Hate speech is one of the most important conceptual categories in anti‐oppression politics today; a great deal of energy and political will is devoted to identifying, characterizing, contesting, and penalizing hate speech. However, despite the increasing inclusion of gender identity as a socially salient trait, antipatriarchal politics has largely been absent within this body of scholarship. Figuring out how to properly situate patriarchy‐enforcing speech within the category of hate speech is therefore an important politico‐philosophical project. My aim in this (...) article is twofold: first, I argue that sexist speech, though oppressive, is not hate speech. Second, I argue that misogynistic speech is hate speech, even when it is intradivisional. This is important because recognizing that the concepthate speechapplies to certain forms of patriarchy‐enforcing speech is another step in clarifying what is wrong with the practice, and how bad it is in relation to other abuses. Consequently, this article provides a more nuanced account of the kinds of expressions that can and should count as instances of hate speech. (shrink)

We are all persons or selves. But what exactly does it mean that we possess an identity and autonomy as persons or selves? This book explores the related problems of self-identity and personal autonomy within the framework of contemporary analytical anthropology, a blend of analytical philosophy of mind and action with moral psychology. Cuypers critically examines the empiricist bundle theory and metaphysical ego theory of self-identity as well as the hierarchical Frankfurt / Dworkin model of (...) personal autonomy. Arguing that all these standard views are found wanting, Cuypers then offers an alternative 'personalist' theory of personal identity, plus an innovative 'moderately heteronomous' theory of autonomy without ever going beyond the analytical frame of reference. In critical discussion with analytical philosophers such as Derek Parfit, John Perry and Harry Frankfurt, this book develops an original perspective on the nature of persons or selves that is orthogonal to the received views in analytical anthropology. (shrink)

In Self-Identity and Powerlessness , Alice Kouobová proposes a conception of human existence that does not essentially depend on the definition of self-identity. She does this by reinterpreting Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and that of other authors.

Abstract:Discussions of the ethics of advertising have been based on a general distinction between informative and persuasive advertising without looking at specific techniques of persuasion. Self-identity image ads persuade by presenting an image of an idealized person-type such as a “beautiful” woman (Chanel) or a sexy teen (Calvin Klein). The product becomes a symbol of the ideal, and target consumers are invited to use the product to project the self-image to themselves and others. This paper argues that (...) image ads are not false or misleading, and that whether or not they advocate false values is a matter for subjective reflection. Image ads can undermine a consumer’s self-esteem by collectively omitting images authentic for that sort of person (such as large women), and by combining impossible images with implied gaze. Image ads generally do not undermine autonomy of choice, internal autonomy, or social autonomy. It is concluded that image advertising is a basically ethical technique, but several recommendations are given on how use of image advertising can avoid specific harms. (shrink)

The key to understanding self-identity is identifying the transcendental structures that make a temporally extended, continuous, and unified experiential life possible. Self-identity is rooted in the formal, temporalizing structure of intentional experience that underlies psychological continuity. Personal identity, by contrast, is rooted in the content of the particular flow of experience, in particular and primarily, in the convictions adopted passively or actively in reflection by a self-identical subject in the light of her social and (...) traditional inheritances. Secondarily, a person’s identity is rooted in others’ characterizations of that person in the light of the social conventions and constructs of the cultures and traditions that have shaped the personal identity of the ones who make the attributions. Personal identity, on this view, is fundamentally rooted in beliefs, traits—especially character traits—sentiments, and moods, that is, in the subject’s convictions about the true, the good, and the right—and in the commitments to the pursuit of (apparently) worthwhile goods and to the practical identities rooted in those convictions. (shrink)

