Ist die wissenschaftlich uberholte, der Sinnlosigkeit verdachtigte, als Fabelei nihilierte Seinsfrage der Metaphysik wiederherstellbar? Antwort sucht ein Entwurf, welcher die unausgeschopften Traditionsbestande in funf Teilgebieten wieder einholt: als Seinslehre zwischen Sein und Nichts, als Kategorienlehre zwischen Substanz und Akzidenzen, als Wesenslehre zwischen Idee und Materie, als Transzendentalienlehre zwischen Einheit und Vielheit, als Existenzlehre zwischen existentia und Existenzialitat. DIe postmetaphysische Wendung leitet eine Prazisierungsanalyse an, die nicht nur die nihilierenden Einschnitte, sondern auch substanzontologische Vereinseitigung aufdeckt. DIeser Methodengang fuhrt - in (...) sachangemessener Auseinandersetzung mit Heideggers seinsgeschichtlicher Kehre - zu Grundlagen einer restitutiven Ontologie hin: zum principial fragenden Zwischensein zwischen Sein und Nichts als Ausdruck menschlichen Daseins, welches als das Fragliche an ihm selbst existiert. UNd das eroffnet eine Aussicht auf die abschlieSSende Fragestellung: Ist eine philosophische Theologie nach dem Ruf "Gott ist tot" wiederherstellbar? (shrink)

Author: Sobota Daniel Title: GENESIS, STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF SEINSFRAGE (Geneza, struktura i dynamika Seinsfrage) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.11, number: 2010/2, pages: 41-71 Keywords: HEIDEGGER, QUESTION OF BEING, ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE, ONTOLOGY, DASEIN Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The main purpose of this article is to present the genesis, structure and dynamics of the most important thought of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy (the question of Being). Since the very beginning (...) of Heidegger’s logical research he was interested in these forms of utterance, which previously had been acknowledged as of marginal significance in discovering the truth and the structure of science. The question of Being is phenomenological unity which has replaced traditional assigning of being and proposition. From this perspective all of the traditional logical and ontological problematic changes itself radically. By considering the question Heidegger revealed the ontological difference and the place of revelation which is a common people’s being (the everyday life). (shrink)

The thesis is guided by the question: What is the subject matter of Heidegger’s philosophy in the period of Being and Time? I start by arguing that Heidegger’s formulation of the question of being is ambiguous because the term ‘being’ is open to at least two interpretations. I claim that this ambiguity has motivated two types of reading of Heidegger’s early work. On the first reading, Heidegger’s philosophy is understood as attempting to infer metaphysical claims (claims about what-is, or being (...) in a traditionally metaphysical sense) on the basis of claims about the structure of Dasein’s understanding. This reading typically renders Heidegger an idealist. On the second reading, Heidegger’s philosophy is taken to have no metaphysical ambitions, and thereby to be limited to elucidating the structure of Dasein’s understanding. I argue that both types of reading are inadequate and diagnose them as grounded in a Cartesian presupposition that Heidegger rejects. On the basis of direct textual evidence and a number of theoretical considerations I assert that although the second type of reading is right in that the primary object of Heidegger’s philosophy is the conditions of understanding and that the idealist reading is wrong, it is a mistake to deny that Heidegger’s philosophy has metaphysical implications. I claim that Heidegger’s exposition of the conditions of understanding involves a larger picture from the outset, a picture that delineates the relation between understanding and entities, and locates the objective in relation to Dasein. On this picture, 1) empirical entities are unqualifiedly independent of Dasein, 2) we have direct cognitive access to these entities as they are in themselves, and 3) there is no a priori unintelligible entities or aspects of entities. I address a number of potential objections to this way of interpreting Heidegger’s work. (shrink)

