Mostraremos que o tratamento dado por Sorensen à vaguidade e ao sorites não deve ser classificado como epistemicista. Além disso, tentaremos mostrar que as aproximações que Sorensen tenta fazer entre o paradoxo sorítico e os paradoxos do não-não e do prefácio não são bem-sucedidas.

Rorty goes on to connect the sorites paradox to analytic philosophy’s long standing concern with the correspondence theory of truth. How do our words hook up with reality? Do our categories map pre-existing contours? The nominalist answers that “facts” are just projections of our forms of speech. Rorty characterizes epistemicism as a hyper-realist backlash. In addition to thinking that our scientific terminology cuts nature at the joint, the epistemicist asserts that even the vague vocabulary of common sense has sharp (...) thresholds. (shrink)

You face two buttons. Pushing one will destroy Greensboro. Pushing the other will save it. There is no way for you to know which button saves and which destroys. What ought you to do? Answer: You ought to make the correct guess and push the button that saves Greensboro. Second question: Do you have an obligation to push the correct button?

Do not pass by my epitaph, Wayfarer, but when you have stopped, hear and learn, then depart. There is no boat, To carry you to Hades, No ferryman Charon, No judge Aeacus, No Dog Cerberus. All of us below have become bones and ashes. Truly, I have nothing more to tell you. So depart, wayfarer, Lest dead though I am I seem to you to be a teller of vain tales.

If a spinning sphere casts a shadow, does the shadow also spin? This riddle is the point of departure for an investigation into the nature of shadow movement. A general theory of motion will encompass all moving things, not just physical objects. Ultimately, I argue that round shadows do indeed spin. Shadows are followers of the objects that cast them. Parts of the shadow correspond to parts of the leader, so motion of the caster's parts accounts for motions of the (...) shadow's parts. I conclude with a discussion of how the dynamic aspects of shadows impose subtle constraints on other puzzles about shadows. (shrink)

Sooner or later, every paradox is accused of equivocation. Usually sooner. For equivocation is a simple, well understood fallacy. People first try to explain a mystery in terms of what is familiar. If postulating a simple ambiguity fails, more subtle ambiguities will be postulated. Those who persist with this diagnosis elaborate the charge of equivocation into an esoteric form.

Sorites arguments employ an induction step such as ‘Small numbers have small successors’. People deduce that there must be an exception to the generalization but are reluctant to conclude that the generalization is false. My hypothesis is that the reluctance is due to the "Generic Overgeneralization Effect". Although the propounder of the sorites paradox intends the induction step to be a universal generalization, hearers assimilate universal generalizations to generic generalizations (for instance, ‘All birds fly’ tends to be remembered (...) as ‘Birds fly’). Most generic generalizations tolerate exceptions – especially when those exceptions are rare, abnormal, or difficult to imagine. Any counterexample to the induction step will have all of these features. (shrink)

What do you get when you cross a fallacy with a good argument? A fugu, that is, a valid argument that tempts you to reach its conclusion invalidly. You have yielded to the temptation more than you realize. If you are a teacher, you may have served many fugus. They arise systematically through several mechanisms. Fugus are interesting intermediate cases that shed light on the following issues: bare evidentialism, false pleasure, philosophy of education, and the ethics of argument. Normally, a (...) fugu will not yield knowledge from known premises. But if the reasoning is only slightly fallacious, they do yield knowledge. These mild fugus show that we can gain knowledge by invalid reasoning. This is a conservative resource for historians. They want to credit discoveries to Euclid rather than those who made minor corrections to his proofs, such as David Hilbert. We also benefit from this practice of grandfathering in old standards of knowledge attribution. For we can compete spiritedly for priority. We do not need to worry that credit will instead go to future scholars who will make the minor amendments needed to raise present proofs to a future standard of demonstration. (shrink)

Roy Sorenson offers a unique exploration of an ancient problem: vagueness. Did Buddha become a fat man in one second? Is there a tallest short giraffe? According to Sorenson's epistemicist approach, the answers are yes! Although vagueness abounds in the way the world is divided, Sorenson argues that the divisions are sharp; yet we often do not know where they are. Written in Sorenson'e usual inventive and amusing style, this book offers original insight on language and logic, the way world (...) is, and our understanding of it. (shrink)

