Recent work by Wan and McLean has shown that all quantum measurements may be reduced to local position measurements. Using an array of particle detectors as the measuring apparatus we show how a model employing superselection rules and unitary evolution leads to a single detector triggering in each act of measurement. We also present an explicit model of particle detection as a unitary ionization process producing a single ion in the detector, subsequent amplification of which to the visible can be (...) described adequately in classical terms. (shrink)

Rosenkranz (2021) offered a logic and a detailed account of justification, according to which justification that p can be analyzed as a form of second-level ignorance: ¬K¬Kp. An intuition behind the analysis is that the justified subject has the potential, at least in a nearby world, to either come to know p or come to know ¬Kp. However, given Rosenkranz’s hyperintensional semantics for modeling knowledge states, we can always construct, out of an ¬K¬K-agent’s knowledge state, epistemic possibilities that prohibit the (...) agent from having that potential. This shows that Rosenkranz’s analysis is still insufficient for carrying all the epistemic weight underlying the notion of justification. A better analysis would require a deeper look into an agent’s knowledge structure and its involved modalities, which could be a lot more complex than what the ¬K¬K rule tells us. (shrink)

Traditionally, there has been a clear distinction between classical systems and quantum systems, particularly in the mathematical theories used to describe them. In our recent work on macroscopic quantum systems, this distinction has become blurred, making a unified mathematical formulation desirable, so as to show up both the similarities and the fundamental differences between quantum and classical systems. This paper serves this purpose, with explicit formulations and a number of examples in the form of superconducting circuit systems. We introduce three (...) classes of physical systems with finite degrees of freedom: classical, standard quantum, and mixed quantum, and present a unified Hilbert space treatment of all three types of system. We consider the classical/quantum divide and the relationship between standard quantum and mixed quantum systems, illustrating the latter with a derivation of a superselection rule in superconducting systems. (shrink)

Wittgenstein argues that understanding a language consists of mastery of techniques for playing language?games rather than some sort of mental state or episode such as mental imagery, rule invocation, or atmosphere investing our experience of words. His elimination of the three mentalistic alternatives presupposes the peculiar distinction, or its virtual lack, between speaker and listener presupposed by his positive claim, instead of establishing the latter. This paper vindicates the episodic nature of certain types of understanding, and gives each of (...) his three alternatives a suitably qualified role therein, by drawing the distinctions in a less biassed way. (shrink)

Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such counterexamples for friends of the PII, but then argue that no response is entirely satisfactory. Finally, I undermine some positive arguments for PII.

The present paper deals with a systemS of propositional calculus, conjunction, equivalence and falsum being its primitive terms.The only primitive rule inS is the rule of extensionality defined by the scheme: $\frac{{E\alpha \beta ,\Phi (\alpha )}}{{\Phi (\beta )}}$.

Argues against D. Hume's (1825) treatise "Of Miracles," which is often used to disprove the existence of psi. Hume states that a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature which are proved to be true by common experience, and that the only sufficient testimony for a miracle would be testimony whose falsehood would be even more miraculous than the miracle itself. The primary objections to Hume's argument are that (1) it is tautological, since it presupposes the nonexistence of (...) miraculous events, and (2) as a metaphysical statement, it is inappropriate when considering empirical evidence, which should be judged by its own rule. (shrink)

The authors use the term “principlism” to refer to the practice of using “principles” to replace both moral theory and particular moral rules and ideals in dealing with the moral problems that arise in medical practice. The authors argue that these “principles” do not function as claimed, and that their use is misleading both practically and theoretically. The “principles” are in fact not guides to action, but rather they are merely names for a collection of sometimes superficially related matters for (...) consideration when dealing with a moral problem. The “principles” lack any systematic relationship to each other, and they often conflict with each other. These conflicts are unresolvable, since there is no unified moral theory from which they are all derived. For comparison the authors sketch the advantages of using a unified moral theory. (shrink)

This study analyzed 16 potential ethics-related problems associated with use and abuse of video news releases (VNRs) by public relations practitioners and electronic journalists. Causes and possible solutions to the problems were suggested and model ethics code guidelines were developed. Moral rules, moral ideals, theories of ethics, public relations theories, and electronic journalism theories were used to provide a general foundation for the analysis. A more specific foundation was provided by guidelines from a variety of media codes of ethics.

