An essential text for understanding Socrates, Xenophon's Memorabilia is the compelling tribute of an affectionate student to his teacher, providing a rare firsthand account of Socrates' life and philosophy. The Memorabilia is invaluable both as a work of philosophy in its own right and as a complement to the study of Plato's dialogues. The longest of Xenophon's four Socratic works, it is particularly revealing about the differences between Socrates and his philosophical predecessors. Far more obviously than Plato in (...) the dialogues, Xenophon calls attention in the Memorabilia to his own relationship with Socrates. A colorful and fully engaged writer, Xenophon aims above all to convince his readers of the greatness of Socrates' thought and the disgracefulness of his conviction on a capital charge. In thirty-nine chapters, Xenophon presents Socrates as an ordinary person and as a great benefactor to those associated with him. (shrink)

Sarah Fielding (1710-1768), the younger sister of Henry Fielding, and the close friend of his literary rival Samuel Richardson, was one of the very few English women to master ancient languages like Latin and Greek. With the help of Shaftesbury's nephew, James Harris, a distinguished writer, scholar and grammarian, she embarked on the ambitious project of translating Xenophon's Memorabilia and the Apology of Socrates from the Greek. This work, titled Memoirs of Socrates, with the Defence of Socrates before his (...) Judges, was finally released in 1762. She proved a discreet editor and a talented Hellenist, whose elegant style garnered praise from Tobias Smollett in his Critical Review. This superb translation is re-published in its entirety for the first time since the 18th century"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In Book II of Xenophon’s Memorabilia the hedonist Aristippus speaks very briefly, though quite emphatically, about a kind of freedom with regards to desires, pleasures and happiness. Much of the later testimony on him suggests a similar concern. My interest here in this paper is in understanding the nature of this freedom. For both dialectical and expositional purposes, I begin with a brief examination of some of the relevant views put forth in Plato’s Gorgias and of the larger socio-philosophical (...) contexts within which they are embedded. (shrink)

In Book II of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, in a discussion with Socrates, the hedonist Aristippus speaks very briefly, though quite emphatically, about a kind of freedom with regards to desires, pleasures and happiness. Much of the later testimony on him suggests a similar concern. My interest in this paper is in understanding the nature of this freedom. In order to do so however I begin with a brief elucidation into some of Socrates’ and Callicles’ proclamations in Plato’s Gorgias about their (...) own conceptions of freedom and the larger socio-philosophical contexts within which they are embedded. Though I hope this elucidation offers some interesting insights of its own, my purpose for including it is mostly dialectical and expositional. That is, I want to use it in order to bring out certain key features with I think, later, will, through comparison and contrast, provide for a clearer and hopefully more substantial understanding of Aristippus’ particular notion of freedom. In sum, I argue that Aristippus is promoting a unique kind of internal state or condition of the soul, one which apparently allows its possessor to engage in all sorts of pleasures without being worsted by them in any way. Part of Aristippus’ motivation here, I argue, is to challenge the popular conception of freedom connected to restraint and abstinence, and the accompanying idea that short-term or momentary pursuit of pleasure necessarily undermines the control of life by reason. (shrink)

Xenophon’s intention in writing the Memorabilia was to show that Socrates was neither naïve nor aloof with regard to the political fate of Athens. In a section on ‘Socratic Politics’, Xenophon shows us that Socrates was a teacher of practical politics by recounting, in the first part of that section, Socrates’ conversations with aspiring and practising, but mostly anonymous, Athenian politicians about the limitations and practical requirements of military and political leadership; and, in the second part, applying those lessons (...) to well-known Athenians. This article argues that, according to Xenophon, Socrates’ objectives in teaching politics were three-fold: first, he aimed to moderate the ambitions of his companions by instructing them about the proper ends and practice of a decent politics; second, he provided advice to these politicians that pointed Athens towards a non-imperial and hence more moderate political life; and finally, he sought to carve out within the city a private sphere reserved for friendship and philosophy. (shrink)

Xenophon’s anecdote concerning the exchange of clothes between a big boy and a little boy in Cyropaedia offers a valuable framework for understanding his conception of justice and the problematics of administering it. Interpreters have erred by assuming that Cyrus’ teacher, as well as Socrates in Memorabilia, simply identifies the just with the lawful. Rather than identifying the two, both characters argue that the law is just; but they differ widely in their explanations of what makes the law just. (...) For Cyrus’ teacher, the obligation to observe the law rests on a universal pre-legal ban on violence; for Socrates statutory law is to be obeyed for utilitarian reasons. Socrates’ view thus justifies both the teacher’s insistence that Cyrus obey the law—since the law is of benefit to the community—and also Cyrus’ decision to violate the law to achieve a just and beneficial redistribution. But it offers no justification for a universal ban on violence. In conformity with the Socratic principle, Cyrus avoids violence as far as possible, but only for the prudential reasons expressed by his mother. Once he acquires the power to coerce, Cyrus uses it to enforce the principle of proportional equality and meritorious redistribution he had approved in his judgment of the actions of the big boy. (shrink)

