Understanding the factors influencing the aesthetic experience of architectures is an important topic in empirical aesthetics. In this study, we examined the effect of three architectural factors, i.e., ceiling height, openness, and contour, on viewers’ aesthetic appreciation through a series of experiments. In previous studies on architectural aesthetics, participants were usually asked to view an image of an architectural space for a few seconds. The long viewing time allows them to focus on different parts of the architecture and (...) then make an aesthetic judgment. The long viewing time, however, also makes it difficult to obtain viewers’ aesthetic scores for a large number of architectural spaces in a short period. In this study, we shortened the visual presentation time to 200 ms, which allowed the viewers to have only one fixation on the image, and asked the viewers to make an aesthetic judgment. It was found that the experiment with a 200-ms viewing time could establish how the three architectural factors influenced aesthetic judgment as well as previous experiments with a 3,000-ms viewing time, suggesting that aesthetic judgment could be made within one fixation. Additionally, we investigated the impact of color on architectural aesthetic judgment by presenting grayscale images. We found that the three architectural factors influenced aesthetic judgment in similar ways for both color and grayscale images. In summary, we found that color was not a main factor modulating viewers’ architectural aesthetic judgments, and we also presented a way to quickly obtain aesthetic scores for architectural spaces. (shrink)

The Christian acceptance of linear time and history was challenged by contemporary Greek philosophers who held to the cyclical view. The problem that this view of history held for the Church was simply that if time and history were cyclical, the concept of free will was destroyed. For more than a thousand years, Dr. Konvitz explains, the linear view of time and history was subordinated to the influence of the Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of timeless reality. Only (...) with the coming of the modern age was there a return to the linear concept of time and history as the basis for secular thought in the West. Buddhism and Hinduism traditionally hold to the cyclical view of time and history. Indian philosophy and religious thought, like that of the ancient Hebrews, could not reconcile itself to the universal suffering of mankind and hit upon the concept of karma. Karma is a universal causality in which individuals are rewarded or punished for their deeds when the soul transmigrates and becomes reincarnated. This view of time and history, Dr. Konvitz suggests, resulted in a traditional acceptance of life as it is and in a lack of historical consciousness. In contrast Judaism, Christianity, and Islam accepted the linear view. Time motion and change were real, and man had only one chance to do good in the world. (shrink)

The concepts of biblical time and history were unique in the ancient world and were adopted by western civilization. In the Hebrew Bible, there is a straight line of movement from the story of creation, Adam, Abraham and the Covenant, Exodus to the concept of the Messiah. This linear history is continued in the New Testament in the story of Jesus as the Messiah, his life and death, and the concept of the second coming of the Messiah. For the (...) Bible as a whole, each event is unique; there is no repetition. Time is real and the story moves forward in time, Professor Konvitz argues. From their early philosophers and historians to the Stoics, Greek thinkers believed in the cyclical nature of time and history, with some arguing for reincarnation and others, prototypical social scientists, seeing repetition of patterns in human behavior. (shrink)

A variety of evidence demonstrates that memory is a reconstructive process prone to errors and distortions. However, the complex relationship between memory encoding, strength of memory reactivation, and the likelihood of reporting true or false memories has yet to be ascertained. We address this issue in a setting that mimics a real-life experience: We asked participants to take a virtual museum tour in which they freely explored artworks included in the exhibit, while we measured the participants’ spontaneous viewing (...) class='Hi'>time of each explored artwork. In a following memory reactivation phase, participants were presented again with explored artworks, followed by novel artworks not belonging to the same exhibit. For each of these objects, participants provided a reliving rating that indexed the strength of memory reactivation. In the final memory recognition phase, participants underwent an old/new memory task, involving reactivated vs. baseline targets, and activated and baseline lures. The results showed that those targets that were spontaneously viewed for a longer amount of time were more frequently correctly recognized. This pattern was particularly true for reactivated targets associated with greater memory strength. Paradoxically, however, lures that were presented after targets associated with higher reliving ratings in the reactivation phase were more often erroneously recognized as artworks encountered during the tour. This latter finding indicates that memory intrusions, irrespective of the viewing time, are more likely to take place and be incorporated into true memories when the strength of target memory is higher. (shrink)

