A new characterization of tabularity in tense logic is established, namely, a tense logic L is tabular if and only if $\mathsf {tab}_n^T\in L$ for some $n\geq 1$. Two characterization theorems for the Post-completeness in tabular tense logics are given. Furthermore, a characterization of the Post-completeness in the lattice of all tense logics is established. Post numbers of some tense logics are shown.

An example of finite tree Mo is presented such that its predicate logic (i.e. the intermediate predicate logic characterized by the class of all predicate Kripke frames based on Mo) is not finitely axiomatizable. Hence it is shown that the predicate analogue of de Jongh - McKay - Hosoi's theorem on the finite axiomatizability of every finite intermediate propositional logic is not true.

A negative solution of the problem posed by Maksimova [5] is given. Two sequences of Superintuitionistic logics are axiomatized by using an analogy of the operation.

In the paper, we tackle the matter of non-classical logics, in particular, paraconsistent ones, for which not every formula follows in general from inconsistent premisses. Our benchmark is Jaśkowski’s logic, modeled with the help of discussion. The second key origin of this paper is the matter of being tabular, i.e. being adequately expressible by finitely many finite matrices. We analyse Jaśkowski’s non-tabular discussive (discursive) logic $ \textbf {D}_{2}$, one of the first paraconsistent logics, from the perspective (...) of a trivalent tabular logic. We are motivated to step down from the ongoing modal $ \textbf {S5}$-perspective of developing $ \textbf {D}_{2}$ both by certain mysteries that have been surrounding it and by gaps in Jaśkowski’s arguments contra the multivalent tabular perspective. Although Jaśkowski’s idea to use $ \textbf {S5}$ in order to define $ \textbf {D}_{2}$ is very attractive since it allows one to benefit from the tools and results of modal logic, it also gives a ‘non-direct’ formulation and, as it appeared later, is superfluous with respect to what is meant to be achieved since one can define the very same logic but using modal logics weaker than S5. It is also known, due to Kotas, that discussive logic is not finite-valued. So, in light of Kotas’s result that $ \textbf {D}_{2}$ is non-tabular, we propose to associate it with a few dozen discussive formulae that Jaśkowski unequivocally and illustratively suggests to be its theorems or non-theorems rather than with axioms of its modern axiomatizations (one of which Kotas employs) in order to be capable of performing a computer-aided brute-force search for suitable trivalent matrices in the cases of one and two designated values. As a result, we find trivalent matrices with two designated values that might be dubbed ‘discussive’ because they meet Jaśkowski’s suggestion to validate and invalidate the litmus theorems and non-theorems, respectively, despite the fact that none of them validates all the negation axioms in the modern axiomatizations of $ \textbf {D}_{2}$. The matrices found are then analysed along with highlighting the ones that were previously mentioned in the literature. We conclude the paper with a comparative analysis of Omori’s results and a test of Karpenko’s hypothesis. (shrink)

We show that for an arbitrary logic being locally tabular is a strictly weaker property than being locally finite. We describe our hunt for a logic that allows us to separate the two properties, revealing weaker and weaker conditions under which they must coincide, and showing how they are intertwined. We single out several classes of logics where the two notions coincide, including logics that are determined by a finite set of finite matrices, selfextensional logics, algebraizable and (...) equivalential logics. Furthermore, we identify a closure property on models of a logic that, in the presence of local tabularity, is equivalent to local finiteness. (shrink)

It is already known that unifiable formulas in normal modal logic |$\textbf {K}+\square ^{2}\bot $| are either finitary or unitary and unifiable formulas in normal modal logic |$\textbf {Alt}_{1}+\square ^{2}\bot $| are unitary. In this paper, we prove that for all |$d{\geq }3$|⁠, unifiable formulas in normal modal logic |$\textbf {K}+\square ^{d}\bot $| are either finitary or unitary and unifiable formulas in normal modal logic |$\textbf {Alt}_{1}+\square ^{d}\bot $| are unitary.

Bailey, C. and R. Downey, Tabular degrees in \Ga-recursion theory, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 55 205–236. We introduce several generalizations of the truth-table and weak-truth-table reducibilities to \Ga-recursion theory. A number of examples are given of theorems that lift from \Gw-recursion theory, and of theorems that do not. In particular it is shown that the regular sets theorem fails and that not all natural generalizations of wtt are the same.

