Much if not most recent literature in philosophy of biology concerns the extent to which biological theories conform to what is known as the "received" philosophical view of scientific theories, a descendant of the logical-empiricist view of theories. But the received view currently faces a competitor--a very different view of theories known as the "semantic" view. It is argued here that the semantic view is more sensitive to (...) the nature and limitations of evolutionary theory than is the received view. In particular, the semantic view better accomodates the fact that evolutionary theory is bound to change as a result of the evolutionary process itself. This unusual feature of evolutionary theory provides a good reason for reconsidering the received view and paying close attention to the semantic view. (shrink)

Achinstein, Putnam, and others have urged the rejection of the received view on theories (which construes theories as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms are given partial observational interpretations by correspondence rules) because (i) the notion of partial interpretation cannot be given precise formulation, and (ii) the observational-theoretical distinction cannot be drawn satisfactorily. I try to show that these are the wrong reasons for rejecting the received view since (i) is false and it is virtually (...) impossible to demonstrate the truth of (ii). Nonetheless, the received view should be rejected because it obscures a number of epistemologically important features of scientific theorizing. I show this by sketching an alternative analysis which reveals some of these features and gives a more faithful picture of scientific theorizing. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Once Received View (ORV) Criticisms of the ORV The “Model Model” of Scientific Theories Mechanisms: Investigating Nonformal Patterns in Scientific Theories Conclusion.

According to the received view of scientific theories, a scientific theory is an axiomatic-deductive linguistic structure which must include some set of guidelines (“correspondence rules”) for interpreting its theoretical terms with reference to the world of observable phenomena. According to the semantic view, a scientific theory need not be formulated as an axiomatic-deductive structure with correspondence rules, but need only specify models which are said to be “isomorphic” with actual phenomenal systems. In this (...) paper, I consider both the received and semantic views as they bear on the issue of how a theory relates to the world (Section 1). Then I offer a critique of some arguments frequently put forth in support of the semantic view (Section 2). Finally, I suggest a more convincing “meta-methodological” argument (based on the thought of Bernard Lonergan) in favor of the semantic view (Section 3). (shrink)

According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view -- if taken seriously as a formal explication -- leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are truly distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are truly equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the (...) semantic view -- as currently formulated -- threatens to undermine scientific structuralism. (shrink)

Marian Przełęcki’s semantics for the Received View is a good explication of Carnap’s position on the subject, anticipates many discussions and results from both proponents and opponents of the Received View, and can be the basis for a thriving research program.

The positivistic Received View construed scientific theories syntactically as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms were given a partial semantic interpretation via correspondence rules connecting them to observation statements. This paper assesses what, with hindsight, seem the most important defects in the Received View; surveys the main proposed successor analyses to the Received View--various Semantic Conception versions and the Structuralist Analysis; evaluates how well they avoid those defects; examines what new problems they face (...) and where the most promising require further development or leave unanswered questions; explores implications of recent work on models for understanding theories; and rebuts the few criticisms of the Semantic Conception that have surfaced. (shrink)

The received view on the development of the correspondence rules in Carnap’s philosophy of science is that at first, Carnap assumed the explicit definability of all theoretical terms in observational terms and later weakened this assumption. In the end, he conjectured that all observational terms can be explicitly defined in in theoretical terms, but not vice versa. I argue that from the very beginning, Carnap implicitly held this last view, albeit at times in contradiction to his professed (...) position. To establish this point I argue that, first, Carnap’s ‘Über die Aufgabe der Physik’ is a contribution to the philosophy of science of logical empiricism, contrary to Thomas Mormann and in agreement with Herbert Feigl. Second, Michael Friedman misunderstands the ‘Aufgabe’ with his claim that it describes a method for arriving at explicit definitions for theoretical terms. Another received view on Carnap’s philosophy of science is that it assumed a formalization of physical theories that was too detached from actual physics and thus justly disavowed in favor of the semantic view as, for example, developed by van Fraassen. But the ‘Aufgabe’ and related works including the Aufbau show that from the very beginning to his last works, Carnap suggested formalizing physical theories as restrictions in mathematical spaces, as in the state-space conception of scientific theories favored by van Fraassen. (shrink)

I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue (...) against the claim that the Received View is intended to make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories. (shrink)

