Applying ideas drawn from contemporary critical theory, this book historicizes psychoanalysis through a new and significant theorization of the Gothic. The central premise is that the nineteenth-century Gothic produced a radical critique of accounts of sublimity and Freudian psychoanalysis. This book makes a major contribution to an understanding of both the nineteenth century and the Gothic discourse which challenged the dominant ideas of that period. Writers explored include Mary Shelley, Edgar Allan Poe, Robert Louis Stevenson, and Bram Stoker.

Dewey's development, on the socio-political plane, is analyzed in terms of his pre-roosevelt quasi-socialism to his post-roosevelt, 1930's mild liberalism and anti-communism. the complicated relations of dewey's with the emerging "third world" revolutions and with the new soviet revolutionary government and with the trotskyist (sidney hook) movement in the u. s. during that time, made a break between dewey's new brand of gradualist, piecemealist, plague-on-both-your-houses liberalism and the real left, and dewey's outlook maintained its continuity as a dominant mode of (...) liberal thought to this day, with all the dire consequences of that. (shrink)

Undoubtedly Romantic love has come to saturate our culture and is often considered to be a, or even the, major existential goal of our lives, capable of providing us with both our sense of worth and way of being in the world. The Radicalism of Romantic Love interrogates the purported radicalism of Romantic love from philosophical, cultural and psychoanalytic perspectives, exploring whether it is a subversive force capable of breaking down entrenched social, political and cultural norms and structures, (...) or whether, in spite of its role in the fight against certain barriers, it is in fact a highly conservative impulse. Exploring both the grounds for the central place of Romantic love in contemporary lives and the meaning, extent and nature of its supposed radicalism, this volume considers love from a variety of theoretical perspectives, with attention to matters of gender, sexuality, class and ethnicity. With authors examining a range of questions, including the role of love in the same-sex marriage debate, polyamory and the notion of love as a political force, The Radicalism of Romantic Love illuminates a fundamental but perplexing aspect of our contemporary lives and will appeal to scholars across the social sciences and humanities with interests in the emotions and love as a social and political phenomenon. (shrink)

Recent military coups in West Africa have put the continent’s democratisation itself into question. In some places, for the moment, these coups appear to have popular backing. Nigeria, where radicalism is firmly rooted in democratic values and a human-rights framework, the radical grassroots opposition to the Buhari government’s creeping authoritarianism lies drenched in blood. The roots of this development go back to the history of Nigeria’s radicalism in the twentieth century. Much has appeared on the global 1968 recently, (...) including that of Africa. 1970s/1980s-style radicalism is reappearing today with Omoyele Sowore’s 2018 presidential candidacy, with the African Action Congress party, the #EndSARS protests and the tragic Lekki Toll Gate massacre (2020) in Nigeria. The shift towards radicalism is palpable with protest music such as Falz’s This is Nigeria, and Burna Boy’s Monsters you Made, both explicitly targeting neocolonialism and police brutality. Contrary to Achille Mbembe’s sweeping dismissal of African radicalism, the movement with very deep roots under study is meaningful once again, and is gathering momentum in West Africa’s giant polity. This article applies Walter Benjamin’s and also Nigerian radical thinkers’ conceptualisation of political, social and artistic radicalism, while it frames the Nigerian version via the movement’s history, in which marxisant theory and praxis, feminism, human rights and pro-democracy movements interact with emancipatory strands of Islam, Christianity, Igbo Judaism, and animism. In the context of Nigerian radicalism, even expressly pro-capitalist art theory performs a radical social function by stressing the African’s right to make universal statements (Olu Oguibe) in its de facto defiance of the neo-colony. As these different strands of protest meet, ethnic uprisings (amongst them IPOB) find ways to establish common cause with social radicalism, posing a composite threat to the prebendalist oligarchy that rules and oppresses the country via a militarised neoliberalism. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim that interesting forms of epistemic evaluation are insensitive to truth in a very specific way. Suppose that two possible agents believe the same proposition based on the same evidence. Either both are justified or neither is; either both have good evidence for holding the belief or neither does. This does not change if, on this particular occasion, it turns out that only one of the two agents has a true belief. Epitomizing this line of thought are thought (...) experiments about radically deceived “brains in vats.” It is widely and uncritically assumed that such a brain is equally justified as its normally embodied human “twin.” This “parity” intuition is the heart of truth-insensitive theories of core epistemological properties such as justification and rationality. Rejecting the parity intuition is considered radical and revisionist. In this paper, I show that exactly the opposite is true. The parity intuition is idiosyncratic and widely rejected. A brain in a vat is not justified and has worse evidence than its normally embodied counterpart. On nearly every ordinary way of evaluating beliefs, a false belief is significantly inferior to a true belief. Of all the evaluations studied here, only blamelessness is truth-insensitive. (shrink)

Student movements around the world have once again made political radicalism an issue. The purpose of this paper is to examine Hegel’s description, criticism, and alternative to radicalism. The paper will be divided into three parts: the first, an examination of various texts on radicalism; the second, Hegel’s definition and criticism of radicalism; and the third, a presentation of Hegel’s alternative to political radicalism.