몸의 기억은 일종의 암묵적 기억으로서 삶의 과정동안 형성된 지각습관과 운동 감각, 상황과 공간 경험 그리고 다른 사람과의 신체적 상호 작용을 통해 형성된 행위구조 속에 침전되어 평생 개인의 삶에 영향을 미친다. 그래서 몸의 기억은 언제나 삶의 세계에 뿌리를 두고 있으며, 개인이 살아온 삶의 역사가 담긴 자기 정체성의 근원이 되는 것이다. 따라서 개인의 인격의 지속성은 주체가 스스로 기술한 자기 서사에서 확인되는 것이 아니라, 암묵적으로 침전된 개인의 역사가 현재화되는 몸의 기억에서 근본적으로 확인되는 것이다. 그래서 몸의 기억은 우리가 항상 되돌아가는 전반성적인 자기 신뢰의 지점이며 (...) 자기정체성의 기반이 되는 것이다. 이러한 몸의 기억에 대한 현상학적 이해는 특히 치매를 앓고 있는 환자에게 세상에 대한 신뢰와 자기 자신에 대한 안정감을 되찾을 수 있는 돌봄의 방향을 제시해 줄 수 있다. 또한 뇌졸중 환자의 회복 체험에 대한 해석학적 현상학적 연구들은 몸의 회복이란 삶의 환경과 엮여 있는 생활습관, 가치관, 관심 등이 통합적으로 육화된 몸의 기억을 회복하는 데 있음을 보여준다. 따라서 몸의 기억에 대한 현상학적 이해는 뇌졸중환자, 치매환자에서 뿐만이 아니라 몸의 회복을 목표로 하는 다양한 의료 실천현장에서 신체적 자기 정체성의 회복을 위한 돌봄의 실천 방향을 제시해준다고 여겨진다. (shrink)

A common view is that self-identity is essential to objects if anything is. Itself a substantive metaphysical view, this is a position of some import in wider debates, particularly in connection with such problems as physicalism and personal identity. In this article I challenge the view. I distinguish between two accounts of essence, the modal and the definitional, and argue that self-identity is essential to objects on the former but not on the latter. After laying (...) out my case, I deal with a number of objections. (shrink)

Introduction -- Cultural theories of people -- Identities in standard English -- Language and social institutions -- The cultural self -- The self's identities -- Theories of identities and selves -- Theories of norms and institutions -- Social reality and human subjectivity.

The analysis of personal identity over time (personal persistence) in terms of properties of the first-person perspective has been neglected for quite a while. However, there seems to be an interesting relation between experiential features on the one hand and the notion of personal persistence on the other hand. This idea is famously spelled out in an argument introduced by Barry Dainton (2000; 2005; 2008), according to which diachronic personal persistence con- sists in experiential continuity (stream of consciousness). This (...) paper challenges one central claim of the argument, whose main target is to ward off the threat of factual interruptions in the stream of consciousness. It will be objected that this problem cannot be properly solved. However, the relevance of experiential features to personal persistence can be shown if one leaves behind the question of criteria of personal identity over time and instead turns to the question of what it means to have a sense of self-identity over time. It will be argued that not only experiential continuity but also experiential features of episodic memory characterise the sense of self-identity over time. (shrink)

This paper investigates the impacts of emotion enhancement on self-identity and assesses possible ethical consequences of these changes. It introduces the crucial dimensions related to the self which emotion enhancement may endanger—emotion standards, narrative identity, self-objectification, and freedom of hope and pursuit. I argue that the ethically salient issue with emotion enhancement is its impact on autonomous agency—whether one’s actions and beliefs are one’s own, and how the relational autonomy may be hindered or fostered. The (...) changes arising from emotion enhancement may be considered to belong to the same self as long as such changes do not alter the individual’s internal value system and the individual identifies with such changes. That being said, emotion enhancement remains unjustified in terms of freedom. Even if the emotional enhancement is performed out of free will, it does not bring freedom in the true sense, and thus threatens the subject’s special kind of being as the same rational agent. (shrink)

In this introduction to the first installment of the Common Knowledge symposium on xenophilia, the editor explains the rationale of the new project, citing increases in aggressive xenophobia internationally. He comments on the intergroup-relations theorist Todd Pittinsky's argument that, since tolerance is not logically the antithesis of negative feelings toward out-groups, even long-established traditions of toleration are inadequate to prevent intergroup aggression. Pittinsky proposes that tolerance be replaced, as a principle of peacekeeping, by the encouragement of positive feelings toward out-groups, (...) and the author of this essay responds by showing how the Freudian theory of ambivalence and the history of literature on which Freud drew in constructing it support Pittinsky's viewpoint. Enemies regularly fall in love, above all in Shakespearean drama, which Freud explains by arguing that all human relations are love-hate relations. Thus, this essay suggests, it takes as much psychic energy to repress the love in what appear to be relationships of hatred as to repress the hatred in what appear to be relationships of love. There is a metaphysical component as well to this argument: the xenophobe and xenophile equally presuppose that the identity principle is applicable to society as well as to mathematics; both assume that each discrete social group is self-identical and differs from all other groups more or less radically. The main difference between –phile and –phobe is the latter's relative incapacity to live with ambivalence. Given these arguments, one must expect to find negative as well as positive motives in the etiology and conduct of xenophilia—and the first installment of the Common Knowledge symposium is said to focus on cases of xenophilia in which varieties of enmity accompany that singular and underrated variety of love. (shrink)