This impressive volume presents the results of a symposium on the structure of scientific theories held at the University of Illinois, Urbana, on March 26-29, 1969; lest this create the wrong impression, let it be noted at the outset that the volume is much more than a collection of papers. Indeed, when one takes into account Frederick Suppe’s book-length introduction, the editing of the critical comments, the extensive bibliography, and the fine index, the work must be seen as (...) the best account of scientific theory now available, one that surely commends itself to every philosopher of science with the slightest interest in metaphysics. The thrust of the symposium was to examine the view of scientific theories that has enjoyed great vogue among logical positivists, who have seen such theories as "axiomatic calculi in which theoretical terms and statements are given a partial observational interpretation by means of correspondence rules." Suppe refers to this as the "Received View," although it has been increasingly questioned in recent years, particularly by philosophers who have some proficiency in the history of science and by scientists who question its fidelity to actual scientific practice. One of the major aims of the symposium was to subject the Received View to analysis and debate by its proponents and by its critics, to assess its present status, and to see if any consensus has begun to develop on this topic—which plays such a key role in the philosophy of science. Suppe performs the analytic function in his critical introduction, and Stephen Toulmin adds a postscript that attempts to chart a course for future research. The message seems to be that the Received View has run its course and has proved to be more a hindrance than a help to philosophizing about science; what will take its place, however, does not emerge with any clarity. Participants in the symposium include all the luminaries in the philosophy of science movement: Carl Hempel, Patrick Suppes, David Bohm, Hilary Putnam, Thomas Kuhn, and Dudley Shapere, among others. Especially noteworthy are Suppe’s account of the development of the Received View and the criticisms that have been lodged against it, viz., its reliance on the analytic-synthetic distinction; the tenability of the observational-theoretical distinction; the notion of partial interpretation; its failure to include models as integral components; its analysis of correspondence rules; and its reliance on axiomatization. Suppe also details some of the proposed alternatives to the Received View, giving in the process lucid expositions of the thought of Toulmin, Kuhn, Hanson, Popper, and Feyerabend—all of which he treats under the rubric of "Weltanshauungen [[sic]] Analyses." Those interested in the relationships between history of science and philosophy of science will find the interchange between I. Bernard Cohen and Peter Achinstein stimulating as well as illuminating. Kuhn takes this occasion to offer his "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," and Shapere continues his criticism of both Kuhn and logical positivism—now more constructively than heretofore—with a penetrating essay entitled "Scientific Theories and their Domains." About the only thing that is lacking is a treatment of recent developments in England, particularly the work of Rom Harré at Oxford and related thinkers, who likewise reject the Received View and offer interesting alternatives to it that have yet to be appreciated and critiqued in the U.S.—W.A.W. (shrink)

The positivistic Received View construed scientific theories syntactically as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms were given a partial semantic interpretation via correspondence rules connecting them to observation statements. This paper assesses what, with hindsight, seem the most important defects in the Received View; surveys the main proposed successor analyses to the Received View—various Semantic Conception versions and the Structuralist Analysis; evaluates how well they avoid those defects; examines what new problems they face (...) and where the most promising require further development or leave unanswered questions; explores implications of recent work on models for understanding theories; and rebuts the few criticisms of the Semantic Conception that have surfaced. (shrink)

This essay offers a meta-level analysis in the sociology and history of physics in the context of the "Arrow of Time" or so-called "Two Times" problem. In effect, it argues that the two topics are intertwined, and it is only by coming to grips with the sociological aspects, involving adherence to certain metaphysical, epistemological and methodological beliefs and practices, that real progress can be made in the physics.

This book is an attempt to understand a significant part of the complex thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, especially in those areas which interested him most: scientific method and related philosophical questions. It is organized primarily from Peirce's own writings, taking chronological settings into account where appropriate, and pointing out the close connections of several major themes in Peirce's work which show the rich diversity of his thought and its systematic unity. Following an introductory sketch of Peirce the thinking (...) and writer is a study of the spirit and phases of scientific inquiry, and a consideration of its relevance to certain outstanding philosophical views which Peirce held. This double approach is necessary because his views on scientific method are interlaces with a profound and elaborate philosophy of the cosmos. Peirce's thought is unusually close-knit, and his difficulty as a writer lies in his inability to achieve a partial focus without bringing into view numerous connections and relations with the whole picture of reality. Peirce received some of the esteem he deserves when the publication of his Collected Papers began more than thirty-five years ago. Some reviewers and critics, however, have attempted to fit Peirce into their own molds in justification of a particular position; others have disinterestedly sought to present him in completely detached fashion. Here, the author has attempted to understand Peirce as Peirce intended himself to be understood, and has presented what he believes Perice's philosophy of scientific method to be. He singles out for praise Peirce's Greek insistence on the primacy of theoretical knowledge and his almost Teilhardian synthesis of evolutionary themes. Primarily philosophical, this volume analyzes Peirce's thought using a theory of knowledge and metaphysics rather than formal logic. (shrink)

The semantic view of scientific theories has been defended as more adequate than the “received” view, especially with respect to biological theories (Beatty 1980, 1981; Thompson 1983). However, the semantic view has not been evaluated on its own terms. In this paper I first show how the theory of sociobiology propounded by E.O. Wilson (1975) can be understood on the semantic approach. I then discuss the criticism that Wilson’s theory is beset by the (...) problem of unreliable generalizations. I suggest that this problem results from the use of the model-building strategy in theory. I conclude that the problem is pressing enough to impugn the semantic view as an adequate account of sociobiological theory.According to proponents of the semantic view of theories, scientific theories function to specify a class of “models,” interpretations, or representations of their postulates. (shrink)

The semantic view of scientific theories has been defended as more adequate than the "received" view, especially with respect to biological theories. However, the semantic view has not been evaluated on its own terms. In this paper it is first shown how the theory of sociobiology propounded by E.O. Wilson can be understood on the semantic approach. The criticism that Wilson's theory is beset by the problem of unreliable generalizations is discussed. It is (...) suggested that this problem results from the use of the model-building strategy in theory construction. The author concludes that the problem is pressing enough to impugn the semantic view as an adequate account of sociobiological theory. (shrink)

I argue against the conception of scientific models advocated by the proponents of the Semantic View of scientific theories. Part of the paper is devoted to clarifying the important features of the scientific modeling view that the Semantic conception entails. The liquid drop model of nuclear structure is analyzed in conjunction with the particular auxiliary hypothesis that is the guiding force behind its construction and it is argued that it does not meet the necessary (...) features to render it a model of the theory, as the Semantic View demands. Given that this model is indicative of how quantum mechanics is applied in the domain of nuclear physics, I claim that the Semantic View does not adequately account for scientific models. (shrink)

