Sports tournaments provide a procedure for producing a champion and ranking the contestants based on game results. As such, tournaments mirror aggregation methods in social choice theory, where diverse individual preferences are put together to form an overall social preference. This connection allows us a novel way of conceptualizing sports tournaments, their results, and significance. I argue that there are genuine intransitive dominance relationships in sports, that social choice theory provides a framework for understanding rankings in such (...) situations and that these considerations provide a new reason to endorse championship pluralism. (shrink)

This paper addresses the gender pay gap among Italian university graduates on entry to the labor market, and stresses the potential for gender stereotypes to impact subjective assessment of individual productivity. We build upon previous research about gender and wage inequality, introducing tournament theory as a framework for the gender pay gap analysis. We hypothesize that the effects of gender make occupational tournaments less fair in some arenas compared with others. As a consequence, men workers have higher probabilities of (...) winning the wage competition, but this process is uneven. Our data show that in contexts where stereotypes are most likely to occur, tournaments appear to be less fair and the unexplained component of the gender pay gap is higher. (shrink)

The objective of this research is to examine whether and how enterprises adjust their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in response to top executives’ local tournament incentives. The findings provide evidence to support the claim that local compensation gaps encourage top executives to reduce their CSR performance; furthermore, they indicate that this reduction is accomplished mainly through the CSR categories of diversity, community, the environment and product. The enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) is examined, and the negative relationship between local (...) compensation gaps and CSR is documented to be weaker in states that feature stronger enforcement of NCAs, which constrains labour mobility and imposes turnover costs. The findings of this research are robust to concerns regarding endogeneity and reverse causality. (shrink)

Exploring online criticisms of the ‘take the knee’ protest during ‘Euro 2020’, this article examines how alt- and far-right conspiracies were both constructed and communicated via the social media platform, Twitter. By providing a novel exploration of alt-right conspiracies during an international football tournament, a qualitative thematic analysis of 1,388 original tweets relating to Euro 2020 was undertaken. The findings reveal how, in criticisms levelled at both ‘wokeism’ and the Black Lives Matter movement, antiwhite criticisms of the ‘take the knee’ (...) protest were embroiled in alt-right conspiracies that exposed an assumed Cultural Marxist, ‘woke agenda’ in the tournament’s organization and mainstream media coverage. In conclusion, it is argued that conspiratorial discourses, associated with the alt-right, provided a framework through which the protest could be understood. This emphasises how the significance of conspiracy functions to promote the wider dissemination of alt-right ideology across popular cultural contexts, such as sport. (shrink)

This paper documents for the first time tournament incentives of pension fund managers and their preferences for social and environmental security characteristics. Using a comprehensive data set on pension fund security holdings, differences in manager tournaments are distinguished by sorting pension funds into portfolios based on the number of concurrent managers each pension fund employs. Results indicate that the way pension schemes structure portfolio manager tournament incentives is important in explaining the social and environmental portfolio firm characteristics of pension (...) fund held stock. (shrink)

The dispute in philosophical decision theory between causalists and evidentialists remains unsettled. Many are attracted to the causal view’s endorsement of a species of dominance reasoning, and to the intuitive verdicts it gets on a range of cases with the structure of the infamous Newcomb’s Problem. But it also faces a rising wave of purported counterexamples and theoretical challenges. In this paper I will describe a novel decision theory which saves what is appealing about the causal view while avoiding its (...) most worrying objections, and which promises to generalize to solve a set of related problems in other normative domains. (shrink)

The current study investigates whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officer to be socially responsible. Furthermore, it explores the role of sub-national institutional contingencies [i.e., state-owned enterprises vs. non-SOEs, foreign-owned entities vs. non-FOEs, cross-listed vs. non-cross-listed, developed region] in CEO tournament incentives and the corporate social responsibility performance relationship. Data were collected from all A-shared companies listed in the stock exchanges of China from 2014 to 2019. The study uses the baseline methodology of ordinary least squares and cluster OLS regression. (...) Moreover, firm-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares regression, and propensity score matching deal with the endogeneity problem and check the robustness of the results. The results provide reliable evidence that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. On the other hand, sub-national institutional contingencies positively affect the association between CEO tournament incentives and CSRP. The findings have important implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSP by providing incentives to top managers. (shrink)

