The paper illustrates how organic chemists dramatically altered their practices in the middle part of the twentieth century through the adoption of analytical instrumentation - such as ultraviolet and infrared absorption spectroscopy and nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy - through which the difficult process of structure determination for small molecules became routine. Changes in practice were manifested in two ways: in the use of these instruments in the development of 'rule-based' theories; and in an increased focus on synthesis, at the (...) expense of chemical analysis. These rule-based theories took the form of generalizations relating structure to chemical and physical properties, as measured by instrumentation. This 'Instrumental Revolution' in organic chemistry was two-fold: encompassing an embrace of new tools that provided unprecedented access to structures, and a new way of thinking about molecules and their reactivity in terms of shape and structure. These practices suggest the possibility of a change in the ontological status of chemical structures, brought about by the regular use of instruments. The career of Robert Burns Woodward (1917-1979) provides the central historical examples for the paper. Woodward was an organic chemist at Harvard from 1937 until the time of his death. In 1965, he won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. (shrink)

Each of us is uniquely subject to certain kinds of stimulation from a small part of the universe within our skins. Mentalistic psychologies insist that other kinds of events, lacking the physical dimensions of stimuli, are accessible to the owner of the skin within which they occur. One solution often regarded as behavioristic, granting the distinction between public and private events and ruling the latter out of consideration, has not been successful. A science of behavior must face the problem of (...) privacy by dealing with events within the skin in their relation to behavior, without assuming they have a special nature or must be known in a special way. (shrink)

This article attemps to provide a good defense for battered women who kill their sleeping husbands, particularly in cases where it is judged that she was mistaken in her assumption of the need to exercise self-defense. Proceeding from the distinction between the imputation of an act to an actor and the imputation of blame to an actor for criminally prohibited conduct , the article moves on to a discussion of the relevance of mistakes as to justifying circumstances under the criminal (...) law. Although some attention is given to the theoretically sound solution to the problem raised by the unknowingly justified actor, primary emphasis is placed on the putatively justified actor. The argument is advanced that the false assumption of justifying circumstances negates the imputation of wrongful conduct to an actor, rather than negating the imputation of blame to him for his wrongful conduct. Accordingly, criminal liability can only attach to an individual acting in putative self-defense, for example, if that individual was negligent for making the mistake . The standard for judging negligence in the United States is that of the so-called "reasonable person". A great deal of discussion in the U.S. scholarly literature has been revolving around the question of whether an "objective" or "subjective" standard of reasonableness should be employed when determining whether an individual acted reasonable and thus non-negligently. This article argues for a "subjective" standard for the criminal law, as opposed to an "objective" standard, which is claimed to have more relevance for tort law . Finally, the claim is made that a battered woman who kills her sleeping husband should be given the benefit of the self-defense justification under the U.S. law approach to self-defense. If the woman is mistaken as to the need to exercise self-defense, then wrongful conduct should be imputed to her only on the basis of whether her mistake was subjectively unreasonable and thus negligent . Der Aufsatz liefert Argumente dafür, daß eine "battered woman" für die Tötung ihres schlafenden Ehemannes strafrechtlich nicht zur Verantwortung gezogen werden kann, und zwar insbesondere dann nicht, wenn sie irrig Umstände annimmt, die, wenn sie vorlägen, die Handlung der Frau unter Notwehrgesichtspunkten rechtfertigen würden. Die Unterscheidung zwischen der Zurechnung eines Vorgangs als Handlung und der Zurechnung einer rechtswidrigen Tat zur Schuld wird vorangeschickt . Dann wird die strafrechtliche Relevanz von Irrtümern über rechtfertigende Umstände besprochen. Zwar wird die theoretisch richtige Lösung auch solcher Fälle diskutiert, bei denen der Täter rechtfertigende Umstände verkennt. Doch wird die Betonung auf die Fälle der Putativnotwehr gelegt, wobei die These vertreten wird, daß die irrige Annahme von rechtfertigenden Umständen die Zurechnung des Vorgangs als Totschlagshandlung und nicht erst die Zurechnung zur Schuld ausschließt. Daraus läßt sich entnehmen, daß der Täter, der in Putativnotwehr handelt, strafrechtlich nur dann verantwortlich ist, wenn sein Irrtum auf Fahrlässigkeit beruht . In den U.S.A. wird die Frage, ob jemand fahrlässig gehandelt hat oder nicht, danach beantwortet, ob eine "reasonable person" in der gegebenen Situation genauso wie der Täter gehandelt hätte. Zur Zeit findet eine lebhafte Diskussion darüber statt, ob dieser Maßstab "objektiv" oder "subjektiv" aufzufassen sei. Anders ausgedrückt: Es wird die Frage gestellt, ob die Geschworenen die Annahmen eines Durchschnittsmenschen oder aber die eines Menschen mit den persönlichen Merkmalen und Erfahrungen des Angeklagten in ihren Überlegungen darüber heranziehen sollten, ob dieser hypothetische Mensch einem Irrtum wie dem des Angeklagten erlegen wäre. Der Aufsatz spricht sich, was strafrechtliche Urteile angeht, für den "subjektiven" und gegen den "objektiven" Maßstab aus, der statt dessen für die deliktsrechtlichen Urteile der angemessenere zu sein scheint . Die Ergebnisse dieser Argumentationen werden dann auf den Fall der "battered woman" angewandt. Es wird gezeigt, daß die geschundene Frau, die ihren schlafenden Ehemann tötet, nach dem U.S. Model Penal Code unter Notwehrgesichtspunkten gerechtfertigt sein kann. Sollte es im Einzelfall so sein, daß die Frau sich über die Erforderlichkeit der Notwehrhandlung geirrt hat, dann kann ihr die Handlung nur dann zugerechnet werden, wenn der Irrtum im "subjektiven" Sinne fahrlässig gewesen ist. (shrink)

