Este trabajo explora la concepción de Marsilio de Padua sobre el poder dentro de una teoría ascendente de gobierno. Siguiendo la línea de la crítica medieval a la plenitudopotestatis , él propone, desde una orientación populista de su doctrina, una organización sociopolítica cuyo fundamento es la voluntas populi y la ley que de allí emana. Es así como en su obra El defensor de la paz puede encontrarse una sorprendente visión republicana de la política, donde la esfera religiosa queda absorbida (...) por la dimensión estatal. La salvación del mundo profano queda, por consiguiente, en sus propias manos, y la praxis intramundana se halla desprovista del auxilio que prestaban los viejos expedientes extracotidianos. Marsilius of Padua and emerging theories of government This paper explores the view maintained by Marsilius of Padua on power within an ascendant theory of government. Following the line of medieval criticism of plenitudo potestatis , he proposes, from a populist orientation of his doctrine, a socio-political organization founded upon the voluntas populi and the law that emanates from it. Thus, readers will be surprised to find a Republican view of politics in his work The Defender of Peace, where the State dimension absorbs the religious sphere. Salvation from the profane world is, therefore, in the State's own hands, and worldly practice is devoid of relief once provided by extraquotidian old records.  . (shrink)

The question of power occupied an even more central role in Marsilius' political thought than previously thought. Behind the appearances of consent in his thought lay, at a deeper level, the idea of power. The core concept of coercive power was located within the field of meaning of plenitudo potestatis through which Marsilius' new theory of the nature of power was strained and projected onto the papacy. But the modern debate about whether Marsilius was a legal positivist has (...) been wrongly posed. His stress on the necessity of a clear power structure had a biological basis. Comparison with jurists reveals the strengths and weaknesses of his treatment of power. (shrink)

This paper examines how the metaphysical theses of the Liber de causis are read in De ecclesiastica potestate of Giles of Rome. The hypothesis of this study is that the causal models developed in both texts are different, and therefore the metaphysical theses of the first cannot be the basis for the political theses of the second. Both in the Liber de causis and in De ecclesiastica potestate there is only one causal chain, i.e. in both texts “all power” comes (...) from God. However, this does not imply that in the Liber de causis “the power of all” comes from God. On the contrary, in the Liber de causis, the secondary causes are sovereign in their action. Thus, the political model of the “plenitudo potestatis” - and of expiry of the legal order - built in De ecclesiastica potestate cannot be derived from the metaphysics set out in the Liber de causis. (shrink)

Comment la pensée médiévale continue-t-elle à agir dans la philosophie juridico-politique moderne, c'est-à-dire dans un horizon intellectuel et historique qui n'est plus le sien? Telle est la question qui anime les contributions au présent ouvrage. Cette action persistante de la pensée médiévale, qui est en même temps transformation de ce qui agit, est étudiée dans le cadre de trois grandes problématiques. 1. Le transfert de la notion de plenitudo potestatis de l'ordre ecclésiastique à l'ordre politique. 2. Le déplacement (...) d'un univers qui trouvait son fondement en Dieu vers un univers qui comporte, non un, mais deux fondements possibles entre lesquels se développe une tension (laquelle deviendra plus tard une concurrence) : Dieu et l'homme. C'est dans le cadre de cette tension entre les deux fondements théologique et éthique que se forment les doctrines du sujet psychologique et affectif, d'une part, et du sujet de droit, d'autre part. 3. Enfin, la constitution d'une théorie du pouvoir politique sur les hommes qui n'est plus pensée dans les catégories de la propriété des choses alors que celles-ci fournissaient, au Moyen Age, le principe d'intelligibilité de celle-là. Ce volume entend ainsi apporter un éclairage nouveau sur la naissance et la constitution de la philosophie juridico-politique moderne. (shrink)

