A strongly independent preorder on a possibly in finite dimensional convex set that satisfi es two of the following conditions must satisfy the third: (i) the Archimedean continuity condition; (ii) mixture continuity; and (iii) comparability under the preorder is an equivalence relation. In addition, if the preorder is nontrivial (has nonempty asymmetric part) and satisfi es two of the following conditions, it must satisfy the third: (i') a modest strengthening of the Archimedean condition; (ii') mixture continuity; and (iii') completeness. Applications (...) to decision making under conditions of risk and uncertainty are provided. (shrink)

We provide conditions under which an incomplete strongly independent preorder on a convex set X can be represented by a set of mixture preserving real-valued functions. We allow X to be infi nite dimensional. The main continuity condition we focus on is mixture continuity. This is sufficient for such a representation provided X has countable dimension or satisfi es a condition that we call Polarization.

We show that without assuming completeness or continuity, a strongly independent preorder on a possibly infinite dimensional convex set can always be given a vector-valued representation that naturally generalizes the standard expected utility representation. More precisely, it can be represented by a mixture-preserving function to a product of lexicographic function spaces.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 273 Verene, Donald Phillip. Vico's Science of Imagination. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981, Pp. 227. $19.5o. In Chapter 1 (Introduction: Vico's Originality), Verene announces two principal concerns, a two-fold approach, and the predominant contention of his study.. 1. Principal concerns: "to consider the philosophical truth of Vico's ideas themselves, rather than to examine their historical character" (p. 19); to consider "the importance of Vico's conception (...) of barbarism for understanding present society" (p. 28). 2. Two-fold approach: "to interpret the central theses of Vico's thought" from the inside in the spirit of the whole and, at the same time, "to develop the problems of Vico's philosophy themselves" (pp. 19--21 ). 3. Predominant contention: "that Vico's ideas constitute a philosophy of recollective universals which generates philosophical understanding fronl the image, not the rational category. This approach regards imagination as a method of pfiilosophical thought" (p. 19) and the imaginative universal as "a key to his conception of knowledge" (p. 67). Vico's philosophy is depicted and characterized by Verene as fi)llows. Beginning with the imagination (fantasia) as an original and independent power of mind, Vico builds his philosophy on the image, the imaginative universal, thereby creating a position outside Western philosophy as traditionally understood. His New Science is a process of recollective fantasia, a kind of memory, and the system built constitutes a system of memory for all of human reality. By means of his concept of memory, Vico works his way back to the world of original thought, the mythicopoeticfantasia of the first men. His discovery of the imaginative universal as their way of thinking and their kind of knowledge establishes a new genetic origin for philosophical thought. Recollective fantasia constitutes the subject-matter and form of Vico's science itself', i.e., the term designates a type of nlemory through which the New Science is acconlplished as well as the type of thought from which it must be understood. "The New Science is a metaphysical fable, h creates a vera narratio of the recollectire imagination. The storia ideale eterna is an ideal trnth, but not an a priori or fictional one. As the master image of the recollective mind, it precisely contains all of the human event. Metaphysical truth, achieved through the exercise of.[antasia.., is generated out of the mind itself.., as images that actually contain the providential structure of reality" (p. 125). Vico's per|ornlative science "is man's true production of a knowledge of" his own nature" (p. 133). "The proof of the science is found through the reader making it for himself" (p. 156). What is the "recollective imaginative universal"? (a term coined by Verene) as distinguished from the universale fantastico? Vico identifies the latter quite simply. Poetic imagination, he tells us, was active in the first men who, "not being able to form intelligible class concepts of things, had a natural need to create poetic characters ; that is, imaginative class concepts or universals, to which, as to certain models or ideal portraits, to reduce all the particular species that resembled them." (The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch. Cornell University Press, 1968; orig. pub. 1948, w ) Thus in the theological age, 274 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY "Jove was born naturally in poetry as a divine character or imaginative universal, to which everything having to do with the auspices was referred by all the ancient gentile nations, which must therefore all have been poetic by nature" (9 381). In the age of heroes, Achilles embodies the idea of valor common to all strong men and Ulysses the idea of prudence common to all wise men (9 403). The myths, fables, and allegories brought to birth by poetic imagination were true stories for their makers. Imaginative universals or genera, "as the human mind later learned to abstract forms and properties from subjects, passed over into intelligible genera, which prepared the way for philosophers.... " (9 934)- Abstracting, categorizing, and predicating on the basis of properties in common, the philosophers in their intelligible class concepts no hmger think in the same manner as the first men did... (shrink)

We prove the independence of a strong partition relation on ℵ ω , answering a question of Erdos and Hajnal. We then give an almost complete answer to the free subset problem.

We study Kim-independence over arbitrary sets. Assuming that forking satisfies existence, we establish Kim's lemma for Kim-dividing over arbitrary sets in an NSOP1 theory. We deduce symmetry of Kim-independence and the independence theorem for Lascar strong types.

This chapter contains sections titled: Two Dichotomies The Existential Mind‐Independence of Moral Principles The Strong Observational Mind‐Independence of Moral Principles Appendix.