The aim of this paper is to look from the point of view of admissibility of inference rules at intermediate logics having the finite model property which extend Heyting's intuitionistic propositional logic H. A semantic description for logics with the finite model property preserving all admissible inference rules for H is given. It is shown that there are continuously many logics of this kind. Three special tabular intermediate logics λ, 1 ≥ i ≥ 3, are given which describe (...) all tabular logics preserving admissibility: a tabular logic λ preserves all admissible rules for H iff 7λ has width not more than 2 and is not included in each λ. MSC: 03B55, 03B20. (shrink)

For a Euclidean space , let L n denote the modal logic of chequered subsets of . For every n 1, we characterize L n using the more familiar Kripke semantics, thus implying that each L n is a tabular logic over the well-known modal system Grz of Grzegorczyk. We show that the logics L n form a decreasing chain converging to the logic L of chequered subsets of . As a result, we obtain that L (...) is also a logic over Grz, and that L has the finite model property. We conclude the paper by extending our results to the modal language enriched with the universal modality. (shrink)

We introduce Boolean-like algebras of dimension n ($$n{\mathrm {BA}}$$ n BA s) having n constants $${{{\mathsf {e}}}}_1,\ldots,{{{\mathsf {e}}}}_n$$ e 1, …, e n, and an $$(n+1)$$ ( n + 1 ) -ary operation q (a “generalised if-then-else”) that induces a decomposition of the algebra into n factors through the so-called n-central elements. Varieties of $$n{\mathrm {BA}}$$ n BA s share many remarkable properties with the variety of Boolean algebras and with primal varieties. The $$n{\mathrm {BA}}$$ n BA s provide the (...) algebraic framework for generalising the classical propositional calculus to the case of n–perfectly symmetric–truth-values. Every finite-valued tabular logic can be embedded into such a n-valued propositional logic, $$n{\mathrm {CL}}$$ n CL, and this embedding preserves validity. We define a confluent and terminating first-order rewriting system for deciding validity in $$n{\mathrm {CL}}$$ n CL, and, via the embeddings, in all the finite tabular logics. (shrink)

The Logic of Causation: Definition, Induction and Deduction of Deterministic Causality is a treatise of formal logic and of aetiology. It is an original and wide-ranging investigation of the definition of causation (deterministic causality) in all its forms, and of the deduction and induction of such forms. The work was carried out in three phases over a dozen years (1998-2010), each phase introducing more sophisticated methods than the previous to solve outstanding problems. This study was intended as part (...) of a larger work on causal logic, which additionally treats volition and allied cause-effect relations (2004). The Logic of Causation deals with the main technicalities relating to reasoning about causation. Once all the deductive characteristics of causation in all its forms have been treated, and we have gained an understanding as to how it is induced, we are able to discuss more intelligently its epistemological and ontological status. In this context, past theories of causation are reviewed and evaluated (although some of the issues involved here can only be fully dealt with in a larger perspective, taking volition and other aspects of causality into consideration, as done in Volition and Allied Causal Concepts). Phase I: Macroanalysis. Starting with the paradigm of causation, its most obvious and strongest form, we can by abstraction of its defining components distinguish four genera of causation, or generic determinations, namely: complete, partial, necessary and contingent causation. When these genera and their negations are combined together in every which way, and tested for consistency, it is found that only four species of causation, or specific determinations, remain conceivable. The concept of causation thus gives rise to a number of positive and negative propositional forms, which can be studied in detail with relative ease because they are compounds of conjunctive and conditional propositions whose properties are already well known to logicians. The logical relations (oppositions) between the various determinations (and their negations) are investigated, as well as their respective implications (eductions). Thereafter, their interactions (in syllogistic reasoning) are treated in the most rigorous manner. The main question we try to answer here is: is (or when is) the cause of a cause of something itself a cause of that thing, and if so to what degree? The figures and moods of positive causative syllogism are listed exhaustively; and the resulting arguments validated or invalidated, as the case may be. In this context, a general and sure method of evaluation called ‘matricial analysis’ (macroanalysis) is introduced. Because this (initial) method is cumbersome, it is used as little as possible – the remaining cases being evaluated by means of reduction. Phase II: Microanalysis. Seeing various difficulties encountered in the first phase, and the fact that some issues were left unresolved in it, a more precise method is developed in the second phase, capable of systematically answering most outstanding questions. This improved matricial analysis (microanalysis) is based on tabular prediction of all logically conceivable combinations and permutations of conjunctions between two or more items and their negations (grand matrices). Each such possible combination is called a ‘modus’ and is assigned a permanent number within the framework concerned (for 2, 3, or more items). This allows us to identify each distinct (causative or other, positive or negative) propositional form with a number of alternative moduses. This technique greatly facilitates all work with causative and related forms, allowing us to systematically consider their eductions, oppositions, and syllogistic combinations. In fact, it constitutes a most radical approach not only to causative propositions and their derivatives, but perhaps more importantly to their constituent conditional propositions. Moreover, it is not limited to logical conditioning and causation, but is equally applicable to other modes of modality, including extensional, natural, temporal and spatial conditioning and causation. From the results obtained, we are able to settle with formal certainty most of the historically controversial issues relating to causation. Phase III: Software Assisted Analysis. The approach in the second phase was very ‘manual’ and time consuming; the third phase is intended to ‘mechanize’ much of the work involved by means of spreadsheets (to begin with). This increases reliability of calculations (though no errors were found, in fact) – but also allows for a wider scope. Indeed, we are now able to produce a larger, 4-item grand matrix, and on its basis find the moduses of causative and other forms needed to investigate 4-item syllogism. As well, now each modus can be interpreted with greater precision and causation can be more precisely defined and treated. In this latest phase, the research is brought to a successful finish! Its main ambition, to obtain a complete and reliable listing of all 3-item and 4-item causative syllogisms, being truly fulfilled. This was made technically feasible, in spite of limitations in computer software and hardware, by cutting up problems into smaller pieces. For every mood of the syllogism, it was thus possible to scan for conclusions ‘mechanically’ (using spreadsheets), testing all forms of causative and preventive conclusions. Until now, this job could only be done ‘manually’, and therefore not exhaustively and with certainty. It took over 72’000 pages of spreadsheets to generate the sought for conclusions. This is a historic breakthrough for causal logic and logic in general. Of course, not all conceivable issues are resolved. There is still some work that needs doing, notably with regard to 5-item causative syllogism. But what has been achieved solves the core problem. The method for the resolution of all outstanding issues has definitely now been found and proven. The only obstacle to solving most of them is the amount of labor needed to produce the remaining (less important) tables. As for 5-item syllogism, bigger computer resources are also needed. (shrink)

