A. P. Martinich's The Two Gods of Leviathan appeared in 1992, and J. R. Collins's The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes in 2005. Martinich offered a revisionist interpretation of Thomas Hobbes's religious commitments. He rebuked the conventional view that Hobbes was an atheist and placed him within particular traditions of reformed Christian theology. Collins's book strongly differed from these conclusions, and reasserted Hobbes's hostility to traditional Christianity as part of a general contextualization of his writings within the period of the English (...) Revolution. The following exchange between Martinich and Collins was first aired in 2007 as a debate at the Southwestern Political Science Association's Annual Conference. (shrink)

During the first half of the present century a number of outstanding philosophers realized that language theory could profitably be viewed as far more than merely a means of studying one among the many human faculties, or merely sharpening the tool we use to philosophize - they realized that there is a sense in which philosophy of language comprises (almost) the whole of philosophy. This was the famous linguistic turn: philosophers came to accept that everything that is is in a (...) sense through language, and that to study what there is is to study what our words mean.1 The enigma of the language-world relationship was brought to the centre of philosophical discussion early in this century by Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Austin and others. Their original point was that we cannot take the representing capacities of language at face value, that in order to treat of things - which cannot be done save with the help of words - we must first treat of words and make sure which of them are really capable of treating of things. Thus the philosophers undergoing the linguistic turn slowly gave up asking what is consciousness (matter, evil etc.)? in favour of asking what is the meaning of 'consciousness' ('matter', 'evil' etc.)? This simple turn seemed to have tremendous consequences for philosophy. By replacing the question what is consciousness? by the question what is the meaning of 'consciousness'? we seem to lose nothing (any meaningful answer to the former question seems to be recoverable from an answer to the latter), and yet it seems to take us from the weird realms of mind to the commonplace domain of language, from the troublesome immersing into people's heads to straightforward observing how they use words. It also seems to guard against the "bewitchment of our reason by language" (Wittgenstein) caused by words which are only seemingly meaningful: such questions as what does the word 'ether' stand for? can be answered simply by nothing, whereas the question what is ether? presupposes that there is something as ether (as.... (shrink)

First published in 1975 by Leeds Books Ltd., this second, revised edition adds only a short, twelve page Postscript and an Index. The former replies to reviews of the original edition by clarifying the use of two key terms, by commenting on its principal weaknesses, and by indicating the direction of further work required by the position advocated.

A new translation which is eminently readable and extremely accurate. Much of the awkwardness and unnecessary obscurity of the Ogden translation has been eliminated. The comprehensive index which combines both English and German expressions is designed to meet the special problems involved in understanding the Tractatus. Unfortunately Russell's introduction to the 1922 edition is reproduced without any indication of the controversy concerning Russell's interpretation, or subsequent interpretations of the Tractatus.--R. J. B.

The doctrine of scientific realism has once again come into the center of attention for many philosophers of science, although of course the approaches, arguments, and emphases have somewhat changed. This book is an excellent entree to the current debates on this topic, as seen by van Fraassen who is probably the most direct and severe opponent of scientific realism. What is at stake is nothing less than the ultimate goal of science and the significance of its theories.

A provocative collection of technical and popular essays dealing with a variety of scientific and political topics which Popper has treated in his major works. For the most part Popper develops, sharpens, and extends to new areas, themes which he has already explored. The major theme running through the essays is that knowledge grows by unjustified and unjustifiable anticipations, guesses and conjectures. These are controlled by criticisms and refutations. Theories can never be positively justified; they can only prove to be (...) resistant to rational criticism. The boldness of Popper's conjectures demands attempted refutations on the part of the reader.--R. J. B. (shrink)

During the past decade some of the most provocative and controversial disputes concerning the philosophy and history of science have centered about the work of Thomas Kuhn and Sir Karl Popper. One, therefore, looks with anticipation to this volume which is based on a symposium held in July, 1965 where Kuhn, Popper and several of Popper's former students met for an intellectual confrontation. But the result is depressing. The volume is an editorial mess. Two of the main scheduled speakers never (...) appeared at the symposium, although papers by them are published here. Some of the remarks published here seem to be those spoken on the day the symposium was held while others, like Kuhn's answer to his critics, were written four years after the symposium. The result is a confusing and distracting editorial unevenness. While Kuhn's fair-minded opening paper raises some of the most important issues to be confronted, one quickly senses that the Popperians are not really very much interested in discussing Kuhn's work but rather in pushing their own pet theses. Kuhn puts this rather generously when he labels it an example of "talking-through-each-other." Most of the Popperians seem to be obsessed with Kuhn's understanding of normal science and neglect the much more interesting questions concerning his views on scientific revolutions, the sense in which science does and does not make progress, the criteria involved in adjudicating among competing theories. It is almost with relief that one reads Margaret Masterman's remark that it is a "crashingly obvious fact" that there is normal science. Ironically, Masterman's article which is basically sympathetic to Kuhn's work is the most illuminating and the most critical. More successfully than any of other contributors she shows the ambiguities involved in Kuhn's idea of a paradigm. One's wishes that the Popperians would take a good hard look at themselves and what they are doing as it is so disastrously illustrated here. Although ostensibly dedicated to serious critical rationalism, they seem more eager to score points than to understand what they are criticizing. Although they supposedly abhor clubiness, they are rapidly forming themselves into a scholastic circle where the object seems to be to show how brilliant or how stupid some other student of Popper is. Although they scorn the quest for origins, they are almost compulsive in attempting to show that anything worthwhile was previously said by Sir Karl. This book illustrates the faults of the Popperians at their worst and few of their virtues. There is much heat and wit, but little light.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Despite the enormous and growing interest in Marx and the availability of Marx's writing in paperback, it is scandalous how little care has been taken in producing careful texts and English translations of Marx's work. O'Malley's edition is an outstanding exception. It is carefully and intelligently edited. The result makes available an extremely interesting text of Marx. A number of scholars have already argued that in this early critique, one can discover some of the earliest formulations of distinctive Marxian themes. (...) Now the reader can judge for himself, for this is the first full English translation of Marx's Critique. But this Critique is not only extremely important for understanding Marx's intellectual development, it also helps to make Hegel's Philosophy of Right come alive. Marx's fundamental ambivalence toward Hegel is evidenced here. It is clear that Marx is still very much under Hegel's influence and we can see how deeply Hegel is shaping Marx's thought, but there is also a toughness and incisiveness in Marx's criticism of Hegel. O'Malley has provided a very extensive introduction which not only provides the necessary background for understanding this text but also explores the role of this work in the totality of Marx's development. Altogether this edition shows a care and judiciousness which is exceptional. It eminently serves the purpose of making an important text accessible.--R. J. B. (shrink)