This paper analyzes concepts of independence and assumptions of convexity in the theory of sets of probability distributions. The starting point is Kyburg and Pittarelli’s discussion of “convex Bayesianism” (in particular their proposals concerning E-admissibility, independence, and convexity). The paper offers an organized review of the literature on independence for sets of probability distributions; new results on graphoid properties and on the justification of “strong independence” (using exchangeability) are presented. Finally, the connection between Kyburg and (...) Pittarelli’s results and recent developments on the axiomatization of non-binary preferences, and its impact on “complete” independence, are described. (shrink)

I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and (...) not have certain properties, for example, my bracelet may phenomenally look to be circular-shaped and oval-shaped (and hence non-circularshaped). So, if strong representationalism is true, then the content of my experience ought to represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. Yet, intuitively, the content of my experience does not represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. The duplication problem is this. On a standard conception of content, spatio-temporally distinct experiences and experiences had by distinct subjects may differ in content despite the fact that they are phenomenally indistinguishable. But this undermines the thesis that phenomenal character determines content. I argue that the two problems can be solved by applying a version of an idea from David Chalmers, which is to recognize the existence of genuinely centered properties in the content of perceptual experience. (shrink)

Recently discovered transcription‐independent features of p53 involve the choice of DNA damage repair pathway after PARylation, and p53's complex formation with phosphoinositide lipids, PI(4,5)P2. PARylation‐mediated rapid accumulation of p53 at DNA damage sites is linked to the recruitment of downstream repair factors and tumor suppression. This links p53's capability to sense damaged DNA in vitro and its relevant functions in cells. Further, PI(4,5)P2 rapidly accumulates at damage sites like p53 and complexes with p53, while it is required for ATR recruitment. (...) These findings help explain how p53 and PI(4,5)P2 maintain genome stability by directing DNA repair pathway choice. Additionally, there is a strong correlation between p53 sequence homology, genome mutation rates as well as lifespans across various mammalian species. Further investigation is required to better understand the connections between genome stability, tumor suppression, longevity and the transcriptional‐independent function of p53. (shrink)

Some claim that the notion of strong emergence as involving ontological or causal novelty makes no sense, on grounds that any purportedly strongly emergent features or associated powers 'collapse', one way or another, into the lower-level base features upon which they depend. Here we argue that there are several independently motivated and defensible means of preventing the collapse of strongly emergent features or powers into their lower-level bases, as directed against a conception of strongly emergent features as having fundamentally (...) novel powers. After introducing the project (Section 1), we motivate and present the powers-based account (Section 2); we then canvass the two main versions of the collapse objection, show how these apply to the powers-based account, and problematize certain strategies of response (Section 3); we then present and defend four better strategies of response (Section 4). (shrink)

A strong coloring on a cardinal $\kappa $ is a function $f:[\kappa ]^2\to \kappa $ such that for every $A\subseteq \kappa $ of full size $\kappa $, every color $\unicode{x3b3} <\kappa $ is attained by $f\restriction [A]^2$. The symbol $$ \begin{align*} \kappa\nrightarrow[\kappa]^2_{\kappa} \end{align*} $$ asserts the existence of a strong coloring on $\kappa $.We introduce the symbol $$ \begin{align*} \kappa\nrightarrow_p[\kappa]^2_{\kappa} \end{align*} $$ which asserts the existence of a coloring $f:[\kappa ]^2\to \kappa $ which is strong over a (...) partition $p:[\kappa ]^2\to \theta $. A coloring f is strong over p if for every $A\in [\kappa ]^{\kappa }$ there is $i<\theta $ so that for every color $\unicode{x3b3} <\kappa $ is attained by $f\restriction )$.We prove that whenever $\kappa \nrightarrow [\kappa ]^2_{\kappa }$ holds, also $\kappa \nrightarrow _p[\kappa ]^2_{\kappa }$ holds for an arbitrary finite partition p. Similarly, arbitrary finite p-s can be added to stronger symbols which hold in any model of ZFC. If $\kappa ^{\theta }=\kappa $, then $\kappa \nrightarrow _p[\kappa ]^2_{\kappa }$ and stronger symbols, like $\operatorname {Pr}_1_p$ or $\operatorname {Pr}_0_p$, also hold for an arbitrary partition p to $\theta $ parts.The symbols $$ \begin{gather*} \aleph_1\nrightarrow_p[\aleph_1]^2_{\aleph_1},\;\;\; \aleph_1\nrightarrow_p[\aleph_1\circledast \aleph_1]^2_{\aleph_1},\;\;\; \aleph_0\circledast\aleph_1\nrightarrow_p[1\circledast\aleph_1]^2_{\aleph_1}, \\ \operatorname{Pr}_1_p,\;\;\;\text{ and } \;\;\; \operatorname{Pr}_0_p \end{gather*} $$ hold for an arbitrary countable partition p under the Continuum Hypothesis and are independent over ZFC $+ \neg $ CH. (shrink)

Independence is the condition that, if X is preferred to Y, then a lottery between X and Z is preferred to a lottery between Y and Z given the same probability of Z. Is it rationally required that one’s preferences conform to Independence? The main objection to this requirement is that it would rule out the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences. In this paper, I put forward a sequential dominance argument with fairly weak assumptions for a (...) variant of Independence (called Independence for Constant Prospects), which shows that Allais and Ellsberg Preferences are irrational. Hence this influential objection (that is, the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences) can be rebutted. I also put forward a number of sequential dominance arguments that various versions of Independence are requirements of rationality. One of these arguments is based on very minimal assumptions, but the arguments for the versions of Independence which are strong enough to serve in the standard axiomatization of Expected Utility Theory need notably stronger assumptions. (shrink)

