This paper defends a 'punctivist' conception of consciousness from recent attacks by Ian Phillips and Matthew Soteriou. As we intend it, 'punctivism' is the view that a subject's experience over some interval is determined by their experiential states at each instant during it. Phillips and Soteriou both offer ingenious arguments purporting to show that the punctivist is unable to make sense of motion perception; and that only by adopting an 'holistic' conception -- whereby a subject's instantaneous experiences are determined by (...) their experience over the interval -- can we make sense of the puzzles such phenomena pose. We contend that both arguments invoke dubious claims, their proffered solutions come with highly controversial commitments, and, if we take punctivism seriously, it is difficult to see why the so-called puzzles should be puzzling in the first place. A punctivist model of motion perception is proposed in response, and objections anticipated. (shrink)

How should the definition of “minimal risk” in the federal research regulations be interpreted in regard to pregnant women and fetuses? Surprisingly, there has been little discussion of this question. There is, after all, a substantial amount of published work addressing the question of how “minimal risk” should be interpreted. Similarly, there is a large body of literature on the ethics of research involving pregnant women and fetuses, particularly maternal-fetal surgery. However, in neither of these bodies of work can one (...) find an analysis of minimal risk in regard to fetuses or pregnant women.The concept of minimal risk is defined in the regulations as follows:Minimal risk means that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests. (shrink)

Anticipation of future decisions can be important for individuals at risk for diseases to maintain autonomy over time. For future treatment and care decisions, advance care planning is accepted as a useful anticipation tool. As research with persons with dementia seems imperative to develop disease-modifying interventions, and with changing regulations regarding research participation in Germany, advance research directives (ARDs) are considered a solution to include persons with dementia in research in an ethically sound manner. However, little is known (...) about what affected people deem anticipatable.This contribution provides a critical reflection of the literature on anticipation and of a qualitative study on the assessment of ARDs with persons with cognitive impairment in Germany. It combines theoretical and empirical reflections to inform the ethical-legal discourse.Anticipation involves the conceptual separation of the past, the present, and the future. Including dimensions such as preparedness, injunction, and optimization helps in establishing a framework for anticipatory decision-making. While dementia may offer a window of time to consider future decisions, individual beliefs about dementia including fears about stigma, loss of personhood, and solitude strongly impact anticipating sentiments. Concepts of anticipation can be useful for the examination of uncertainty, changing values, needs, and preferences interconnected with the dementia trajectory and can serve as a means to make an uncertain future more concrete. However, fears of losing one’s autonomy in the process of dementia also apply to possibilities of anticipation as these require cognitive assessment and reassessment of an imagined future with dementia. (shrink)

In this essay, I respond to Tim Lewens's proposal that realists and Strong Programme theorists can find common ground in reliabilism. I agree with Lewens, but point to difficulties in his argument. Chief among these is his assumption that reliabilism is incompatible with the Strong Programme's principle of symmetry. I argue that the two are, in fact, compatible, and that Lewens misses this fact because he wrongly supposes that reliabilism entails naturalism. The Strong Programme can fully accommodate (...) a reliabilism which has been freed from its inessential ties to naturalism. Unlike naturalistic epistemologists, the Strong Programme's sociologistic reliabilist insists that all scientific facts are the product of both natural and social causal phenomena. Anticipating objections, I draw on Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations to explain how the sociologistic reliabilist can account for standard intuitions about the objective elements of knowledge. I also explain how the Strong Programme theorist can distinguish between a belief's seeming reliable and its being reliable. (shrink)

In small-scale societies, punishment of adults is infrequent and employed when the anticipated cost-to-benefit ratio is low, such as when punishment is collectively justified and administered. In addition, benefits may exceed costs when punishers have relatively greater physical and social capital and gain more from cooperation. We provide examples from the Tsimane horticulturalists of Bolivia to support our claims.