En la tesina hemos examinado el problema de la tolerancia religiosa, a partir de los escritos de Marsilio de Padua, Thomas Hobbes y John Locke. La elección de los pensadores modernos ha respondido a la relevancia de sus contribuciones para la discusión acerca del problema que supone la tolerancia religiosa en la Modernidad.1 La interpretación que hemos propuesto en relación con los aportes de Hobbes, ha permitido considerarlo como un autor que exhortó a la diversidad como una estrategia para la (...) regulación de la religión. En cuanto a Locke, hemos señalado su defensa de la tolerancia en nombre de la racionalidad, su reivindicación de la utilidad de una actitud tolerante como medio para preservar la coexistencia pacífica. Observamos que las contribuciones de ambos pensadores trascendieron ampliamente los horizontes de su tiempo para arribar a nuestros días con una vigencia sorprendente. De allí que estos autores se convierten en lecturas obligatorias sobre esta materia al intentar buscar posibles soluciones a uno de los problemas políticos más apremiantes. Sin embargo, es importante señalar que, en la historia del pensamiento político, el principio de tolerancia fue desarrollado, no solo por autores modernos, sino asimismo por autores medievales, entre ellos, Marsilio de Padua. Este pensador tuvo una influencia decisiva en el pensamiento filosófico-político de los teóricos modernos anteriormente mencionados a raíz de sus aportes a la discusión de la tolerancia, sus contribuciones en lo que se refiere a la circunscripción del poder pontificio, su crítica a la doctrina de la plenitudo potestatis papal y sus reflexiones en torno a la relación entre el poder temporal y espiritual. Por tal motivo, dedicamos un primer capítulo a presentar y analizar los argumentos filosóficos-políticos centrales de Marsilio de Padua, con el fin de señalar los alcances de este antecedente medieval en el desarrollo de la noción moderna del principio de tolerancia religiosa. En el segundo capítulo, examinamos los argumentos de Hobbes, e intentamos señalar que su preocupación central fue, no tanto la tolerancia religiosa, sino antes bien el problema de la regulación de la religión. En el tercer capítulo, pasamos revista de los aportes de Locke en lo que respecta a esta materia desde una perspectiva liberal. Por último, en el cuarto capítulo realizamos un estudio comparativo entre Marsilio y Hobbes, por un lado, y entre este último y Locke, por otro. (shrink)