The paper considers certain extensions of the system LC introduced in Dunn & Meyer 1997. LC is a structurally free system , but it has combinators as formulas in the place of structural rules. We consider two ways to extend LC with conjunction and disjunction depending on whether they distribute over each other or not. We prove the elimination theorem for the systems. At the end of the paper we give a Routley-Meyer style semantics for the distributive extension, including some (...) new definitions and an algorithm which are used in proving a representation theorem in general, i.e., for arbitrary combinators. (shrink)

We prove a Gleason-type theorem for the quantum probability rule using frame functions defined on positive-operator-valued measures, as opposed to the restricted class of orthogonal projection-valued measures used in the original theorem. The advantage of this method is that it works for two-dimensional quantum systems and even for vector spaces over rational fields—settings where the standard theorem fails. Furthermore, unlike the method necessary for proving the original result, the present one is rather elementary. In the case of a qubit, (...) we investigate similar results for frame functions defined upon various restricted classes of POVMs. For the so-called trine measurements, the standard quantum probability rule is again recovered. (shrink)

Although science supplies medicine's “gold standard,” knowledge exercised in the care of patients is, like moral knowing, a matter of narrative, practical reason. Physicians draw on case narrative to store experience and to apply and qualify the general rules of medical science. Literature aids in this activity by stimulating moral imagination and by requiring its readers to engage in the retrospective construction of a situated, subjective account of events. Narrative truths are provisional, uncertain, derived from narrators whose standpoints are always (...) situated, particular, and uncertain, but open to comparison and reinterpretation. Reading is thus a model for knowing in both morality and clinical medicine. While principles remain essential to bioethics and science must always inform good clinical practice, the tendency to collapse morality into principles and medicine into science impoverishes both practices. Moral knowing is not separable from clinical judgment. While ethics must be open to discussion and interpretation by patients, families, and society, it is nevertheless substantively and epistemologically an inextricable part of a physician's clinical practice. (shrink)

The Common Rule creates a division of moral labor in research. It implies that investigators and sponsors can outsource their ethical obligations to IRBs and participants, thereby fostering a culture of compliance, rather than one of responsibility. The proposed revisions to the Common Rule are likely to exacerbate this problem. To harness the expressive power of the law, I propose the Common Rule be revised to include the ethical responsibilities of investigators and sponsors.

Imagine a study in which HIV-infected pregnant women are given antiretroviral treatment to determine how effectively it will prevent HIV transmission during childbirth. Each mother’s involvement in this study ends with the birth of her child, at which time her access to antiretrovirals provided by the study also ceases. At the outset of the study, the investigator and sponsor agree that after the child’s birth, they will refer mothers who require treatment for their HIV to a national program that provides (...) antiretroviral treatment and care. Assuming the Institutional Review Board raises no objections to this plan, should the research team consider their ethical obligations to participants fulfilled? If the investigator and sponsor were to consult the Common Rule, they would find little to suggest that there are any further ethical issues to address. (shrink)

An Institute of Medical Ethics working party argues that an ethically desirable relationship of mutual empowerment between patient and clinician is more likely to be achieved if patients understand the ground rules of medical confidentiality. It identifies and illustrates ambiguities in the General Medical Council's guidance on AIDS and confidentiality, and relates this to the practice of different doctors and specialties. Matters might be clarified, it suggests, by identifying moral factors which tend to recur in medical decisions about maintaining or (...) breaching confidentiality. The working party argues that two such factors are particularly important: the patient's need to exercise informed choice and the doctor's primary responsibility to his or her own patients. (shrink)

Wischik presents an extensive reply to our paper on conscientious objection, which explores the implications of distinguishing ‘medical acts’ from ‘socioclinical acts’. He provides an extensive leg...

We agree with Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland’s (2023) assessment that the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) should be viewed as an essential requirement of the organ donation process, and that the essence of the r...