Papers included:«About Properties of L-Inconsistent Theories» by Vyacheslav Moiseyev «Paraconsistent logic! » by Jean-Yves Béziau «The Logic of Lying» by Moses Òkè «Sparse Parts» by Kristie Miller «Are Functional Properties Causally Potent?» by Peter Alward «Subcontraries and the Meaning of `If…Then’» by Ronald A. Cordero «Does Frege’s Definition of Existence Invalidate the Ontological Argument?» by Piotr Labenz «Why Prisoners’ Dilemma Is Not A Newcomb Problem» by P. A. Woodward «A Paradox Concerning Science and Knowledge» by Margaret Cuonzo «Between Platonism and (...) Pragmatism: An alternative reading of Plato’s Theaetetus» by Paul F. Johnson «Blob Theory: N-adic Properties Do Not Exist» by Jeffrey Grupp. (shrink)

A para‐reflection is a privational phenomenon that is often mistaken for a reflection. You have seen them as the ‘reflection’ of your pupil in the mirror. Your iris reflects light in the standard way but your pupil absorbs all but a negligible amount of light (as do other dark things such as coal and black velvet). Para‐reflections work by contrast. Since they are parasitic on their host reflections, para‐reflections are relational and dependent in a way that reflections are not. Nevertheless, (...) para‐reflections obey nearly all the laws of reflection with exquisite fidelity. Para‐refractions display parallel obedience to the laws governing refraction. Physicists and psychologists who study optics have neglected these everyday phenomena. Happily, physicists have been attentive and insightful about other privational phenomena such as vacuums and cold spots. I conclude that this kind of subtle treatment of negative things needs to be extended to optics.1 The invisible red herring2 Mind‐independent privations3 Para‐reflections are mind‐independent4 Parasitical entities5 Para‐refractions and shadows6 How science has coped with privations. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the property that excited Kuhn's interest in thought experiments: conflict vagueness. This property often generates inconsistent beliefs but is not itself inconsistency. Although it is absent from most thought experiments, a substantial portion of the most provocative thought experiments do spring from this species of vagueness; for they motivate conceptual reform by touching a nerve of indeterminacy. Hence, study of conflict vagueness reveals the ways thought experiments restructure our conceptual scheme.

An ill-informed reading of Adam Ferguson 's epitaph has given me an idea for securing posthumous recognition. Consider philosophers in the year 2201 who read my epitaph: ‘Here lies Roy Sorensen who will be long remembered for his paradoxes’. If these future scholars remember me, then well and good. If they do not remember me, my epitaph will appear to be rendered false by their failure to recall me. Suppose the poignancy of this self-defeat leads my epitaph to be (...) widely repeated. I thereby acquire ignominy as the forgotten philosopher. But wait! Eventually someone will notice that no one can remember that Roy Sorensen is forgotten. For if someone did remember that Roy Sorensen is forgotten, then he would be forgotten—not remembered. After all, memory implies truth. Thus the self-defeating aspect of my epitaph is itself self-defeating! The happy ending is that my epitaph becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy by a curious kind of double-negation. (shrink)

Can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift? Can time have a beginning? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Riddles, paradoxes, conundrums--for millennia the human mind has found such knotty logical problems both perplexing and irresistible. Now Roy Sorensen offers the first narrative history of paradoxes, a fascinating and eye-opening account that extends from the ancient Greeks, through the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, and into the twentieth century. When Augustine asked what God was doing (...) before He made the world, he was told: "Preparing hell for people who ask questions like that." A Brief History of the Paradox takes a close look at "questions like that" and the philosophers who have asked them, beginning with the folk riddles that inspired Anaximander to erect the first metaphysical system and ending with such thinkers as Lewis Carroll, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W.V. Quine. Organized chronologically, the book is divided into twenty-four chapters, each of which pairs a philosopher with a major paradox, allowing for extended consideration and putting a human face on the strategies that have been taken toward these puzzles. Readers get to follow the minds of Zeno, Socrates, Aquinas, Ockham, Pascal, Kant, Hegel, and many other major philosophers deep inside the tangles of paradox, looking for, and sometimes finding, a way out. Filled with illuminating anecdotes and vividly written, A Brief History of the Paradox will appeal to anyone who finds trying to answer unanswerable questions a paradoxically pleasant endeavor. (shrink)

Shadows haunt the world of common sense by being “out there” independently of whether anyone is looking. Yet they are confi ned to a single sense: sight. Like ghosts, shadows evade tactile corroboration. They do not obey the laws governing material things.