For a Euclidean space \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathbb{R}^n $$ \end{document}, let Ln denote the modal logic of chequered subsets of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathbb{R}^n $$ \end{document}. For every n ≥ 1, we characterize Ln using the more familiar Kripke semantics, thus implying that each Ln is a tabular logic over the well-known modal system Grz of Grzegorczyk. We show that the logics Ln form (...) a decreasing chain converging to the logic L∞ of chequered subsets of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$\mathbb{R}^\infty $$ \end{document}. As a result, we obtain that L∞ is also a logic over Grz, and that L∞ has the finite model property. We conclude the paper by extending our results to the modal language enriched with the universal modality. (shrink)

We consider structural completeness in modal logics. The main result is the necessary and sufficient condition for modal logics over K4 to be hereditarily structurally complete: a modal logic λ is hereditarily structurally complete $\operatorname{iff} \lambda$ is not included in any logic from the list of twenty special tabular logics. Hence there are exactly twenty maximal structurally incomplete modal logics above K4 and they are all tabular.

An important perquisite for verification of the correctness of software is the ability to write mathematically precise documents that can be read by practitioners and advanced users. Without such documents, we won't know what properties we should verify. Tabular expressions, in which predicate expressions may appear, have been found useful for this purpose. We frequently use partial functions in our tabular documentation. Conventional interpretations of expressions that describe predicates are not appropriate for our application because they do not (...) deal with partial functions. Experience with this documentation has led us to choose a logic in which predicates are total but functions remain partial. We have found that this particular interpretation results in simpler expressions and is easily understood by practitioners. (shrink)

A moda logic Λ is called invariant if for all automorphisms α of NExt K, α = Λ. An invariant ogic is therefore unique y determined by its surrounding in the attice. It wi be established among other that a extensions of K.alt1S4.3 and G.3 are invariant ogics. Apart from the results that are being obtained, this work contributes to the understanding of the combinatorics of finite frames in genera, something wich has not been done except for transitive frames. (...) Certain useful concepts will be established, such as the notion of a d-homogeneous frame. (shrink)

We investigate the substitution Frege () proof system and its relationship to extended Frege () in the context of modal and superintuitionistic propositional logics. We show that is p-equivalent to tree-like , and we develop a “normal form” for -proofs. We establish connections between for a logic L, and for certain bimodal expansions of L.We then turn attention to specific families of modal and si logics. We prove p-equivalence of and for all extensions of , all tabular logics, (...) all logics of finite depth and width, and typical examples of logics of finite width and infinite depth. In most cases, we actually show an equivalence with the usual system for classical logic with respect to a naturally defined translation.On the other hand, we establish exponential speed-up of over for all modal and si logics of infinite branching, extending recent lower bounds by P. Hrubeš. We develop a model-theoretical characterization of maximal logics of infinite branching to prove this result. (shrink)

We give a necessary and sufficient condition for any modal logic with fmp to inherit all inference rules admissible in S4. Using this condition we describe all tabular modal logics inheriting inference rules admissible for S4.