First, I discuss the older “theory-centered” and the more recent semantic conception of scientific theories. I argue that these two perspectives are nothing more than terminological variants of one another. I then offer a new theory-centered view of scientific theories. I argue that this new view captures the insights had by each of these earlier views, that it’s closer to how scientists think about their own theories, and that it better accommodates the phenomenon (...) of inconsistent scientific theories. (shrink)

상대성 이론에 대한 논리경험주의의 철학적 분석이 마무리되는 시점인 1920년대 후반에는 논리경험주의의 주요 논자인 슐리크, 라이헨바흐, 카르납이 20세기 전반기에 형성된 새로운 과학철학에 대한 자신들의 견해를 피력했다. 1920년대 후반부터 나치즘이 유럽을 잠식하기 전인 1930년대 초반까지를 “자연철학에서 과학철학으로의 이행기”라 부를 수 있다. 새로운 논리경험주의 과학철학의 등장에 수리논리학, 비트겐슈타인의 철학이 큰 영향을 미쳤지만, 상대성 이론에 대한 철학적 분석을 집중적으로 수행하여 이를 토대로 새로운 과학철학 개념을 제시한 학자는 라이헨바흐였다. 과학적 철학의 이념과 역할에 대한 라이헨바흐의 견해를 잘 보여주는 두 저작은『물리적 지식의 목표와 방법』(1929)과『원자와 우주』(1930)이다. 이 저작에서 (...) 라이헨바흐는 물리학 지식 일반에 적용되는 인식론적 입장을 제시한다. 첫째, 물리학 지식에는 선험적이지 않으나 체계 내에서 구성적 역할을 하는 원리들이 존재한다. 둘째, 구성적 원리들의 체계는 경험의 압력에 맞춰 변화할 수 있으며, 이때 이전 체계와의 연속성을 유지하기 위해 ‘연속적 근사의 방법’을 사용한다. 셋째, 구성적 원리들에 덧붙는 정의들은 임의적이며 규약적이다. 넷째, 과학적 지식에 등장하는 모든 종류의 사실에는 이론적 요소가 포함되어 있으며, 우리는 확실성의 정도에 따라 사실들을 분류한다. 다섯째, ‘동등화의 유일성’ 기준으로 물리적 참됨을 정의하면 이러한 참됨은 오직 전체로서의 물리적 지식 체계에만 적용된다. 이상과 같은 라이헨바흐의 인식론적 입장은 논리경험주의의 ‘수용된 견해(received view)’와는 차별화되는 것이었고, 콰인(Quine)이 제시한 전체론적 관점과도 상당 부분 유사성을 갖고 있었다. (shrink)

Is a policy-friendly philosophy of science possible? In order to respond this question, I consider a particular instance of contemporary philosophy of science, the semantic view of scientific theories, by placing it in the broader methodological landscape of the integration of philosophy of science into STS (Science and Technology Studies) as a component of the overall contribution of the latter to science policy. In that context, I defend a multi-disciplinary methodological integration of the special discipline composing STS (...) against a reductionist interdisciplinary unification, arguing that if STS wants to contribute to policy advising by constructing narratives of science practice feasible for science policy both in terms of descriptive completeness and intelligibility, then it must avoid the explanatory reductionism tendencies of special disciplines in interdisciplinary contexts. This would favour, at the same time, a relaxation of esoteric language. On this basis, it seems that the semantic view is one right candidate among other approaches in the philosophy of science for facilitating the integration of the methodologically different contributions to STS toward policy objectives. In fact, besides offering a more realistic and descriptively complete picture of science practice with respect to its predecessor in the philosophy of science, namely the syntactic view, the semantic view is also able to capture some aspects of science practice that elude even sociological approaches to STS, thus inviting different perspective on the same subject matter. (shrink)

The Scientific Realism Debate (SRD) has been accused of going around in circles without reaching a consensus, so that several scholars have advocated its dissolution in favor of reformed projects that are eliminativist towards the distinctively philosophical aims and methods. In this paper, after outlining the project that SRD-participants have been involved in for some time now—which we call the Received View—we discuss two dissolution-proposals: sociological externalism and localism. We argue that these projects are incomplete and that, (...) even when judged in themselves, they cannot flourish without the ‘traditional’ philosophical reflection they wish to get rid of. However, although not substitutes for the Received View, those projects have some insightful features. These are assigned their proper place in the dialectics of SRD, which is shown to be an instance of the method of reflective equilibrium (MRE). Lastly—based on Michael DePaul’s work—we provide a response to the well-known concern that MRE is epistemically circular, by claiming that MRE is the only rational method of inquiry. Overall, our goal is ‘therapeutic’: we try to mitigate the anxiety caused by simultaneously believing that SRD is circular and suspecting that there is a good way out of the circle that we just haven’t found yet. For, having dismissed the suspicion that there might be a good trick to dissolve the circle, one may learn to live in it and be more calm in carrying on with what one has. (shrink)