We study a class of 0-categorical simple structures such that every M in has uncomplicated forking behavior and such that definable relations in M which do not cause forking are independent in a sense that is made precise; we call structures in independent. The SU-rank of such M may be n for any natural number n>0. The most well-known unstable member of is the random graph, which has SU-rank one. The main result is that for every strongly independent structure M (...) in , if a sentence φ is true in M then φ is true in a finite substructure of M. The same conclusion holds for every structure in with SU-rank one; so in this case the word ‘strongly’ can be removed. A probability theoretic argument is involved and it requires sufficient independence between relations which do not cause forking. A stable structure M belongs to if and only if it is 0-categorical, 0-stable and every definable strictly minimal subset of is indiscernible. (shrink)

According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that (...) class='Hi'>strong pluralists cannot provide an explanation of the Grounding Problem. In this paper, we argue that strong pluralism can be motivated independently of the successful answer to the Grounding Problem. In order to achieve that aim, we provide a haecceitistic interpretation of strong pluralism according to which strong pluralism should be read as a position committed to the existence of primitive individuals, i.e., the individuals that have their criteria of individuation independently of their qualitative profiles. That said, we do not aim at defending haecceitism. Instead, our aim is rather modest: we want to provide a new way for the strong pluralist to supplement his view to make it more watertight. (shrink)

Uniform sequential continuity, a property classically equivalent to sequential continuity on compact sets, is shown, constructively, to be a consequence of strong continuity on a metric space. It is then shown that in the case of a separable metric space, uniform sequential continuity implies strong continuity if and only if one adopts a certain boundedness principle that, although valid in the classical, recursive and intuitionistic setting, is independent of Heyting arithmetic.

We show a number of improvements in the use of Hidden Conditional Random Fields for phone classification on the TIMIT and Switchboard corpora. We first show that the use of regularization effectively prevents overfitting, improving over other methods such as early stopping. We then show that HCRFs are able to make use of non-independent features in phone classification, at least with small numbers of mixture components, while HMMs degrade due to their strong independence assumptions. Finally, we successfully apply (...) Maximum a Posteriori adaptation to HCRFs, decreasing the phone classification error rate in the Switchboard corpus by around 1% – 5% given only small amounts of adaptation data. (shrink)

A filter of a sentential logic ? is Leibniz when it is the smallest one among all the ?-filters on the same algebra having the same Leibniz congruence. This paper studies these filters and the sentential logic ?+ defined by the class of all ?-matrices whose filter is Leibniz, which is called the strong version of ?, in the context of protoalgebraic logics with theorems. Topics studied include an enhanced Correspondence Theorem, characterizations of the weak algebraizability of ?+ and (...) of the explicit definability of Leibniz filters, and several theorems of transfer of metalogical properties from ? to ?+. For finitely equivalential logics stronger results are obtained. Besides the general theory, the paper examines the examples of modal logics, quantum logics and Łukasiewicz's finitely-valued logics. One finds that in some cases the existence of a weak and a strong version of a logic corresponds to well-known situations in the literature, such as the local and the global consequences for normal modal logics; while in others these constructions give an independent interest to the study of other lesser-known logics, such as the lattice-based many-valued logics. (shrink)

Public reason liberalism demands that political decisions be publicly justified to the citizens who are subjected to them. Much recent literature emphasises the differences between the two main interpretations of this requirement, justificatory and political liberalism. In this paper, I show that both views share structural democratic deficits. They fail to guarantee political autonomy, the expressive quality of law, and the justification to citizens, because they allow collective decisions made by incompletely theorised agreements. I argue that the result can only (...) be avoided by changing public reason’s role in collective decision-making. Instead of incompletely theorised agreements, we should demand agreement both on the public reasons themselves and on the other premises that justify political decisions. In this way, it is always possible to point to a procedure-independent reason that justifies democratic decisions, and the reasoning of the state is public and contestable. Finally, I explain how this, in turn, implies that only political liberalism can be rescued—by accepting what I will call strong political liberalism. Modifying justificatory liberalism in the necessary way will inevitably open the door to an objectionable form of perfectionism. (shrink)

The notion of a strongly determined type over A extending p is introduced, where p .S. A strongly determined extension of p over A assigns, for any model M )- A, a type q S extending p such that, if realises q, then any elementary partial map M → M which fixes acleq pointwise is elementary over . This gives a crude notion of independence which arises very frequently. Examples are provided of many different kinds of theories with strongly (...) determined types, and some without. We investigate a notion of multiplicity for strongly determined types with applications to ‘involved’ finite simple groups, and an analogue of the Finite Equivalence Relation Theorem. Lifting of strongly determined types to covers of a structure is discussed, and an application to finite covers is given. (shrink)

We show that knowledge satisfies interpersonal independence, meaning that a non-trivial sentence describing one agent’s knowledge cannot be equivalent to a sentence describing another agent’s knowledge. The same property of interpersonal independence holds, mutatis mutandis, for belief. In the case of knowledge, interpersonal independence is implied by the fact that there are no non-trivial sentences that are common knowledge in every model of knowledge. In the case of belief, interpersonal independence follows from a strong interpersonal (...) independence that knowledge does not have. Specifically, there is no sentence describing the beliefs of one person that implies a sentence describing the beliefs of another person. (shrink)