The unsafe behavior of construction workers is one of the most important and direct causes of safety accidents. Managers usually develop effective incentives aimed at regulating worker safety behavior. Due to the large number of workers in construction projects, there are multiple differences in fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, which will lead to the complex effect of the traditional mechanism to regulate workers’ safety behavior. In order to improve the effectiveness of incentive measures for worker safety behavior, this (...) paper takes into account the multiple differences of individual workers’ fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, based on the tournament mechanism to construct a competition incentive model. By designing a tournament reward and salary distribution for heterogeneous workers, the occurrence of unsafe behaviors can be reduced. The study found that in terms of the optimal level of safety investment, workers with risk aversion attitude generally invest higher than that of workers with risk preference, no matter whether they have a strong fairness preference or not; In terms of the distribution of tournament rewards, workers with a risk aversion attitude and a higher level of fairness preference need to be given higher incentives. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop an approach to population ethics which explains what we are permitted to do in virtue of the possible complaints against our action. This task is made difficult by a serious problem that arises when we attempt to generalize the view from two-option to many-option cases. The solution makes two significant moves – first, accepting that complaints are essentially pairwise comparative, and second, reimagining decision-making as a tournament between options competing two at a time. The right (...) view about when one option defeats another with respect to complaints, paired with the right view about how to pick the winners of the tournament given the relations of defeat, leads to a uniquely attractive view in the person-affecting tradition. (shrink)

Let T and T1 be tournaments with n elements, E a basis for T, E′ a basis for T′, and k ≥ 3 an integer. The dual of T is the tournament T” of basis E defined by T = T for all x, y ε E. A hemimorphism from T onto T′ is an isomorphism from T onto T” or onto T. A k-hemimorphism from T onto T′ is a bijection f from E to E′ such that for (...) any subset X of E of order k the restrictions T/X and T1/f are hemimorphic. The set of hemimorphisms of T onto itself has group structure, this group is called the group of hemimorphisms of T. In this work, we study the restrictions to n – 2 elements of a tournament with n elements. In particular, we prove: Let k ≥ 3 be an integer, T a tournament with n elements, where n ≥ k + 5. Then the following statements are equivalent: All restrictions of T to subsets with n – 2 elements are k-hemimorphic. All restrictions of T to subsets with n – 2 elements are 3-hemimorphic. All restrictions of T to subsets with n – 2 elements are hemimorphic. All restrictions of T to subsets with n – 2 elements are isomorphic, Either T is a strict total order, or the group of hemimorphisms of T is 2-homogeneous. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop an approach to population ethics which explains what we are permitted to do in virtue of the possible complaints against our action. This task is made difficult by a serious problem that arises when we attempt to generalize the view from two-option to many-option cases. The solution makes two significant moves – first, accepting that complaints are essentially pairwise comparative, and second, reimagining decision-making as a tournament between options competing two at a time. The right (...) view about when one option defeats another with respect to complaints, paired with the right view about how to pick the winners of the tournament given the relations of defeat, leads to a uniquely attractive view in the person-affecting tradition. (shrink)

We identify a new monotonicity condition (called cover monotonicity) for tournament solutions which allows a discrimination among main tournament solutions: The top-cycle, the iterated uncovered set, the minimal covering set, and the bipartisan set are cover monotonic while the uncovered set, Banks set, the Copeland rule, and the Slater rule fail to be so. As cover monotonic tournament solutions induce social choice rules which are Nash implementable in certain non-standard frameworks (such as those set by Bochet and Maniquet (CORE Discussion (...) Paper No. 2006/84, 2006) or Özkal-Sanver and Sanver (Social Choice and Welfare, 26(3), 607–623, 2006), the discrimination generated by cover monotonicity becomes particularly notable when implementability is a concern. (shrink)