Among the main concerns of 20th century philosophy was that of the foundations of mathematics. But usually not recognized is the relevance of the choice of a foundational approach to the other main problems of 20th century philosophy, i.e., the logical structure of language, the nature of scientific theories, and the architecture of the mind. The tools used to deal with the difficulties inherent in such problems have largely relied on set theory and its “received view”. (...) There are specific issues, in philosophy of language, epistemology and philosophy of mind, where this dependence turns out to be misleading. The same issues suggest the gain in understanding coming from category theory, which is, therefore, more than just the source of a “non-standard” approach to the foundations of mathematics. But, even so conceived, it is the very notion of what a foundation has to be that is called into question. The philosophical meaning of mathematics is no longer confined to which first principles are assumed and which “ontological” interpretation is given to them in terms of some possibly updated version of logicism, formalism or intuitionism. What is central to any foundational project proper is the role of universal constructions that serve to unify the different branches of mathematics, as already made clear in 1969 by Lawvere. Such universal constructions are best expressed by means of adjoint functors and representability up to isomorphism. In this lies the relevance of a category-theoretic perspective, which leads to wide-ranging consequences. One such is the presence of functorial constraints on the syntax–semantics relationships; another is an intrinsic view of (constructive) logic, as arises in topoi and, subsequently, in more general fibrations. But as soon as theories and their models are described accordingly, a new look at the main problems of 20th century’s philosophy becomes possible. The lack of any satisfactory solution to these problems in a purely logical and set-theoretic setting is the result of too circumscribed an approach, such as a static and punctiform view of objects and their elements, and a misconception of geometry and its historical changes before, during, and after the foundational “crisis”, as if algebraic geometry and synthetic differential geometry – not to mention algebraic topology – were secondary sources for what concerns foundational issues. The objectivity of basic geometrical intuitions also acts against the recent version of structuralism proposed as ‘the’ philosophy of category theory. On the other hand, the need for a consistent and adequate conceptual framework in facing the difficulties met by pre-categorical theories of language and scientific knowledge not only provides the basic concepts of category theory with specific applications but also suggests further directions for their development (e.g., in approaching the foundations of physics or the mathematical models in the cognitive sciences). This ‘virtuous’ circle is by now largely admitted in theoretical computer science; the time is ripe to realise that the same holds for classical topics of philosophy. (shrink)

The six essays in this volume discuss philosophical thought on scientific theory including: a call for a realist, rather than instrumentalist interpretation of science; a critique of one of the core ideas of positivism concerning the relation between observational and theoretical languages; using aerodynamics to discuss the representational aspect of scientific theories and their isomorphic qualities; the relationship between the reliability of common sense and the authenticity of the world view of science; removing long-held ambiguities on (...) the theory of inductive logic; and the relationship between the actuality of conceptual revolutions in the history of science and traditional philosophical pictures of scientific theory-building. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Should Clinicians’ Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM?Elizabeth H. Flanagan (bio) and Roger K. Blashfield (bio)Keywordsclinicians, DSM, values, psychopathology, scienceThe relationship between clinicians and the DSM is complex. Clinicians are the primary intended audience of the DSM. However, as Widiger (2007) pointed out in his commentary, there is a tension associated with trying to meet the clinical goals of the DSM and also trying to optimize the (...) class='Hi'>scientific goals of the DSM. Most commentators would agree that the recent editions of the DSM (from the DSM-III onward) have favored scientific values (e.g., Sadler 2005). Some commentators have taken sides and aligned themselves with either clinicians or with the science of classification. For instance, Garb (2005) has argued that clinicians should receive incentives to align themselves more closely with the science of the DSM. In contrast, Westen and Shedler (1999) have favored a clinician-based approach to the DSM and have argued that an ideal classification should be based on the prototypes that clinicians use to conceptualize diagnostic categories. Perhaps an extreme suggestion on how to deal with this tension between the values of clinicians and the values of scientists is to adopt the ICD-10 solution and create two versions of the next DSM. One version would be written for clinicians and another for researchers (Phillips et al. 2003).Widiger (2007) wondered whether the two of us as authors are on the fence about how the views of clinicians should affect the DSM. As clinical psychologists who are both clinicians and researchers, we understand his comment, especially in light of our attempt in our article not to overgeneralize from the time-consuming, labor-intensive, yet methodologically limited study we reported in our major paper.Nonetheless, our answer to the question asked in the title of this response, “Should clinicians’ views of mental illness influence the diagnostic manual?” is a clear and unequivocal yes. In our view, too much of the research literature stimulated by the recent DSMs has primarily used the diagnostic criteria in these DSMs to specify patient samples and then perform various experiments to study the DSM categories. We favor a different approach to research which is consistent with a comment once made by the philosopher of science, Karl Popper: “scientific theories originate from myths, and... a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories” (1963, 39). We believe that clinicians, with their years [End Page 285] of experience dealing with the ambiguities, the emotionality, and the chaos of psychopathology, have formed complex conceptual systems to try to understand the mysteries of abnormal behavior. We strongly support increased research attempts that will use clinicians as subjects and that will attempt to understand how clinicians use diagnostic concepts to understand patients.Although research on clinicians has not attracted a large amount of attention in the field, there is a long history of such research studies. For instance, in the 1970s, Overall used multivariate techniques to create graphical maps of how clinicians represented relationships among diagnoses (Overall et al. 1977). Widiger has used a similar strategy in some of his research (Widiger et al. 1987). In the early 1980s, a view of concept formation from cognitive psychology was used by Cantor et al. (1980) to look at psychiatric diagnoses as representing prototypes. Horowitz and colleagues extended this research. Blashfield and his colleagues had a grant to use the prototype model to study personality disorders and performed research investigating both case histories (Blashfield et al. 1985) and analyses of diagnostic criteria (Blashfield and Breen 1989; Davis, Blashfield, and McElroy 1993). Westen and colleagues have attempted to reconceptualize DSM personality disorder categories using the prototype model (Westen and Shedler 1999). Ahn and her colleagues (Ahn et al. 2006; Kim and Ahn 2002) have taken more recent applications of ideas from cognitive psychology to study how clinicians use and understand diagnostic categories. Finally, Flanagan and colleagues (Flanagan and Blashfield 2006; Flanagan, Keeley, and Blashfield, in press; Flanagan, Miller, and Davidson, submitted) have used qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques to try to understand the diagnostic concepts held by experienced clinicians.Besides empirical studies of how clinicians use diagnostic concepts, we also support the increased interest in... (shrink)

