A portrait of scholastic approaches to a qualified disagreement of opinions, focusing on the antagonism of scholastic probabilism and anti-probabilism in the early modern era.

Popper a passé sa licence sous la direction de Bühler en 1928. Affirmer que Popper a été profondément influencé, non seulement par la théorie du langage de Bühler, mais aussi par sa psychologie, ne correspond pas à l’opinion courante. Le deuxième chapitre de Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntis montre clairement que Karl Bühler a représenté l’un des points de départ les plus importants de la théorie de l’esprit de Popper. Selon Popper, dans l’épistémologie de Carnap, il y a un « (...) préjudice inductif » : afin de rétablir une opinion neutre et adopter une épistémologie qui soit indépendante de la psychologie, il est nécessaire de démontrer que, dans la psychologie aussi, le déductivisme est possible et concevable. Popper donne des exemples très clairs de psychologie déductive et cite la théorie de Kant, Johannes Mueller, l’École Wuerzburg et Ernst Mach. Le choix de tels exemples est significatif afin de comprendre la nature de la formation de Popper. En particulier, il est important de souligner l’absence de la « psychologie de la Gestalt » ou de ses penseurs, tels que Wertheimer, Koehler, Koffka, etc. En effet, Bühler s’opposait fortement à la psychologie de la Gestalt de l’École Wertheimer et, entre l’Institut Bühler de Vienne et les psychologues de la Gestalt à Berlin, il y avait une véritable rivalité. Popper — qui est normalement considéré, de façon simpliste, comme étant « un psychologue gestaltiste » — a tout à fait adopté l’idée de Bühler.Popper graduated under Bühler's direction in 1928. It's not part of the common view to say that Popper was strongly influenced, not only by Bühler's theory of language, but also by his psychology. The second chapter of Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnis shows clearly that one of the fundamental starting points for Popper's theory of mind was Karl Bühler. According to Popper, an “inductive prejudice” is contained in Carnap's epistemology : to restore a neutral point of view and to adopt an epistemology independent of psychology, it is necessary to show that, within the psychology, the deductivism is also possible, or thinkable. Popper provides some clear examples of deductive psychology and cites Kant's outlook, Johannes Mueller, the Wuerzburg's school and Ernst Mach. The choice of such examples is very important for the understanding of the nature of Popper's training. It is significant, in particular, the absence of the Gestaltpsychology or of its exponents, such as Wertheimer, Koehler, Koffka etc. In fact, Bühler was in sharp contrast with the Gestaltpsychology of Wertheimer's school and between the Bühler's Vienna Institute and the Berlin Gestalt -psychologists there was a real rivalry. Popper — who by the standard view is simplistically considered “a gestaltist psychologist” — adopted completely the Bühler's point of view. (shrink)

In a familiar interpretation, the Non-Identity Problem claims that persons whose existence depends on a seemingly harmful action cannot in fact be harmed through such an action. It is often objected that the persons in question can nevertheless be wronged through a violation of their rights. However, this objection seems to fail because these persons would readily waive any violated right in order to come into existence. The present article will analyze this Waiver Counter Argument in detail and show why (...) it does not succeed. First, it is necessary to distinguish between a prospective and a retrospective waiver scenario. In the prospective scenario an imagined person must consider whether she wants to waive a right in order to come into existence. In the retrospective scenario a person is asked whether she would prefer a wronged existence to never having been born. In both scenarios the conditions of a legitimate waiver of rights are not met, but for different reasons. On this basis, an argument against NIP can be developed. (shrink)

L’Economico di Senofonte contiene un interessante trattato sulla vita matrimoniale: al centro di questo trattato si colloca la figura della moglie di Iscomaco, così come viene delineata da quanto quest’ultimo narra a Socrate. Una figura in parte innovativa, in quanto viene associata alla gestione dell’oikos come responsabile di quanto si svolge all’interno della casa: un ruolo diverso da quello del marito, che si occupa e dirige ciò che si svolge all’esterno: i compiti di moglie e marito risultano quindi diversi ma (...) complementari. Questa differenza di attitudini e quindi di ruoli è presentata come voluta sia dalla divinità, sia dalla natura sia dalla consuetudine. La moglie di Iscomaco viene quindi a configurarsi come una collaboratrice e una compagna per il marito. Tuttavia questa moglie non intrattiene con il marito una relazione paritaria: infatti gestisce attività e persone all’interno della casa secondo le direttive impartite dal marito; anche nella sfera della vita sessuale deve adeguarsi ai desideri e alle convinzioni di Iscomaco; il suo stesso status di moglie sarà mantenuto soltanto se lei risponderà alle sue aspettative: paradossalmente la sua stessa autonomia è in realtà eterodiretta. Se pure può considerarsi una “maîtresse de la maison”, tuttavia, come ha sottolineato con una formula efficacissima Foucault, si tratta comunque di una “maîtresse obéissante de la maison”. (shrink)

Xenophon’s Oeconomicusincludes an interesting treatise on married life, at the hearth of which is the figure of Ischomachus’ wife, such as she is described by Ischomachus’ words to Socrates. It is an almost innovative figure, because she shares the management of the oikosas being responsible for what is carried out within the oikos: her role is different from her husband’s, who runs and manages what is carried out outside of the oikos. Therefore husband’s and wife’s tasks are different, though complementary. (...) The difference in inclinations and, therefore, roles is shown as established by god, nature and custom. So Ischomachus’ wife is a collaborator and companion of her husband, even though she does not have an equal relation with her him: she manages the activities and people within the oikosaccording to her husband’s directives. Also in the sphere of sexual life she has to conform to his desires and convictions; her own status as a wife will be preserved only if she meets his expectations: paradoxically her own autonomy is other-directed. Even if she may be considered a “maîtresse de la maison”, nevertheless, as Foucault outlined with a very incisive expression, she is anyway the “maîtresse obéissante de la maison”. (shrink)