Behavior that solves a problem is distinguished by the fact that it changes another part of the solver's behavior and is strengthened when it does so. Problem solving typically involves the construction of discriminative stimuli. Verbal responses produce especially useful stimuli, because they affect other people. As a culture formulates maxims, laws, grammar, and science, its members behave more effectively without direct or prolonged contact with the contingencies thus formulated. The culture solves problems for its members, and does so by (...) transmitting the verbal discriminative stimuli called rules. Induction, deduction, and the construction of models are ways of producing rules. Behavior that solves a problem may result from direct shaping by contingencies or from rules constructed either by the problem solver or by others. Because different controlling variables are involved, contingency-shaped behavior is never exactly like rule-governed behavior. The distinction must take account of a system which establishes certain contingencies of reinforcement, such as some part of the natural environment, a piece of equipment, or a verbal community; the behavior shaped and maintained by these contingencies; rules, derived from the contingencies, which specify discriminative stimuli, responses, and consequences, and the behavior occasioned by the rules. (shrink)

It has been suggested that if the preservation and development of consciousness in the biological evolution is a result of natural selection, it is plausible that consciousness not only has been influenced by neural processes, but has had a survival value itself; and it could only have had this, if it had also been efficacious. This argument for mind-brain interaction is examined, both as the argument has been developed by William James and Karl Popper and as it has been discussed (...) by C.D. Broad. The problem of identifying mental phenomena with certain neural phenomena is also addressed. The main conclusion of the analysis is that an explanation of the evolution of consciousness in Darwinian terms of natural selection does not rule out that consciousness may have evolved as a mere causally inert effect of the evolution of the nervous system, or that mental phenomena are identical with certain neural phenomena. However, the interactionistic theory still seems, more plausible and more fruitful for other reasons brought up in the discussion. (shrink)

The problem of finding irreducible representations of a simple Lie group that decompose into just pure replications of a representation of a subgroup is considered. Replications involving tensor representations of the orthogonal groups are studied in detail using counting groups whose representation dimensions correspond to branching multiplicities. Replications involving spinor and mixed tensor representations are briefly considered.

Most studies of motifs of biological regulatory networks focus on the analysis of asymptotical behaviours, but transient properties are rarely addressed. In the line of our previous study devoted to isolated circuits 19:172–178, 2003), we consider chorded circuits, that are motifs made of an elementary positive or negative circuit with a chord, possibly a self-loop. We provide detailed descriptions of the boolean dynamics of chorded circuits versus isolated circuits, under the synchronous and asynchronous updating schemes within the logical formalism. To (...) this end, we address the description of the trajectories in the dynamics of isolated circuits with coding techniques and adapt them for chorded circuits. The use of the logical modeling gives access to mathematical tools allowing complete analytical analysis of basic yet important motifs. In particular, we show that whatever the chosen updating rule, the dynamics depends on a small number of parameters. (shrink)

In Section 1 we show that the De Morgan type rules (= sequential rules in L(, ) which remain correct if and are interchanged) are finitely based. Section 2 contains a similar result for L(). These results are essentially based on special properties of some equational theories.