Student movements around the world have once again made political radicalism an issue. The purpose of this paper is to examine Hegel’s description, criticism, and alternative to radicalism. The paper will be divided into three parts: the first, an examination of various texts on radicalism; the second, Hegel’s definition and criticism of radicalism; and the third, a presentation of Hegel’s alternative to political radicalism.

To date, the philosophy of Max Stirner (1806-1856) has not attracted much academic attention. An early critic of Karl Marx and precursor of existentialist thought, he is nevertheless remembered as a radical Young Hegelian engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to move 'beyond Hegel'. Arguing that this image of Stirner is based on a faulty interpretation of his relationship to Hegelian philosophy, this book proposes an entirely new reading of his philosophical magnum opus Der Einzige und sein Eigentum. In (...) this work, traditional philosophy, epitomized by Hegel, is reduced to the property of the unique or single individual. This move must not only be seen a refusal to keep traditional philosophy alive by criticising it, but also entails an 'existentialist' inversion of the traditional relation between thinker and idea. This exciting new interpretation, which is demonstrated here by a detailed analysis of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, clears the way for a philosophical rehabilitation of Stirner's ideas. (shrink)

Compared with another founder of philosophical anthropology Max Scheler, Plessner is desolated by Chinese academe. His works have not been translated into Chinese systematically, and there are few articles about his life and thoughts. The reasons for this are complicated, but the most important point of these is that Plessner has paid most of his attention to the German problems. However, Plessner’s thought, especially his critique of social radicalism, enlightens us a lot. Plessner’s critique of modernity stimulates us to (...) think about the controversy which broke out between New Left-wingers and Liberalists in the late 20th century and to discern the common ground between the two parties: Radicalism. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill's philosophy contains an important ‘radical’ dimension, deriving from his early exposure to the philosophies of Jeremy Bentham and of his father, James Mill. In this chapter, I argue that the doctrine Mill termed ‘philosophic radicalism’ is best understood as an attempt to initiate political reform by introducing radically democratic institutions, avoiding narrowly ‘sectarian’ assumptions about utility and social theory. Contrasting Mill's understanding of philosophic radicalism with Bentham's early and late democratic theory, I show that (...) philosophic radicalism characterized by its critique of ‘aristocratic’ privilege and the corresponding aim to uproot it, but also by commitments of varying intensity to the extension of the franchise, to public and parliamentary deliberation, and to the ‘omnicompetence’ of democratic legislation. (shrink)

When public opinion gets polarized, the population’s beliefs can experience two different changes: they can become more extreme in their contents or they can be held with greater confidence. These two possibilities point to two different understandings of the rupture that characterizes political polarization: extremism and radicalism. In this article, I show that from the close examination of the best available evidence regarding how we get polarized, it follows that the pernicious type of political polarization has more to do (...) with radicalism than with extremism. Reinforcing the confidence in the core beliefs of the group we identify with makes our beliefs immune to the reasons coming from the other political side. Finally, I also suggest that the rise of political polarization is not necessarily the result of an irrational process. (shrink)

Too much rationalist social philosophy is polarized into radical and conservative factions, both seeking support for rival claims to intellectual authority. Moreover, each faction can raise what it sees as a valid critique of the other. To the uncommitted, this mutual critique presents a reductio ad absurdum of rationalism and invites violence and despair. The radicalist claim that a rationalist social philosophy is necessarily radical clashes with the conservative critique which sees radicalism demanding the impossible from reason. (...) So the question is whether this radical controversy between opposing rationalisms is amenable to rational resolution.This question is addressed through an examinalion of three writers: two radicals, Jean-Paul Sartre, who presents a comprehensive rationalism, and Herbert Marcuse, whose rationalism is irrationally grounded and authoritarian, and a conservative, Karl Popper, whose critique of comprehensive rationalism is effective against Sartre’s view, but whose own concession to irrationaIism unwittingly supports Marcuse’s approach.Yet, if Popper’s approach can be improved by abandoning both polarization and the exclusion of all radicalism, then we may have a rational social philosophy of a new non-authoritarian sort. The prospects for such a new approach are considered in the last section. (shrink)