This study aimed to understand the preserved elements of self-identity in persons with moderate to severe dementia attributable to Alzheimer’s disease. A semi-structured interview was developed to explore the narrative self among residents with dementia in a residential care facility and residents without dementia in an independent living setting. The interviews were transcribed verbatim from audio recordings and analyzed for common themes, while being sensitive to possible differences between the groups. The participants with dementia showed evidence of (...) self-reference even though losses in explicit memory were evident. The most noticeable difference between the two groups was time frame reference. Nonetheless, all participants showed understanding of their role in relationships and exhibited concrete preferences. Our findings suggest that memory loss and other cognitive deficits associated with moderate to severe dementia do not necessarily lead to a loss of “self.”. (shrink)

There has been some research conducted regarding nurses’ career success aimed at exploring its influencing factors, but there is no research on the mechanism of self-identity on the career success of infection control nurses. In order to further explore the formation mechanism of career success of nurses, we conducted our study using the Kaleidoscope Career Model to explore the chain-mediating effects of cognitive emotion regulation and social support between self-identity and career success. Five hundred forty-seven infection (...) control nurses from nine different hospitals participated in the study and completed questionnaires on the self-identity, cognitive emotion regulation, social support, and career success scales. The results from structural equation modeling reveal that self-identity has a positive effect on positive emotion regulation and social support and a negative impact on negative emotion regulation. Positive emotion regulation has a positive effect on social support. All antecedents have a positive impact on career success except negative emotion regulation, which has a negative one. Bootstrap analysis shows that the relationship between self-identity and career success is partially mediated by the chain of cognitive emotion regulation and social support. Overall, our research sheds light on the mechanism of self-identity on career success of nurses. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Identity disturbances are common in clinical conditions and personality measures need to extend to assessment of coherence in underlying levels of self-coherence. The problem has been difficult to solve because self-organization is a complex unconscious set of mind/brain processes embedded in social roles and values. Theory helps us address this problem and suggests methods and limitations of interpretation that involve self-reports of subjects, observers who rate subjects, and narrative analyses of verbal communications from subjects.

Provides links to Internet resources in the field of international relations. Includes resources on diplomacy, history, and politics; economics and international management; international law; international organizations; regional studies; research institutes; United States government resources; and more.

The formulation and implementation of policies addressing the need to adapt to climate change can be difficult due to the long-term, uncertain nature of localised climate change impacts and associated vulnerabilities. Difficulties are intensified because policy interventions can involve high costs, foregone opportunity and changes to people's way of life. Factors such as these can spur an uncritical, or reflexive, negativity regarding efforts to address the projected impacts of climate change. Such reflexive negativity is often trivialised in pejorative terms, such (...) as 'Nimbyism'. However, stakeholder reluctance to accept the need for adaptation planning may be strongly influenced by self-perceptions that are resistant to change. People's sense of self and sense of place may contribute to an 'imaginative intangibility' with respect to climate adaptation, blocking thoughtful reflection and deliberation regarding alternative approaches and providing rationales for cheating the system once implemented. If acknowledged and addressed in a sensitive manner, it may be possible to manage these self-perceptions to elevate public discourse about climate change and help create situationally appropriate adaptation policy regimes. (shrink)

This paper presents a new cognitivist account for the old puzzle of self-consciousness or knowing self-reference. Knowing self-reference does not rely on reflection on some putative pre-existent pre-reflexive self-consciousness, nor is it the result of a process of identification of oneself as the employer of the relevant token of “I” according to the token-reflexive rule of the first-person pronoun. Rather, it relies on the architecture of the cognitive system. By exploiting the acquaintance relation that every brain (...) has to one’s own body, a “mental file” is opened in a subliminal way to house information about oneself gained through the appropriate proprioceptors. Knowing self-reference based on self-files dispenses with self-identification because the opening of the file in the same brain/body is not a deed of the cognitive system but rather something that takes place sub-personally. (shrink)

First part of a discussion about what kind of guidelines we can find in our group or cultural identity for our place making and architectural planning.

