of attaining the state where “the ten thousand things are one with me,” but also demonstrates how metaphysics and the philosophy of language are two interwoven threads in Zhuangzi’s reasoning. (shrink)

One of the many senses of the word spirituality—surely one of the vaguest words in the modern English language—is that of a special quality of life, a sublime fulfillment that somehow transcends the vicissitudes of fortune. According to this sense, spiritual people experience life as having such abundance of value or meaning that they can endure great hardship and tragedy without coming to despair. This abiding fullness and the equanimity it provides are perhaps the greatest prize of the spiritual (...) life.Spiritual fulfillment was once claimed as the special reward of religion, but no longer. In late modernity "spiritual but not religious" has become a commonplace self-description, and presumably this concept of .. (shrink)

The present essay examines the conflicting ontological assumptions that one can find behind the word dao in the texts of the Laozi and Zhuangzi and argues that the relative indifference to these texts toward whether or not dao has an ontic reality should not be considered a flaw of early Daoism. Rather, the historical process by which the term dao collects various possible ontological implications can be thought of as a philosophical stance in its own right. That is, if the (...) terms which one is obliged to use in discussing the immaterial necessarily hide, at least as much as they explain, the nature of Being, then it is a reasonable response to decline to ground one’s ethics in an ontology, and that while the resulting philosophy may not qualify as a fully-adumbrated system, this does not diminish its potential usefulness. (shrink)

In this article I compare the linguistic skepticism of Levinas to that of the early Daoist skepticism of the Zhuangzi. I will argue that both Levinas as the Zhuangzi use skepticism as a therapeutic tool to question the rigid use of language and to create an openness in the self in which the self is inspired by something more than itself. For Levinas, language is primarily a response-ability; language ultimately refers to the absolute responsibility to the Other. For the Zhuangzi, (...) words are simply too rigid to attune to the subtle differences and changes in the world. Through carefree wandering, the self becomes more receptive to the unfolding of the way (Dao). Both the Zhuangzi as Levinas see language not only as a system of references that is able to convey the world, but also see language as communication; as a response to the outside world. For Levinas, this response-ability is aimed at the Other and is primarily an ethical demand. For the Zhuangzi, genuine language is more a spontaneous receptivity; a wandering with words in which words are open to different interpretations and perspectives. In the end of this article I will argue that Levinas and the Zhuangzi see language as a communicative praxis that mirrors receptivity and passivity. (shrink)

Ideal for students and scholars alike, this edition of _Zhuangzi _ includes the complete Inner Chapters, extensive selections from the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters, and judicious selections from two thousand years of traditional Chinese commentaries, which provide the reader access to the text as well as to its reception and interpretation. A glossary, brief biographies of the commentators, a bibliography, and an index are also included.

Brook Ziporyn's carefully crafted, richly annotated translation of the complete writings of Zhuangzi—including a lucid Introduction, a Glossary of Essential Terms, and a Bibliography—provides readers with an engaging and provocative deep dive into this magical work.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Leaky Boat Holding Wine: A Study of the Word-Meaning Debate in Wei-Jin Six Dynasties Period Thought by Jing YuanRun Gu (bio)Lou Chuan Zai Jiu: Yanyi zhi Bian yu Wei-Jin Liu Chao Sixiang Xueshu Yangjiu 漏船载酒: 言意之辨与魏晋六朝思想学术研究 (A Leaky Boat Holding Wine: A Study of the Word-Meaning Debate in Wei-Jin Six Dynasties Period Thought). By Jing Yuan 袁晶. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2022. Pp. 247. Paperback RMB23.93, isbn (...) 978-7-208-17567-9.In A Leaky Boat Holding Wine: A Study of the Word-Meaning Debate in Wei-Jin Six Dynasties Period Thought (hereafter A Leaky Boat Holding Wine), Jing Yuan offers a careful review and critical evaluation of one of the major philosophical topics in the Wei-Jin period, namely, the word-meaning (Yanyi 言意) debate. In several previous publications, Yuan has addressed the word-meaning controversy from different angles and in various classics, including Prajnaparamita and The Analects.The word-meaning debate, as Yuan explains, can be interpreted as a conflict between cognition and expression, and reveals a series of contradictions and conflicts in ontology, epistemology, and philosophy of life among scholars in the Wei-Jin period. The debate refers to the controversy on whether words can fully express meaning or not. It departs from the relationships between word and meaning to critically evaluate their functions and limitations, and mainly consists of two ways of thinking: "distinguishing names, analyzing principles" (bian ming xi li 辯名析理) and "getting the meaning, forgetting the words" (de yi wang yan 得意忘言). Although this debate had already developed in China for quite some time, it was only prevalent as a common philosophical theme in the Wei-Jin period, a time characterized by social disorder and endless war. The metaphor in the book title, "a leaky boat holding wine," is from one of Lu Xun's (1881) poems, illustrating that although people use words as a tool to express meaning, it is impossible for words to convey all meaning. Yuan uses the metaphor to refer to the capacity of a word to carry meaning, and indicates that human thought and expression are inseparable from words, but cannot be entirely restricted to them.The book is organized in chronological order, and readers can easily grasp how the word-meaning debate was developed and reshaped in different periods, responding to various social-political contexts. Chapter 1 starts with the origin of the debate in the early Qin period. The author provides a solid examination of relevant theories and high-quality secondary literature. She clearly demonstrates that both early Daoist and Confucian thinkers were involved in the debate, and [End Page 1] that it aimed to describe a core ontology--or a search for the principles of the cosmos--and understand various other aspects of the world, including natural cycles and social ethics. Confucius advocated a metaphorical grasp of the Dao, transforming epistemology into practical philosophy. He held a critical attitude toward the relationship of word and meaning, arguing that words could express meaning because people could use them to influence the state and society. Confucius also believed that Dao, as an imaginative and contextual concept, could not be expressed through words.In contrast, Zhuangzi--"the most significant source of inspiration for Neo-Daoism (Metaphysics) in the Wei-Jin period" (p. 70)--focuses on the limitations of the function of words to convey meaning, highlighting the ineffable nature of Dao. Zhuangzi's concept of Dao, according to Yuan, is always beyond the reach of our senses and can only be attained through an intuitive grasp of reality: through the ability to reach an epiphany and perceive through the mind, even when not observing through physical means. It is only with an intuitive way of thinking that one can identify the ultimate noumenon and grasp the idea of Dao when words cannot contain it. In Zhuangzi's epistemology, Dao is grasped using a method of knowing that transcends ordinary sense perception, knowledge or rationality, and provides a non-logical intuition and an experience of a practical nature that transcends knowing.On this basis, the author brings together ancient and current research on the word-meaning debate, to critically assess the impact of Zhuangzi... (shrink)