Diese Untersuchung hat zum Ziel, das Wesensverhältnis zwischen Interexistenzialität und Seinsfrage immanent offenzulegen. Die systematische Herausarbeitung erwächst aus zwei einfachen Fragen: Wie wird der Mitmensch in der seinsvergessenden Uneigentlichkeit in seinem Sein vortheoretisch verstanden? Wie ist im Gegenzug dazu, das eigentliche Verständnis des Mitmenschen hermeneutisch-phänomenologisch zu entschlüsseln und zu exponieren? Im Rahmen der Fundamentalontologie Heideggers konstituiert sich das spezifische Thema aus Sachfeld (Interexistenzialität), Sachhorizont (Seinsfrage), Sachhinsicht (Uneigentlichkeit und Eigentlichkeit) und Leitfaden (Flucht). Der Einblick in diesen Sachzusammenhang macht ganz (...) allgemein zweierlei sichtbar: die verstellenden Folgen der Seinsvergessenheit im Horizont der Interexistenzialität und die Grundrolle der Seinsfrage für die Gewinnung des wesensmäßigen Verständnisses und Verhaltens angesichts des Mitmenschen als jeseinig-existierendes Mitdasein. (shrink)

Heidegger's central concern is the question of being (Seinsfrage). The paper reconstructs this question at least for the young (pre- Kehre) Heidegger in the light of two interconnected hypotheses: (1) the substantial content of the question of being can be identified by seeing it as a response to (Marburg) neo-Kantianism; and (2) this content centres around the claim that, pace the neo-Kantians, 'epistemological' concerns are grounded in 'ontological' ones, for which reason 'ontology' must precede 'epistemology' as a form of (...) philosophical inquiry. In section I the general position of (Marburg) neo-Kantianism is sketched. In section II the implications of the neo-Kantian position for the concepts of truth and reality, reason, and experience, are outlined; significant similarities to Sellars, Davidson, and Brandom are revealed. Finally, in section III Heidegger's analysis of everydayness is shown to yield a distinct critique of the neo-Kantian relativization of the concept of the real to the theoretically knowable. From this critique it emerges why Heidegger thinks that 'ontology' precedes 'epistemology'. The project of fundamental ontology marked by the question of being thus shows itself to be at least in part a response to the aporia of Marburg neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

Este artículo recorre críticamente el análisis del pensamiento heideggeriano sobre el Ser proporcionado por Jean-Luc Marion. Partiendo de Sein und Zeit y llegando a Was ist Metaphysik? se delinea un profundo cambio en el horizonte de sentido en el cual se desarrolla la búsqueda del ser: abandonada la analítica existencial, parece posible una revelación del ser al Dasein sin necesidad de mediaciones ónticas. El artículo intenta sondear las razones y la viabilidad de este pasaje que, según Marion, abre a la (...) pura donación. En el curso de la argumentación son múltiples las confrontaciones con el método fenomenológico de Husserl. (shrink)

Even in the relatively recent literature on the issue of the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger, some scholars recognize that despite a large number of very good accounts, the darkness surrounding the matter has not yet been totally lifted. In particular, we still lack a complete account of the exact influence that Husserl’s Phenomenology exerted on Heidegger’s project of a Fundamental Ontology. To use, e.g., Dahlstrom’s wording, until now, the available works on this subject “merely provide points of departure (...) for an explanation of the relation between the two phenomenologists” (Dahlstrom 2001, 142 n. 103; emphasis added). The situation is, of course, somewhat awkward, since Heidegger himself not only admitted his debt to Husserl’s philosophy, but also sometimes tried to guide us through the inner itineraries of this debt. In his Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity (SS 1923), Heidegger admitted, in front of his students, that it was Husserl who gave him his philosophical eyes: “die Augen hat mir Husserl eingesetzt” (GA 63, 5). There are many occasions on which Heidegger thematizes his debt to Husserl’s Phenomenology. Two years later, in his Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time (SS 1925), he introduced his students to what he presented as the “three fundamental discoveries” of Husserl’s Phenomenology: intentionality, the doctrine of categorial intuition, and the phenomenological sense of the a priori, thereby publicly acknowledging his admiration for Husserl’s work. Both there and in BT, (1927) as well as in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (SS 1927), Heidegger constantly acknowledges the decisive dependence of his philosophy on Husserl’s thinking. [...] All the available textual evidence, then, makes clear that Heidegger considered the doctrine of categorial intuition, developed in the sixth LI, as the most decisive influence from Husserl on his own thought (with intentionality and the phenomenological a priori following closely). Now, what precisely is the meaning of this influence? How might that Husserlian doctrine have helped Heidegger shape the way in which he treated the sole concern of his entire philosophical career, namely the question of Being (Seinsfrage)? (shrink)