In the setting of transplant medicine, decision making needs to take into account the multiple clinical and psychosocial case variables, rather than turn to arbitrary rules that cannot be scientifically supportedThe yearly demand for liver transplants far exceeds the supply of available organs .1 Additionally, alcoholic cirrhosis has been a controversial indication for transplant as these recipients can be viewed as having caused their own illness—an illness that is preventable by abstaining from alcohol . While not categorically denying liver transplantation (...) to those with alcoholic cirrhosis, many hospitals have incorporated a six month alcohol abstinence criterion 2 in an effort to select optimal candidates. The six month rule has two purposes; namely, allowing the liver a chance to recover in the absence of alcohol , and also observation of the patient to verify that he/she remains alcohol free, with the hope of reducing the risk of relapse. Everhart et al,3 determined that 85% of US liver transplant programmes and 43% of third party payers require a defined period of abstinence—for example, three or six months—as part of the waiting list process.Liver transplantation does not cure alcoholism, as evidenced by the fact that roughly 20% of these patients use alcohol following transplant, with one third exhibiting “repetitive or heavy drinking”.4 Arguments abound as to the scientific merit of a six month abstinence criterion in reducing the risk of alcohol relapse following transplant. Some propose that a minimum of six months abstinence itself predicts a lower relapse rate,5 while others argue that six months is not predictive or that other factors—for example, illicit drug use—in combination with a minimum number of months abstinent is predictive.6,7 Even the United …. (shrink)

BackgroundIn specific situations it may be necessary to make an exception to the general rule of informed consent for scientific research with an intervention. Earlier reviews only described subsets of arguments for exceptions to waive consent.MethodsHere, we provide a more extensive literature review of possible exceptions to the rule of informed consent and the accompanying arguments based on literature from 1997 onwards, using both Pubmed and PsycINFO in our search strategy.ResultsWe identified three main categories of arguments for the (...) acceptability of a consent waiver: data validity and quality, major practical problems, and distress or confusion of participants. Approval by a medical ethical review board always needs to be obtained. Further, we provide examples of specific conditions under which consent waiving might be allowed, such as additional privacy protection measures.ConclusionsThe reasons legitimized by the authors of the papers in this overview can be used by researchers to form their own opinion about requesting an exception to the rule of informed consent for their own study. Importantly, rules and guidelines applicable in their country, institute and research field should be followed. Moreover, researchers should also take the conditions under which they feel an exception is legitimized under consideration. After discussions with relevant stakeholders, a formal request should be sent to an IRB. (shrink)

Han Fei was a famous Legalist in the late Warring States period. During the struggle to criticize the Confucian school, he developed the theory of the "rule of law," which laid a theoretical groundwork on which the newly emerging landlord class could build a centralized feudal state. His works had been appreciated by Ch'in Shih-huang. When Ch'in Shih-huang read the book Han Fei Tzu, he sighed and said, "I would feel no regret about dying if I could meet this (...) person and become his friend." Later Ch'in Shih-huang applied this progressive theory of Han Fei in practice and developed it through practice. (shrink)

Unlike the principles of Kant, Mill, and Rawls, those of principlism are not action guides that stem from an underlying, integrated moral theory. Hence problems arise in reconciling the principles with each other and, indeed, in interpreting them as action guides at all, since they have no content in and of themselves. Another approach to "theory and method in bioethics" is presented as an alternative to principlism, though actually the "alternative" predates principlism by about 10 years. The alternative's account of (...) morality stays close to ordinary, common morality with its rules and ideals, which in turn are grounded in aspects of human nature. As such, morality must be understood to be a rational, impartial, and public system that is incumbent on everyone. Morality is a unified and integrated system. The moral rules and ideals are also "culture-" and "profession-sensitive" in that they are interpreted more specifically within these various contexts. (shrink)