Too much rationalist social philosophy is polarized into radical and conservative factions, both seeking support for rival claims to intellectual authority. Moreover, each faction can raise what it sees as a valid critique of the other. To the uncommitted, this mutual critique presents a reductio ad absurdum of rationalism and invites violence and despair. The radicalist claim that a rationalist social philosophy is necessarily radical clashes with the conservative critique which sees radicalism demanding the impossible from reason. (...) So the question is whether this radical controversy between opposing rationalisms is amenable to rational resolution.This question is addressed through an examinalion of three writers: two radicals, Jean-Paul Sartre, who presents a comprehensive rationalism, and Herbert Marcuse, whose rationalism is irrationally grounded and authoritarian, and a conservative, Karl Popper, whose critique of comprehensive rationalism is effective against Sartre’s view, but whose own concession to irrationaIism unwittingly supports Marcuse’s approach.Yet, if Popper’s approach can be improved by abandoning both polarization and the exclusion of all radicalism, then we may have a rational social philosophy of a new non-authoritarian sort. The prospects for such a new approach are considered in the last section. (shrink)

It is characteristic of Anselm to adopt the formulations of his authorities while giving them meanings of his own, hiding conceptual disagreement by means of verbal echoes. Anselm's considerable originality sometimes goes unnoticed because readers see the standard Augustinian language and miss the fact that Anselm uses it to state un-Augustinian views. One striking instance of Anselm's quiet radicalism is his understanding of free choice and the fall. He seems to uphold standard Augustinian privation theory when he affirms that (...) injustice is merely an absence of justice where justice should be; he seems also to be committed to the standard Augustinian view that everything that has being is created by God. A closer examination, however, shows that Anselm clearly has qualms about whether privation theory can do all of the work to which Augustine had tried to put it; and Anselm actually affirms that every free choice has being and yet is not created by God. I begin by showing that Anselm regards unjust acts a.. (shrink)

This paper revisits an aspect of Charles Mills’s work that is usually overlooked, namely, his early engagement with the tradition of analytical Marxism, particularly in From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism (2003). This collection of essays is important not only because it marks Mills’s intellectual trajectory, but also because, as I aim to show in the following, it allows us to trace the source of Mills’s radicalism. I argue that Mills’s radicalism locates (...) the causal source of social change in the material conditions of oppression. I then show how this analysis of Mills’s radicalism can help in clarifying his critique of ideal theory and his insistence on the importance of nonideal theory. I end by considering the relation between class and racial oppression in Mills’s early Marxist work. (shrink)

In The Political Economy of Progress, Joseph Persky argues for seeing John Stuart Mill as a consistent ‘radical’ with much to offer modern ‘radical’ political discourse. In this article, I further this claim with consideration of Mill's political philosophy, as well as his political economy. Exploring Mill's commitment to radical reordering of the economy, as well as emphasizing his commitment to egalitarianism; his historically nuanced view of ‘the progress of justice’; and his desire for a transformation of social relations (...) allows us to see more clearly how Mill's radicalism was a specific species of socialism. That is, Mill's early radical enthusiasm for the ideals of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ is also to be seen in his later socialism. Recognizing his ‘radicalism’ as a species of socialism allows greater understanding of the depth, importance and ‘radicalism’ of Mill's desired socialist reforms. (shrink)

If man has no nature - if our intellect and understanding are products of our own activities - do we possess a key to self-modification? Are we free to re-make mankind? Sartre champions the romantic idea that we can - by sheer determination - begin afresh. Oakeshott is struck by the vandalism of such a project - he seeks to defend political culture from degradation by meddling academics. The Radical and Conservative understanding of social order and the human self are (...) compared in this in-depth analysis of two contrasting philosophies. (shrink)

... writing to the Princess Dashkofï in, thus analysee! the spirit of his century: Chaque siècle a son esprit qui le caractérise. L'esprit du nôtre semble ...