In recent years in Turkey, it has been attempted to ensure that students who need special education are educated through inclusion. In the meanwhile, it became important to reveal scientifically the educational theories on which the inclusive education is based and the approach of Islam towards inclusive education that somehow has an influence on our national education policy. This study aims to examine the educational theories on which the inclusive education is based and the Islamic approach towards inclusive (...) education. The data of the study was collected by literature review. As a result, it is possible to say that the underlying theories of inclusive education are integrated education theory, cognitive democrative theory and dysontogenesis theories. In addition, although there are no specific verses for inclusive education in the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, it can be said that Islam has an positive approach to the inclusive education in general. Depending on this result, formal education should be conducted in the context of the principle of “least restricted education environment”.Summary: It is a matter of controversy about how education that increases the potential of human beings can be given to people who differ from their peers and who need special education. In recent years, there have been two prominent views in literature on this issue: The first is the ‘discriminatory’ view, which advocates that individuals with special needs should receive education in special spaces with similar students. The second is the ‘integrative view’, which states that these students should receive inclusive education with their peers. This view defends that students with special needs should be educated in separate boarding/day special education schools and special education classes within the normal schools. Recently in Turkey it is aimed to provide education to the students who need special education mostly by means of inclusion as an alternative to the first group. For this education, which is held with the claim of a less restricted environment, the conditions of the students are constantly improved with new regulations.This study aims to reveal the theories that can be the basis of inclusive education and Islam's approach to inclusive education. In this study, I will try to find answers to the following questions.1. What are the educational theories and claims that can be the basis of inclusive education?2. What are the principles of inclusive education in the Qur’an and Sunnah?This study is important in terms of revealing general opinions that may be the basis of theoretical foundations of inclusive education and examining Islam’s approach to inclusive education. The study, which was prepared by examining the English and Turkish literature available within the scope of the possibilities, was designed with theoretical analysis method. Although ‘accessibility’, which is considered among the shortcomings of theoretical studies in literature, is an important limitation for this study, the fact that it constitutes a theoretical ground for future studies and fills an important gap in the literature determines the importance of the study.Integrated education theory, cognitive democratic theory and dyontogenesis theories can be regarded as the establishing theoretical foundations of inclusive education. Integrated education theory is based on Whitehead’s philosophy of education. This philosophy sees the individual as a whole. It does not intend to make people have a profession or make money by simply using their intelligence. Instead, it helps to ensure that both the individual and society as a whole are happy by helping them to make the most of their potential. This model is based on developing emotion, mind, body, and spirituality as a whole. The distinctness and sacredness of human life and the need to know about this sacredness are the main pillars of integrated education theory. In this model all people are seen equal. According to this theory, the “natural” as well as the “beautiful” is appreciated. Therefore, no one feels bad in such an environment because of its differences. Because of the value given to them, each individual’s love of learning and ideals remain alive. The individual makes use of his/her mind to make a connection between the meaning of life and the school.Cognitive democratic theory asserts that educational arrangements should be made to prevent any feelings of alienation, oppression, and insignificance by considering different groups in education. This theory, which emphasizes the phenomenon of democracy and citizenship, aims at social cohesion in the light of epistemological principles. The theory is based on the fact that social change and change in education support each other. According to the theory, the formation of democratic citizenship is only possible if the school environment is a place where students can internalize democratic values. This is achieved by equal consideration of each segment at different levels. According to this theory, elements such as classroom environment, discipline, program, rights, participation in decisions, educational activities should be organized according to democratic values. In such an environment, different special education students find a place for themselves.Vygotsky's dysontogenesis thesis is based on his theory of social learning. His theory provides a methodological framework for inclusion in special education. The theory states that information is obtained through social communication. In this theory, knowledge is an element that is acquired together with other people rather than something that happens in the human mind. According to this theory, instead of focusing on the brain (head), where social knowledge is formed, self, mind, emotion should be included in education. Also, disability is a social deviation rather than a biological disease. Social relations and the environment mostly shape this deviation. Therefore, the abnormal child approach that has become a place in the society should be abandoned. The theory opposes the concept of mental retardation. Because mental disability should be explained by the differences in mental development. According to this theory, mental retardation is a social problem; education should be provided with appropriate methods over the examples that can be experienced in a commonplace with their peers. Distracting the student from his/her normal peers due to his/her differences, creates negative social conditions and harms his/herself.As far as I have examined, there is no direct Qur’anic verse or phrase about inclusive education for the disabled. However, there are verses regarding the integration and solidarity of the society on righteousness. Principles for inclusive education can be drawn from these verses. The Prophet valued the disabled and settled the principles on how society should treat them. He frequently visited them, enabled them to employ appropriate jobs, determined the conditions of the economic order by considering them, and dignified them with honor. In other words, he tried to make provisions to prevent the disabled from being separated from society. For example he urged Zahir bin Itban to continue trade, asked Abdullah Ibn Umm Mektum to come to community prayers, thus he sought different ways to integrate disabled people into society. These practices can be seen as a positive outlook towards the mainstreaming education of today. In the period of the four great caliphs, practices for mainstreaming education continued. (shrink)