Faced with a choice between escaping without consequences and submitting to a democratic decision, Socrates chooses the latter. So immense is Socrates’ duty to obey law, we are led to believe, that even the threat of death is insufficient to abrogate it. Crito proposes several arguments purporting to ground Socrates’ strong duty to obey, with the appeal to the Athenian system’s democratic credentials carrying most of the normative weight. A careful reading of the dialogue, in conjunction with the ‘Apology’, (...) reveals, however, a more complex picture. If Crito sets the conditions that render a regime legitimate, and therefore warranting of obedience, the Apology reveals a legal system’s shortcomings that justify disobedience. This article substantiates this position by delineating circumstances that can justify resistance. Contemporary forms of political resistance can also rely on similar conditions. Plato’s texts anticipate the current democratic turn of civil disobedience. (shrink)

What I will be referring to as the normative view in contemporary African discourse on personhood has received substantial treatment and is beginning to exhibit the sort of systematic coherence that I believe Kwasi Wiredu once anticipated.1 Much of this is due to Wiredu's own work, as well as important recent work by Polycarp Ikuenobe, whose most recent articulation and defense of the view appear in this journal.2 My aim is to engage with this way of thinking about what it (...) means to be a person with a view to repairing aspects of it deemed to be most problematic. To this end, I pursue two broad lines of contestation—the one is theoretical, contesting some of the features it takes to be conceptually required for... (shrink)

Timm Triplett argues (Inquiry 29 [1986], no. 4) that David Bloor does not succeed in justifying a relativistic interpretation of mathematics. It is objected that Triplett has focused his attention on the wrong chapter of Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery, and that the examples which Triplett demands Bloor provide to make the case do appear in the subsequent chapter. Moreover, Bloor has anticipated and refuted Triplett's brief criticism of the examples that make Bloor's case for the relativism of mathematics. Finally, (...) Triplett's own example of a basic mathematical truth can be shown to be socially relative. (shrink)

Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry has recently been bolstered by empirical research suggesting that people’s concrete-case intuitions are vulnerable to irrational biases (e.g., the order effect). What is more, skeptics argue that we have no way to ‘‘calibrate” our intuitions against these biases and no way of anticipating intuitional instability. This paper challenges the skeptical position, introducing data from two studies that suggest not only that people’s concrete-case intuitions are often stable, but also (...) that people have introspective awareness of this stability, providing a promising means by which to assess the epistemic value of our intuitions. (shrink)

The book is structured around the life story of the Buddha, starting with traditions about relics of previous buddhas and relics from the past lives of the Buddha Sakyamuni.

This book examines both the personal and the political sides of Nietzsche's writings to show how his writings can expand notions of democratic politics and democratic understanding.

Purely parallel neural networks can model object recognition in brief displays – the same conditions under which illusory conjunctions have been demonstrated empirically. Correcting errors of illusory conjunction is the “tag-assignment” problem for a purely parallel processor: the problem of assigning a spatial tag to nonspatial features, feature combinations, and objects. This problem must be solved to model human object recognition over a longer time scale. Our model simulates both the parallel processes that may underlie illusory conjunctions and the serial (...) processes that may solve the tag-assignment problem in normal perception. One component of the model extracts pooled features and another provides attentional tags that correct illusory conjunctions. Our approach addresses two questions: How can objects be identified from simultaneously attended features in a parallel, distributed representation? How can the spatial selectional requirements of such an attentional process be met by a separation of pathways for spatial and nonspatial processing? Our analysis of these questions yields a neurally plausible simulation of tag assignment based on synchronizing feature processing activity in a spatial focus of attention. (shrink)

From Plato through the nineteenth century, the West could draw on comprehensive political visions to guide government and society. Now, for the first time in more than two thousand years, Tracy B. Strong contends, we have lost our foundational supports. In the words of Hannah Arendt, the state of political thought in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has left us effectively “thinking without a banister.” _Politics without Vision_ takes up the thought of seven influential thinkers, each of whom attempted (...) to construct a political solution to this problem: Nietzsche, Weber, Freud, Lenin, Schmitt, Heidegger, and Arendt. None of these theorists were liberals nor, excepting possibly Arendt, were they democrats—and some might even be said to have served as handmaidens to totalitarianism. And all to a greater or lesser extent shared the common conviction that the institutions and practices of liberalism are inadequate to the demands and stresses of the present times. In examining their thought, Strong acknowledges the political evil that some of their ideas served to foster but argues that these were not necessarily the only paths their explorations could have taken. By uncovering the turning points in their thought—and the paths not taken—Strong strives to develop a political theory that can avoid, and perhaps help explain, the mistakes of the past while furthering the democratic impulse. Confronting the widespread belief that political thought is on the decline, Strong puts forth a brilliant and provocative counterargument that in fact it has endured—without the benefit of outside support. A compelling rendering of contemporary political theory, _Politics without Vision_ is sure to provoke discussion among scholars in many fields. (shrink)

Various arguments have been given against positive euthanasia, but little attention has been given to the question of whether these arguments are uniformly effective in all contexts. There appears to be a range of cases, involving non-voluntary killing of irreversibly unconscious patients, in which these arguments do not succeed. Various reasons have been given in support of positive killing in such cases. It can be argued that there is a range of cases for which a policy of allowing positive killing (...) is morally required. However, currently there are legal obstacles to implementing such a policy. (shrink)

Written in the intense political and intellectual tumult of the early years of the Weimar Republic, Political Theology develops the distinctive theory of sovereignty that made Carl Schmitt one of the most significant and controversial ...