The ongoing publication of Heidegger's complete works has called into question the interpretive and translative practices that have historicized Heidegger's thinking through the adaptation of categories and mind-sets inherited from metaphysics. Ivo De Gennaro argues that the posthumous treatises in particular - many of which have yet to be translated into English - show that the "other onset of thinking" that Being and Time inaugurated and which those historicizing accounts have interpreted and translated away, has already taken place. This book, (...) on the other hand, speaks solely from that other onset, that of being itself. While arguing the "one-pointedness" of Heidegger's entire path of thinking, De Gennaro draws mainly on the posthumous treatises to offer both a provisional exploration of, and an introduction to, a thinking whose sense and implications have barely begun to emerge. This challenging and original interpretation marks an important contribution to Heidegger scholarship. (shrink)

The ongoing publication of Heidegger's complete works has called into question the interpretive and translative practices that have historicized Heidegger's thinking through the adaptation of categories and mind-sets inherited from metaphysics. Ivo De Gennaro argues that the posthumous treatises in particular - many of which have yet to be translated into English - show that the "other onset of thinking" that Being and Time inaugurated and which those historicizing accounts have interpreted and translated away, has already taken place. This book, (...) on the other hand, speaks solely from that other onset, that of being itself. While arguing the "one-pointedness" of Heidegger's entire path of thinking, De Gennaro draws mainly on the posthumous treatises to offer both a provisional exploration of, and an introduction to, a thinking whose sense and implications have barely begun to emerge. This challenging and original interpretation marks an important contribution to Heidegger scholarship. (shrink)

The present text shows the hidden root of the question of being in Heidegger's Early Writings. His first logic and epistemological investigations in a neokantian atmosphere moves to ontological interests: he gives up the notion of transcendental subject, and asks for the historical and temporal background of live. In this sense, the young Heidegger gives his work a new direction by searching for the hermeneutical pressupositions that allows philosophy to formulate again the question of being from a radical point of (...) view. (shrink)

Der Autor stellt die Seinsfrage von dessen Bejahung durch eine fundamentalontologische Liebe aus. Ihre psychosozialen Möglichkeiten sowie die christliche Vergebungslehre werden ausgelotet und die Konfessionen daran erinnert, ihrer Kernbotschaft gerecht zu werden: das von ihnen gepredigte Sein auch selbst zu leben.

Within the Seinsfrage, the question of being, the «who» question, or Werfrage, arises at once. Who is this «who»? In other words, who am I? Questioning the being, inevitably means questioning ourselves. Would it thus be possible to conceive of a subject without being? This question, paradoxical as it may appear, nevertheless has a historiographical legitimacy, if we consider that «phenomenological anthropology», as the young Heidegger conceived it, precedes in effect the formulation of the Seinsfrage. From his very (...) first lectures in Fribourg, an access into subjectivity, apprehended as a «wordly ipseity », is thereby opened. While criticizing Natorp who unreservedly denied such a possibility, Heidegger yet ends up conceding the point almost entirely. This, at least, is our hypothesis: the «I» exists only at the cost of a tension between facticity and existence, a tension which, in the eyes of Natorp, leads to a confirmation that the «I», strictly speaking, cannot be – and this allows us therefore a glimpse into the legitimate possibility of a Werfrage without Seinsfrage. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper aims to rebuild the relationship between the Seinsfrage and Catholicism in Heidegger’s meditation and to shed light on his critique to Christianity as a philosophical necessity rooted in his broader critique of modernity in the context of the Black Notebooks. In order to reach these purposes, this contribution will be articulated in two parts: in the first one, I will rebuild Heidegger’s relationship to Catholicism and in the second one, I will focus on Black Notebooks as important (...) tools in understanding Heidegger’s critique to Catholicism, a critique that is built on three levels: historical, speculative and political. The essay will show how the Schwarze Hefte illuminate Heidegger’s attempts to answer the question of Being in an incessant tension with the coeval seven major treatises on the Seinsgeschichte, in which Christianity, metaphysics and nihilism are inextricably tied together. (shrink)