To understand the tma we should follow a rule of polemical force as well as a rule of validity. Following just the latter vlastos renders the explicit theory of forms and the two suppressed premises as an inconsistent triad. But the rule of polemical force indicates that the explicit theory is ambivalent. Just one f-Ness must be the basis, Either for any f thing being f, Or for any set of f things being just that set. It (...) cannot be the basis for all f things being f. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"General Rules" in Hume's Treatise THOMAS K. HEARN, JR. IT COULDBE CONFIDENTLYASSERTED in 1925 that Hume was "no longer a living figure." x Stuart Hampshire records that when he began his philosophy studies in 1933, Hume's conclusions were regarded at Oxford as "extravagances of scepticism which no one could seriously accept." 2 That virtually no Anglo-American philosopher would now share such opinions about Hume testifies not only to the (...) general change in the philosophical climate but, in addition, it reflects a transformation which has occurred in the interpretation of Hume's philosophy. In eitecting this transformation.much credit is due to the work of Norman Kemp Smith. Kemp Smith argued that preoccupation with Hume's empiricist heritage and his scepticism had blinded scholars to the fundamentally constructive intent of his philosophy, and, indeed, that only from the perspective of his positive achievement was it possible to grasp the nature and significance of Humean scepticism. This paper, in keeping with the basic orientation of Kemp Smith, sets out a central feature in the attempt to describe and assess Hume's constructive, nonsceptical point of view: Hume attributes to general rules "a mighty influence on our actions and understanding..." (374).4 This paper examines the Treatise to show that this was not just a casual comment. To discuss the "influence" of general rules requires an examination of their character and the various aspects of "action and understanding " in which such rules function. The thesis to be developed can be stated briefly. In Book I Hume introduces two sorts of general rules which must be distinguished carefully. One type of rule describes a propensity of the imagination to extend the scope This research was supported by a grant from the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. x Charles W. Hendcl, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume (New York, 1963), p. 20. (First published in 1925.) For Professor Hendel's later comments on this statement, see pp. xxi ft. "Hume's Place in Philosophy" in David Hume, ed. D. F. Pears (London, 1963), p. 3. a Proper stress is due here to the phrase "basic orientation." There is much about Kemp Smith's understanding of Hume which is mistaken in my view. 9 The page references in parentheses refer to the Svlby-Bigge edition of A Treatise o/ Human Nature (Oxford, 1888). [4o5] 406 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY of judgments formed in one set of circumstances to other resembling but non-identical circumstances. The other type of general rule, the discussion of which largely occupies this paper, functions to correct certain natural propensities which result in erroneous belief or action if permitted to operate unchecked. The same pattern, a natural tendency requiring correction by general rules, is exhibited in all three books of the Treatise, and can be said to represent one of the basic ingredients in Hume's account of human nature and experience. It is somewhat surprising that in a book which patiently discusses almost evcxy theme in the Treatise, Kemp Smith's study contains no discussion at all of rules. This is the more puzzling as Kemp Smith clearly recognized that by reflection the understanding supplies principles which are normative for the interpretation of experience.5 Our aim in this study is to discuss what for Hume these principles are, and, as far as possible, how they fit into the Humean account of human nature. A fuller understanding of the nature and function of such reflective principles is required to spare Kemp Smith's interpretation from a seeming inconsistency. This apparent inconsistency arises because Kemp Smith takes the slavery of reason to the passions as the "key" to his understanding of Hume, but then develops the view that for Hume reason/s a passion, in Hume's words, "a wonderful and unintelligible instinct." (179)6 The inconsistency disappears when it is recognized that Kemp Smith's account of Hume requires a more subtle and complex understanding of the role of reason than that suggested by the emphasis on the "slavery of reason" especially in the early parts of the book. This study represents a way of supplying the broader and more const,ructive understanding of reason which... (shrink)

The general problem of visual search can be shown to be computationally intractable in a formal, complexity-theoretic sense, yet visual search is extensively involved in everyday perception, and biological systems manage to perform it remarkably well. Complexity level analysis may resolve this contradiction. Visual search can be reshaped into tractability through approximations and by optimizing the resources devoted to visual processing. Architectural constraints can be derived using the minimum cost principle to rule out a large class of potential solutions. (...) The evidence speaks strongly against bottom-up approaches to vision. In particular, the constraints suggest an attentional mechanism that exploits knowledge of the specific problem being solved. This analysis of visual search performance in terms of attentional influences on visual information processing and complexity satisfaction allows a large body of neurophysiological and psychological evidence to be tied together. (shrink)

The goal is to isolate points of philosophical interest in the preceding articles on narrative medical ethics in order to focus subsequent dialogue between the two disciplines. Ethics is an enterprise that has over the centuries developed a somewhat malleable structure, comprising characteristics, methods, lines of reasoning, rules, principles, assumptions, and arguments. This structure provides the framework within which many disciplines contribute to ethics through the exercise of their particular interests, skills, and methods. Challenging or changing the structural components requires (...) arguments of a traditional sort appropriate to the discipline of ethics. Three tenets are proposed as comprising the “received view” or credo of the literature and ethics movement. Each is examined. Then the individual articles in this issue are explored to the end of ferreting out points that would be fruitful points of discussion between philosophy and literature folks pursuing their mutual interest in ethics. (shrink)

What is African American Politics? What form should it take? How does it conceptualize white supremacy? In In the Shadow of Du Bois, Robert Gooding-Williams uses the work of W. E. B. Du Bois and Fredrick Douglass to provide answers to these questions. While the choices of Douglass and Du Bois make a great deal of sense, they reproduce the tendency of confining political theory to literature – a move that bounds the genre in problematic ways. In this article, I (...) in effect attempt to “unbound” the genre by considering Ella Baker, a civil rights era political organizer. (shrink)