The medieval experience of the Franciscans is marked by the decision of acting in different societies. In this context the awareness of their presence bring them to focus on the requirements that, by themselves, can legitimize the political authority.If in Scoto legitimacy is exclusively founding by the consensus of the people who voluntarily choose to confer its power to an authority, if in Ockham the legitimacy of power is conditioned by the double principle of circumnstantiality and functional efficency, in Eiximenis (...) the basis of the authority is submit to a double temperament. First of all the authority can never be considered as an exercise of plenitudo potestatis due to a constitutional principle: the ruler of a community derives his power not only from the consensus but from an agreed pact in which is clearly fixed circles and ends of his action. The second one regards the co-essential condition of the legitimacy: the power of the ruler has a strictly functional justification. This kind of authority must ensure not only the classicals peace and justice, it has to become an engine of the process looking for the “millor estament de la cosa pública”, for the economic emprovement of the subjects belonging to the political communitiy, but also of those who could enter in it by a specific and very well circunscribed pathways of integration. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Absolute and Ordained Power of God and King in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Philosophy, Science, Politics, and LawFrancis OakleyThe quintessentially scholastic distinction between God’s power understood as absolute and ordained (potentia dei absoluta et ordinata) has been described “as a ‘yes and no’ answer to the question whether God is able to do or arrange things other than he did in creating the orders of nature and (...) grace.” 1 The importance of that distinction the historical scholarship of the past forty years has served increasingly to indicate. 2 The idea that it expressed had emerged already in the twelfth century, and in the standard form familiar to us from later years we now know it to have surfaced among the theologians of Paris in the opening years of the thirteenth. We also know that long before the end of the thirteenth century it had come to be understood in the two distinct ways that were to persist on through the late medieval and early modern centuries and to be acknowledged in the neo-scholastic manuals of the late nineteenth century.According to the first of these understandings, embedded in the classical formulations given to the distinction by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and many other later thinkers, the term potentia absoluta was used simply to denote God’s power in itself, taken in abstracto and without reference to the orders of nature and grace he has actually willed de potentia ordinata to establish. There was no question, that is, of the absolute power’s [End Page 669] being understood as a presently-active power by means of which God intervenes in the world to act apart from or set aside the order established by the ordained power. It refers instead to God’s ability to do many things he does not choose to do. Or put in the temporal terms that William Courtenay favors, it refers to “the total possibilities initially open to God, some of which were realized by creating the established order,” the “unrealized possibilities” being “now only hypothetically possible.” 3Side by side with this “classical” usage, however, there had emerged already in the thirteenth century what has been called a “juristic” or “opera-tionalized” understanding of the potentia dei absoluta as a presently-active power of potential interposition in the established order. Thus Duns Scotus, who gave a most influential expression to this alternative understanding, drawing an analogy not only with kings but with any free agent within whose power the law falls, distinguished between the ordained power by which God acts de jure in accordance with the rightful law he has established and the absolute power whereby de facto he can act apart from or against the law. In such a formulation the absolute power clearly exceeds the ordained. Rather than referring simply to the realm of logical possibility prior to God’s ordination of things, that absolute power is now construed as a presently-active and extraordinary power capable of acting apart from the order established de potentia ordinata and prevailing in the ordinary course of things. This “juristic” understanding of the distinction was clearly affiliated closely with the cognate distinction that medieval canonists invoked as early as the thirteenth century in an attempt to elucidate what the pope, in the absoluteness of his plenitudo potestatis, or absolute power, could do that was not open for him to do when acting in accordance with his merely ordained or “ordinary” power.Philosophy and ScienceIn an earlier and complementary article, I traced the career of the power distinction, as well as the persistence of the two distinct ways of understanding it, across the fifteenth century and on into the thinking of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theologians, Lutheran and Reformed as well as Catholic. 4 It remains now to go on to demonstrate that the currency of the distinction in these later centuries was no more confined to strictly theological circles or settings than it had been during the Middle Ages. The Coimbran commentators and Suárez certainly deployed it for more generally philosophical purposes, 5 [End Page 670] and in the seventeenth century they were by no means... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz’s Political and Moral Philosophy in the Novissima Sinica, 1699–1999Patrick RileyThe Preface to Leibniz’s Novissima Sinica 1 contains an important but highly compressed and abbreviated quintessence of his theory of justice or jurisprudence universelle—a version so compressed and abbreviated that one must have a broader and fuller understanding of this universal jurisprudence before one can entirely appreciate what Leibniz has to say about Christian charity, Platonism, and geometry in (...) the Novissima Sinica itself. Above all, one wants to know why Leibniz, in the key paragraph of the Preface to Novissima Sinica, should describe the Chinese emperor as just and charitable and as a (more or less) “Platonic” geometer who is as wise as he is charitable. And why should Leibniz contrast this “wisely charitable” Chinese ruler with the Pontius Pilate who irresponsibly asked, “What is truth?” and then permitted the judicial murder of the very Christ who did most to make charity and justice coextensive by saying, “A new law I give unto you, that ye love one another”? 2 The wise course, therefore, is to throw enough light on Leibnizian universal jurisprudence in general to make his moral-political utterances in Novissima Sinica intelligible in particular.In 1693, four years before the publication of Novissima Sinica, Leibniz revealed the outlines of his jurisprudence universelle in the Codex Iuris Gentium:a good man is one who loves everybody, so far as reason permits. Justice, then, which is the virtue which regulates that affection which [End Page 217] the Greeks call philanthropy, will be most conveniently defined... as the charity of the wise man, that is, charity which follows the dictates of wisdom... Charity is a universal benevolence, and benevolence the habit of loving or of willing the good. Love then signifies rejoicing in the happiness of another..., the happiness of those whose happiness pleases us turns into our own happiness, since things which please us are desired for their own sakes. 3Slightly later, in La véritable piété, Leibniz indicated what this view of justice entails:those who... reduce justice to [mere] rigor, and who fail altogether to understand that one cannot be just without being benevolent... in a word, not only those who look for their profit, pleasure, and glory in the misery of others, but also those who are not at all anxious to procure the common good and to lift out of misery those who are in their care, and generally those who show themselves to be without enlightenment and without charity, boast in vain of piety which they do not know at all, whatever appearance they create. 4The central idea of Leibniz’s “universal jurisprudence,” which aims to find quasi-geometrical, eternal moral verities equally valid for all rational beings, human or divine, is that justice is “the charity of the wise” (caritas sapientis), 5 that it is not mere conformity to sovereign-ordained “positive” law given ex plenitudo potestatis (in the manner of Hobbes); nor is it mere “refraining from harm” or even “rendering what is due” (the neminem laedere and suum cuique tribuere of Roman law). 6 The equal stress on “charity” and on “wisdom” suggests that Leibniz’s practical thought is a kind of fusing of Platonism—in which the wise know the eternal truths such as absolute goodness (Phaedo 75d), which the gods themselves also know and love (Euthyphro 93-10e) and which therefore deserve to rule (Republic 443d-e) 7 —and of Pauline Christianity, whose key moral idea is that charity or love is the first of the virtues (“though I speak [End Page 218] with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal”). 8 Historically, there is nothing remarkable in trying to fuse Platonism and Christianity. Augustine’s thought (particularly the early De Libero Arbitrio) is just such a fusion. 9 But Leibniz was the last of the great Christian Platonists, and left the world just as Hume, Rousseau, and Kant were about to transform and “secularize” it.I. If one decomposes caritas sapientis into its parts, charity and wisdom, the provenance of both elements is clear enough... (shrink)