This paper uses a field survey to investigate the quality of individuals’ beliefs of relative performance in tournaments. We consider two field settings, poker and chess, which differ in the degree to which luck is a factor and also in the information that players have about the ability of the competition. We find that poker players’ forecasts of relative performance are random guesses with an overestimation bias. Chess players also overestimate their relative performance but make informed guesses. We find (...) support for the “unskilled and unaware hypothesis” in chess: high-skilled chess players make better forecasts than low-skilled chess players. Finally, we find that chess players’ forecasts of relative performance are not efficient. (shrink)

This paper examines the theoretical background and actual behavior in a gaming tournament with endogenous timing where a person has more incentive, structure, and time to form a strategy. The baseline treatment suggests that subgame perfection is a reasonable predictor of behavior –- subjects made 170 of 208 theoretically predicted choices of best actions, with the majority of mistakes made in timing choices by the players who did not survive the cut to the second round. Four sensitivity treatments established that (...) the design feature that lead to more predictable behavior was time to think –- 745 of 960 correctly predicted decisions with more time versus 595 of 960 with less time. A random effects Probit model suggests that the key design feature that closed the gap between predicted and observed behavior was not necessarily the non-linear payoffs created by the tournament design, but rather that the key was providing people with more time to think about their strategy. (shrink)

Evolutionary applications of game theory present one of the most pedagogically accessible varieties of genuine, contemporary theoretical biology. We present here Oyun (OY-oon, http://charlespence.net/oyun), a program designed to run iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments, competitions between prisoner’s dilemma strategies developed by the students themselves. Using this software, students are able to readily design and tweak their own strategies, and to see how they fare both in round-robin tournaments and in “evolutionary” tournaments, where the scores in a given “generation” (...) directly determine contribution to the population in the next generation. Oyun is freely available, runs on Windows, Mac, and Linux computers, and the process of creating new prisoner’s dilemma strategies is both easy to teach and easy for students to grasp. We illustrate with two interesting examples taken from actual use of Oyun in the classroom. (shrink)

Recent articles, including those by Dixon and Torres and Hager, criticize tournament playoffs, primarily for reasons of fairness and integrity. Many suggest that playoff and tournament prominence reflect monetary and entertainment interests rather than the pursuit of athletic excellence. Nevertheless, tournament playoffs are increasingly popular. While the concerns are serious, in this paper I defend the overlooked value of playoffs and tournaments. Playoff critics employ too narrow a conception of the best team and too limited a view of excellence. (...) Rather, playoffs and seasons highlight distinct and valuable conceptions of athletic excellence. To better capture this, I consider two alternative championship formats: the hybrid system and championship pluralism. The hybrid system includes a playoff informed by the regular season. Despite its apparent advantages, I reject the hybrid approach. Instead, I propose championship pluralism as a preferred championship model. (shrink)

We introduce a new solution for tournaments called the unsurpassed set. This solution lies between the uncovered set and the Copeland winner set. We show that this solution is more decisive than the uncovered set in discriminating among alternatives, and avoids a deficiency of the Copeland winner set. Moreover, the unsurpassed set is more sensitive than the uncovered set but less sensitive than the Copeland winner set to the reinforcement of the chosen alternatives. Besides, it turns out that this (...) solution violates the other standard properties including independence of unchosen alternatives, stability, composition consistency and indempotency. (shrink)

This paper examines the theoretical background and actual behavior in a gaming tournament with endogenous timing where a person has more incentive, structure, and time to form a strategy. The baseline treatment suggests that subgame perfection is a reasonable predictor of behavior –- subjects made 170 of 208 theoretically predicted choices of best actions, with the majority of mistakes made in timing choices by the players who did not survive the cut to the second round. Four sensitivity treatments established that (...) the design feature that lead to more predictable behavior was time to think –- 745 of 960 correctly predicted decisions with more time versus 595 of 960 with less time. A random effects Probit model suggests that the key design feature that closed the gap between predicted and observed behavior was not necessarily the non-linear payoffs created by the tournament design, but rather that the key was providing people with more time to think about their strategy. (shrink)

We consider T -round elimination tournaments where players have fixed resources instead of cost functions. We show that players always spend a higher share of their resources in early than in later rounds in a symmetric equilibrium. Equal resource allocation across T rounds takes place only in the winner-take-all case. Applications for career paths, elections, and sports are discussed.