The six essays in this volume discuss philosophical thought on scientific theory including: a call for a realist, rather than instrumentalist interpretation of science; a critique of one of the core ideas of positivism concerning the relation between observational and theoretical languages; using aerodynamics to discuss the representational aspect of scientific theories and their isomorphic qualities; the relationship between the reliability of common sense and the authenticity of the world view of science; removing long-held ambiguities on (...) the theory of inductive logic; and the relationship between the actuality of conceptual revolutions in the history of science and traditional philosophical pictures of scientific theory-building. (shrink)

Two views of scientific theories dominated the philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the syntactic view of the logical empiricists and the semantic view of their successors. I show that neither view is adequate to provide a proper understanding of the connections that exist between theories at different times. I outline a new approach, a hybrid of the two, that provides the right structural connection between earlier and later theories, and that takes (...) due account of the importance of the mathematical models of a theory and of the various distinct formulations that pick out these models. (shrink)

Scientific inquiry has led to immense explanatory and technological successes, partly as a result of the pervasiveness of scientific theories. Relativity theory, evolutionary theory, and plate tectonics were, and continue to be, wildly successful families of theories within physics, biology, and geology. Other powerful theory clusters inhabit comparatively recent disciplines such as cognitive science, climate science, molecular biology, microeconomics, and Geographic Information Science (GIS). Effective scientific theories magnify understanding, help supply legitimate explanations, and assist (...) in formulating predictions. Moving from their knowledge-producing representational functions to their interventional roles (Hacking 1983), theories are integral to building technologies used within consumer, industrial, and scientific milieus. -/- This entry explores the structure of scientific theories from the perspective of the Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Views. Each of these views answers questions such as the following in unique ways. What is the best characterization of the composition and function of scientific theory? How is theory linked with world? Which philosophical tools can and should be employed in describing and reconstructing scientific theory? Is an understanding of practice and application necessary for a comprehension of the core structure of a scientific theory? How are these three views ultimately related? (shrink)

One of the vividly discussed topics in the contemporary philosophy of science (especially physics) is the opposition between realism and Anti-Realism. The supporters of the first way of thinking trust in the objective existence of realities studied by science. They consider theories as approximate descriptions of these realities (Psillos 1999, xvii), whereas their opponents do not. However, both sides base their argumentation on simplified notions of scientific theories. In this paper, we present a more general approach, which (...) can be coined as “Theoretical Physics Realism” (TPR). It is based on the detailed reconstruction of the polysystemic nature of physical theories. The consequences of this reconstruction for understanding the genuine relationship between theories and experiments in studying the realities are indicated. The paper distinguishes between abstract (general) and domain-dependent theories and appeals to specific physical theories together with their application domains rather than to general speculations. (shrink)

Philosophical analysis of ecological theories has lagged behind the study of evolutionary theory. The semantic conception of scientific theories, which has been employed successfully in the analysis of evolutionary theory, is adopted here to analyse ecological theory. Two general problems in ecology are discussed. One arises from the continued use of covering law models in ecology, and the other concerns the applicability of ecological theory in conservation biology. The semantic conception of ecological theories is used to (...) resolve these problems. (shrink)

Scientific theories are analyzed in terms of the role that they play in science rather than in terms of their logical structure. It is maintained that theories: provide descriptions of the fundamental features of their domains; on the basis of 1, explain non-fundamental features of their domains; provide a guide for further research in their domains. Any set of propositions that carries out these functions with respect to some domain counts as a theory. This view of (...) theories is developed and defended, and provides the basis for reconsidering a number of issues in the philisophy of science. It is argued that theories need not be unrestrictedly universal with respect to space and time; that the distinction between observable and theoretical entities fails because observables do function as theoretical entities in scientific theories, that there is no genuine philosophical problem of reduction; that the notion of "levels" can be replaced by the notion of "domains"; and that theories are the basic unit of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Hierarchical Bayesian models (HBMs) provide an account of Bayesian inference in a hierarchically structured hypothesis space. Scientific theories are plausibly regarded as organized into hierarchies in many cases, with higher levels sometimes called ‘paradigms’ and lower levels encoding more specific or concrete hypotheses. Therefore, HBMs provide a useful model for scientific theory change, showing how higher‐level theory change may be driven by the impact of evidence on lower levels. HBMs capture features described in the Kuhnian tradition, particularly (...) the idea that higher‐level theories guide learning at lower levels. In addition, they help resolve certain issues for Bayesians, such as scientific preference for simplicity and the problem of new theories. *Received July 2009; revised October 2009. †To contact the authors, please write to: Leah Henderson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, 32D‐808, Cambridge, MA 02139; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

What are scientific theories and how should they be represented? In this article, I propose a causal–structural account, according to which scientific theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated causal and credal nets. In contrast with other accounts of scientific theories (such as Sneedian structuralism, Kitcher’s unificationist view, and Darden’s theory of theoretical components), this leaves room for causality to play a substantial role. As a result, an interesting account of explanation (...) is provided, which sheds light on explanatory unification within a causalist framework. The theory of classical genetics is used as a case study. 1 Introduction2 The Theory of Classical Genetics3 Three Philosophical Accounts of the Theory of Classical Genetics3.1 The structuralist account3.2 Kitcher’s unificationism3.3 Darden and theory change in science4 A Common Lacuna: Where is Causality?5 Woodward’s Interventionist Account of Causation6 Causal Bayes Nets and Their Interrelations6.1 Causal Bayes nets6.2 Relations among causal nets6.3 Credal nets and their interrelations7 The Theory of the Gene and its Causal Graph8 A First Exemplar: Stem Length in Pea Plants8.1 Three crosses on stem length in pea plants8.2 The causal graph for stem length in pea plants8.3 Morgan’s explanatory principles and the credal net for stem length in pea plants9 Explaining Mendel’s Crosses: A Causal–Structural Account10 Monohybrid Crosses with Complete Dominance11 Exemplars,Explanatory Patterns, Generic Credal Nets, and Mechanism Schemas12 Incomplete Dominance13 Anomalies14 Multi-hybrid Crosses with Independent Assortment15 Multi-hybrid Crosses with Linkage and Crossing-Over16 Double Crossing-Over and the Linear Order of the Gene17 Causal–Structural Explanation18 Explanatory Unification19 Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