Developing a suggestion of Wittgenstein, I provide an account of truth tables as formulas of a formal language. I define the syntax and semantics of TPL (the language of Tabular Propositional Logic), and develop its proof theory. Single formulas of TPL, and finite groups of formulas with the same top row and TF matrix (depiction of possible valuations), are able to serve as their own proofs with respect to metalogical properties of interest. The situation is different, however, for (...) groups of formulas whose top rows differ. For them I provide (i) a tree-style system of ‘row tree proofs’, which is shown to be sound and complete, and (ii) an alternative, re-writing strategy. (shrink)

What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality ? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truth-functionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known. A clear distinction can be drawn between logics characterizable (...) through: (1) genuinely finite-valued truth-tabular semantics; (2) no finite-valued but only an infinite-valued truthtabular semantics; (3) no truth-tabular semantics at all. Any of those logics, however, can in principle be characterized through non-truth-functional valuation semantics, at least as soon as their associated consequence relations respect the usual tarskian postulates. So, paradoxical as that might seem at first, it turns out that truth-functional logics may be adequately characterized by non-truth-functional semantics . Now, what feature of a given logic would guarantee it to dwell in class (1) or in class (2), irrespective of its circumstantial semantic characterization? (shrink)

The Polish logician Roman Suszko has extensively pleaded in the 1970s for a restatement of the notion of many-valuedness. According to him, as he would often repeat, “there are but two logical values, true and false.” As a matter of fact, a result by W´ojcicki-Lindenbaum shows that any tarskian logic has a many-valued semantics, and results by Suszko-da Costa-Scott show that any many-valued semantics can be reduced to a two-valued one. So, why should one even consider using logics with (...) more than two values? Because, we argue, one has to decide how to deal with bivalence and settle down the tradeoff between logical 2-valuedness and truth-functionality, from a pragmatical standpoint. -/- This paper will illustrate the ups and downs of a two-valued reduction of logic. Suszko’s reductive result is quite non-constructive.We will exhibit here a way of effectively constructing the two-valued semantics of any logic that has a truth-functional finite-valued semantics and a sufficiently expressive language. From there, as we will indicate, one can easily go on to provide those logics with adequate canonical systems of sequents or tableaux. The algorithmic methods developed here can be generalized so as to apply to many non-finitely valued logics as well —or at least to those that admit of computable quasi tabular two-valued semantics, the so-called dyadic semantics. (shrink)

Correspondence analysis is Kooi and Tamminga’s universal approach which generates in one go sound and complete natural deduction systems with independent inference rules for tabular extensions of many-valued functionally incomplete logics. Originally, this method was applied to Asenjo–Priest’s paraconsistent logic of paradox LP. As a result, one has natural deduction systems for all the logics obtainable from the basic three-valued connectives of LP -language) by the addition of unary and binary connectives. Tamminga has also applied this technique to (...) the paracomplete analogue of LP, strong Kleene logic \. In this paper, we generalize these results for the negative fragments of LP and \, respectively. Thus, the method of correspondence analysis works for the logics which have the same negations as LP or \, but either have different conjunctions or disjunctions or even don’t have them as well at all. Besides, we show that correspondence analyses for the negative fragments of \ and LP, respectively, are also suitable without any changes for the negative fragments of Heyting’s logic \ and its dual \ and LP). (shrink)

In this paper we define the notion of frame based formulas. We show that the well-known examples of formulas arising from a finite frame, such as the Jankov-de Jongh formulas, subframe formulas and cofinal subframe formulas, are all particular cases of the frame based formulas. We give a criterion for an intermediate logic to be axiomatizable by frame based formulas and use this criterion to obtain a simple proof that every locally tabular intermediate logic is axiomatizable by (...) Jankov-de Jongh formulas. We also show that not every intermediate logic is axiomatizable by frame based formulas. (shrink)

We give a systematic method of constructing extensions of the Kuznetsov-Gerčiu logic KG without the finite model property (fmp for short), and show that there are continuum many such. We also introduce a new technique of gluing of cyclic intuitionistic descriptive frames and give a new simple proof of Gerčiu’s result [9, 8] that all extensions of the Rieger-Nishimura logic RN have the fmp. Moreover, we show that each extension of RN has the poly-size model property, thus improving (...) on [9]. Furthermore, for each function f: omega -> omega, we construct an extension Lf of KG such that Lf has the fmp, but does not have the f-size model property. We also give a new simple proof of another result of Gerčiu [9] characterizing the only extension of KG that bounds the fmp for extensions of KG. We conclude the paper by proving that RN.KC = RN + (¬p vee ¬¬p) is the only pre-locally tabular extension of KG, introduce the internal depth of an extension L of RN, and show that L is locally tabular if and only if the internal depth of L is finite. (shrink)