When Bertrand Russell alerted Gottlob Frege to an inconsistency in his Grundgesetze, Frege relinquished deep commitments. When Edward Evans-Pritchard alerted the Azande to an inconsistency in their beliefs about witchcraft inheritance, they did not revise their beliefs. Nor did they engage in the defensive maneuvers depicted in Plato’s dialogues. Evans-Pritchard characterized their indifference to contradiction as irrational. My historical thesis is that the ensuing anthropological debate mirrors the debate about the sorites paradox. I favor a simple explanation of this (...) parallelism: Evans-Pritchard’s witchcraft inheritance argument is a sorites argument—albeit in a form masked by the different ontologies of the Azande and Evans-Pritchard. Evans-Pritchard failed to recognize his witchcraft inheritance argument as a sorites paradox because he was witchcraft nihilist in a community of witchcraft realists. My general conjecture is that many of the irrationalities that seem distinctive of alien cultures are actually paradoxes that are universal. The irrationality of the aliens is real and profound; it is just not distinctive of those aliens or their cultures. The universality of the irrationality helps to explain Evans-Pritchard’s surprising success at understanding the Azande. Since he shares their core irrationality, Evans-Pritchard could simulate Azande thinking. Although I am attributing an anthropological illusion to Evans-Pritchard, I think it is one that coheres nicely with his compelling account of Azande. I am a conservative follower of Evans-Pritchard, trying to debug his research programme. I endorse all of his central doctrines and I rely on his insights. (shrink)

When Bertrand Russell alerted Gottlob Frege to an inconsistency in his Grundgesetze, Frege relinquished deep commitments. When Edward Evans-Pritchard alerted the Azande to an inconsistency in their beliefs about witchcraft inheritance, they did not revise their beliefs. Nor did they engage in the defensive maneuvers depicted in Plato’s dialogues. Evans-Pritchard characterized their indifference to contradiction as irrational. My historical thesis is that the ensuing anthropological debate mirrors the debate about the sorites paradox. I favor a simple explanation of this (...) parallelism: Evans-Pritchard’s witchcraft inheritance argument is a sorites argument—albeit in a form masked by the different ontologies of the Azande and Evans-Pritchard. Evans-Pritchard failed to recognize his witchcraft inheritance argument as a sorites paradox because he was witchcraft nihilist in a community of witchcraft realists. My general conjecture is that many of the irrationalities that seem distinctive of alien cultures are actually paradoxes that are universal. The irrationality of the aliens is real and profound; it is just not distinctive of those aliens or their cultures. The universality of the irrationality helps to explain Evans-Pritchard’s surprising success at understanding the Azande. Since he shares their core irrationality, Evans-Pritchard could simulate Azande thinking. Although I am attributing an anthropological illusion to Evans-Pritchard, I think it is one that coheres nicely with his compelling account of Azande. I am a conservative follower of Evans-Pritchard, trying to debug his research programme. I endorse all of his central doctrines and I rely on his insights. (shrink)

Do we need light to see? I argue that the black experience of a man in a perfectly dark cave is a representation of an absence of light, not an absence of representation. There is certainly a difference between his perceptual knowledge and that of his blind companion. Only the sighted man can tell whether the cave is dark just by looking. But perhaps he is merely inferring darkness from his failure to see. To get an unambiguous answer, I switch (...) the focus from perceptual knowledge to non-epistemic seeing. My conclusion is that we see even in the limiting case of absolute darkness - regardless of whether we believe we are seeing. We see little of pratical interest. But in terms of basic information, we see about as much as we do when the lights are on. Depending on what has gone before and after, we may even see ordinary objects. (shrink)

I can get away with it because no one is in a position to call me on it. Professor Robinson cannot consistently complain that (A) begs the question against his thesis that there is no such fallacy. He would discourage anyone from "helping" him by accusing me of committing the fallacy against him. With advocates like that, who needs adversaries? I. EMBEDDING PERSPECTIVES After all, Robinson has a viable reply to my argument. He should simply deny my premise. Later I (...) will show how (A) might rationally persuade Robinson. But my immediate goal is not to convert the skeptic about the existence of the fallacy but rather to use his extreme position to make a point about the nature of question-begging. Those who object that argument (A) begs the question against Robinson must do so on behalf of Robinson. This assistance requires that one launch the accusation from Robinson's perspective and with his dialectical interests at heart. (shrink)