Georgians' acquaintance with Islam was with the first Arab raids. From the first Muslim Arab domination, Georgians started to become Muslims with cultural interaction. Islam spread especially in Eastern Georgia during the time of Muslim Arabs, Seljuks and Mongols. The spread of Islam in Western Georgia started with the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire's contact with Georgia begins with the conquest of Trabzon by Fatih Sultan Mehmed. When the Ottomans contacted the region, the geography of Georgia was divided into small kingdoms. (...) With the conquest of Trabzon, the Georgian border was reached and in 1479, Acaristan, Borcka and Maçahel surroundings joined the Ottoman lands. On the one hand, Sukhumi was captured from the north. Then, continuing to advance in the region, Yavuz Sultan Selim paid tribute to the Kingdom of Güryel and Imeret (Açıkbaş) in 1508 during his governorship of Trabzon. Thus, the Ottoman borders had reached beyond the Black Sea coast into Western Georgia. As a result of the increasing relations around Adjaria, which came under Ottoman rule, Islamization began to spread rapidly among the people. Contrary to what is claimed, the spread of Islam in the region did not spread from the ruling strata to the lower, but from the popular strata to the ruling strata. This process was surprisingly fast. In the process of Islamization, many mosques, masjids and schools were built in Adjara, especially with the help of the people. The foundations operating in the region and the mosques and masjids serving under them show that, contrary to the claims of Russian and Georgian historians, Islamization took place rapidly at the beginning of the 17th century in Adjara. In this process, many mosques, masjids and schools were built in the region. In this research, based on the numerous Hurufat records belonging to Adjara, Batumi, Gönye, Çürüksu and Maçahel, the Islamization process will be evaluated by making a social reading with the data obtained from the religious structures established in the rural settlements of the Adjara geography and their officials. Evaluations were made on the Islamization process in Adjara by making a social reading. (shrink)

Med hjemmel i de lovfestede spesielle god skikk-reglene har flere yrker utformet yrkesetiske regler med en lovmessig forankring. Denne artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i fem yrker og gir en juridisk analyse av god revisorskikk, god advokatskikk, god regnskapsføringsskikk, god meglerskikk og god landmålerskikk. Formålet er å sammenligne den rettslige betydningen av disse SGS-reglene. De sammenlignes ut fra hjemmelsgrunnlaget og hvilken bransjeorganisasjon som har utformet de yrkesetiske reglene, autorisasjonsordning og en hypotese om at de yrkesetiske reglene inneholder følgende elementer: profesjonsansvar, integritet, objektivitet, (...) taushetsplikt og kompetansekrav.Sammenligningen viser at lovfestede SGS-regler har ført til at de aktuelle bransjeorganisasjonene har tatt ansvar for å utforme de yrkesetiske reglene. Når det gjelder autorisasjonsordningen, har Finanstilsynet ansvaret for autorisasjonene til revisorer, regnskapsførere og eiendomsmeglere. For advokater har Tilsynsrådet for advokatvirksomhet ansvaret for å føre tilsyn med advokatbevillingene, mens landmålerne ikke er underlagt en autorisasjonsordning.Analysen viser at en finner de fem elementene både i god revisorskikk, god advokatskikk, god regnskapsføringsskikk og god landmålerskikk. God meglerskikk er derimot svært forskjellig fra de andre yrkesetiske reglene. Samlet viser analysene at de yrkesetiske reglene har en viss rettslig betydning, selv om den varierer.Nøkkelord: lovfestede god skikk-regler, yrkesetiske reglerEnglish summary: The significance of ethical rules based on legislated rules for Code of ConductIn accordance with statutory authority rules for Code of conduct, several professions have designed ethical rules with a legal foundation. This article is based on a legal analysis of CoC for auditors, lawyers, accountants, real estate agents and for land surveyors. The purpose of the article is to compare the legal significance of these rules for the CoC. The various rules for CoC are compared in terms of their legal basis, the professional organisation which has designed the professional ethical rules and the system of authorisation. The rules for CoC are also compared in a hypothesis about five elements. The hypothesis is that the ethical rules contain the following elements: professionalism, integrity, objectivity, confidentiality and competency.The comparison shows that legislated rules for CoC have enabled the relevant professional organisations to take responsibility for designing professional ethical rules. In the case of system of authorisation, the «Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway» is responsible for authorising auditors, accountants and real estate agents. For lawyers the «Supervisory Council For Legal Practice» is responsible for supervising their authorisation, whereas land surveyors are not subject to an authorisation system – either public or professional.The analysis shows that one can find all five elements in the CoC for auditors, lawyers, accountants, and land surveyors. The CoC for real estate agents, however, is different from the other ethical rules. Overall, the analysis shows that the ethical rules have a certain legal significance, although it varies. (shrink)