This study seeks to bring to light Socrates' view of virtue on the basis of the Memorabilia of Xenophon. It opens with a consideration of Gregory Vlastos' account of Socrates' "moral theory" in Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher . The study criticizes Vlastos for overlooking various passages of the Memorabilia that are pertinent to this theme and seemingly inconsistent with his account of it. ;The discussion of Vlastos prepares the way for a consideration of Xenophon. In the first (...) chapter, the study examines Xenophon's presentation of Socrates' view of "continence" or "self-control." The analysis indicates that Socrates had a very favorable view of this quality---he was himself outstandingly continent---and focuses on his claim that continence is "a foundation of virtue" . In trying to explain this claim, however, the study is led to consider an exhortation to continence in which Socrates recounts a debate between female personifications of "Virtue" and "Vice" . Following a close analysis of this debate, I argue that Socrates follows a path that is neither that of Virtue nor that of Vice: he travels "the middle road of Socratic virtue." In particular, I maintain that if continence is "a foundation of virtue" for both Virtue and Socrates, the phrase must be understood differently in each case. ;It thus becomes necessary to clarify the character of the Socratic "middle road." To that end, the study considers successively Socrates' view of "justice," of "the noble" and of "moderation." In each case, Socrates' view is brought to light, analyzed and closely compared with the view that Virtue either explicitly accepts, or else would likely accept. In conclusion, the study returns to the theme of continence and argues that continence is a foundation of Socrates' virtue in the sense that it is a foundation of his "wisdom" and "moderation." Having explained the meaning of this phrase, the study ends with a consideration of the Socratic view of the best life. (shrink)

Many scholars suggest that one of the main differences between Xenophon’s and Plato’s portrayals of Socrates is in their emphases on the self-control the self-knowledge respectively. The aim of the paper is to examine the role the self-knowledge plays in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. In its first part Xenophon’s conception of the self-knowledge is analysed. Then it tries to answer the question whether the self-knowledge requires any preconditions. The last part is focused on the possible obstacles precluding the self-knowledge.

Xenophon's anecdote concerning the exchange of clothes between a big boy and a little boy in Cyropaedia offers a valuable framework for understanding his conception of justice and the problematics of administering it. Interpreters have erred by assuming that Cyrus' teacher, as well as Socrates in Memorabilia, simply identifies the just with the lawful. Rather than identifying the two, both characters argue that the law is just; but they differ widely in their explanations of what makes the law just. (...) For Cyrus' teacher, the obligation to observe the law rests on a universal pre-legal ban on violence; for Socrates statutory law is to be obeyed for utilitarian reasons. Socrates' view thus justifies both the teacher's insistence that Cyrus obey the law -- since the law is of benefit to the community -- and also Cyrus' decision to violate the law to achieve a just and beneficial redistribution. But it offers no justification for a universal ban on violence. In conformity with the Socratic principle, Cyrus avoids violence as far as possible, but only for the prudential reasons expressed by his mother. Once he acquires the power to coerce, Cyrus uses it to enforce the principle of proportional equality and meritorious redistribution he had approved in his judgment of the actions of the big boy. (shrink)

This essay examines the first stage of the positive part of the Socratic education in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, whose subject is moderation concerning the gods. This stage of the Socratic education investigates whether providential gods exist and whether it ismoderate to be pious. Socrates does not accept either one of the two teleological sarguments in favour of the existence of providential gods that he advances in the Memorabilia. Instead, he holds that human beings cannot know whether or not the (...) gods exist, and moderation refers to the manner in which Socrates deems it reasonable to proceed in light of this uncertainty. Socrates suggests that the smoderate alternative to piety is justice, and this essay concludes by considering why justice is moderate but piety is not. (shrink)

The work is proven to have a unified and sustained rhetorical argument. It imitates the philosophical process that it attributes to Socrates.

And he wondered whether it was not evident to them that it is not possible for human beings to discover these things [sc. divine things, τὰ δαιμόνια]. Since even those who thought most of themselves for their speaking about these things do not hold the same opinions with one another, but are disposed towards one another like madmen.

In two passages from Xenophon's Memorabilia, Socrates refutes Aristippus, first by a rather brutal brand of Realpolitik , then by refusing to answer Aristippus' questions about the good and the beautiful . This article argues that the nasty politics that emerge in Memorabilia 2.1 are not Socratic, but rather the natural consequence of Aristippean hedonism. Political considerations of another sort drive Socrates' tactics in Memorabilia 3.8, where his evasive manoeuvres are driven by his desire to avoid a (...) direct confrontation with hedonism. Socrates' own views are hedonistic in some sense, as revealed by his otherwise irrelevant discussion of pleasing home plans and altar sites at the end of 3.8, but Socrates does not wish to reveal as much to companions lacking his self-control. Socrates' treatment of Aristippus has as much to do with politics as with pleasure. (shrink)

In two passages from Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates refutes Aristippus, first by a rather brutal brand of Realpolitik, then by refusing to answer Aristippus’ questions about the good and the beautiful. This article argues that the nasty politics that emerge in Memorabilia 2.1 are not Socratic, but rather the natural consequence of Aristippean hedonism. Political considerations of another sort drive Socrates’ tactics in Memorabilia 3.8, where his evasive manoeuvres are driven by his desire to avoid a direct confrontation (...) with hedonism. ocrates’ own views are hedonistic in some sense, as revealed by his otherwise irrelevant discussion of pleasing home plans and altar sites at the end of 3.8, but Socrates does not wish to reveal as much to companions lacking his self-control. Socrates’ treatment of Aristippus has as much to do with politics as with pleasure. (shrink)

This essay discusses Socrates' use of hypothetical choices as an early version of what was to become in the twentieth century the discipline of decision theory as expressed by one of its prominent proponents, F. P. Ramsey. Socrates' use of hypothetical choices and thought experiments in the dialogues is a way of reassuring himself of an interlocutor's philosophical potential. For example, to assess just how far Alcibiades is willing to go to attain his goal of being a great Athenian leader, (...) we employ Ramsey's concept of Mathematical Expectation. Mathematical Expectation operates on the assumption that it is not enough to measure probability; we must also measure our belief to apportion our belief to the probability. In other words, it illustrates how strongly or to what degree a person holds a particular belief. If a person's belief in X lacks enough doubts to cancel the belief out, the probability of his acting on this belief is higher than if his belief in X was plagued by a greater number of doubts. (shrink)