The increasing emphasis on evidence-based clinical practice has thrown into sharp focus multiple deficiencies in current systems of ethical review. This paper argues that a complete overhaul of systems for ethical oversight of studies involving human subjects is now required as developments in medical, epidemiological and genetic research have outstripped existing structures for ethical supervision. It shows that many problems are now evident and concludes that sequential and piecemeal amendments to present arrangements are inadequate to address these. At their core (...) present systems of ethical review still rely on the integrity and judgment of individual investigators. One possible alternative is to train and license research investigators, make explicit their responsibilities and have ethics committees devote much more of their time to monitoring research activity in order to detect those infringing the rules. (shrink)

Abortion is forbidden under normal circumstances by nearly all the major world religions. Traditionally, abortion was not deemed permissible by Muslim scholars. Shiite scholars considered it forbidden after implantation of the fertilised ovum. However, Sunni scholars have held various opinions on the matter, but all agreed that after 4 months gestation abortion was not permitted. In addition, classical Islamic scholarship had only considered threats to maternal health as a reason for therapeutic abortion. Recently, scholars have begun to consider the effect (...) of severe fetal deformities on the mother, the families and society. This has led some scholars to reconsider the prohibition on abortion in limited circumstances. This article reviews the Islamic basis for the prohibition of abortion and the reasons for its justification. Contemporary rulings from leading Shiite scholars and from the Sunni school of thought are presented and reviewed. The status of abortion in Muslim countries is reviewed, with special emphasis on the therapeutic abortion law passed by the Iranian Parliament in 2003. This law approved therapeutic abortion before 16 weeks of gestation under limited circumstances, including medical conditions related to fetal and maternal health. Recent measures in Iran provide an opportunity for the Muslim scholars in other countries to review their traditional stance on abortion. (shrink)

In 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services proposed changes to the regulations that govern human subjects protection in federally funded research. The proposed changes involve modifying inclusion standards for minimal-risk research and removing the necessity of review from certain categories of noninvasive research. All studies would instead be required to comply with privacy protections as initiated by the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act . We argue that relying on HIPAA to protect participants from participation-related risks in noninvasive (...) research is insufficient to protect the autonomy and psychological health of potential research participants. Instead, we suggest a streamlined review format for these categories of research. (shrink)

Upshot: The commentaries raise a plethora of issues, extending the article’s problematic in insightful ways. In this response, we chose to focus on two interesting views on the “powerful idea” in the constructionist sense, on systems versus causal-rule thinking and on the affective aspect of collaborative learning.

This article proceeds on two main assumptions. (1) The ‘understanding’ of universes of discourse and human practice can no longer be based on the rules developed by older systems of hermeneutics. (2) Modern hermeneutics has not tried to compensate this loss of methodological efficiency by working out new frameworks. It is rather exclusively occupied with (metatheoretical) efforts to provide ‘foundations’. Thus we get ontological, dialectical, transcendental etc. systems. These may serve as general possibilities for looking at history. They do not, (...) however, advance the solution of the manifold methodological difficulties of concrete research. A functional analysis of fundamentalist hermeneutics can demonstrate more precisely that this type of theory has largely proved fruitless. Certainly we cannot do without fundamentalist concepts like historicity, tradition, consciousness or, for that matter, emancipation. It is equally clear, however, that these concepts cannot merely be defined along the lines prescribed by philosophies of science. The present article therefore pleads for an anthropological extension and specification of ‘hermeneutic’ (?) frameworks which should allow us to analyse historical life forms, ways of experience, strategies of meaning formation in a more precise and differentiated manner. (shrink)

THIS paper is an effort to bring together two issues bearing on the moral philosophy of Hume. First, an effort will be made to interpret and clarify the role of general rules in Hume’s account of moral judgment. Second, the proper classification of the moral sentiments according to categories made familiar by studies in the philosophy of mind will be offered. The collective bearing of these two matters on the analysis of Hume’s moral theory will then be explored.

Boston Medical Center/Boston University Medical Campus recently reduced certain requirements for human subjects research where this could be done without adversely affecting the rights and welfare of participants, in anticipation of changes in the Final Common Rule. Modifications affected exempt and expedited categories, approval periods, ceding review, Quality Improvement/Quality Assessment activities, and some requirements for pregnant women, prisoners, and children. This case study may assist other institutions in responding to the Final Common Rule.