Several scholars have recently criticized the dominant emphasis upon mid-level principles in bioethics best exemplified by Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics . In Part I of this essay, I assess the fairness and cogency of three broad criticisms raised against ‘principlism’ as an approach: (1) that principlism, as an exercise in applied ethics, is insufficiently attentive to the dialectical relations between ethical theory and moral practice; (2) that principlism fails to offer a systematic account of the principles of (...) nonmaleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and justice; and (3) that principlism, as a version of moral pluralism, is fatally flawed by its theoretical agnosticism. While acknowledging that Beauchamp and Childress's reliance upon Ross's version of intuitionism is problematic, I conclude that the critics of principlism have failed to make a compelling case against its theoretical or practical adequacy as an ethical approach. In Part II, I assess the moral theory developed by Bernard Gert in Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules , because Gert has recommended his approach as a systematic alternative to principlism. I judge Gert's theory to be seriously incomplete and, in contrast to principlism, unable to generate coherent conclusions about cases of active euthanasia and paternalism. Keywords: active euthanasia, applied ethics, Beauchamp and Childress, intuitionism, paternalism, principlism, W.D. Ross CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The contextualist epistemological theories proposed by David Lewis and othersoffer a view of knowledge which awards a central role to the contexts ofknowledge attributions. Such contexts are held to determine how strong anepistemic position must be in order to count as knowledge. Lewis has suggestedthat contextualism so construed can be used both to ward off the skeptic and tosolve the Gettier problem. A person knows P, he says, just in case her evidenceeliminates every possibility that not-P, where the domain of (...) `every' is determinedby the context. Lewis provides a list of rules that can tell us, for a given context,which not-P possibilities must be eliminated and which can properly be ignored.But his account entails, counterintuitively, that knowledge can truly be attributedeven to a person in a Gettier situation provided only that the attributor is ignorantof the fact that the person is gettiered. It has been criticized on those grounds byS. Cohen. In this paper I shall argue that most other forms of contextualism sufferthe same fate as Lewis's. The allies of contextualism haven't yet shown us whethercontextualism can succeed in maintaining a notion of ordinary knowledge whileresisting the absurdity that knowledge can be a matter of sheer good luck. At theend of the paper I shall suggest a possible solution to the problem by showing howCohen's line of criticism leads to a modified conception of what sort of justificationa belief must have to count as knowledge in ordinary contexts. (shrink)

Rule utilitarianism as commonly formulated has the undesired implication that in case wrong has been done, Any act whatsoever is right. This is due to the fact that in setting the criterion for a set of rules which confers rightness, Rule utilitarians fail to require that obedience to the rules in situations of less than universal obedience must result in the most good attainable in those situations. I suggest a rule-Utilitarian criterion which remedies this defect and which, (...) Borrowing from brandt, Also guarantees that the public acknowledgement of the rules would be desirable. (shrink)

The present author developed a calculus for the logic of ‘because’. In a recent paper in this journal, it has been claimed that the central inference rules for the logic are invalid and that the intuition upon which the rules are based is not accounted for. This note criticises these arguments and presents an independent argument in favour of the rules used in the logic.

ABSTRACTThe concept of poverty is understood differently by people across the globe. Despite this conceptual limitation, higher economic growth in the last few decades in many countries has helped reduce extreme global poverty. The growth process has been supported by globalization. The number of global poor is, however, still quite large and more than the entire population of USA, UK, France and Russia. Their numbers have gone up by 100 million in Sub Sahara region in last three decades. While removal (...) of extreme poverty is clearly vital, it cannot be considered sufficient for a dignified life. The crux of human dignity is development and it must provide every individual access to education, healthcare, nutrition, habitat, and exercising of democratic rights in accordance with the rule of law. While helping reduce poverty, globalization has also led to some morally unsustainable consequences. There is huge and rapidly increasing inequality of wealth and income in most nations. There are now new opportunities for corruption which are being exploited by multinationals. These corrupt practices are resulting in illicit flow of about one trillion Dollars every year. For a more ethical society, effective measures are needed for controlling corruption for improving quality of life. (shrink)