In this book, Rousseau is understood as a theorist of the common person. For Strong, Rousseau resonates with Kant, Hegel, and Marx, but he is more modern like Emerson, Nietzsche, Eittegenstein, and Heidegger. Rousseau's democratic individual is an ordinary self, paradoxically multiple and not singular. In the course of exploring this contention, Strong examines Rousseau's fear of authorship , his understanding of the human, his attempt to overcome the scandal that relativism posed for politics, and the political importance (...) of sexuality. (shrink)

Although there are important moral arguments against cloning human beings, it has been suggested that there might be exceptional cases in which cloning humans would be ethically permissible. One type of supposed exceptional case involves infertile couples who want to have children by cloning. This paper explores whether cloning would be ethically permissible in infertility cases and the separate question of whether we should have a policy allowing cloning in such cases. One caveat should be stated at the beginning, however. (...) After the cloning of a sheep in Scotland, scientists pointed out that using the same technique to clone humans would, at present, involve substantial risks of producing children with birth defects. This concern over safety gives compelling support to the view that it would be wrong to attempt human cloning now. Thus, we do not reach the debate about exceptional cases unless the issue of safety can be set aside. I ask the reader to consider the possibility that in the future humans could be cloned without a significantly elevated risk of birth defects from the cloning process itself. The remainder of this paper assumes, for sake of argument, that cloning technology has advanced to that point. Given this assumption, would cloning in the infertility cases be ethically permissible, and should it be legally permitted? (shrink)

Principlism has been advocated as an approach to resolving concrete cases and issues in bioethics, but critics have pointed out that a main problem for principlism is its lack of a method for assigning priorities to conflicting ethical principles. A version of principlism referred to as 'specified principlism' has been put forward in an attempt to overcome this problem. However, none of the advocates of specified principlism have attempted to demonstrate that the method actually works in resolving detailed clinical cases. (...) This paper shows that when one tries to use it, specified principlism fails to provide practical assistance in deciding how to resolve concrete cases. Proponents of specified principlism have attempted to defend it by arguing that it is superior to casuistry, but it can be shown that their arguments are faulty. Because of these reasons, specified principlism should not be considered a leading contender in the search for methods of making justifiable decisions in clinical cases. (shrink)

Several methods have been reported for extracting sperm from a man after he dies or enters a persistent vegetative state. Although such sperm retrieval could be performed for nonprocreative purposes, such as research, in this paper I focus on cases involving procreative intent. Since 1980, more than ninety cases have occurred in which family members requested sperm retrieval from patients who died or were irreversibly unconscious, with the intent that a wife, girlfriend, or other woman would be inseminated. Recently, the (...) first report of pregnancy and birth following postmortem sperm retrieval appeared in the media.In these cases, death or PVS typically is caused by anoxic injuries, trauma, or rapidly progressing infections. (shrink)

Several methods have been reported for extracting sperm from a man after he dies or enters a persistent vegetative state. Although such sperm retrieval could be performed for nonprocreative purposes, such as research, in this paper I focus on cases involving procreative intent. Since 1980, more than ninety cases have occurred in which family members requested sperm retrieval from patients who died or were irreversibly unconscious, with the intent that a wife, girlfriend, or other woman would be inseminated. Recently, the (...) first report of pregnancy and birth following postmortem sperm retrieval appeared in the media.In these cases, death or PVS typically is caused by anoxic injuries, trauma, or rapidly progressing infections. (shrink)