For each intermediate propositional logicJ, J * denotes the least predicate extension ofJ. By the method of canonical models, the strongly Kripke completeness ofJ *+D(=x(p(x)q)xp(x)q) is shown in some cases including:1. J is tabular, 2. J is a subframe logic. A variant of Zakharyashchev's canonical formulas for intermediate logics is introduced to prove the second case.

In this paper, we axiomatize the first-degree entailments of relatedness logic, and introduce both tabular and algebraic semantics for such a fragment. Thereby, we partly answer the problems referred to as P1 and P28 in the Problem Section of this journal.Back to Main Menu.

We exhibit infinitely many semisimple varieties of semilinear De Morgan monoids (and likewise relevant algebras) that are not tabular, but which have only tabular proper subvarieties. Thus, the extension of relevance logic by the axiom $$(p\rightarrow q)\vee (q\rightarrow p)$$ ( p → q ) ∨ ( q → p ) has infinitely many pretabular axiomatic extensions, regardless of the presence or absence of Ackermann constants.

Most material below is ranked around the splittings of lattices of normal modal logics. These splittings are generated by nite subdirect irreducible modal algebras. The actual computation of the splittings is often a rather delicate task. Rened model structures are very useful to this purpose, as well as they are in many other respects. E.g. the analysis of various lattices of extensions, like ES5, ES4:3 etc becomes rather simple, if rened structures are used. But this point will not be touched (...) here. The variety T BA , which corresponds to S4, is congruence- distributive. Hence any every tabular extension L S4 has nite many extensions only. Around 1975 it has been proved by several authors, that also the converse is true: If L S4 has nitely many extensions only, then L is necessarely tabular. These and other results will be extended to much richer lattices. For simplicity we state the results explicitely only for the lattice N of modal logics with one modal operator. But most of them carry over literally to the lattice Nk of k-ramied normal modal logics . It is easy to construct examples of 2-ramied modal logics which are P OST-complete but not tabular. Whether this will be possible for normal modal logic seems to be an open problem. In view of results below it seems very unlikely that such examples exist. (shrink)

We define the concepts of minimal p-morphic image and basic p-morphism for transitive Kripke frames. These concepts are used to determine effectively the least number of variables necessary to axiomatize a tabular extension of K4, and to describe the covers and co-covers of such a logic in the lattice of the extensions of K4.

I read Stefan Collini’s What are Universities For? last week with very mixed feelings. In the past, I’ve much admired his polemical essays on the REF, “impact”, the Browne Report, etc. in the London Review of Books and elsewhere: they speak to my heart. If you don’t know those essays, you can get some of their flavour from his latest article in the Guardian yesterday. But I found the book a disappointment. Perhaps the trouble is that Collini is too decent, (...) too high-minded, has too unrealistically exalted a view about what actually happens in universities which is too coloured by attitudes appropriate to the traditional humanities. And he is optimistic to the point of fantasy if he thinks that people are so susceptible to “the romance of ideas and the power of beauty” that they will want, or can be brought to want, lots and lots of universities in order to promote the ideas (as if they would suppose that the task of “conserving, understanding, extending and handing on to subsequent generations the intellectual, scientific, and artistic heritage of mankind” was clearly ill-served when there were only forty universities in England, as opposed to a hundred and whatever). (shrink)

A common reaction to Hegel’s suggestion that we collapse Kant’s distinction between form and content is that, since such a move would also deprive us of any way of distinguishing the merely logical from the real possibility of our concepts, it is incoherent and ought to be rejected. It is true that these two distinctions are intimately related in Kant, such that if one goes, the other does as well. But it is less obvious that giving them up as Kant (...) conceives them is as incoherent a proposal as many of Hegel’s critics think. It has been the point of a recent account of Hegel’s idealism to demonstrate that his critique of Kant’s dichotomy between form and content or concept and intuition does not commit him to the view that human cognition is materially creative of its content in the manner of a God-like or intuitive intellect—does not, in other words, signify a return to a pre-Critical metaphysics. This is the interpretative stance I adopt here as well, in hope of giving defenders of Kant reasons for taking Hegel more seriously. (shrink)

The Editors express their gratitude and appreciation to the indi-viduals listed below who served as referees for Informal Logic for Volumes 31 (2011) and 32 (2012).