Understanding Sankara brings together the essays of the late Richard De Smet, SJ (1916-1997) on the great Indian Advaitin. With the help of his discovery of a doctrine of laksana (analogy) in Sankara, De Smet challenges the traditional interpretation of the acarya as an illusionistic mayavadin. He also attempts a dialogue between Sankara's Advaita and Christianity, especially as represented by Thomas Aquinas. The present collection makes available this important contribution to Indology and opens it up to (...) dialectic and dialogue. (shrink)

Prakrit work with Hindi commentary and translation on Jaina monastic life and discipline.

Contributed research papers presented at National Seminar jointly organized by Somanth Sanskrit University, Veraval and Sanskrit Sahitya Akadami at Gandhinagar on February 21-22, 2022.

SAT's most recent publication, this English translation from the original Sankrit by Adi Sankara is a very clear, aphoristic explanation of what the self is and the Knowledge that reveals.

Classical commentary on Yogasūtra of Patañjali.

Papers presented at the International Conference on "the State of Buddhism, Buddhists and Buddhist Studies in India and Abroad", held at Banaras Hindu University during 2-4 January 2009. Commemoration volume on the birth centenary of Bhikku Jagdish Kashyap, 1908-1976.

To define the determinants of impaired facial emotion recognition (FER) in patients with mesial temporal lobe epilepsy associated with hippocampal sclerosis (MTLE-HS), we examined 76 patients with unilateral MTLE-HS, 36 prior to antero-mesial temporal lobectomy (AMTL) and 40 after AMTL, and 28 healthy control subjects with a FER test consisting of 60 items (20 each for anger, fear, and happiness). Mean percentages of the accurate responses were calculated for different subgroups: right vs. left MTLE-HS, early (age at onset <6 years) (...) vs. late-onset, and before vs. after AMTL. After controlling for years of education, duration of epilepsy and number of antiepileptic drugs (AEDs) taken, on multivariate analysis, fear recognition was profoundly impaired in early-onset right MTLE-HS patients compared to other MTLE patients and control subjects. Happiness recognition was significantly better in post-AMTL MTLE-HS patients compared to pre-AMTL patients while anger and fear recognition did not differ. We conclude that patients with right MTLE-HS with age at seizure onset <6 years are maximally predisposed to impaired fear recognition. In them, right AMTL does not further worsen FER abilities. Longitudinal studies comparing FER in the same patients before and after AMTL will be required to refine and confirm our cross-sectional observations. (shrink)

Rāmānuja is known as a theistic ācārya who interpreted Brahmasūtras in Viśiṣṭādvaita point of view. He propounded his philosophy by refuting Kevāldvaita system of Śaṅkara. He criticized the existence and knowledge of indeterminate objects and refuted the concept of Nirviśeṣa Brahman. Therefore, Brahman for him is Saviśeṣa. The name Viśiṣṭādvaita itself signifies that it is Qualified Monism. Brahman is qualified by matter and soul. Matter and soul though real are completely dependent on Brahman for their existence. Hegel is a German (...) Philosopher who propounded Absolute Idealism. Hegel solved the problem of reality from a synthetic and positive point of view. Predecessors of Hegel were reflecting on Reality with one sided abstractions. Absolute is ultimately real for him. Hegel’s Absolute is not devoid of all objects and qualities. Absolute is inclusive of all the categories and all things of the world. Absolute is not abstract like Śaṅkara’s Brahman but it goes very much closer to Ramanuja’s Saviśeṣa Brahman. Thus, both these philosopher though differ in some principles which are very peculiar to them, they definitely meet at on one point of ‘Concrete Monism’. Logical method adopted by them to reach towards their goal is also strikingly similar. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of monism according to Rāmānuja and Hegel with philosophical point of view. Comparative study of both will throw light on some striking similarities as well as some differences of these great philosophers. (shrink)

Thomas Sankara was 33 years old when he seized power in a bloodless coup. During the four years of his governance, he organized adult literacy campaigns and mass vaccination of children, promoted women's rights and fought corruption as well as desertification caused by inappropriate agricultural practices introduced during the colonial period. Within two years, child mortality and illiteracy dropped significantly and vaccination coverage increased. Beyond these quantitative results, Sankara firmly believed that the decolonization of his country started from (...) the formation of the conscience of citizens, from learning to “rely on themselves” – materially and psychologically – and from the abandonment of a logic of technological and financial dependence that generated hunger and debt. To achieve his goals, he launched campaigns to “consume Burkinabè,” to plant trees and preserve rainwater in areas affected by desertification. (shrink)

This article analyzes Śaṅkara’s use of dreaming in Advaita Vedānta. For Śaṅkara, dreaming functions philosophically as a direct phenomenal inquiry into mind and consciousness. Dreaming also functions as a syllogistic illustration. While dreaming, we experience unreal objects that do not exist apart from our minds. Dreaming thus illustrates the waking world’s nonrealism despite perceiving it as real, and that waking objects are consciousness alone. However, the dream illustration raises several questions: In what ways does illusory dream reality extend to waking (...) objects? And does Śaṅkara view the objective waking world as the individual’s cognitive construction similar to the dream, or as īśvara’s cosmological construction? This article argues that for Śaṅkara, the individual’s waking cognitive construction is primarily epistemological rather than an external ontological power akin to a creator deity; however, distinctions between individual and īśvara are ultimately indeterminable and lose meaning from the standpoint of nondual brahman. (shrink)