In my essay, a critique of “the best secular argument against abortion” I reconstructed and criticised two versions of Don Marquis’s well-known argument against abortion. In critiquing the version I call the “essence argument”, I presented counterexamples to one of the premises in that argument. In this issue of the journal, Ezio Di Nucci takes note of the fact that I used the term “valuable future” in the premise but used the term “future like ours” in the counterexamples. Because the (...) terms are different, Di Nucci claimed that my counterexamples had no bearing on the premise and are therefore unsuccessful. The main error in Di Nucci’s objection is a failure to acknowledge that Marquis uses the terms “valuable future” and “future like ours” interchangeably. For the purpose of reconstructing Marquis’s argument, the term “valuable future” is to be taken in a sense that means the same as “future like ours”. Once this point is recognised, Di Nucci’s objection falls apart. (shrink)

This paper presents an integrative, descriptive model of ethical decision making, with special attention given to issues of measurement. After building the model, hypotheses are developed from a portion of it. These hypotheses are tested in an exploratory analysis to determine if further research and testing of this model and the measurement instruments it employs are warranted.

Don Marquis has put forward a non-religious argument against abortion based on what he claims is a morally relevant similarity between killing adult human beings and killing fetuses. He asserts that killing adults is wrong because it deprives them of their valuable futures. He points out that a fetus’s future includes everything that is in an adult’s future, given that fetuses naturally develop into adults. Thus, according to Marquis, killing a fetus deprives it of the same sort of valuable future (...) that an adult is deprived of in being killed and this makes abortion seriously wrong. Commentators have raised a number of objections to Marquis’s argument, to which he has satisfactorily responded. In this paper, difficulties with Marquis’s argument that have not been considered by previous commentators are pointed out. A main thesis of this paper is that Marquis does not adequately defend his argument against several important objections that he himself has raised. These new considerations support the view that Marquis’s argument is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Ethical controversy over transplantation of human fetal tissue has arisen because the source of tissue is induced abortions. Opposition to such transplants has been based on various arguments, including the following: rightful informed consent cannot be obtained for use of fetal tissue from induced abortions, and fetal tissue transplantation might result in an increase in the number of abortions. These arguments were not accepted by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel. The majority opinion of (...) the panel stated that abortion and fetal tissue use are entirely separate issues, and that tissue use is ethically acceptable because it can be morally insulated from the issue of abortion. In support of this view, panel members and others have replied to the arguments put forward by opponents of fetal tissue use. However, replies to the two arguments mentioned above have been unsatisfactory, and the shortcomings of those replies are identified herein. Examination of the arguments pro and con suggests that fetal tissue use cannot be completely insulated from the issue of abortion. Thus, in seeking an ethical justification for fetal tissue transplantation we must consider reasons other than those put forward by the NIH panel. In this paper it is argued that whatever wrong is involved in using fetal tissue from induced abortions must be balanced against the benefits for patients, and it is on this basis that fetal tissue transplantation can be ethically justified. (shrink)

Nations with legal environments that allow indigenous entrepreneurs to create legal businesses are more likely to be peaceful and prosperous nations. In addition to focusing on the role of multinational corporations, those interested in creating peace through commerce should focus on promoting legal environments that allow indigenous entrepreneurs to create peace and prosperity. In order to illustrate the relationship between improved legal environments and conflict reduction, this article describes a case study in which increased economic freedom led to reduced violence (...) in Northern Ireland between 1975 and 2000. (shrink)

The world as we find it -- Kant and the death of God -- Nietzsche: the tragic ethos and the spirit of music -- Max Weber, magic, and the politics of social scientific objectivity -- "What have we to do with morals?": Nietzsche and Weber on the politics of morality -- Sigmund Freud and the heroism of knowledge -- Lenin and the calling of the party -- Carl Schmitt and the exceptional sovereign -- Martin Heidegger and the space of the (...) political -- Without a banister: Hannah Arendt and roads not taken -- Conclusion: the world as it finds us. (shrink)

Some have argued that embryos and fetuses have the moral status of personhood because of certain criteria that are satisfied during gestation. However, these attempts to base personhood during gestation on intrinsic characteristics have uniformly been unsuccessful. Within a secular framework, another approach to establishing a moral standing for embryos and fetuses is to argue that we ought to confer some moral status upon them. There appear to be two main approaches to defending conferred moral standing; namely, consequentialist and contractarian (...) arguments. This article puts forward a consequentialist argument for the conferred moral standing of preembryos, embryos, fetuses, and infants. It states and defends an original version of the commonlyheld view that moral standing increases during gestation. It also explores the implications of this viewpoint for several issues: what is involved in showing ‘respect’ for preembryos; and whether it is permissible to create preembryos solely for research. (shrink)