Kripshe treats ‘god’ as an empty natural kind term such as ‘unicorn’. She applies Saul Kripke's fresh views about empty natural kinds to ‘god’. Metaphysically, says Kripshe, there are no possible worlds in which there are gods. Gods could not have existed, given that they do not actually exist and never did. Epistemologically, godlessness is an a posteriori discovery. Kripshe dismisses the gods in the same breath that she dismisses mermaids. Semantically, the perspective Kripshe finds most perspicacious, no counterfactual situation (...) is properly describable as one in which there are gods. Perhaps it is not quite a necessary truth that there are no gods. According to Saul Kripke, failed natural kind terms are ill-defined. Incorporating ill-defined terms into declarative sentences yields only mock propositions. Just as the meteorologist has no professional interest in mock thunder, the logician has no professional interest in mock propositions. Kripshe disagrees with agnostics who assign a low probability to ‘There is at least one god’. The bearers of probabilities must be propositions. Despite this deference to science, Kripshe agrees with the a priori atheist that, necessarily, no future experience could constitute an encounter with a god. Divine revelation is impossible. Kripshe's a posteriori necessary atheism compares favorably to familiar forms of atheism and to non-cognitivists. It reveals interesting challenges to a coherent formulation of atheism. (shrink)

If people never dreamed, would it make a difference to how they picture reality? Or themselves? Philosophers would certainly lose the most natural way of introducing skepticism. The Chinese Taoist, Chuang Tzu (369 B. C. - ?), dreamt he was a butterfly. When he awoke he wondered whether he was a man who dreamt he was butterfly or a butterfly now dreaming he is a man. Any experience can be explained as either a faithful representation of the world or as (...) a mere figment of a sleeper's imagination. (shrink)

Creationists believe that C. K. Chesterton created Father Brown in his detective stories. Since creating implies a creation, Father Brown exists. Atheists object that the same reasoning could prove the existence of God. But creationists such as Jonathan Schaffer insist atheists do believe that God exists. Serious metaphysics rarely concerns existence. The disagreement between the theist and the atheist is about the nature of God, not His existence. Schaffer underestimates the religious imagination. There could be a religion that explicitly regarded (...) God as a fictional character. The tenets of this, presently hypothetical, religion are developed in a dialogue. (shrink)

We propose here the first translation into Portuguese of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s small treatise De Ente et Uno (1491). The translation is preceded by a brief presentation in which the work is contextualized within the scope of the thought of its young author and in the Florentine philosophical environment of the end of the Quattrocento. In the aftermath of the controversies between defenders of Plato and defenders of Aristotle, a quarrel brought by Greek and Byzantine intellectuals into Italy, who (...) exacerbated the differences between the two philosophers, there were also others who tried to show the essential concord between them, a purpose of which Pico’s treatise is one of the most expressive and relevant documents, seeking to prove the equivalence between Plato’s One and Aristotle’s Being. (shrink)

Ockham's razor is popularly phrased as a prohibition against multiplying entities beyond necessity. This prohibition should extend to the receptacle for these entities. To state my thesis more positively and precisely, both qualitative and quantitative parsimony apply to space, time, and possibility. All other things equal, we ought to prefer a hypothesis that postulates less space. Smaller is better. Admittedly, scientists are ambivalent about economizing on the void. They praise simplicity. Yet astronomers have a history of helping themselves to as (...) much empty space as they wish—staggering common sense with the vastness of the universe. This largesse is abetted by an aesthetic bias for sublime hypotheses. Whereas abductions based on beauty converge with parsimony, abductions based on the sublime diverge from parsimony. Awe stifles our inner accountant. Both types of abduction are popular. Both are dubious because we lack independent assurance that the universe is beautiful or sublime. The analogy between space and time supports an extension of parsimony to time. Uniformitarian geologists regarded time as a free resource. However, geologists and cosmologists must justify their postulation of an immense past. Possibility follows suit. Contrary to David Lewis, possible worlds should be minimized. Parsimony about possibilities provides a rationale for parsimony about absences. Absences are possibilities that are not actual. So proliferation of absences entails proliferation of possibilities. We should admit only those absences which do explanatory work. (shrink)

A blindspot is a consistent but inaccessible proposition. For instance, I cannot know 'The test is on Friday but I do not know it'. No contradiction follows from the supposition that you know my blindspot. But could you know my blindspot if we are epistemic peers? Epistemic peers have the same evidence and reasoning ability. So either both peers know a proposition or both are ignorant. Since I cannot know my blindspot, neither can my peer. Thus the formal ignorance associated (...) with blindspots spreads to my peers. This contagion is used to improve a solution to the blindspot solution to the surprise test paradox. (shrink)

Epistemicists say there is a last positive instance in a sorites sequence-we just cannot know which is the last. Timothy Williamson explains that knowledge requires a margin for error and this ensures that the last heap will not be knowable as a heap. However, there is a class of disjunctive predicates for which knowledge at the thresholds is possible. They generate sorites paradoxes that cannot be diagnosed with the margin for error principle.