What does everyone in the modern world need to know? Renowned psychologist Jordan B. Peterson's answer to this most difficult of questions uniquely combines the hard-won truths of ancient tradition with the stunning revelations of cutting-edge scientific research. Humorous, surprising and informative, Dr. Peterson tells us why skateboarding boys and girls must be left alone, what terrible fate awaits those who criticize too easily, and why you should always pet a cat when you meet one on the street. What does (...) the nervous system of the lowly lobster have to tell us about standing up straight (with our shoulders back) and about success in life? Why did ancient Egyptians worship the capacity to pay careful attention as the highest of gods? What dreadful paths do people tread when they become resentful, arrogant and vengeful? Dr. Peterson journeys broadly, discussing discipline, freedom, adventure and responsibility, distilling the world's wisdom into 12 practical and profound rules for life. [This book] shatters the modern commonplaces of science, faith and human nature, while transforming and ennobling the mind and spirit of its readers. (shrink)

This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, (...) processes the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics that evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms. -/- Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. This book brings together leading researchers on dual processes to summarize the state-of-the-art, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work. It includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture and by psychologists specialising in traditionally distinct and isolated fields. For all those in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that will advance dual-process theorizing, promote interdisciplinary communication, and encourage further applications of dual-process approaches. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Learning to BreatheFive Fragments Against RacismB. Venkat Mani (bio)For Dr. JLW, for all Black academics and students1. Air HungerI know you, Derek Chauvin. You may think that we first met on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis. I was called George Perry Floyd. For you, I was just another Black man, a potential criminal. For me, you were not a police officer, but the knee that stands for racism. You (...) kneeled on my windpipe for 9 minutes and 29 seconds. Those were neither my first nor my last memories.You may choose not to recognize me, as you always have. But I do. I recognize every bone, muscle, tendon, pointy curve of the cap, every contour of your strong, heavy, determined, calculating, conniving knee that presses on my windpipe with a false sense of racist superiority. 9 minutes and 29 seconds. As often as you can.We have a history. You have never missed the opportunity of kneeling on my windpipe. You hauled me into your slave ships from various African ports along the Atlantic, then you kneeled on my windpipe all over your cotton and tobacco plantations in the Americas. We met again on schooners from Indian shores journeying across the Indian and Pacific oceans. With slavery banned in the British empire, you turned me into an indentured laborer. You made me put my thumb imprint on a document you created, in a script I could not read, of a language I could not speak. Then you threw me thousands of miles away in Mauritius, Fiji, and numerous Caribbean islands, pressing on my windpipe on sugarcane plantations. My wife, children, sisters, mothers, aunts, brothers, uncles, nephews, nieces, grandparents, great grandparents, we all have lived through those fatal 9 minutes and 29 seconds: on water and land. Repeatedly. Consistently. Incessantly.You want specific dates? April 8, 1857, Barrackpore, Northern India. My name was Mangal Pandey, you called me a Sepoy. You hanged me for standing up against my subjugation by your British East India Company. Against your rule over my land and my people. With your many titles [End Page 41] and names: Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell, Brigadier-General Charles Windham, you rampaged through the streets of Delhi, Meerut, Lucknow, killing anyone in your way so I could be a jewel in Victoria's crown. January 29, 1863, Bear River, Idaho. I was one among the Shoshone of Bia Ogoi, you were Colonel Patrick Connor. You came to us on a frigid morning and killed us by the hundreds. November 15, 1884, the Congo Conference, Berlin. You were called Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and were acting at the behest of sharecropping interests of King Leopold the Second. Your name for me was a "savage." You set up a society to civilize me while you plundered my bounty. You started drawing lines through land, rivers, mountains, deserts. For you, it was the Scramble for Africa. For me, bloody murder. You knelt on my windpipe, smoking a pipe with tobacco my people had grown. April 13, 1919, Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar. You were called Brigadier General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer. For you, I was just a troublemaking native disrupting the civilized business of the Empire. You surrounded our peaceful gathering in Amritsar and opened fire. Your Nobel Laureate Rudyard Kipling claimed that "you did your duty as you saw fit." By killing us in thousands until the bullets ran out. Rikki Tikki Tavi. May 31, 1921, Tulsa, Oklahoma. Inspired by Jim Crow, your knees came running to us in mobs to massacre us. October 19, 1926, Imperial Conference, London. Your name was Field Marshall the Right Honorable Jan Christian Smuts. For you, I was one among the many "colored" subjects from the Cape Colony. You spoke vehemently against mixing my people with your people. Eloquently, I was told, in favor of apartheid.You know very well, Chauvin, that our acquaintance neither begins in 1857 nor ends in 1926. I could take you on a grand tour of the world and give you all the dates when you appeared in different forms. Your self-induced conviction of racial supremacy over me remained the same... (shrink)