Tournament-like promotion systems are the default in audit firms, which are generally internally owned professional partnerships. While awarding promotions in a contest-like fashion stimulates contestants’ motivation and productivity, it may also upset an organizations’ ethical climate and trigger ethically adverse behaviors. Since nearly all research on promotion tournaments in management has been conducted in public firms, little is known about how these incentive systems operate in professional partnerships. In this study, we analyze how the perception of the two controllable (...) design parameters of promotion tournaments—the relative pay spread between winners and losers and tournament breadth in terms of the number of contestants that compete for a prize—affects audit firm behavior. Survey results provide evidence that the tournament’s perceived breadth prompts adverse behavior, as it does in public firms. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, the perceived pay spread has no significant effect on adverse behavior, but triggers desirable behaviors instead. Our study suggests that promotion tournaments indeed provide powerful incentives, but also that understanding the unintended consequences of these incentives on organizational ethical climates and behavior requires tournament theory to be contextualized when it is applied in new settings like internally owned professional partnerships. (shrink)

Tournament-like promotion systems are the default in audit firms, which are generally internally owned professional partnerships. While awarding promotions in a contest-like fashion stimulates contestants’ motivation and productivity, it may also upset an organizations’ ethical climate and trigger ethically adverse behaviors. Since nearly all research on promotion tournaments in management has been conducted in public firms, little is known about how these incentive systems operate in professional partnerships. In this study, we analyze how the perception of the two controllable (...) design parameters of promotion tournaments—the relative pay spread between winners and losers and tournament breadth in terms of the number of contestants that compete for a prize—affects audit firm behavior. Survey results provide evidence that the tournament’s perceived breadth prompts adverse behavior, as it does in public firms. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, the perceived pay spread has no significant effect on adverse behavior, but triggers desirable behaviors instead. Our study suggests that promotion tournaments indeed provide powerful incentives, but also that understanding the unintended consequences of these incentives on organizational ethical climates and behavior requires tournament theory to be contextualized when it is applied in new settings like internally owned professional partnerships. (shrink)

Drawing on models of the interaction order, we describe how planning is an inherently social activity. We argue that planning as a practice involves five core elements: mirroring, identifying, coordinating, timing, and surmounting. Specifically, planning depends on (1) a realization of likely responses of others, (2) a recognition of communal understandings, grounded in local cultures, (3) a commitment to collaborative engagements with allies, (4) an adjustment to temporal sequences involving the use of “in time” strategies and tactics, and (5) an (...) ability to overcome or avoid obstacles and blocking moves set by competitors and adversaries. Planning is evident in micro-, meso-, or macro-level domains. To demonstrate how planning is a social accomplishment, we analyze three distinct ethnographic sites: the world of competitive chess, dependent on the micro-interactions of two competitors; the meso-level process of homebuying, requiring the aid of real estate agents as allies; and macro-level structures in directing social movement activism in a contentious action field. Planning extends beyond cognitive achievement and is central to a sociology of the future. (shrink)

The name of the third author was incorrect in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

In contrast to Axelrod’s advice “don’t be envious” it is argued that the emotion of envy may enhance cooperation. TIT FOR TAT does exhibit a certain degree of envy. But, it does so in inconsistent ways. Two variants of TIT FOR TAT are introduced and their strategic properties are analyzed. Both generate the very same actual play as TIT FOR TAT in a computer tournament without noise. However, if noise is introduced they display some greater degree of stability. This is (...) due to the fact that they form, in a prisoner’s dilemma supergame with suitable parameters, an equilibrium with themselves that is subgame perfect or (in case of the first strategy) close to subgame perfect. It is additionally argued that these strategies are exceptionally clear and comprehensible to others in that they conform to well known real live behavior patterns. (shrink)