At a time when Americans are increasingly concerned with finding jobs and economic stability, supporting families, and surviving in the global economy, many consider the arts to be a luxury, a frivolous distraction which entices students away from real learning. In Strong Arts, Strong Schools, Charles Fowler argues that, far from a luxury, the arts are a vitally important part of our society and our schools. Speaking directly to educators, policy makers, and parents alike, Fowler presents a compelling (...) defense of the arts and their importance in our lives. The arts illuminate "life in all its mystery, misery, delight, pity and wonder." Without them, students are deprived of learning what it means to be truly human. The arts teach students how rather than what to think. Highlighting the crucial effect of the arts on learning, he contends that the arts teach skills that other basic subjects cannot--critical thinking and problem solving, judgment and independence, attention to detail and craftsmanship, and an openness to other cultures and ways of thinking. Arguing on behalf of the arts, Fowler shows how the arts can enliven and extend the entire school curriculum by integrating different subjects in innovative interdisciplinary ways, sparking the interest of at-risk or special needs students. "The best schools have the best arts programs," writes Fowler. "Excellence in education and excellence in the arts go hand in hand." In eighteen compelling essays, Fowler demonstrates the importance of the arts in our culture and the necessity of rescuing the arts for our future. Beginning with an overview of the context in which the arts operate, he offers an honest and sometimes distressing overview of the state of education and arts education today. He then examines the arts and economics, presenting a carefully researched exposition of the significance of the arts and their relationship to science and industry. Showing how the arts provide a more comprehensive education, he shows why the arts engage students and make learning relevant and fun. Tackling the controversial question of curriculum, Fowler addresses such questions as who should study the arts, which arts, and whose culture should be taught. Citing a shameful neglect of creativity in our culture, he highlights the negligence of the schools in teaching students to be creative and inventive thinkers, and he shows the capacity of the arts to communicate these essential skills. Fowler concludes the book with suggestions for reform and with practical strategies for winning the support of school boards and school administrators. Finally asking "how do we get there," he offers specific recommendations for changing our schools, providing equal opportunity for all, and--perhaps most critically in today's economic climate--paying the bill. In this elegantly written, passionately argued book, Fowler presents a convincing case for teaching the arts to all children. "A downtrodden army of cultureless children," Fowler warns, "is marching toward a barren and depleted adulthood and taking the future of our civilization with them." Strong Arts, Strong Schools is a clarion call to action for any teacher, parent, policy maker, or citizen concerned about the fate of the arts in American society and about the state of our schools. (shrink)

At a time when Americans are increasingly concerned with finding jobs and economic stability, supporting families, and surviving in the global economy, many consider the arts to be a luxury, a frivolous distraction which entices students away from real learning. In Strong Arts, Strong Schools, Charles Fowler argues that, far from a luxury, the arts are a vitally important part of our society and our schools. Speaking directly to educators, policy makers, and parents alike, Fowler presents a compelling (...) defense of the arts and their importance in our lives. The arts illuminate "life in all its mystery, misery, delight, pity and wonder." Without them, students are deprived of learning what it means to be truly human. The arts teach students how rather than what to think. Highlighting the crucial effect of the arts on learning, he contends that the arts teach skills that other basic subjects cannot--critical thinking and problem solving, judgment and independence, attention to detail and craftsmanship, and an openness to other cultures and ways of thinking. Arguing on behalf of the arts, Fowler shows how the arts can enliven and extend the entire school curriculum by integrating different subjects in innovative interdisciplinary ways, sparking the interest of at-risk or special needs students. "The best schools have the best arts programs," writes Fowler. "Excellence in education and excellence in the arts go hand in hand." In eighteen compelling essays, Fowler demonstrates the importance of the arts in our culture and the necessity of rescuing the arts for our future. Beginning with an overview of the context in which the arts operate, he offers an honest and sometimes distressing overview of the state of education and arts education today. He then examines the arts and economics, presenting a carefully researched exposition of the significance of the arts and their relationship to science and industry. Showing how the arts provide a more comprehensive education, he shows why the arts engage students and make learning relevant and fun. Tackling the controversial question of curriculum, Fowler addresses such questions as who should study the arts, which arts, and whose culture should be taught. Citing a shameful neglect of creativity in our culture, he highlights the negligence of the schools in teaching students to be creative and inventive thinkers, and he shows the capacity of the arts to communicate these essential skills. Fowler concludes the book with suggestions for reform and with practical strategies for winning the support of school boards and school administrators. Finally asking "how do we get there," he offers specific recommendations for changing our schools, providing equal opportunity for all, and--perhaps most critically in today's economic climate--paying the bill. In this elegantly written, passionately argued book, Fowler presents a convincing case for teaching the arts to all children. "A downtrodden army of cultureless children," Fowler warns, "is marching toward a barren and depleted adulthood and taking the future of our civilization with them." Strong Arts, Strong Schools is a clarion call to action for any teacher, parent, policy maker, or citizen concerned about the fate of the arts in American society and about the state of our schools. (shrink)

I argue that the answer to the above question turns on three distinctions as to the meaning of content-independent reasons and the types of statement in which they feature. The first distinction is between two senses of content-independence, which I refer to as weak and strong content-independence. I argue that, while legal rules can (and often do) give rise to content-independent reasons in the weak sense, whether they can be said to generate content-independent reasons in the (...) class='Hi'>strong sense depends on two further distinctions: first, a distinction between evaluative and descriptive statements about reasons (i.e., statements describing reasons as they figure in the internal assumption of a certain normative practice, such as law); second, a distinction between reasons for action and reasons for adopting certain attitudes. Strong content-independence, I argue, is a sound notion only insofar as it figures in descriptive reason-statements (as opposed to evaluative reason-statements) with regard to actions (as opposed to attitudes). Finally, I uncover an underlying explanation that links the different senses in which legal rules provide content-independent reasons, and accounts for the differences between them. (shrink)