A para-reflection is a privational phenomenon that is often mistaken for a reflection. You have seen them as the ‘reflection’ of your pupil in the mirror. Your iris reflects light in the standard way but your pupil absorbs all but a negligible amount of light (as do other dark things such as coal and black velvet). Para-reflections work by contrast. Since they are parasitic on their host reflections, para-reflections are relational and dependent in a way that reflections are not. Nevertheless, (...) para-reflections obey nearly all the laws of reflection with exquisite fidelity. Para-refractions display parallel obedience to the laws governing refraction. Physicists and psychologists who study optics have neglected these everyday phenomena. Happily, physicists have been attentive and insightful about other privational phenomena such as vacuums and cold spots. I conclude that this kind of subtle treatment of negative things needs to be extended to optics. 1 The invisible red herring 2 Mind-independent privations 3 Para-reflections are mind-independent 4 Parasitical entities 5 Para-refractions and shadows 6 How science has coped with privations. (shrink)

Imagine a child playing in the afternoon sun, suddenly jerking her arm one way then the other, trying to catch her shadow out. The game, the child soon learns, is one that she can never win. Her shadow moves the moment she does. Such childish games father common sense wisdom; when things move, so do their shadows. Or do they? A spinning sphere casts a shadow. But does its shadow also spin? The question takes you by surprise. Surely not? you (...) think. But then again, why not? This is the trope of Sorensen’s work. A seemingly simple phenomenon is probed in just the right way and, without warning, you are unsure what to say. (shrink)

This enjoyable book presents a potpourri of paradoxes with the purpose of showing how they connect to serious philosophical issues. The main paradoxes are Zeno's, the sorites, Newcomb's problem, the paradoxes of confirmation, the surprise examination, and the paradoxes of self-reference. A final chapter defends the assumption that contradictions are unacceptable and an appendix throws in sixteen minor paradoxes. Along the way, R. M. Sainsbury peppers the reader with helpful queries and provocative asides.

Epistemologists have profited from studies of the ways in which ‘know’ is ambiguous. We can also profit by studying the ways in which ‘know’ is vague. After classifying sources of vagueness for ‘know,’ I spend the second section examining theories of vagueness. With the exception of the theory that vague predicates are incoherent, which I try to refute, we need not take a stand on a particular theory to show that the vagueness of knowledge has substantive epistemological implications. The third (...) section supports the thesis through a survey of ways in which appeals to vagueness can be applied to the field's issues. First, I show how higher order vagueness is evidence against the KK thesis, the incorrigibility of sense data, and the completability of epistemology. An interesting resemblance between infinity and vagueness provides the point of departure for the next type of application. For this resemblance suggests a new way of handling apparently infinite belief structures. The approach is illustrated with an analysis of common knowledge. The third type of application concerns the ways in which disguised sorites creep into our thinking about knowledge. In addition to brief illustrations concerning naive holism, question begging, and an objection to incorrigibilism, I provide more detailed illustrations involving Jonathan Adler's sceptical appeal to epistemic universalizability, the prediction paradox, and William Lycan's objection to Gilbert Harman's social knowledge cases. I conclude with some general remarks on the lessons to be learned from the vagueness of knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Paradoxes Stimulate Theory Development An Analogy with Perceptual Illusions Do Logical Paradoxes Exist? Imagination Overflows Logical Possibility Paradoxes Evoke Logical Analogies An Implication about the Nature of Paradox.

Tired of being weak-willed? Do you want to end procrastination and back-sliding? Are you envious of those paragons of self-control who always do what they consider best? Thanks to a breakthrough in therapeutic philosophy, you too can now close the gap between what you think you ought to do and what you actually do. Just send $1000 to the address below and you will never again succumb to temptation. This is a MONEY-BACK GUARANTEE. The first time you do something that (...) you know to be irrational, your money will be refunded, no questions asked. (shrink)

Shadows haunt the world of common sense by being “out there” independently of whether anyone is looking. Yet they are confi ned to a single sense: sight. Like ghosts, shadows evade tactile corroboration. They do not obey the laws governing material things.