On August 29, 1995, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled that certain practices of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ohio relating to the calculation of copayments on insurance claims violated provisions of ERISA, and thus BCBSO could be liable for unpaid benefits and breach of fiduciary duty ). According to BCBSO's Explanation of Benefits and Schedule of Benefits, beneficiaries were responsible for a 20 percent copayment for hospital charges, and the remaining 80 percent (...) of the Provider's Reasonable Charges would be paid by BCBSO. BCBSO negotiated with the hospitals to create discount agreements whereby the actual charge to BCBSO was less than 80 percent of the total amount of the hospital's charges. By this arrangement, BCBSO paid less than 80 percent of what patients were billed; concurrently, patients paid more than 20 percent of the amount ultimately paid to hospitals for their services. (shrink)

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

This paper addresses whether universal, general education programs are enough to satisfy basic criteria of human rights, or whether comprehensive family planning programs, in conjunction with universal education programs, might also be morally required. Even before the Reagan administration instituted the ‘global gag rule’ at the 1984 conference in Mexico City, prohibiting funding to nongovernmental organizations that included providing information about abortion as a possible method of family planning, the moral acceptability of family planning programs has been called into (...) question. This paper makes a moral argument for family planning by appealing to both data and to theory: data about the efficacy of universal and comprehensive family planning education programs at reducing fertility and infant mortality, and theory about what is required for the establishment of autonomy. It reasons that universal educational programs are insufficient for the promotion of autonomy, and therefore argues on substantive autonomy grounds for comprehensive family planning programs in addition to universal education programs. (shrink)

I give the label “ethical pluralism” to the meta-ethical view that competing moral views are valid. I assume that validity is conferred on a moral view by its satisfying the relevant meta-ethical criteria in a maximally satisfactory way. If the relevant meta-ethical criteria are based on something roughly like the wide reflective equilibrium model, then ethical pluralism is likely to be correct. Traditional moral views do not grant exemptions from their own binding rules or principles to agents – should any (...) exist – who adhere to a competing valid moral view. Given the usual conception of accepting a moral view, an ethical pluralist cannot honestly accept a traditional moral view. Consequently, I argue, an ethical pluralist is committed to the view that all traditional moral views are invalid. Given the likelihood of ethical pluralism, this conclusion is alarming. I set forth a weak conception of accepting a moral view that is designed to allow an ethical pluralist honestly to accept a traditional moral view. In particular, my conception is designed to explain how someone can (a) be guided by the view that she accepts; (b) accept her own moral view while rationally not accepting competing views that she thinks are equally valid; and (c) not be prepared to prescribe morally to those who are following other valid views. Central to my formulation are what I call a stance of modest respectful disapproval toward other people’s wrong behavior, together with acceptance of decisive moral reasons for oneself that are generated by the valid moral view that one accepts. (shrink)

In the historical progress of nations, economic wealth plays an important role as well as prosperity in social and cultural make-up. When the entire Turkish history is considered, we come across with the institution of Akhism that is both related to the regulation of sociocultural life as well as to the operation of business life within the framework of certain principles and rules. Even though Akhism has aspects in parallel with today’s management philosophies, history has not been immutable and economical (...) activities have changed since the thirteenth-century establishment of Akhism. This theoretical study intends to introduce Akhism that stands as a turning point in Ottoman history in social, cultural and economical aspects. Then the purposes of the institution, its principles and historical progress will be outlined. Furthermore, Akhi associations as well as conflicts with total quality management, social responsibility and corporate culture will be diagnosed. (shrink)