A sampler of Russell's writings from 1963 to 1959 which provides representative selections from his multifarious writings. The book is designed more for the general reader than for the scholar interested in piecing together the complex mosaic of the man and his work. There is a preface by Bertrand Russell. Handsomely printed, the total effect shows once again how unique and many-sided is this twentieth-century intellectual explorer.--R. J. B.

Mourant has provided a carefully edited, topically organized anthology. The introductions are clearly written. One still waits, however, for an Augustinian anthology which reveals, rather than conceals Augustine's development.—R. J. W.

A brilliant attempt to show how the Transcendental Deduction can be construed as a strict logical deduction. Using Kemp Smith's "pathwork" theory in a novel way, Wolff organizes his commentary around four versions of the main argument which reflect Kant's increasing philosophic subtlety. The heart of the commentary is an analysis of synthesis as a rule-directed mental activity. Throughout there is a judicious balance of historical, textual and philosophic analysis, making this a truly rich commentary.--R. J. B.

Cavell is one of the most gifted and sensitive philosophers who has been influenced by Wittgenstein and Austin. He is no slavish disciple but an intelligent and perceptive interpreter of the contemporary sensibility. Six of the ten essays have already appeared in print and some have already become intellectual gems. In "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Cavell better than most has managed to capture and convey the spirit and the intensity of the later Wittgenstein. The title essay is the (...) most articulate defense of what ordinary language philosophy can be at its best. But Cavell is also an incisive commentator on Beckett and Kierkegaard. He illuminates a range of aesthetic issues. Cavell's forte is that of an essayist who manages to create in each of his essays a "form of life" within which one can participate and share his insight.--R. J. B. (shrink)

A medley of sensible and informative papers ranging over Advaita Vedanta, the similarities of Eastern and Western philosophy, and social problems of contemporary India.--R. J. B.

The precise relationships between ideology and cultural policies is a topic of interest to any philosopher concerned with culture. In this fascinating study, the author explores the background of Nazi ideology and policies concerning architecture. Lane persuasively shows how Nazi policies were influenced and inherited from the ideological disputes that surrounded "modern" tendencies in architecture during the Weimar period, especially those disputes concerning the Bauhaus. She also traces the devious paths whereby the social significance of architecture became an issue of (...) national concern in Germany. In the course of the analysis, we not only have a detailed study of architecture and ideology during this crucial period in German history, but a paradigm for intellectual history at its best.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The product of the seventh symposium of New York University's Institute of Philosophy, this volume centers on three topics: grounds for judgment of artistic excellence, interpretation of meaning in art criticism, and art and reality. Each of the three sections features a lead paper, followed by a series of comments. Issues raised by the main papers are quite thoroughly explored, but sometimes one wishes that provocative suggestions made in commentary were taken up by other participants.—R. J. W.

This volume is based on a sharp distinction between the history of philosophy and the history of ideas. Its essays on the major philosophers of past and present make little attempt to trace historical connections, but rather concentrate on exposition and criticism. In general the individual authors are experts on the philosophers they discuss, and the level of the exposition is high. Most of the contributors are British, and practitioners of the method of linguistic analysis. This gives the volume a (...) rather tendentious tone.—R. J. W. (shrink)

For many years scholars have paid lip service to the "dramatic" or "mimetic" character of Plato's dialogues, but too few have taken this character seriously. Klein does, making it the basis of his exposition. He convincingly demonstrates that the dramatic action and the topic discussed are tightly interwoven and must be taken together to understand the Meno. In his introduction he distinguishes three kinds of mimesis: ethological, doxological, and mythological. The Meno is interpreted as primarily ethological. But one can ask (...) whether the author has done justice to the doxological element in the dialogue. He places considerable emphasis on the character of the "historical" Meno and does not seem to consider seriously the possibility that Meno's responses to Socrates show that he is learning something about the nature of ἀρετή. To suggest a possible criticism is in no way to take issue with the major thesis of this thorough and imaginative study.—R. J. W. (shrink)