According to the view we may term “strong cognitivism”, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject takes objects to have independently of her attitudes towards these objects. The main concern of this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. The central argument to this effect is a top-down argument: it proceeds by an analysis of the complex (...) phenomenon of love and derives a conclusion regarding the nature of more basic mental phenomena—particular desires. More specifically, its starting point is the crude intuition that the significance conferred by love upon its objects is of a distinctively personal kind—an intuition that is expressed by the apparent non-substitutability of two similar subjects only one of whom is loved with respect to their importance for the lover. I argue that the initial notion of non-substitutability can be refined and modified so as to form a real challenge to all versions of strong cognitivism and to establish the existence of attitude-dependent reasons. (shrink)

Rawls in his later philosophy claims that it is sufficient to accept political conception as true or right, depending on what one's worldview allows, on the basis of whatever reasons one can muster, given one's worldview (doctrine). What political liberalism is interested in is a practical agreement on the political conception and not in our reasons for accepting it. There are deep issues (regarding deep values, purpose of life, metaphysics etc.) which cannot be resolved through invoking common reasons (this is (...) the fact of free reason itself), and trying to resolve them would involve us in interminable debates and would hamper the practical task of agreement on the political conception. Given the absolute necessity of a political society which is stable and enduring, it is thus wise to avoid these issues in founding a political society and choosing its basic principles - this is the pragmatic part of Rawls's position. In this paper I argue that this strategy leads Rawls into a paradox: (i) although the intention is to stay independent of comprehensive doctrines, the political conception is in fact totally (and precariously) dependent on comprehensive doctrines (not just on one doctrine but on each and every major doctrine in society). It is dependent on them: for its conceptualisation as an independent idea, for its justification, for the check of its reasonability in relation to the external world, for the formation of identities and value inculcation and hence for the formation of its model citizen; (ii) the very search for independence makes the political conception more dependent on comprehensive doctrines, and by extension makes it potentially more prone to intervention in and tampering with comprehensive doctrines (it is enough to show that it is a strong conceptual possibility to cast doubt on the whole strategy). Thus, for example, the political conception relies on the hope that “firmly held convictions gradually change” and that it would “in fact . . . have the capacity to shape those doctrines toward itself”. The purpose of the Rawlsian conjecture is to give these “hopes” a concrete, practical form by giving advice to proponents of the comprehensive doctrine on how they can do all this and “try to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception”. I further argue that this paradox can be overcome by making the core of political liberalism more flexible. (shrink)

The main goal of this work is to present the proof-theoretical and model-theoretical approaches to probabilistic logics which allow reasoning about independence and probabilistic support. We extend the existing formalisms [14] to obtain several variants of probabilistic logics by adding the operators for independence and confirmation to the syntax. We axiomatize these logics, provide corresponding semantics, prove that the axiomatizations are sound and strongly complete, and discuss decidability issues.

This paper is motivated by the concern that increasingly fewer philosophers of mind seem prepared to call themselves ‘functionalists’ these days. I suggest that this has less to do with explicit arguments presented against functionalism than with a gradual decay in the clarity of the term’s reference. This decay has two sources: functionalism has involved several different, logically independent research commitments, and it has become tightly associated, to an unnecessary degree, with classical computationalism, a program which is now under severe (...) pressure from connectionist and other bottom-up methodologies in Al. After diagnosing the causes of this drift, I seek to arrest it by sketching a version of functionalism---Minimal Strong Functionalism---that is strong enough to have ontological and methodological bite, but that is sufficiently minimal in its empirical commitments so as to not be hostage to the outcome of the current dispute in Al between connectionists and classicists. (shrink)

It is common in recent epistemology to distinguish different senses, or conceptions, of epistemic justification. The proposed oppositions include the objective/subjective, internalist/externalist, regulative/nonregulative, resource-relative/resource-independent, personal/verific, and deontological/evaluative conceptions of justification. In some of these cases, writers regard both members of the contrasting pair as legitimate; in other cases only one member. In this paper I want to propose another contrasting pair of conceptions of justification, and hold that both are defensible and legitimate. The contrast will then be used to construct (...) a modified version of reliabilism, one which handles certain problem cases more naturally than my previous versions of reliabilism. (shrink)

We provide a general theorem implying that for a (strongly) dependent theory T the theory of sufficiently well-behaved pairs of models of T is again (strongly) dependent. We apply the theorem to the case of lovely pairs of thorn-rank one theories as well as to a setting of dense pairs of first-order topological theories.

This paper is motivated by the concern that increasingly fewer philosophers of mind seem prepared to call themselves ‘functionalists’ these days. I suggest that this has less to do with explicit arguments presented against functionalism than with a gradual decay in the clarity of the term’s reference. This decay has two sources: functionalism has involved several different, logically independent research commitments, and it has become tightly associated, to an unnecessary degree, with classical computationalism, a program which is now under severe (...) pressure from connectionist and other bottom-up methodologies in Al. After diagnosing the causes of this drift, I seek to arrest it by sketching a version of functionalism---Minimal Strong Functionalism---that is strong enough to have ontological and methodological bite, but that is sufficiently minimal in its empirical commitments so as to not be hostage to the outcome of the current dispute in Al between connectionists and classicists. (shrink)

In this paper we study elementary submodels of a stable homogeneous structure. We improve the independence relation defined in Hyttinen 167–182). We apply this to prove a structure theorem. We also show that dop and sdop are essentially equivalent, where the negation of dop is the property we use in our structure theorem and sdop implies nonstructure, see Hyttinen.