One of the factors that contributes to an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness - his or her moral worth – is effort. On the one hand, agents who act effortlessly seem to have high moral worth. On the other hand, agents who act effortfully seem to have high moral worth as well. I explain this pair of intuitions and explore the contour of our views about cases in between them. This paper uses conceptual graphs for clarity and, in additional work I (...) have done on value theory, as arguments. Conceptual graphs reflect a way of doing philosophy that is new and powerful, as reflected in work over the past several decades by Derek Parfit, Shelly Kagan, Larry Temkin, and Thomas Hurka. (shrink)

You receive a pink packet from Miss Lead, a notoriously deceptive truth-teller. You know that if you open the packet and do not find blank pages, then you will justifiably change your mind about the evidence being misleading. Indeed, you will infer that your previous fears about misleading evidence were themselves founded on misleading evidence. Should you open the pink packet? No, answers an advocate of self-censorship. Yes, answers an advocate of the principle that you should base conclusions on all (...) the available evidence. Your final deliberations will be guided by Gilbert Harman’s Thought. Ultimately, the case against opening the packet prevails. (shrink)

William of Ockham wrote, ‘It is futile to do with more things that which can be done with fewer .’ But what if each option uses less than its predecessor but no option uses the least? A scale perfectly balanced between a pair of kilogram weights can be tipped by adding half a kilogram to one side, or a quarter of a kilogram, or an eighth of a kilogram, or … For any choice, there is an option that gets the (...) job done with less. Relative futility does not entail absolute futility. The job can get done – but only if we use superfluous means. Is this a refutation of Ockham’s Razor or just a close shave? (shrink)

Unit 731, a biological warfare research organisation that operated under the authority of the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930s and 1940s, conducted brutal experiments on thousands of unconsenting subjects. Because of the US interest in the data from these experiments, the perpetrators were not prosecuted and the atrocities are still relatively undiscussed. What counts as meaningful moral repair in this case—what should perpetrators and collaborator communities do decades later? We argue for three non-ideal but realistic forms of moral repair: (...) (1) a national policy in Japan against human experimentation without appropriate informed and voluntary consent; (2) the establishment of a memorial to the victims of Unit 731; and (3) US disclosure about its use of Unit 731 data and an apology for failing to hold the perpetrators accountable. (shrink)

Kant stated that there are three mental faculties: cognition, feeling, and desire. The faculty of feeling has received the least scholarly attention, despite its importance in Kant's broader thought, and this volume of new essays is the first to present multiple perspectives on a number of important questions about it. Why does Kant come to believe that feeling must be described as a separate faculty? What is the relationship between feeling and cognition, on the one hand, and desire, on the (...) other? What is the nature of feeling? What do the most discussed Kantian feelings, such as respect and sublimity, tell us about the nature of feeling for Kant? And what about other important feelings that have been overlooked or mischaracterized by commentators, such as enthusiasm and hope? This collaborative and authoritative volume will appeal to Kant scholars, historians of philosophy, and those working on topics in ethics, aesthetics, and emotions. (shrink)

Neste artigo apresentamos, de forma concisa e em português, alguns elementos-chave dos principais debates contemporâneos na filosofia da memória. Nosso principal objetivo é tornar essas discussões mais acessíveis aos leitores de língua portuguesa, fornecendo uma atualização importante para esforços anteriores (Sant’Anna & Michaelian, 2019a). Começamos introduzindo a noção de viagem no tempo mental, a qual estabelece a base empírica para a metodologia empregada em trabalhos recentes, antes de apresentar dois debates centrais. Primeiro, o debate entre causalistas e simulacionistas sobre a (...) teoria da lembrança filosoficamente correta (§2). Segundo, o debate entre continuístas e descontinuístas sobre a relação entre lembrança episódica e certas formas de imaginação (em particular, o pensamento episódico acerca do futuro) (§3). Na segunda parte do artigo, apresentamos e exploramos dois tópicos de discussão crescente: a natureza do sentimento de passado característico da memória episódica (§4) e questões de meta-nível relativas ao próprio caráter das controvérsias exploradas na primeira parte do artigo (§5). (shrink)

El texto siguiente trae una discusión en el campo teórico y empírico, de las relaciones entre grupos pantaneros y la naturaleza, en el entorno de las haciendas que se encuentran alrededor de Corumbá y Ladario, ciudades situadas a las márgenes del río Paraguay. En este texto, se comunican resultados parciales del proyecto de investigación acerca del conocimiento, de la cultura y de las representaciones producidas en el contexto de esas poblaciones en el proceso de apropiación de los recursos naturales. (...) De esa forma, se busca mostrar como estos grupos humanos piensan y actúan con relación al territorio pantanero. Finalmente se debate sobre las posibilidades de desarrollo local en el contexto de esas tradiciones. (shrink)