Abstrak: Tujuan dari artikel ini adalah menginterpretasi dan mengafirmasi bahwa Ada (das Sein) dalam “pertanyaan tentang Ada” (die Seinsfrage) dalam pemikiran Heidegger adalah univok sebagaimana konsep Ada itu univok dalam pemikiran Duns Scotus. Oleh karena itu, pertanyaan utama yang menuntun artikel ini adalah, bagaimana dapat ditunjukkan hubungan antara konsep Ada itu univok antara Dun Scotus dan Heidegger? Untuk memahami dengan baik tema ini, kita akan mengulasnya dalam empat bagian. Pertama, kita akan berkonsentrasi pada pengertian konsep ekuivok, analog, univok. Kedua, (...) kita fokus pada konsep analogi dan univok dalam pemahaman Abad Pertengahan. Bagaimana Duns Scotus memahami Ada itu univok akan dijelaskan pada bagian ketiga. Kemudian, kita akan mengelaborasi sebuah penafsiran Ada itu univok dalam pemi- kiran Heidegger pada bagian keempat. Pada akhirnya, konsep Ada itu univok dalam pemikian Heidegger terletak pada konsepnya tentang waktu. Kata-kata kunci: Ekuivok, analog, univok, metafisika, Ada, Dasein, In- nerzeitigkeit, Zeitlichkeit, ekstasis, transendental. Abstract: The scope of this article is to interpret and affirm that Being (das Sein) in Heidegger’s “question of Being” (die Seinsfrage) is similarly univocal to Duns Scotus’ concept of the univocity of Being. Therefore, the central question which guides this article is, how can it point to the relationship between Duns Scotus and Heidegger in regards to the concept of the univocity of Being? To understand well this theme, we will explain it in four parts. First, we concentrate on the definitions of equivocity, analogy and univocity. Second, we focus on the concepts of analogy and univocity in the Middle Ages. How Duns Scotus understands the univocity of Being will be pointed out in third part. After that, we will elaborate an interpretation of the univocity of Being in Heidegger’s thought in fourth part. In the end, concept of the univocity of Being in Heidegger’s thought is put in his concept of time. Keywords: Equivocity, analogy and univocity, metaphysics, Being, Dasein, Innerzeitigkeit, Zeitlichkeit, ecstatic, transcendence. (shrink)

Die 'Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis' dürfen mit Fug und Recht nach 'Sein und Zeit' als das zweite Hauptwerk Heideggers bezeichnet werden. Denn sie enthalten nach der fundamentalontologischen Ausarbeitung der Seinsfrage in 'Sein und Zeit' die erste Durchgestaltung des seinsgeschichtlichen Weges derselben Frage. Das seinsgeschichtliche Denken entfaltet das Wesen des Seins nicht mehr im Überstieg (Transzendenz) über das Seiende auf dessen Wahrheit hin (Horizont), sondern im Vollzug des ereigneten Entwurfs aus dem ereignenden Zuwurf der Wahrheit des Seins. 'Ereignis' ist (...) der Name für die Zusammengehörigkeit der ereignend sich zuwerfenden Wahrheit und des ereigneten Seinsentwurfes das Da-seins. Die 'Beiträge zur Philosophie' sind das Werk, in dem sich das Denken der im 'Brief über den Humanismus' genannten 'Kehre' vollzieht. (shrink)

In der Vorlesung des Sommersemesters 1927 unter dem Titel Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie nimmt Martin Heidegger eine Neue Ausarbeitung des 3. Abschnitts des I. Teiles von 'Sein und Zeit' in Angriff. Der Gesamtbestand der Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie in ihrer Systematik und Begrundung besteht in der Diskussion der Grundfrage nach dem Sinn von Sein uberhaupt und der aus ihr entspringenden Probleme. Die so gekennzeichnete Thematik von Zeit und Sein wird auf dem Umweg einer phanomenologischen Erorterung von vier geschichtlichen Thesen uber das (...) Sein behandelt. Die phanomenologisch-kritische Diskussion dieser Thesen fuhrt zu der Einsicht, dass allem zuvor die Grundfrage nach dem Sinn von Sein uberhaupt beantwortet sein muss, um die aus den vier geschichtlichen Thesen herausgeschalten vier Grundprobleme in zureichender Weise systematisch ausarbeiten zu konnen. Wer Sein und Zeit als einen Weg zur Ausarbeitung der Seinsfrage uberhaupt als dem Ziel studiert, bleibt auf Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie verwiesen. (shrink)