This paper deals with the problematic aspect of the reconstruction of binary relations: it includes all the questions raising the possibility or impossibility to determine a structure by gathering given substructures. It is the continuation of three studies: the first made by G. Lopez [9] in 1972 about the determination of a binary relation through the types of isomorphism of its restrictions, the second made by K. B. Reid and C. Thomassen [15] in 1976 about the strongly self-complementary tournaments (...) , the third made by C. Thomassen [16] in 1989 about the cycle space of a tournament. In the second section, we use the notion of class of difference to extend a study made in [16] to binary relations. Then, in the third section, we improve the result of this last study in the case of the tournaments. After noticing that the result of [15] inferred itself naturally from the approach developed in [9], we extend, in the fourth section, the study made in [15] to binary relations. (shrink)

Drawing on tournament theory, we argue that when environmental goals are incorporated into the cadre evaluation system, compared to officials who are close to retirement (i.e., retiring officials), non-retiring officials may exert more effort to foster risky green innovation. Based on a sample of publicly traded firms from heavily polluting industries in China between 2008 and 2016, we hypothesize and find that confronted with severe environmental pollution, firms in provinces with non-retiring governors have higher green innovation performance than those in (...) provinces with retiring governors. Moreover, we find that this effect is stronger for firms in provinces whose governors have higher promotion anticipation, for local state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and for politically connected firms. Our study identifies the political incentives of government officials as an important antecedent of corporate green innovation and highlights the value of establishing a “green” cadre evaluation system to promote sustainable development. (shrink)

In 2021, the men’s English national football team reached their first final at a major international tournament since winning the World Cup in 1966. This success followed their previous achievement of reaching the semi-finals (knocked-out by Croatia) at the 2018 World Cup. True to form, the defeats proved unfalteringly English; with the 2021 final echoing previous tournament defeats, as England lost to Italy on penalties. However, what resonated with the predictability of an English defeat, was the accompanying chant, ‘it’s coming (...) home’. A ubiquitous presence throughout the course of both tournaments—while chanted at England football matches, it was also repeated across social media, the press and commercial advertising—the chant originates from the 1996 single, Three Lions (Football’s Coming Home), performed by David Baddiel, Frank Skinner and The Lightning Seeds. In what follows critical attention will be given to examining how the song offers what will be argued is a melancholic outlook. By re-approaching examples of English nostalgia and hubris, this chapter will expose how illustrations of English melancholy offer the potential for promoting collective forms of expression, which, when contextualized alongside England’s lack of footballing success (for the men’s team, at least), can be offset against a melancholic mediation that is cognizant of the centrality of loss—both for the subject and our collective sporting endeavours. (shrink)

Robert King Merton’s article published in Science popularized the Matthew Effect: “For to everyone who has, more will be given and he will grow rich; but from the one who has not, even what he has will be taken away”. The Matthew Effect prevails at the individual, organization-industry, and country-global levels. This interdisciplinary review connects the Holy Bible with agency theory, tournament theory, corporate social responsibility, prospect theory, behavioral economics, the psychology of money, and business ethics in the literature. I (...) expand the Matthew Effect, incorporate prospect theory and the love of money, and develop a multi-level theory of the Matthew Effect in Monetary Wisdoms: Individual decision-makers apply their deep-rooted values as a lens, frame the critical concerns in the immediate and omnibus contexts, and maximize expected utility and ultimate serenity-happiness across people, context, and time at the individual, organization-industry, and country-global levels. The rich serve God, enjoying the ultimate joy and happiness. The poor serve mammon, destroying their lives. The rich get richer. The poor get poorer. Scholars of business ethics and CSR must explore this phenomenon in future studies. (shrink)

This book explores the role of artificial intelligence in the development of a claim that morality is person-made and rational. Professor Danielson builds moral robots that do better than amoral competitors in a tournament of games like the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken. The book thus engages in current controversies over the adequacy of the received theory of rational choice. It sides with Gauthier and McClennan, who extend the devices of rational choice to include moral constraint. Artificial Morality goes further, by (...) promoting communication, testing and copying of principles and by stressing empirical tests. (shrink)