In [U. Kohlenbach, Some logical metatheorems with applications in functional analysis, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 357 89–128], the second author obtained metatheorems for the extraction of effective bounds from classical, prima facie non-constructive proofs in functional analysis. These metatheorems for the first time cover general classes of structures like arbitrary metric, hyperbolic, CAT and normed linear spaces and guarantee the independence of the bounds from parameters ranging over metrically bounded spaces. Recently ]), the authors obtained generalizations of these metatheorems (...) which allow one to prove similar uniformities even for unbounded spaces as long as certain local boundedness conditions are satisfied. The use of classical logic imposes some severe restrictions on the formulas and proofs for which the extraction can be carried out. In this paper we consider similar metatheorems for semi-intuitionistic proofs, i.e. proofs in an intuitionistic setting enriched with certain non-constructive principles. Contrary to the classical case, there are practically no restrictions on the logical complexity of theorems for which bounds can be extracted. Again, our metatheorems guarantee very general uniformities, even in cases where the existence of uniform bounds is not obtainable by straightforward functional analytic means. Already in the purely intuitionistic case, where the existence of effective bounds is implicit, the metatheorems allow one to derive uniformities that may not be obvious at all from a given constructive proof. Finally, we illustrate our main metatheorem by an example from metric fixed point theory. (shrink)

Often ‘nationalism’ and ‘having a state proper to the nation’ are considered as inseparable. Relatedly, when these thoughts are applied to the reality of sub-state nations, such as Flanders, Catalonia Basque Country and Québec, sub-state nationalism (SSN) and separatism seem to be conceptually entangled in their aim for an independent state. This chapter considers sub-state nationalism and sub-state separatism as conceptually distinct, and aims at examining the relationship between sub-state separatist political parties and immigration policies. This requires, on the one (...) hand focusing on the integration policies, given that often immigration policies with regard to admission and removal lies beyond the competence of sub-state nations. On the other hand, it focuses on the two major Flemish pro-independence parties, namely the Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), and Vlaams Belang (VB). While sub-state separatist movements appear to be particularly opposed to increasing immigration, they operate under a particular ‘legitimacy dilemma’ with its paradoxical tendencies to both exclude and include immigrants. The chapter will show contextually that even the relatively more inclusive political party positions, such as the ones taken by the N-VA, are not sufficiently inclusive, when the normative distinction between ‘cultural assimilation’ and ‘cultural integration’ is taken seriously. Theoretically, it will engage with a renowned articulation of the legitimacy dilemma offered by Will Kymlicka, to argue that it is not sufficient to account for the normative necessity to respect the ‘autonomy of immigrants’. As I will demonstrate, this has to do with the inability of the dilemma to distinguish sufficiently ‘cultural assimilation’ from ‘cultural integration’. In other words, on the one hand the chapter contributes to the apparent absence of strong defenses for ‘moral autonomy of immigrants, by describing what such an autonomy might imply for designing of integration policies. On the other hand, it critically assesses Flemish pro-independence parties’ concrete policies with respect to integration. By offering a contextual political theory on these issues, it offers an example of how a moral principle might be implemented, and serve as a critical focal point to evaluate public policies. (shrink)

independence facts implied by a particular directed acyclic graph; an alternative equivalent rule has been proposed by Lauritzen et al. (1990). Geiger et al. (1990) have shown that d-separation is atomic-complete for independence statements..

The purpose of this study was to assess the degree of editorial independence at a sample of medical journals and the relationship between the journals and their owners. We surveyed the editors of 33 medical journals owned by not-for-profit organizations (“associations”), including 10 journals represented on the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (nine of which are general medical journals) and a random sample of 23 specialist journals with high impact factors that are indexed by the Institute for Scientific (...) Information. The main outcome measures were the authority to hire, fire, and oversee the work of the editor; the editor’s tenure and financial compensation; control of the journal’s budget; publication of material about the association; and the editor’s perceptions about editorial independence and pressure over editorial content. Of the 33 editors, 23 (70%) reported having complete editorial freedom, and the remainder reported a high level of freedom (a score of ≥8, where 10 equals complete editorial freedom and 1 equals no editorial freedom). Nevertheless, a substantial minority of editors reported having received at least some pressure in recent years over editorial content from the association’s leadership (42%), senior staff (30%), or rank-and-file members (39%). The association’s board of directors has the authority to hire (48%) or fire (55%) the editor for about half of the journals, and the editor reports to the board for 10 journals (30%). Twenty-three editors (70%) are appointed for a specific term (median term =5 years). Three-fifths of the journals have no control over their profit, and the majority of journals use the association’s legal counsel and/or media relations staff. Stronger safeguards are needed to give editors protection against pressure over editorial content, including written guarantees of editorial freedom and governance structures that support those guarantees. Strong safeguards are also needed because editors may have less freedom than they believe (especially if they have not yet tested their freedom in an area of controversy). (shrink)