Contextualizar os processos oriundos de um período pandêmico é reconhecer que, para a nossa sociedade, o que vivemos com a pandemia da Covid-19 foi, de fato, inédito e histórico. Além de apresentar um cenário de acúmulo de emoções, mudança de rotina e sentimentos de medo e angústias, uma nova forma de interação social e trabalho precisou ser vivenciada. Assim, verificamos a importância de levantar reflexões acerca da maternidade vivenciada no contexto de isolamento social pelas mulheres que são mães discentes (...) e que precisaram conciliar suas atividades de cuidados diários com os estudos acadêmicos. É fundamental refletir sobre como funcionou o ambiente universitário no formato virtual e como tem sido o processo de retorno às aulas presenciais. Desse modo, neste artigo, o objetivo é apresentar reflexões acerca dos efeitos que o isolamento social no contexto da Covid-19 pode ter gerado à saúde mental de mulheres que são mães e universitárias. Tal texto compõe o levantamento bibliográfico do projeto de pesquisa “Atenção à saúde mental de mães universitárias no contexto da Covid-19”, realizado no curso de Psicologia da Universidade Federal do Pará. Acreditamos ser possível vivenciar no ambiente acadêmico aquilo que consideramos uma clínica da situação contemporânea e que colabora para a criação de espaços de acolhimento dentro da Universidade. No caso específico desta pesquisa, buscamos um acolhimento voltado para as mães universitárias que buscam permanecer nesses espaços, mesmo diante de tantos desafios. (shrink)

Tendo por objecto a análise da obra de Coluccio Salutati, De nobilitate legum et medicine, este ensaio propõe-se captar a formulação do paradigma filosófico do Humanismo em torno de um tríplice debate que naquela obra se expõe: um debate episte-mológico acerca do estatuto dos saberes - da ciência natural, representada pela Medicina, e dos estudos humanos, representados pela Ciência das Leis; um debate éticoantropológico acerca do valor e primado da vida activa ou da vida especulativa e, por conseguinte, (...) um confronto de modelos antropológicos entre o ideal do homem intelectual dedicado apenas à investigação da verdade e o ideal do homem moral, cuja principal faculdade é a vontade, a qual se exerce na acção virtuosa e na acção política; por último, um debate de alcance metafísico, na medida em que se propõe a inversão do modo tradicional de entender os transcendentais, — o ens, o verum, o bonum - subordinando-se a ontologia do ens e do verum a uma ontologia do bonum. /// Having for subject the analysis of Coluccio Salutati's De nobilitate legum et medicine, this essay aims to show the formulation of the early philosophical paradigm of Humanism taking into account the threefold debate this work explains: an epistemic debate about the status of sciences, the natural sciences represented by Medicine, and the human sciences represented by Law; an ethical and anthropological debate about the excellency of the vita activa over the vita speculativa; finally, a metaphysical debate that subverts the traditional view of the relation between the transcendentals, establishing the precedence of bonum above ens and verum. (shrink)

O Hino Homérico à Terra elucida a crença de que da deusa Gaia se originam todas as coisas, inclusive as mulheres. O delinear deste gênero na literatura e nas artes helênicas é apresentado através do viés do olhar masculino que, assim como no mito de Pigmaleão e Galatéia, cria imagens segundo seu ideal de perfeição e imperfeição. Este artigo tem como objetivo trazer alguns pontos iniciais sobre a obra Gynaicologia, de Hipócrates, mantendo um diálogo constante com os relatos mítico-literários, na (...) busca por identificar o ideal de uma physisfemina que excede às formas imortalizadasna perda, argila, bronze e papel, para recriar uma imagem, a partir do relato médico, acerca deste gênero, e ao final, quem sabe, fazer ecoar o que Pigmaleão disse ao concluir sua obra-prima: kallíste. (shrink)

O objeto deste artigo é a leitura que Claude Geffré faz de Paul Tillich em De Babel a Pentecostes: ensaios de teologia inter-religiosa. O autor recorre à teologia de Tillich para desenvolver uma “hermenêutica do diálogo inter-religioso”, a fim de responder ao desafio do pluralismo religioso para a teologia cristã. O argumento que Geffré encontra é que apenas a partir do paradoxo cristológico, à luz do conceito de “revelação final” e “preocupação última”, a teologia cristã pode responder ao pluralismo religioso (...) sem perder-se de si mesmo. O artigo tem dois momentos: primeiro, uma percepção da obra de Geffré, especialmente a primeira parte, intitulada Não há outro nome, onde está nosso foco; segundo, a análise dos três conceitos de Tillich desenvolvidos por Geffré, procurando identificar e caracterizar acentos da leitura e analisar o resultado dessa leitura à luz das referências na obra de Tillich. Nossa conclusão sublinha a pertinência da teologia de Tillich para a reflexão acerca do problema proposto, tal como Geffré demonstra, e destaca uma crítica a partir do conceito de preocupação última, cuja implicação questiona a positividade desse conceito para uma teologia inter-religiosa, uma vez que seu caráter paradoxal seja relativizado. (shrink)