In Ockhamist branching-time logic [Prior 67], formulas are meant to be evaluated on a specified branch, or history, passing through the moment at hand. The linguistic counterpart of the manifoldness of future is a possibility operator which is read as `at some branch, or history (passing through the moment at hand)'. Both the bundled-trees semantics [Burgess 79] and the $\langle moment, history\rangle$ semantics [Thomason 84] for the possibility operator involve a quantification over sets of moments. The Ockhamist frames are (...) (3-modal) Kripke structures in which this second-order quantification is represented by a first-order quantification. The aim of the present paper is to investigate the notions of modal definability, validity, and axiomatizability concerning 3-modal frames which can be viewed as generalizations of Ockhamist frames. (shrink)

The thesis revolves around the following questions. What is time? Is time tensed or tenseless? Do things endure or perdure, i.e. do things persist by being wholly present at many times, or do they persist by having temporal parts? Do causes bring their effects into existence, or are they only correlated with each other? Within a realist approach to metaphysics, the author claims that the tensed view of time, the endurance view of persistence, and the production view (...) of causality naturally combine into what is called the dynamic view of temporal reality, and that the tenseless view of time, the perdurance view of persistence, and the correlation view of causality naturally combine into what is called the static view of temporal reality. The author argues in favour of a dynamic view. During the discussion a number of metaphysical problems are addressed. First, it is argued that the charges that the dynamic view is contradictory, made by J.M.E. McTaggart and David Lewis, are viciously circular. Secondly, it is argued that the static view cannot account for change, and deprives metaphysics of essential means to provide natural explanations to empirical phenomena. Thirdly, the author presents a novel account of the nature of necessary causal production. He suggests that the traditional conception of causes as essentially being external to the effects should be abandoned, and that causal production instead should be explicated in terms of reciprocal interactions between coexistent substances. (shrink)

This paper argues that we can see our lives as a snapshot happening now or as a moving picture extending across time. These dual ways of seeing our lives inform how we conceive of the problem of age group justice. A snapshot view sees age group justice as an interpersonal problem between distinct age groups. A moving picture view sees age group justice as a first-person problem of prudential choice. This paper explores these different ways of thinking about age (...) group justice and illustrates them using a principle of respect for human dignity, understood in terms of reasonable support for floor level central human capabilities at each stage of life. I argue that different frames are suitable for different kinds of decisions, and each provides a true, but partial, picture of aging and age group justice. (shrink)

Authors have paid considerable attention to how to define the meaningful work construct. This has led to providing comprehensive definitions in the light of different theoretical frameworks that reflect a degree of contestation within the field. Several of them have proposed definitions linked to the individuals’ pervasive sense of the value of their work. Others have offered descriptions centred on their temporal, episodic nature and emphasising the individual’s occasional work experience. These definitions reflected a potential temporal condition as well as (...) the variety of time perspectives underpinning the authors’ conceptualizations of the construct. This paper conducted a broad literature review to analyse works which have adopted a temporal framework or supported a time-based definition of the construct. The analysis indicates two different conceptualizations of the construct: as a permanent/steady mindset and as a changeable/episodic experience. As a reflective paper, the present contribution develops an overall framework for views and theories on meaningful work. It reports a critical review on the matter to elevate understanding of meaningful work for further research and applied implications in work and organizational studies. (shrink)

Years ago, Michael Dummett defended McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, arguing that it cannot be dismissed as guilty of an “indexical fallacy.” Recently, E. J. Lowe has disputed Dummett’s claims for the cogency of the argument. I offer an elaboration and defense of Dummett’s interpretation of the argument (though not of its soundness). I bring to bear some work on tense from the philosophy of language, and some recent work on the concept of the past as it (...) occurs in memory, in an effort to support the claim that McTaggart is not guilty of any simple indexical fallacy. Along the way I criticize an account of what is at stake in disputes about the reality of tense due to A. W. Moore, and I argue for the superiority of the conception of tense-realism that is implicit in McTaggart’s work. The paper is intended to prepare the ground for a substantive defense of the reality of tense. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Malament (2004) employs a time reversal transformation that differs from the standard one, without explicitly arguing for it. This is a new and important understanding of time reversal that deserves arguing for in its own right. I argue that it improves upon the standard one. Recent discussion has focused on whether velocities should undergo a time reversal operation. I address a prior question: What is the proper notion of time reversal? This is (...) important, for it will affect our conclusion as to whether our best theories are time-reversal symmetric, and hence whether our spacetime is temporally oriented. *Received February 2007; revised March 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Yale University, P.O. Box 208306, New Haven, CT 06520-8306; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