This thesis explores Heidegger's attempt to move beyond the recuperative powers of the dialectic. Its title announces a certain aporia: the "beyond," of course, is precisely what Hegel claims to have transcended; and he has determined that all attempts to overcome him--refutation, opposition, supersession; reversal , inversion , bisection , dissection , periodization --only confirm the potency of the original system. Heidegger displays an acute self-consciousness concerning such aporias of "overcoming." ;This thesis inscribes the Heideggerean project within the horizon of (...) speculative idealism. Heidegger appears to be embroiled in Hegel's earlier struggle with Reflexionsphilosophie . He seems to oscillate between two poles: between a "speculative" drive to surpassing the limit and a "reflective" hesitation or acquiescence at the barrier ; between "good infinite" and "bad infinite"; ultimately between Vernunft and Verstand. Heidegger appears "speculative" in his resistance to the bad infinite in its modern guises , the flux of das Man, the seriality of Technik, the fragmentations of a political aggregate). He appears "reflective" or "Romantic" in his appeal to a "task of thinking": interminable, provisional, forever "underway." He thus appears, at one time, both to resuscitate all Hegel's protests against Reflexionsphilosophie and to vindicate a "philosophy of finitude" which risks relapsing into just the terms Hegel had sought to surpass. Heidegger's thought is neither Spekulation nor Reflexion: it risks the appearance of both in order to negotiate a space between. The movement "'beyond' Aufhebung" is thus in fact a movement between a philosophy of Aufhebung and a philosophy of the "beyond" . ;Such oscillation compels us to rethink the metaphysics of the limit; here a line is traced which may not be comprehended by a speculative logic, and which has many different aspects . This thesis explores these various aspects as they unfold throughout the Heideggerean corpus but with particular reference to Zur Seinsfrage. (shrink)

«Etienne Gilson laissait à sa mort, en septembre 1978, le manuscrit d'un ouvrage largement inédit dont il avait achevé la préparation dix ans plus tôt, à en croire l'indication marginale "janvier 1968" qui figure sur la table des matières, complète et paginée. Ce volume posthume qu'Etienne Gilson avait intitulé malicieusement Constantes philosophiques de l'être comporte huit chapitres, inédits pour moitié, tandis que les autres reprennent sous une forme parfois assez différente et généralement plus développée la matière d'essais publiés séparément de (...) 1952 à 1967. La composition des textes ainsi rassemblés s'échelonne donc sur une quinzaine d'années sans qu'on puisse toujours dater avec précision la rédaction des quatre chapitres jusqu'à présent inédits. Ce qui est sûr en tout cas, c'est que, comme l'auteur le souligne lui-même dans sa Préface, tous ont été conçus dans la perspective d'un recueil d'ensemble, qui s'est constitué progressivement et comme de lui-même. Le présent ouvrage, beaucoup plus doctrinal qu'historique, se situe par ailleurs dans le prolongement direct des réflexions que le grand historien avait d'abord développées dans l'Etre et l'Essence. L'auteur y poursuit en particulier, à la faveur d'une mise en perspective de l'ensemble de la tradition philosophique occidentale, un débat déjà engagé dans les appendices de la seconde édition de l'Etre et l'Essence, en 1962 ; débat qui porte sur ce que Gilson nomme ici "la nouvelle philosophie de l'être". S'interrogeant en philosophe "sur les données de l'histoire", l'historien demande à présent : "qu'y a-t-il de nouveau dans les aventures de l'être?", la nouveauté tenant pour l'essentiel au "cas Heidegger". Par où l'historien de la pensée médiévale n'ajoute pas simplement une pièce nouvelle au dossier déjà volumineux de l'interprétation thomiste de la Seinsfrage, mais contribue, à sa façon, à la position de la question de la structure ontothéologique de la métaphysique.» -- Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

The existential analytic of Being and Time is set within the frame of the Seinsfrage. This question arises for Heidegger out of his critical engagement with Husserl's phenomenology. More careful attention to Heidegger's project as a phenomenological one reveals that Dasein, the entity who asks the Seinsfrage and who always has a pre-ontological understanding of Being, is also intentional. Dasein's existentiality is an intentionality. I will argue that inauthenticity and authenticity may be fruitfully understood in terms of the (...) phenomenological notions of empty intention and intentional fulfillment, respectively. Such an approach opens up the possibility of understanding Dasein's subjectivity in a way which challenges more traditional existentialist and voluntarist interpretations. (shrink)