O artigo discute como a teoria de gênero de Judith Butler, principalmente a partir do que a autora denominou de metafísica da substância, opera uma desontologização das experiências de sexo-gênero. Para isso, expõe-se como Butler opera a desontologização do sujeito generificado, através de sua crítica feminista acerca da ideia de sujeito concebida a partir do marco da diferença sexual. Posteriormente, dedica-se ao que Butler denominou de “metafísica da substância”, vista como o que sustenta, no marco do sistema de sexo-gênero (...) binário, a ideia de diferença natural dos corpos, momento no qual a autora recorre à genealogia da moral realizada por Nietzsche para justificar sua genealogia do gênero e dos corpos, vislumbrando esses como indissociáveis, razão pela qual conclui que, à maneira do gênero, a produção dos corpos ocorre de forma performativa através de recitações contextualizadas que estabelecem os marcos de inteligibilidade humana, os quais são, por isso, passíveis de transformação. (shrink)

O discurso didático que a escola vem construindo ao longo da história da educação brasileira tem em seu bojo o centralismo epistemológico eurocêntrico institucionalizado. Sendo assim, entendemos ser necessário a constante problematização em torno desses discursos na ação docente. Neste artigo, temos como objetivo analisar a forma como são discursivizadas a História e Cultura Afro-Brasileiras, Africanas, e Indígenas no discurso didático do livro de Física do Ensino Médio Integrado ao Técnico em uso no IFBA, campus Eunápolis. Realizamos uma pesquisa bibliográfica (...) por meio da análise de um corpus constituído de materialidades advindas da coleção, Compreendendo a Física, Alberto Gaspar – 3. ed. – São Paulo: Ática, 2016. Para isso mobilizamos a análise do discurso de linha francesa, as teorias fundantes desta pesquisa de perspectiva multicultural e decolonial, bem como discussões acerca do Livro Didático, esse aparato didático tão presente nas salas de aula e tão pouco consensual. Os resultados apontam que o discurso didático da coleção analisada, não se movimenta para a efetivação de fato da legislação específica do Ensino de História e Cultura Afro-brasileira na rede regular de educação básica. Por isso podemos afirmar que há necessidade de ampliação no plano conceitual e epistemológico do que significa construir uma proposta didática sob a perspectiva racial, que considere para o ensino de Física, as epistemologias africanas e indígenas que potencializam a descolonização deste artefato cultural. Palavras-chave: Relações étnico-raciais. Livro didático. Descolonização. Discurso didático. (shrink)

El hecho de que Unamuno sea un escritor autobiográfico nos permite determinar su concepción de rector, no solo sobre la base de lo que nos dice acerca de dicho cargo, sino también a partir de su experiencia, lo que es particularmente sugestivo, ya que la idea sui generis que tenía de dicho cargo se encarna en la realidad social que lo rodea.Por ejemplo, un texto que permitiría acceder a la experiencia de Unamuno como rector esel discurso que pronunció en (...) el “Paraninfo de la Universidadde Salamanca el 1 de octubre de 1931, al inaugurar, en calidad de rector, el curso académico de 1931-1932” (cf. Unamuno 1971d 395). (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar a pertinência do recurso da narração tanto na representação quanto da própria constituição da ipseidade. Para realizar esse intento, optou-se por uma estratégia comparativa entre uma posição antinarrativista e uma narrativista no que concerne aos poderes da narração em apreender e compor o domínio das identificações. Em um primeiro momento será realizada uma reconstrução das posições de Jean-Paul Sartre acerca da narração tendo por base a ontologia fenomenológica de O ser e o (...) nada bem como as considerações sobre narrativa e identidade encontradas no romance A náusea e no texto de Diários de uma guerra estranha. O momento seguinte explorará os argumentos narrativistas de Alasdair MacIntyre em Depois da Virtude, de Charles Taylor em As fontes do self e, especialmente, de Paul Ricoeur em Tempo e narrativa e O si-mesmo como outro. Finalmente, no momento mais estritamente comparativo, pretende-se mostrar certas dificuldades da posição antinarrativista, bem como a fecundidade da posição narrativista, no que diz respeito ao distinto modo de administração da demanda por sentido no rechaço antinarrativista da identidade e do acolhimento do desafio de permanente elaboração de sentido da posição narrativista. (shrink)