We find the claim that time is not real in both western and eastern philosophical traditions. In what follows I will call the view that time does not exist temporal error theory. Temporal error theory was made famous in western analytic philosophy in the early 1900s by John McTaggart (1908) and, in much the same tradition, temporal error theory was subsequently defended by Gödel (1949). The idea that time is not real, however, stretches back much further than (...) that. It is common to hear it said that according to Buddhist philosophy (as though that were a monolithic view) time is illusory. While it is not true that, in general, either contemporary or ancient Buddhist scholars have thought time to be illusory, there are certainly some schools of Buddhist thought, such as that of traditional Dzogchen practitioners, according to which there is no time. This paper is an attempt to set out a taxonomy of different views about what it takes for there to be time and, alongside that, a taxonomy of views about whether there is time or not, and if there is time what it is like. (shrink)

The Anthropocene concept allows human history to be imagined within the temporal framework of planetary processes. Accordingly, some environmentalists increasingly favour massively lengthening the temporal horizons of moral concern. Whilst there are defensible reasons for doing so, I wish to take issue with the ‘secular time’ perspective underlying some such approaches. To make my case, I present, in the first section, two recent manifestations of the long view perspective: a) ‘deep future’ narratives in popular climate science and futurism; b) (...) the ideas behind the Long Now Foundation. In the second section, I apply a critical lens to these perspectives via classic analyses of secular time by Charles Taylor, Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben. I conclude by suggesting that these post-secular critiques should be considered alongside recent approaches to the Anthropocene and the ‘geological turn’ from new materialist perspectives. (shrink)

In the absence of continuing selves or persons, Buddhist philosophers are under pressure to provide a systematic account of phenomenological and other features of conscious experience. Any such Buddhist account of experience, however, faces further problems because of another cardinal tenet of Buddhist revisionary metaphysics: the doctrine of impermanence, which during the Abhidharma period is transformed into the doctrine of momentariness. Setting aside the problems that plague the Buddhist Abhidharma theory of experience because of lack of persons, I shall focus (...) on problems that arise because of its allegiance to momentariness and explore some responses on behalf of the Abhidharma Buddhist philosophers. I address two challenges to the Buddhist view in this paper. The first, which I will call the “Phenomenological Challenge”, primarily concerns the temporal properties of what is represented in conscious experience. The second, which I will call the “Metaphysical Challenge”, concerns the temporal properties of conscious representation itself. (shrink)

The physical possibility of spacetimes containing closed timelike curves (CTCs) challenges the philosophy of time in the way that temporal ordering is, at best, remarkably non-standard: events on CTCs precede themselves. Apparently, such universes do not possess a consistent time order but only a consistent time direction. Thus, temporal directionality seems to be more fundamental than ordering in earlier-later or past-present-future. I will argue that this favors presentism as the adequate ontology of spacetimes: only presentism consistently copes (...) with the idea that temporal ordering depends on empirical constraints. The presentist Now is fundamentally undivided and productively directed towards existence. Time order arises by extending the Now, which can fail and in fact fails in universes containing CTCs. (shrink)