We investigate the notions of strict independence and strict non-forking, and establish basic properties and connections between the two. In particular, it follows from our investigation that in resilient theories strict non-forking is symmetric. Based on this study, we develop notions of weight which characterize NTP2, dependence and strong dependence. Many of our proofs rely on careful analysis of sequences that witness dividing. We prove simple characterizations of such sequences in resilient theories, as well as of Morley sequences (...) which are witnesses. As a by-product we obtain information on types co-dominated by generically stable types in dependent theories. For example, we prove that every Morley sequence in such a type is a witness. (shrink)

This paper discusses a sequence of extensions ofNFU, Jensen's improvement of Quine's set theory “New Foundations” (NF) of [16].The original theoryNFof Quine continues to present difficulties. After 60 years of intermittent investigation, it is still not known to be consistent relative to any set theory in which we have confidence. Specker showed in [20] thatNFdisproves Choice (and so proves Infinity). Even if one assumes the consistency ofNF, one is hampered by the lack of powerful methods for proofs of consistency and (...) independence such as are available for use withZFC; very clever work has been done with permutation methods, starting with [18] and [5], and exemplified more recently by [14], but permutation methods can only be applied to show the consistency or independence of unstratified sentences (see the definition ofNFUbelow for a definition of stratification). For example, there is no method available to determine whether the assertion “the continuum can be well-ordered” is consistent with or independent ofNF. There is one substantial independence result for an assertion with nontrivial stratified consequences, using metamathematical methods: this is Orey's proof of the independence of the Axiom of Counting fromNF(see below for a statement of this axiom).We mention these difficulties only to reassure the reader of their irrelevance to the present work. Jensen's modification of “New Foundations” (in [13]), which was to restrict extensionality to sets, allowing many non-sets (urelements) with no elements, has almost magical effects. (shrink)

This paper discusses a sequence of extensions ofNFU, Jensen's improvement of Quine's set theory “New Foundations” (NF) of [16].The original theoryNFof Quine continues to present difficulties. After 60 years of intermittent investigation, it is still not known to be consistent relative to any set theory in which we have confidence. Specker showed in [20] thatNFdisproves Choice (and so proves Infinity). Even if one assumes the consistency ofNF, one is hampered by the lack of powerful methods for proofs of consistency and (...) independence such as are available for use withZFC; very clever work has been done with permutation methods, starting with [18] and [5], and exemplified more recently by [14], but permutation methods can only be applied to show the consistency or independence of unstratified sentences (see the definition ofNFUbelow for a definition of stratification). For example, there is no method available to determine whether the assertion “the continuum can be well-ordered” is consistent with or independent ofNF. There is one substantial independence result for an assertion with nontrivial stratified consequences, using metamathematical methods: this is Orey's proof of the independence of the Axiom of Counting fromNF(see below for a statement of this axiom).We mention these difficulties only to reassure the reader of their irrelevance to the present work. Jensen's modification of “New Foundations” (in [13]), which was to restrict extensionality to sets, allowing many non-sets (urelements) with no elements, has almost magical effects. (shrink)

There is a simple technique, due to Dragalin, for proving strong cut-elimination for intuitionistic sequent calculus, but the technique is constrained to certain choices of reduction rules, preventing equally natural alternatives. We consider such a natural, alternative set of reduction rules and show that the classical technique is inapplicable. Instead we develop another approach combining two of our favorite tools—Klop’s ι-translation and perpetual reductions. These tools are of independent interest and have proved useful in a variety of settings; it (...) is therefore natural to investigate, as we do here, what they have to offer the field of sequent calculus. (shrink)

Past research has found a strong and positive association between the independent self-construal and life satisfaction, mediated through self-esteem, in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In Study 1, we collected data from four countries and replicated these findings in cultures which have received little attention in past research. In Study 2, we treated independence as a multifaceted construct and further examined its relationship with self-esteem and life satisfaction using samples from the United States and Romania. Different ways of (...) being independent are associated with self-esteem and life satisfaction in the two cultures, suggesting that it is not independence as a global concept that predicts self-esteem and life satisfaction, but rather, feeling independent in culturally appropriate ways is a signal that one’s way of being fits in and is valued in one’s context. (shrink)

Cook and Reckhow [5] pointed out that $\mathcal {N}\mathcal {P} \neq co\mathcal {N}\mathcal {P}$ iff there is no propositional proof system that admits polynomial size proofs of all tautologies. The theory of proof complexity generators aims at constructing sets of tautologies hard for strong and possibly for all proof systems. We focus on a conjecture from [16] in foundations of the theory that there is a proof complexity generator hard for all proof systems. This can be equivalently formulated (for (...) p-time generators) without a reference to proof complexity notions as follows:•There exists a p-time function g stretching each input by one bit such that its range $rng(g)$ intersects all infinite $\mathcal {N}\mathcal {P}$ sets.We consider several facets of this conjecture, including its links to bounded arithmetic (witnessing and independence results), to time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, to feasible disjunction property of propositional proof systems and to complexity of proof search. We argue that a specific gadget generator from [18] is a good candidate for g. We define a new hardness property of generators, the $\bigvee $ -hardness, and show that one specific gadget generator is the $\bigvee $ -hardest (w.r.t. any sufficiently strong proof system). We define the class of feasibly infinite $\mathcal {N}\mathcal {P}$ sets and show, assuming a hypothesis from circuit complexity, that the conjecture holds for all feasibly infinite $\mathcal {N}\mathcal {P}$ sets. (shrink)