Fundamental aspects of human use of the environment can be explained by game theory. Game theory explains aggregate behaviour of the human species driven by perceived costs and benefits. In the 'game' of global environmental protection and conservation, the stakes are the living conditions of all species including the human race, and the playing field is our planet. The question is can we control humanity's hitherto endless appetite for resources before we irreparably harm the global ecosystem and cause extinction of (...) even more species? The central problem is that some proportion of the individuals or groups will behave selfishly. The inducement for using more than a fair share, or 'cheating', increases as that resource becomes rarer, thus the benefits of cheating increase. In addition, the total number of people is increasing, so the proportion of cheaters must decrease to even keep total resource use constant. Cost benefit analysis of the effect of regulation and incentives on potential cheaters may provide a rational approach to controlling environmental problems. While it is debatable that environmental values are constant across cultures, communal use of resources seems to follow global rules. Cooperative use and punishment of those who use more than their share appear to be ubiquitous in human societies. Schemes for controlling human impact on the global environment must take into consideration basic behaviours including development of social norms and the positive feedback created because resources become more valuable with increasing rarity leading to more incentive for consumption. (shrink)

The law of informed consent to medical treatment has recently been extensively overhauled in England. The 2015 Montgomery judgment has done away with the long-held position that the information to be disclosed by doctors when obtaining valid consent from patients should be determined on the basis of what a reasonable body of medical opinion agree ought to be disclosed in the circumstances. The UK Supreme Court concluded that the information that is material to a patient’s decision should instead be judged (...) by reference to a new two-limbed test founded on the notions of the ‘reasonable person’ and the ‘particular patient’. The rationale outlined in Montgomery for this new test of materiality, and academic comment on the ruling’s significance, has focused on the central ethical importance that the law now accords to respect for patient autonomy in the process of obtaining consent from patients. In this paper, we dispute the claim that the new test of materiality articulated in Montgomery equates with respect for autonomy being given primacy in re-shaping the development of the law in this area. We also defend this position, arguing that our revised interpretation of Montgomery’s significance does not equate with a failure by the courts to give due legal consideration to what is owed to patients as autonomous decision-makers in the consent process. Instead, Montgomery correctly implies that doctors are ethically obliged to attend to a number of relevant ethical considerations in framing decisions about consent to treatment, which include subtle interpretations of the values of autonomy and well-being. Doctors should give appropriate consideration to how these values are fleshed out and balanced in context in order to specify precisely what information ought to be disclosed to a patient as a requirement of obtaining consent, and as a core component of shared decision-making within medical encounters more generally. (shrink)

There is a well-known, superficially plausible argument which says that a game is defined by its rules, so that cheaters in that game can't possibly be winners, or even legitimate participants. The article critically examines this argument and provides counterexamples to its underlying assumptions. -/- ================= This article originally appeared in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, VIII, 1981, pp. 41-46. It has since been reprinted in Morgan, William and Meier, Klaus, eds, Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, and Vanderwerken, David and (...) Wertz, Spencer, Sport Inside Out. 40 years later, I don't have an uploadable copy, but I don't understand why, if you have a new anthology that includes it, you can't simply generate an archive copy from it or one of the prior publications. Or, just cite the sources where it appears. (shrink)

Although in Drosophila pair‐rule genes play crucial roles in the genetic hierarchy that subdivides the embryo into segments, the extent to which pair‐rule patterning is utilized by different arthropods and other segmented phyla is unknown. Recent data of Dearden et al.1 and Henry et al.,2 however, hint that a pair‐rule mechanism might play a role in the segmentation process of basal arthropods and vertebrates. BioEssays 25:425–429, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Legal precedent, professional‐society statements, and even many medical ethicists agree that some situations may call for a clinician to engage in an act of lying or nonlying deception of a patient or patient's family member. Still, the moral terrain of clinical deception is largely uncharted, and when it comes to practical guidance for clinicians, many might think that ethicists offer nothing more than the rule never to deceive. This guidance is insufficient to meet the real‐world demands of clinical practice, (...) and this article endeavors to articulate a framework to help clinicians better navigate the ethics of clinical deceit. The framework articulates four morally relevant dimensions of a potential deceptive act that should be examined to better determine the moral justification that might be required: the target of the act, the nature of the information, the nature of the act, and the context of the act. (shrink)