Humans are emotionally affected by cute or infantile appearances, typical of baby animals and humans, which in turn often leads to careful and cautious behavior. The purpose of this pre-registered study was to examine whether looking at cute images of baby pets improves performance of computerized cognitive-motor tasks. Ninety-eight participants were recruited for this online study and were randomly assigned to two experimental groups. The participants in one group performed two cognitive-motor tasks before and after viewing images of adult (...) pets and the participants in the other group performed the tasks before and after viewing images of baby pets. The participants who viewed images of baby pets rated them as significantly cuter and more infantile compared with those who viewed images of adult pets. All participants improved their performance from the pre-test to the post-test, but no differences in correct responses and reaction times were seen between the groups. However, pet ownership appeared to serve as a moderating variable with pet owners performing the Simon task faster than non-pet owners. In addition, pet owners reacted faster in the alternate task-switching task after viewing cute and infantile images but not after viewing images of adult pets. This effect was not found among non-pet owners. In conclusion, this study did not find that viewing cute images improves cognitive-motor performance, yet this may be dependent on moderators like pet ownership. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze the temporal structures that are appropriate to study the notion of point of view. When we analyze the points of view and their structure, it seems clear that we must take into account the time t in which a point of view is attributed to a subject. A two-dimensional temporal logic which combines a modal dimension for possibilities and a temporal one for the flow of time, offers a clear view of the temporary (...) location of a point of view. In this logic, we have histories, thanks to the temporal dimension, and evaluation is in two indices, time and history. These stories can be seen as different scenarios, providing a clear advantage when applying to the analysis of the notion of point of view. The conclusion is that, in order to give a proper approach for the notion of point of view, all these aspects should be combined. (shrink)

The book Time and Eternity , the English version of Zeit und Ewigkeit , by Antje Jackelén, contains scientific and theological treatments of these two topics, starting with the usage of such ideas in German, Swedish, and English hymns. This essay describes her work and explains how the scientific ideas provide a coherent framework for understanding the place of time.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

The article covers Erwin W. Straus’ views on the problem of time and temporal experience in the context of psychopathology. Beside Straus’ published scholarship, including his papers dealing exclusively with the subject of time, the sources utilized in this essay comprise several of Straus’ unpublished manuscripts on temporality, with the primary focus on the 1952 manuscript Temporal Horizons, which is discussed in greater detail and subsequently published for the first time in this journal. In the first part (...) of the article, the author introduces what he considers to be the central tension of the whole of Straus’ work on the issue of time, namely, the tension stemming from a dualistic account of time with its personal and impersonal dimensions. Interpretative developments of this tension are followed covering Straus’ early German works and his late American scholarship. The author presents Straus’ way of overcoming the dualistic account of time and his arguments in favour of what is termed here the “unified view of time”. Of critical importance for the unified view is Straus’ concept of “today”, which is extensively commented upon. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on the psychopathological consequences of the unified view as seen by Straus. A clear-cut boundary between a normal and a psychotic experience of time is supposed to lie in breaking the bond between the personal and the impersonal orders of time, leading to a fundamental estrangement. This view, it is claimed, is already present in a nutshell in Straus’ earliest work, and is elaborated upon later. In conclusion, both the merits and the weaknesses of Straus’ account of temporality are presented. A major advantage is that Straus abstains from a dualistic conception of time and reappraises the often-devalued clock time. A fundamental drawback is that Straus does not venture to explore the pathological varieties of temporal experience and fails to specify the acknowledged differences between, on the one hand, psychotic elements in depressive disorders, and, on the other hand, such elements in schizophrenic disturbances. (shrink)

This paper analyzes "ticking time bomb" scenarios in the discursive legitimation of torture and other coercive interrogation techniques. Judith Butler proposes a Foucauldian framework to suggest that Adminstration policies can be read as the irruption of sovereignty within governmentality. Rereading Foucault, I suggest that the policies could equally be understood as an exercise of governmentality, i.e., the subordination of juridical law to economy. I then propose as a reconciliation of these readings that time bomb scenarios serve rhetorically to (...) make the exercise of arbitrary power Butler identifies appear as an exercise of governmentality; sanitized of complications, coercive interrogation appears efficient. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the work of the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard “The Point of View for My Work as an Author” which is the most complete statement on the topic of his use of pseudonyms. The purpose of the article is to reveal the meaning of “The Point of View” for the study of the thinker’s creativity, to identify and discuss work-related problems. The first part of the article is devoted to the history of the cre­ation and publication (...) of “The Point of View”. The interpretations of pseudonymity in “The Point of View” and “Concluding Unscientific Postscript” are compared, the dif­ference between the goals and circumstances of the creation of works is considered. The reasons why Kierkegaard postponed the publication of “The Point of View” and never published it are analyzed. In the second part of the article the content of “The Point of View” is considered. Kierkegaard's interpretation of authorship and re­lated problems are analyzed. Kierkegaard connects his interpretation with the modern crisis of Christianity and shows that in these conditions a direct message about Chris­tianity is impossible. A religious author who carries out indirect communication ap­pears as a new religious type. The formation of these views of the thinker and their sig­nificance in the context of his epoch are discussed. The author of the article shows that the last part of “The Point of View” is in contradiction with its first part. Next, the criti­cism of “The Point of View” is considered. The author concludes that the skeptical atti­tude towards the content of the work is fair, but it is more aimed at destroying ideas about the possible integrity of Kierkegaard’s work and is influenced by Derrida’s doc­trine of deconstruction. The contradiction between the parts of “The Point of View” may be a consequence of Kierkegaard’s religious views and his communicative strat­egy. Arguments are made in favor of a positive attitude to the work and problems are formulated, work on which will help clarify the topic of pseudonymity. The author con­cludes that “The Point of View” is an important source through which we can trace the change in Kierkegaard’s attitude to his work. (shrink)