In all countries where health care access is considered a social right, regulation is both a tool of performance improvement as well as an instrument of social justice. Both social (equity in access) and economical (promoting competition) regulation are at stake due to the nature of the good itself. Different modalities of regulation do exist and usually new regulatory cycles include the creation of stronger regulatory agencies. Indeed, health care regulation is rising steadily in most developed countries as a consequence (...) of the introduction of the New Public Management perspective to provide essential public goods.Health care is delivered by different organisations with very different cultural backgrounds—public and private (profit and non-profit)—that should be accountable for their decisions. Control by regulatory agencies is instrumental to accomplish this goal. However, there is some dispute with regards the degree of regulatory autonomy. The objective of this paper is to determine if independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are effective in carrying out health care regulation. The authors apply Walshe’s analytical framework to the Regulatory Authority of Health (Portugal) to answer the question if independent regulation works.In conclusion, the two year experience of the Regulatory Authority of Health is important not only because the primary goals of independent regulation were achieved but also because this authority is now a full partner in the health care sector. However, independent agencies need to develop strong mechanisms of accountability because good regulatory governance is the paradigm of this institutional innovation. (shrink)

I argue that the answer to the above question turns on three distinctions which make it clear that legal rules are content-independent reasons in some senses, but not in others. The first distinction is between two senses of content-independence, which I refer to as weak and strong content-independence. I argue that, while legal rules do give rise to content-independent reasons in the weak sense, whether they can be said to generate content-independent reasons in the strong sense (...) depends on two further distinctions: first, a distinction between evaluative and descriptive statements about reasons; second, a distinction between reasons for action and reasons for adopting certain attitudes. Strong content-independence, I argue, is a sound notion only insofar as it figures in descriptive reason-statements (as opposed to evaluative reason-statements) with regard to actions (as opposed to attitudes). Finally, I uncover an underlying explanation that links the different senses in which legal rules are content-independent reasons, and accounts for the differences between them.Resumen:En este artículo se argumenta que la respuesta a la pregunta de si las normas jurídicas son razones “independientes de contenido” depende de tres distinciones que demarcan cómo las normas jurídicas son razones independientes de contenido en algunos sentidos, pero no en otros. La primera distinción es entre dos sentidos de “independiente de contenido” que el autor refiere como fuerte y débil. En el argumento se sostiene que, si bien las normas jurídicas generan razones independientes de contenido en el sentido débil, el hecho de que generen razones independientes de contenido en el sentido fuerte depende, a su vez, de otras dos distinciones: primero, una distinción entre enunciados evaluativos y descriptivos de razones; y segundo, una distinción entre razones para la acción y razones para adoptar ciertas actitudes. La independencia de contenido fuerte —continúa el argumento— es una noción consistente sólo en la medida en que se formule con enunciados descriptivos de razones (a diferencia de enunciados evaluativos de razones) que se relacionan con acciones (en contraste con las actitudes). Finalmente, se enuncia una tesis implícita que vincula los diferentes sentidos en que las normas jurídicas son razones independientes de contenido, al mismo tiempo que explica sus diferencias. (shrink)

This is the introductory chapter to a book. This study has two parts. The first part concerns some central concepts in philosophical anthropology and the second part some of the central questions in ethics. One of today’s leading philosophers, Charles Taylor (b. 1931), suggests with his notion of “strong evaluation” that these two areas should be studied in tandem: the self and the good are interrelated, and the nature of persons is intertwined with the nature of values.1 Strong (...) evaluations, i. e. value-judgements and convictions, or “evaluations based on qualitative distinctions concerning worth”, are in Taylor’s view internally related to identity and human agency. The questions I ask in this study are, first, what exactly is strong evaluation and what is its role in relation to human agency, personhood, identity, selfhood and subjectivity? Secondly, can a moral theory be developed, which is realist concerning strong evaluations and yet rejects Taylor’s idea of constitutive “sources” of morality? The goal is first of all to defend the general relevance of strong evaluation in philosophical anthropology and to make contributions to more specific ongoing debates (concerning personhood and identity). Secondly, the goal is to argue that a realist moral theory need not rely on anything that Taylor calls moral sources or constitutive goods, and to outline such a “source-less” theory (which I call “engaged value realism”) and in so doing to contribute to various specific questions of practical philosophy (for example concerning cultural diversity, universality and validity; subject-dependence, subject-independence and reality of values; the nature of individual orientations, commitments and general goods). (shrink)

In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified beliefs be truth conducive (likely to be true) is not always compatible with the requirement that they be epistemically responsible (arrived at in an epistemically responsible manner)1. He supports this claim by criticising Alvin Goldman's view that if a belief is strongly justified, it is also epistemically responsible. In light of this, Riggs recommends that we develop two independent conceptions of justification, one that insists upon (...) the requirement that beliefs be truth conducive and another that insists that they be epistemically responsible. It will then, on his view, be possible to properly evaluate beliefs with regard to each conception of justification. Riggs, however, is mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are independent. If a belief is responsibly arrived at, it is therefore likely to be true. He is thus also mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are incompatible. This mistake arises because Riggs assumes that justification is possible or, at least, that it involves standards that are akin to our own. Moreover, once this assumption is made explicit, we can see why a notion of justification that connects epistemic practice with likely truth is significant. (shrink)