The origination of General Systems Theory is credited to Ludwig von Bertalanffy who, two years after receiving his doctorate from the University of Vienna, published a work in 1932 entitled Theorie der Formbildung. Despite, by his own account, an exposure to and familiarity with the positivism of the Vienna circle, von Bertalanffy was dissatisfied with the reductionist and atomistic forms of explanation which this group asserted is characteristic of scientific explanation. He was particularly unhappy with attempts to pattern explanations (...) of biological phenomena after the model of classical Newtonian physics. In this early work, Models Theories of Development, von Bertalanffy maintained both that the main problem for biology is to discover patterns (laws) which are typical of biological systems and that the discovery of such patterns would produce a major change in the way the world is viewed in general. Von Bertalanffy worked out his proposed model for biological explanation in such subsequent books as Theoretische Biologie and Problems of Life and then in his later years in such works as Robots, Man and Minds and Organismic Psychology and Systems Theory, went on to apply his concepts in a cross-disciplinary way to psychology. Again, by his own account, at a somewhat later period, others, for example the economist Kenneth Boulding and the bio-mathematician A. Rapport, had arrived at, for parallel reasons, certain similar ideas relative to their own disciplines. These individuals together with others formed a joint enterprise which was to result in the interdisciplinary systems movement. Von Bertalanffy stressed the multi-dimension possibilities for fruitful research in a large number of conceptual areas, including the humanities, in his final major work, General Systems Theory Foundation, Development and Applications. (shrink)

. Standard considerations of philosophy of science are reformulated in psychological terms and arguments, suggesting a fundamental change in life perspective: subjective experiences or introspective data are subject to motivational biases and therefore not admitted as objective empirical facts in science, However, we never experience objects or events of the external world, i.e., so called objective facts, but exclusively subjective percepts or mental events. They are merely assumed to, but may or may not be accurate or distorted mental representations of (...) objects or events of an external world. Accordingly, the latter are theoretical constructs, i.e., constructs of the fictitious but most successful predictive (implicit) theory, called external world, which seems to be constructed from regularities observed in mental events and serves as a reference fiction for, erroneously called empirical, tests of predictions of scientific theories. (shrink)

In philosophy of science two questions become central in the discussion of the nature of empirical science: 1) What is a theory, i.e. how is it built up, how does it work? And: 2) How does a theory relate to its corresponding experiential basis? To deal with these two questions modern philosophy of science has devised various ‘models’ on the nature and working of scientific theories. Some aspects of these models are widely held within the community of philosophers (...) of science, but others are still being discussed quite controversially. In this paper, we will consider both kinds of aspects. Particularly, we will analyze how the meaning of scientific concepts is determined; the axiomatic construction of a scientific theory; the idea of model building views as a bridge between theory and experience; the holistic semantic thesis of science; the question about the true of scientific theories; and, finally, the hierarchic structure of theories.En filosofía de la ciencia, dos cuestiones resultan centrales en la discusión acerca de la naturalezade la ciencia empírica: 1) ¿qué es una teoría ?, es decir, ¿cómo estáconstituida y cómo funciona? y 2) ¿cómo se relaciona una teoría con su correspondientebase experiencial? Para tratar estas dos cuestiones, la moderna filosofía de la ciencia ha desarrolladovarios “modelos” sobre la naturaleza y el funcionamiento de lasteorías científicas. Algunos aspectos de estos modelos son ampliamente aceptados por lacomunidad de filósofos de la ciencia, mientras que otros son todavía discutidos de manerabastante controvertida. En este trabajo, consideraremos ambos tipos de aspectos. En particular,analizaremos cómo se determina el significado de los conceptos teóricos, la construcción axiomática de una teoría científica, la idea de las concepciones sobre la construcción de modelos como puente entre la teoría y la experiencia, la tesis semántica holista de la ciencia, la cuestión acerca de la verdad de las teorías científicas y, finalmente, la estructura jerárquica de las teorías. (shrink)

Model checking, a prominent formal method used to predict and explain the behaviour of software and hardware systems, is examined on the basis of reflective work in the philosophy of science concerning the ontology of scientific theories and model-based reasoning. The empirical theories of computational systems that model checking techniques enable one to build are identified, in the light of the semantic conception of scientific theories, with families of models that are interconnected by simulation relations. (...) And the mappings between these scientific theories and computational systems in their scope are analyzed in terms of suitable specializations of the notions of model of experiment and model of data. Furthermore, the extensively mechanized character of model-based reasoning in model checking is highlighted by a comparison with proof procedures adopted by other formal methods in computer science. Finally, potential epistemic benefits flowing from the application of model checking in other areas of scientific inquiry are emphasized in the context of computer simulation studies of biological information processing. (shrink)