Experience of matter can be described in the context of time and space, whereas, some people say, experience of mind may be described according to time only. Accordingly, though time and space together are regarded as objective forms, one may have a propensity for treating time alone as a particular form of the subjective consciousness. For space is indeed referred to the self-evidence of being, while time is thought to belong rather to the self-evidence of (...) our own consciousness. According to my opinion, however, even the spatial description is indispensable for the state of “mind”. For instance, the contents of our consciousness can be described only in terms of the localized phases of their images. Contrary to Kant, who regarded time and space together as forms of the outer intuition (i.e. as conditions of sensation), and time alone as form of the inner sense, I have a firm intention to assert them both as two forms of objective being because it is the being itself that can be the ultimate object of any of our cognitive powers — sensation, understanding and reason. Time and space are not forms proper to a particular “being” such as conscious existence like ours; they are also, nay, above all, two objective forms of being in general that transcends all such limited existences. It follows that these forms themselves, once abstracted in our mind, must, first of all, be valid for material beings; after that, i.e. derivatively and analogically, they may also be valid for mind-beings. The main aim of this paper is “dialectically” to elucidate that fact on the subject of time in particular. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the temporal content of perceptual experience. It argues that we must recognize the existence of temporal perceptions, i.e., perceptions the content of which cannot be spelled out simply by looking at what is the case at an isolated instant. Acts of apprehension can cover a succession of events. However, a subject who has such perceptions can fall short of having a concept of time. Similar arguments have been put forward to show that a subject (...) who has spatial perceptions can fall short of having a concept of space. In both cases, it is the fact that perception is from a point of view which stands in the way of it constituting an exercise of a concept of how things are objectively. However, the paper also shows that the way in which perception is perspectival takes a different form in each of the two cases. (shrink)

This volume evaluates Thomas Bradwardine's view of time as a mathematical, philosophical and theological concept within the context of ancient and medieval ...

One of the more recalcitrant issues in the philosophy of time concerns the question of temporal asymmetry. Some theorists, many of them, like Einstein, physicists, believe that time is fundamentally reversible. According to this view, the physical universe is indifferent to the direction of time; consequently, something like an arrow of time is held to be a human subjective imposition on an otherwise temporally isotropic world. Another position, held by Alfred North Whitehead and contemporary process philosophers, (...) maintains that temporal asymmetry is a primitive condition of the universe, and that therefore even the most basic physical processes, such as those occurring at the subatomic level, display a distinct temporal direction. Finally, the philosopher of time J.T. Fraser (1978) claims that temporal asymmetry is an emergent feature of the universe, appearing for the first time with biogenesis. According to Fraser, with the emergence of life comes a present, or “now”, a temporal dimension whose absence in more primitive levels of cosmic evolution prohibits the attribution of an arrow of time to any pre-biotic entity. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show that a fuller treatment of imagination than offered by the deconstructionists depends upon ascertaining more completely its temporal character as originally outlined in Heidegger's dialogue with Kant. Emphasis is placed on the need to consider imagination as extending the temporal horizon both for the revealment and concealment of being. An adequate response to the deconstructionists lies in identifying the "economy" of imagination as the foothold for considering both the forgetting and recollection of being.