In the Formula of Humanity, Kant embraces the principle that it is wrong for us to treat others merely as means. For contemporary Kantian ethicists, this Mere Means Principle plays the role of a moral constraint: it limits what we may do, even in the service of promoting the overall good. But substantive interpretations of the principle generate implausible results in relatively ordinary cases. On one interpretation, for example, you treat your opponent in a tennis tournament merely as a means (...) and thus wrongly when you try, through defeating him, to win first place. The article aims to develop a reconstruction of the Mere Means Principle that has more plausible implications than do rival reconstructions. It sets out a sufficient condition for an agent's treating another merely as a means. This condition is intended to be Kantian, but not necessarily one that Kant endorses. (shrink)

This book explores the role of artificial intelligence in the development of a claim that morality is person-made and rational. Professor Danielson builds moral robots that do better than amoral competitors in a tournament of games like the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken. The book thus engages in current controversies over the adequacy of the received theory of rational choice. It sides with Gauthier and McClennan, who extend the devices of rational choice to include moral constraint. _Artificial Morality_ goes further, by (...) promoting communication, testing and copying of principles and by stressing empirical tests. (shrink)

Remember that childhood game “Odds or Evens” you used to play in order to settle important disputes such as who gets the last slice of pizza? There was only one element of skill to that game: trying to figure out what the other person would throw. But that wasn’t easy. If your opponent was savvy, that meant trying to figure out what he thought you were going to throw. And that sometimes meant figuring out what he thought you thought he (...) was going to throw. -/- Philosophers call this “thought attribution,” and top poker players are remarkably good at it. The ability to attribute thoughts to other people is especially important in the No-Limit Texas Hold’em tournaments that have, through television and the Internet, swept the globe in recent years. What is required to succeed in this game is not merely attributing “first-order” thoughts to other players, but attributing to them thoughts about your thoughts about their thoughts. In fact, that’s the minimum. The kind of thinking done by the very best players (T. J. Cloutier, Howard Lederer, and Daniel Negreanu are especially good at it) is much more complex than that. -/- In this paper, I explore the light that recent philosophical work on thought attribution sheds on the kind of thinking that goes on at the expert poker table. The paper should be revealing to poker experts and novices alike. And it should be of interest to philosophers interested in poker or thought attribution. -/- The essay is published in Poker and Philosophy, a volume of Open Court's Popular Culture and Philosophy Series. The goal of the series is to introduce philosophical themes to non-philosophers by way of particular topics of interest (in this case poker). (shrink)

We describe a broad class of problems, called “uncompromising problems,” which are characterized by the requirement that solutions must perform optimally on each of many test cases. Many of the problems that have long motivated genetic programming research, including the automation of many traditional programming tasks, are uncompromising. We describe and analyze the recently proposed “lexicase” parent selection algorithm and show that it can facilitate the solution of uncompromising problems by genetic programming. Unlike most traditional parent selection techniques, lexicase selection (...) does not base selection on a fitness value that is aggregated over all test cases; rather, it considers test cases one at a time in random order. We present results comparing lexicase selection to more traditional parent selection methods, including standard tournament selection and implicit fitness sharing, on four uncompromising problems: 1) finding terms in finite algebras; 2) designing digital multipliers; 3) counting words in files; and 4) performing symbolic regression of the factorial function. We provide evidence that lexicase selection maintains higher levels of population diversity than other selection methods, which may partially explain its utility as a parent selection algorithm in the context of uncompromising problems. (shrink)

The sports world has historically rejected the practice of tanking. I argue that this attitude is unwarranted. To do so, I introduce a concept called strategic suboptimal play (SSP), which is the practice of incurring the risk of a short-term competitive disadvantage to increase the chances of gaining a longer-term competitive advantage. Tanking is just an instance of SSP employed in higher-order games, i.e. games that are at least partially played by other games, like tournaments or seasons. Since SSP (...) is integral to every sport, there are currently no easy grounds for rejecting it outright. As such, the same is true of tanking. I will explore some possible reasons why tanking is wrongly thought objectionable, as well as some objections to and implications of my argument for competitive sports more broadly. (shrink)