This article concerns the validity of six canonical rules that institutional review boards use to constrain the behavior of investigators. These rules require investigators to design their studies in a scientifically valid way, not pay their subjects to take risks, minimize risks to their subjects, secure for their subjects access to effective interventions post-trial, not pay their subjects too much and allow their subjects to withdraw from the study unconditionally. Enforcement of these rules is problematic because there are other relationships (...) that seem to be like the investigator-subject relationship in all ethically relevant respects, such as the employer-employee and volunteer organizer-volunteer relationships, to which we would not dream of applying these same rules. Applying these rules in one context but not the others is a violation of ethical consistency I label “exceptionalism.” We should conclude that it is time to reexamine the validity of the six rules. (shrink)

A system of natural deduction rules is proposed for an idealized form of English. The rules presuppose a sharp distinction between proper names and such expressions as the c, a (an) c, some c, any c, and every c, where c represents a common noun. These latter expressions are called quantifiers, and other expressions of the form that c or that c itself, are called quantified terms. Introduction and elimination rules are presented for any, every, some, a (an), and the, (...) and also for any which, every which, and so on, as well as rules for some other concepts. One outcome of these rules is that Every man loves some woman is implied by, but does not imply, Some woman is loved by every man, since the latter is taken to mean the same as Some woman is loved by all men. Also, Jack knows which woman came is implied by Some woman is known by Jack to have come, but not by Jack knows that some woman came. (shrink)

Gandhi's politics is thoroughly biopolitical and ‘minoritarian’ in all its aspects. His political practice and concepts could be redefined as micro-political experiments in the Deleuzian sense. Gandhi himself viewed his life and practices as ‘experiments’. Like Gilles Deleuze, who grants the concept of becoming-woman a privileged position in his philosophical idea of becoming, Gandhi gives becoming-woman a decisive role in his experiments of ‘self-rule’ in both its personal and collective sense. He sees woman as the emblem of ahimsa, which (...) according to him is the only principle and means to attain ‘self-rule’. Gandhi identifies the minoritarian political potential of woman as against Man, who resists becomings by being himself destined to be static and standardised, that is, ‘Majoritarian’. From this perspective, Gandhi's concept of the practice of Brahmacharya is an experiment in becoming-woman by creating a new line of relation between man and woman that goes beyond the confinement of conjugal sexuality and familial desire. Building upon the complementary relation between the philosophical concepts of Deleuze and the political practice of Gandhi, this paper attempts a detailed re-evaluation of Gandhi's practice of Brahmacharya as a political experiment in liberating man, who otherwise acts as a subject of the colonial, national, patriarchal and biopolitical powers. (shrink)

Modern science is big business. Governments, universities, and corporations have invested billions of dollars in scientific and technological research in the hope of obtaining power and profit. For the most part, this investment has benefited science and society, leading to new discoveries, inventions, disciplines, specialties, jobs, and career opportunities. However, there is a dark side to the influx of money into science. Unbridled pursuit of financial gain in science can undermine scientific norms, such as objectivity, honesty, openness, respect for research (...) participants, and social responsibility. In The Price of Truth, David B. Resnik examines some of the important and difficult questions resulting from the financial and economic aspects of modern science. How does money affect scientific research? Have scientists become entrepreneurs bent on making money instead of investigators searching for the truth? How does the commercialization of research affect the public's perception of science? Can scientists prevent money from corrupting the research enterprise? What types of rules, polices, and guidelines should scientists adopt to prevent financial interests from adversely affecting research and the public's opinion of science? (shrink)

Problem: The task of developing an ethics for the media according to constructivist principles is heavily loaded in two respects. On the one hand, critics of constructivism insist that this discourse generally legitimates forgery, arbitrariness, and laissez-faire -- a hotchpotch of facts and fictions; on the other, constructivists protest that their very school of thought inspires the maximum measure of personal responsibility and ethical-moral sensibility. Method: Taking as its point of departure a media falsification scandal that received wide publicity in (...) Germany, this article seeks to outline some of the fundamental questions of a constructivist media ethics. The close scrutiny of the scandal involving the interview fabricator, Tom Kummer, leads the author to identify three fundamental questions of a constructivist media ethics: (1) the question of autonomy; (2) the question of fact and fiction; (3) the question of responsibility. These questions are discussed at length, and with particular attention to the current debates regarding the ethics of media and communication studies. Findings: The author is able to show that constructivist premises and postulates will certainly help to create ethical-moral sensibility, but cannot supply, as immediate derivatives of constructivist epistemology, programmes for action or concrete regulations of behaviour that can be implemented step by step. For an ethics of the media, constructivism can thus primarily provide meta-reflections and meta-rules. (shrink)