This paper seeks to carve out a distinctive category of conspiracy theorist, and to explore the process of becoming a conspiracy theorist of this sort. Those on whom I focus claim their beliefs trace back to simply trusting their senses and experiences in a commonsensical way, citing what they take to be authoritative firsthand evidence or observations. Certain flat Earthers, anti-vaxxers, and UFO conspiracy theorists, for example, describe their beliefs and evidence this way. I first distinguish these conspiracy theorists by (...) contrasting them with another group that has recently received a lot of attention from the media, philosophers, and academics more broadly. I then dig more deeply into the nature of these conspiracy theorists’ epistemic self-understanding, in order to give an account of the process by which one becomes such a conspiracy theorist. I conclude with some takeaways and implications: first, I explore the implications of my account for whether these conspiracy theorists’ beliefs are rational; then, I argue that my account has practical takeaways about counteracting beliefs in misinformation, since strategies appropriate to this kind of conspiracy theorist may not be the same ones that are appropriate for other kinds. (shrink)

Possession is preeminently the form in which the other becomes the same, by becoming mine. (Levinas, TI, 46)If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose (...) a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. (Burne, T, App., 635)The I think must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought: .... they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist altogether in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. (Kant, CPR, 76-7). (shrink)

Returning to the much-neglected work of George Herbert Mead, this book defines the self and links it to identity and collective action.

The article’s aim is to explore human hand allograft recipients’ postoperative experience of disownership and their gradual experience of their new hand as theirs, with the aid of the work of the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Many have used a Merleau-Pontinian perspective in the analysis of embodiment. Far fewer have used it in medico-ethical analysis. Drew Leder’s phenomenologically based ethics of organ donation and organ sale is an exception to this tendency. The article’s second aim is to examine Leder’s phenomenologically (...) based ethics of organ donation and organ sale. Though I find parts of Leder’s approach promising, I also elaborate a line of reasoning that draws on Merleau-Ponty, that does allow us to argue for certain kinds of organ donation and against organ sale—and that avoids some of the problems with Leder’s approach. This alternative route builds on the concept of the integrity of the body-subject. (shrink)

This dissertation discusses friendship in relation to self-identity in the thought of Paul Ricoeur. Its main claim is that Ricoeur's notion of self-identity designates a hermeneutically mediated experience, and that this complex experience can only be illumined by a phenomenology that is sensitive to ethical aspects. Another finding is that, according to Ricoeur, whatever we do, say, or write, takes on the form of narrative experience. Finally, the dissertation shows that what looks like the force of (...) the discourse, driving author to reader, and readers to one another, is in fact the force of philia, and that the latter is a source that nourishes practical wisdom exercised in relations with others. The call to friendship is a call to esteem for the being-like-me, a call to recognize a likeness beyond question and doubt, which relates selfhood and alterity, sameness and difference. (shrink)

Professor Weiss thinks that nothing less than a complete explanation of all there is will do for a philosophy. This desire to be all-encompassing defines the kind of multiplication of entities he believes to be necessary. For him the method of philosophy is dialectical, and dialectic is the recognition and provision of that which would complete the given. The technique is similar to what some psychologists have called "eduction of the correlate"; it is similar also to Kant's transcendental method of (...) proof, which proceeds from our actual experience to the conditions under which alone such experience is possible. (shrink)

Ashley and Stack couple their claim that Hume holds a logical-construction theory with the remarkable suggestion that, so understood, his views yield "... at least a recognizable facsimile of the identity most of us believe in." The highly implausible suggestion that the non-philosopher regards his self as a logical construct should be enough to provide a motive for re-examining the arguments Ashley and Stack offer for their interpretation. These arguments make use of the distinction Hume develops between perfect (...) and imperfect identity and lead, first of all, to the conclusion that, contrary to some interpretations, Hume does not refuse the self all identity, but only perfect identity, that is, identity defined as the "idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted through a supposed variation of time." Finding the self to be not such an object, Hume says it cannot be said to have such identity. It can, however, be said to have imperfect identity, constituted by the "uninterrupted progress of thought" over a succession of objects, namely our perceptions. (shrink)