In the opening sections of his Brahma-sutra-bhasya , Ramanuja makes a very forceful assault on Sankara's Advaita theory. This assault anticipates in a striking way modern western attacks on metaphysical religious positions, attacks which stem from Hume and are associated today with names like A. J. Ayer and Antony Flew. In this paper I wish to argue that certain aspects of Sankara's position, as enunciated in his Brahma-sutra-bhasya , suggest that Ramanunja's assault, and therefore by implication a modern (...) western attack on Sankara also, depends for its success on a misinterpretation of Sankara's views. I wish then to suggest a possible alternative interpretation of Sankara's Advaita in terms viable for today, drawing, though indirectly, on such writers as R. B. Braithwaite and R. M. Hare. An incidental implication of this paper is that these two philosophers of religion would meet less opposition from the religious if they were Hindu rather than Christian! A more important implication is that light could be thrown on the present religious controversy in the west by a study of Indian philosophy of religion, if only we were more disposed to treat it as a living tradition which might teach us something, rather than as an antique. (shrink)

Abstract Sankara's philosophy fails definitively at the point where he leaves the human experience??sinning and suffering??unaccounted for. What in each of us, he asks, sins and suffers? Is it the antahkarana, the ?mental organ? giving rise to the series of mental states (buddins) that file by illumined by the atman? Impossible, he says, for the antahkarana by itself is material (jada,) and therefore unconscious (acit). Then is it the ?tman, upon which the antahkarana is superimposed? Inconceivable, he says, for (...) the atman is identical with Brahman, and Brahman is by definition pure bliss?consciousness, as far removed from sin and suffering as can be imagined. Then is the atman in conjunction with the antahkarana?a partnership that Sankara calls the jiva (or soul)?the sinner and sufferer? Yes, he says, as long as you remember that the sin and suffering are ultimately illusory, as illusory as the antahkarana itself. I show why Sankara's answer fails and what the failure implies, then suggest a fruitful way to approach Sankara and teach his philsophy to our students. (shrink)

Study on the works of Sankaracarya; includes English translation of selected stotras of Sankaracarya.

Like all monisms Vedanta posits a distinction between the relatively and the absolutely Real, and a theory of illusion to explain their paradoxical relationship. Sankara's resolution of the problem emerges from his discourse on the nature of maya which mediates the relationship of the world of empirical, manifold phenomena and the one Reality of Brahman. Their apparent separation is an illusory fissure deriving from ignorance and maintained by 'superimposition'. Maya, enigmatic from the relative viewpoint, is not inexplicable but only (...) not self-explanatory. Sahkara's exposition is in harmony with sapiential doctrines from other religious traditions and implies a profound spiritual therapy. (shrink)

This and the following lessons cover the topic of Vedānta and ethics. Vedānta has two meanings. The first is the literal sense – “End of Vedas” – and refers to the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads—the latter part of the Vedas. The second sense of “Vedanta” is a scholastic one, and refers to a philosophical orientation that attempts to explain the cryptic Vedānta Sūtra (Brahma Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa, which aims at being a summary of the End of the Vedas. We shall pursue (...) the question of ethics in both senses of Vedānta. In this module we shall examine the ethical theory of Deontology found in the Upaniṣads. Having explored the implications of this model for moral philosophy, we can reflect upon the three commentarial approaches. In this lesson, we will examine Śaṅkara’s Advaita approach. Advaita Vedānta, especially in Śaṅkara's form, presents a version of moral scepticism, or more strongly, moral irrealism. In this account, there is nothing objective about ethics: it mediates our desires-oriented psychology, and should be dispensed with along with the desire-oriented psychology. Śaṅkara seems to come close to doing the impossible: saying insightful things about what he takes to be a fiction, which is the individual self, for which ethics is essential. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to understand the implications of a kara's claim that liberation is not an action. If liberation is not an action, how is it up to us and therefore our responsibility? What role do actions have in a life concerned with liberation? The key to understanding a kara's view, I suggest, requires broad reflection on his claim in his commentary on Brahma S tra I.1.4 that cessation of action in accordance with Vedic prohibition is not an (...) action. I will conclude by discussing the implications of this interpretation on the nature of m y in a kara. (shrink)

Verse biography of Śaṅkarācārya, exponent of the Advaita school in Indic philosophy.

Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta is largely dismissive of ritual action, in part because the metaphysical position of non-duality erodes any independent existence of the individual as a ritual agent, and because knowledge of non-duality is thought to be independent of action. However, a close reading of Śaṅkara shows that he does accept forms of devotional practice that have remained largely marginalized in studies of Advaita Vedānta. This article compares and contrasts contemplative devotion, in the form of visualized meditations on īśvara, with (...) knowledge-like contemplation of non-duality. The challenge is that the Upaniṣads provide no clear distinctions between the two, and these upāsanas appear indistinguishable from nididhyāsana because they incorporate a conceptual identity with brahman or appear to affirm non-duality in some sense. Furthermore, the practices of both are rather obscure despite their significance in Śaṅkara’s system. Analyzing Śaṅkara’s interpretations of their underlying Upaniṣadic sentence structures in terms of grammatical apposition and reconstructing their use of visualization, superimposition, and negation, provides clues to properly delineate these practices, and to understand their epistemological functions and potential religious experiences. (shrink)