The scientific methodology underlying model-building is critically investigated. The modeling views of Popper and Samuelson and their prototypes are critically examined in the light of the theme of the moral law of unity of knowledge and unity of the world-system configured by the meta-epistemology of organic unity of knowledge. Upon such critical examination of received methodology of model-building in economics, the extended perspective?namely of integrating the moral law derived from the divine roots as the meta-epistemology?is rigorously studied. The (...) example of the Islamic prerogative in interpreting the holistic world-system through model-building in economics is highlighted. A religio-philosophical approach is adopted to exemplify some approaches in Islamic model-building. An especial focus is placed here on grassroots types of financing and activities. The critique of these models within the existing Islamic scholarship is carried out. The result is new dimensions of macroeconomic analysis that emanate in a logical way from the meta-epistemological approach, and oppose the mainstream ideas, both in received and Islamic economic thinking as of now. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I examine a view called ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’, which holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a structure. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable scientific realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of (...) its rivals. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the available historical literature, a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles played by theory, model, and evidence and the relationship between them. In particular, I am going to discuss not only Crick and Watson's well-known model (...) and Franklin's x-ray diffraction pictures (the evidence) but also the less well known theory of helical diffraction, which was absolutely crucial to Crick and Watson's discovery. The insights into this groundbreaking historical episode will have consequences for the ‘new’ received view of scientific models and their function and relationship to theory and world. The received view, dominated by works by Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison ([1999]), rather than trying to put forth a ‘theory of models’, is interested in questions to do with (i) the function of models in scientific practice and (ii) the construction of models. In regard to (i), the received view locates the model (as an idealized, simplified version of the real system under investigation) between theory and the world and sees the model as allowing the application of the former to the latter. As to (ii) Cartwright has argued for a phenomenologically driven view and Morgan and Morrison ([1999]) for the ‘autonomy’ of models in the construction process: models are determined neither by theory nor by the world. The present case study of the discovery of the DNA structure strongly challenges both (i) and (ii). In contrast to claim (i) of the received view, it was not Crick and Watson's model but rather the helical diffraction theory which served a mediating purpose between the model and the x-ray diffraction pictures. In particular, Cartwright's take on (ii) is refuted by a comparison of Franklin's bottom-up approach with Crick and Watson's top-down approach in constructing the model. The former led to difficulties, which only a strong confidence in the structure incorporated in the model could circumvent. How to Get to the Structure 1.1 X-ray diffraction and its synthesis 1.2 Model building and Pauling's panache 1.3 The structure of proteins 1.3.1 A failed inference to the best explanation 1.3.2 The misleading 5.1 Å spot in proteins and how to get rid of it 1.3.3 Derived predictions from Pauling's alpha-helix of protein molecules The CCV Theory of Helical X-Ray Diffraction 2.1 The role of the CCV theory in the discovery of the DNA structure Killing the Helix 3.1 Appreciating all evidence—in vain Conclusion Epilogue: Chargaff's Ratios CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

An examination of earlier views yields an account of theoretic change on which changes in theory which do involve changes in meanings of terms are classified as a special (and by no means exhaustive) case of theoretic change which, latter, is construed as a more general phenomenon. Only the general problem is given detailed consideration here. The account given considers the problem of how replacement of intensional theories by extensional ones may be treated within the general framework provided. Among (...) its results is the conclusion that rational changes in a scientific theory may be cogently construed as determined by warranted decisions that a new theory is more adequate (than the old one it replaces) with regard to purposes for which a theory is sought. (shrink)

The publication in English of Karl R. Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery twenty-five years after the appearance of the German original, is an important event. At the time when many philosophers questioned the cognitive value of scientific hypotheses , Popper has shown how to reconcile the free use of bold explanatory hypotheses with an insistence on empirical testing. Many of Popper's views have now been accepted even by most of his earlier opponents, which is no small tribute (...) to a philosopher who had challenged an important current of opinion. But, though the basic aspects of Popper's theory have attracted considerable attention in recent years, some of his finer points have received insufficient discussion. It is hoped that the publication of this important book in English translation will now help to remedy this situation. (shrink)

One of the most difficult and interesting problems of rational decision is the choice among possible diverging paths in theory construction and among competing scientific theories—i.e., systems of accurate testable hypotheses. This task involves many beliefs—some warranted and others not as warranted—and marks decisive crossroads. Suffice to recall the current conflict between the general theory of relativity and alternative theories of gravitation that account for the same empirical evidence, the rivalry among different interpretations of quantum mechanics, and (...) the variety of cosmological theories. They all account for the same observed facts although they may predict different kinds of as yet unknown facts; they are consequently, up to now, empirically equivalent theories even though they are conceptually different and may even involve different philosophical views—i.e., they are conceptually inequivalent. (shrink)

Philosophical analysis of ecological theories has lagged behind the study of evolutionary theory. The semantic conception of scientific theories, which has been employed successfully in the analysis of evolutionary theory, is adopted here to analyse ecological theory. Two general problems in ecology are discussed. One arises from the continued use of covering law models in ecology, and the other concerns the applicability of ecological theory in conservation biology. The semantic conception of ecological theories is used to (...) resolve these problems. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the notions of structure and models within the semantic approach to theories. To highlight the role of the mathematics used to build the structures which will be taken as the models of theories, we review the notion of mathematical structure and of the models of scientific theories. Then, we analyse a case-study and argue that if a certain metaphysical view of quantum objects is adopted, namely, that which sees them as (...) non-individuals, then there would be strong reasons to ask for a different mathematical framework for describing the structures that would be the models of the corresponding theory. In departing from the standard frameworks, we hope to bring to the scene, within the scope of the semantic approach, the importance of paying attention to some fundamental concepts usually only superficially touched by philosophers of science. (shrink)