What impact should sufficientarianism have on the measurement of inequality? Like other theories of justice, sufficientarianism influences how economic inequality is conceived. For the purpose of measurement, its standards of justice can be approximated by income-based thresholds of sufficiency. At which income level could a threshold of having enough be pegged in OECD countries? What would it imply for standard indicators of inequality, such as decile comparisons of cumulated income, income spreads, or the Gini coefficient? This paper suggests some answers (...) to these questions, showing that sufficientarian ideas could make a difference with respect to the measurement of inequality in a society. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

The comment focusses on O'Neill's advocacy of Classical Institutionalism (CI) and the problems of the ideal-regarding approach to the construction of institutions. It maintains that CI shows no signs of progress which would justify a renewed exclusive interest in this paradigm and that the ideal-regarding approach needs some consequentialist balancing to avoid obvious risks of totalitarian denaturation.

This paper focuses on Leibniz’s engagement with Thomas Hobbes’s political anthropology in the Mainz-period writings, and demonstrates that Leibniz tried to construct an alternative to the English philosopher by conceiving of a physically- and ontologically-grounded psychology of actions. I provide textual evidence of this attempt, and account for Leibniz’s rejection of Hobbes’s political theory and anthropological assumptions. In doing so, I refer to diverse aspects of Leibniz’s work, thereby highlighting his aspiration to congruity and consistency between different areas of investigation. (...) Furthermore, Leibniz’s political writings and letters will reveal another—sometimes neglected—aspect of the issue: his concern to defend and legitimize the existence of pluralist and collective constitutional political systems like the Holy Roman Empire by providing the theoretical ground of their ability to last. (shrink)

Deontologists often assume that ethical constraints hold ‘come what may’ but that violations of the constraints can be excused or pardoned. Vinit Haksar has argued for pardon as deontologically appropriate mitigation for the violation of deontological constraints. However, the reasons he adduces against excuse are inconclusive. In this paper, I show how complex the question of excuse versus pardon for deontological transgressions is. Liability for the development of character traits and the assumption of agent-centered responsibility have to be taken into (...) account before the possibility of pardon can be identified as appropriate deontological softener for strict constraints. (shrink)

This paper claims that deontological and consequentialist ethics are best distinguished with reference to different assumptions concerning moral accountability and accounting. Deontological ethics can thereby be defended against the accusation of inordinate concern with the moral purity of agents. Moreover, deontological ethics can and should reject being based on the concept of agent-relative value. Even under the assumption that deontological ethics can be consequentialized, agent-relative value need not play a fundamental role. This is not the same as denying agent-relativity a (...) key role in deontological ethics. Deontological moral accounting of universal value should be regarded as agent-relative, whereas consequentialist accounting assumes a shared moral account of all moral agents. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, SJ (1607–67), conceived a procedure for determining natural moral laws by voting under a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, imagined possible people who are ignorant of their social position, personal characteristics, nation, and the historical period in which they live vote as equals. These possible people are asked to establish a moral law in pursuit of their own and collective happiness, which they are obligated by God to follow. This article discusses Pallavicino's innovative approach to natural (...) law and examines its reception in Southern Germany and (what is now) Austria. (shrink)

Social epistemology existed in the scholastic tradition in the shape of doctrines on the legitimate use of probable opinions. Medieval scholasticism had developed sophisticated approaches in this respect, but the apogee of scholastic theoretical reflection on social epistemology occurred in the Baroque era and its Catholic moral theology. The huge debate on probable opinions at that time produced the most far-reaching and deepest investigations into the moral and epistemological foundations and limitations of opinion-based, reasonable discourse prior to the late twentieth (...) century. It is time to recover the arguments and claims of Baroque scholastic social epistemology, not only to fill a lacuna in intellectual history but also to see whether some of its challenges are still with us today. (shrink)

How should a crisis sparked by migration of the poor be dealt with? How should tax evasion be addressed? What is the appropriate response to manipulation of elections? Daniel Schwartz's book illustrates that moralists, lawyers, political decision makers, and society at large already contended with these issues some four hundred years ago. The underlying problems and their normative implications were thoroughly analyzed by scholastic authors at the time, many of whom wrote with an eye on influencing the emerging interested public, (...) or doubled as advisors for political decision makers. Political morality, the moral analysis of political decisions, is a particular field of applied ethics (undoubtedly, an important... (shrink)

In the history of scholastic philosophy, the fifteenth century is traditionally regarded as a period of decay, a downturn between the heights of fourteenth-century nominalism and the Spanish revival of scholasticism in the sixteenth century. This paper sets out to challenge this received view. First, however, the received view is confirmed on the basis of sixteenth-century lists of ecclesiastical writers containing very few notable scholastic philosopher-theologians for the fifteenth century. On the other hand, the same lists show a significant increase (...) in notable scholastics in the fields of practical ethics and jurisprudence. The overall picture signals a shift of philosophical and theological activity from theoretical towards practical concerns. If practical philosophy is not considered to be of lesser rank than theoretical philosophy, there was thus no downturn of scholastic philosophy in the fifteenth century. (shrink)

Critical feminist studies in religion seek to articulate a theoretical analytics not in terms of gender and feminine identity but in socio-political terms. They understand wo/men as socio-political subject-citizens who are producing cultural knowledges and religious discourses in situations of domination and alienation.

Responsive to the signs of the Latin American situation, liberation theology suggests new interpretations of the symbols of faith and calls for a radical transformation of man and society.