Empirical political theory has grown in importance. In empirical political theory, attention to data is part of the evaluative step. A concern was raised that being attentive to the content of political science data implies that such attentiveness would limit the normative contours of empirical political theory, and will create a status-quo bias. This concern has been called the ‘problem of critical distance’. One way to appraise the significance of this problem is to examine the work done by empirical political (...) theorists such as Anderson (on racial integration), Wenar (on international trade), and Carens (on immigration). All three scholars suggest radical policies that differ from existing institutions and rules. The likelihood that a theory will suffer from the problem of critical distance will depend on the type of usage of data by a given theorist, her/his normative standpoint, and the manner in which they coalesce or differ. (shrink)

This study aimed to analyse the contribution of the Sufi order in stemming religion-based violence as a form of the Sufis’ response to rampant violence, extremism and religious radicalism. This study used a qualitative method in which the data were obtained through interviews, observation and documentation. Then they were analysed by using an interactive model. This study was carried out in three Sufi communities of the Sufi order Qadariyah wan Naqshabandiyah (TQN) in Indonesia, namely in Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School, (...) Futuhiyyah Islamic Boarding School Mranggen and Darul Ulum Islamic Boarding School Jombang. The results of the study show that the three TQN orders have the concepts of dhikr and love, which are internalised in the act of Sufism. The Sufi order has the doctrines of love of God, mutual love, discourse of moderation and tolerance towards religion and other groups as the main instruments in the fight against religious radicalism. The resistance of the Sufis to religious radicalism shows that the Sufi order is cornered from attacks by formalist groups in religion. This fact reopens the historical archive of contradictions between the two major currents of Islamic thought and movement, Salafi versus Sufi. The counter-radicalism narrated by the Sufis of the three TQN communities represents their defensive attitude towards the aggressiveness of the textual and radical Salafis. Contribution: This article contributes to prevent and reduce the rise of religious radicalism in Indonesia. The doctrines of tanbih, mahabbah, tolerance and moderatism developed by the Sufis in the three TQN communities became a source of reference and inspiration for resistance to violence and religious radicalism. (shrink)

The order in which Plato’s thoughts follow upon one another in the Republic is logical, but the dramatic or the picturesque medium through which he is constantly presenting his ideas disguises the logical structure of the work.

Over time our understanding of the 'political' has been progressively shaped by the secular rational calculations of modern European political thought. This paper aims to critique these 'calculations' with reference to crucial moments of departure and flight within western philosophy itself. It concludes by reclaiming fin de siècle radicalism/philosophy as a forgotten instance of empirical-metaphysical hybridity: a form of politics or ethics capable of housing the imperatives of both desire and prayer.

The free world stands and falls on its cultural and religious policies, which affect not only the social structures within countries, but also the relations between people and peoples, generations and nations. No culture can exist in the abstract, and therefore no one can take an intelligent interest in cultural and religious affairs without a clear and consistent philosophy of life. However, after years of development we see a widening gap between people and groups in the same society caused (...) by different viewpoints on the same issues. The „fringe population” becomes more and more disillusioned because of unemployment or poverty. In this marginalized zone lie the strongest roots of radical issues, because these people do not have very much to lose. These people find hope and solutions in the radical ideas of extreme groups, i.e. in religious sects, in right-wing quasi-political groups (the Neo-Nazis) or left-wing groups (Neo-Communists). It may prove fruitful to look into the fundamentals of the tension between relativism and radicalism for a better understanding the role of morality and ethics in a globalized world. (shrink)

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the Bali bombing on October 12, 2002, Islamic schools in Southeast Asia have become a focus of international attention (Hefner, 2009), includi...

In the recent progressive reappraisals of the enlightenment by Jonathan Israel and Rainer Forst, Voltaire figures as almost a reactionary thinker, opposing the radical dimensions of the enlightenment pushing forwards secularisation, democratisation, and toleration. Part 1 examines Israel’s and Forst’s accounts of Voltaire, showing their striking proximity. Part 2 is divided into the three subheadings of (i) Voltaire’s deism, (ii) the pivotal subject of toleration, and (iii) the decisive question of what philosophical radicalism, in the direction of democratising reform, (...) involves. At issue in Israel’s and Forst’s claims that Voltaire’s deism represents a step backwards from Bayle’s and Spinoza’s more radical conceptions of reason and toleration, we will claim, is a shared, anachronistic failure to duly credit Voltaire’s deism’s distance from the revealed religions, and the radicalism of Voltaire’s anti-clericism. In the key claim of the paper, however, we will argue that the larger issue in Israel’s and Forst’s positioning of Voltaire as almost reactionary are a deeper set of assumptions about how we should assess philosophical texts which aim to act in the world, and (evoking Feuerbach) to change it (2, iii). Both Israel and Forst, despite the former’s extensive labours in contextualisation, read the texts of eighteenth century philosophers for their arguments alone, rather than as rhetorical and political acts and interventions which aimed to reach, entertain, and reform an expanding reading public through esprit, art, satire, and rhetoric, as well as by making argumentative contributions to the controversies of the day. (shrink)