The article analyses the development of the idea of sovereignty, which is the result of six centuries of intellectual and political development that began in the early Middle Ages. Having studied the development of this idea from the idea of the plenitudo potestatis of the papacy in Gregory VII to the idea of the sovereign individual in Locke, the authors conclude that the modern understanding of popular sovereignty and the state is a consequence of the modern idea of (...) sovereign individuals that form a political community in the only possible way - on the basis of agreement. (shrink)

El trabajo expone el significado de la obra de Marsilio de Padua, la primera teoría medieval no clerical del Estado. Marsilio se propone combatir la doctrina de la plenitudo potestatis papal, porque la considera causa de la guerra civil en Italia a principios del siglo XIV. Se basa para ello en la unidad de la soberanía, frente al dualismo que caracteriza a otros defensores del poder secular, como Juan de Paris, Ockham o Dante. Sostiene que no existe fundamento (...) espiritual para un poder diferente del poder del legislador humano y que el único poder supremo o plenitudo potestatis no corresponde al Papa sino al gobernante secular. De lo cual se sigue la completa absorción de la Iglesia por el Estado y la atribución al gobernante temporal de toda la organización eclesiástica. La filosofía marsiliana representa un esfuerzo sin precedentes por dar al poder un fundamento racional, pero está lejos de la idea moderna de soberanía, así como del liberalismo y de la voluntad general de Rousseau. No tuvo éxito en su tiempo, pero influyó en la reforma anglicana y en el erastianismo de Hobbes. (shrink)

Every legitimate exercise of political power owes its very existence to Church. On the other hand, every Church power lies in papal power. Therefore, the power of the Pope himself, even in earthy matters, is a total, absolute power, sine pondere, numero et mensura, as Egidio points out. Two powers, two swords but just a unique authority: that of the Pope.

The epistemology of Richard of Saint-Victor is characterised through a detailed analysis of contemplatio, the highest mode of human knowledge. Contemplatio culminates in an ecstasy, in which man reaches the highest object of his knowledge, God himself, and is fulfilled by true spiritual pleasure. This plenitude of spiritual pleasure is not just the fruit of knowledge, but fed by love. Richard distinguishes three paths of knowledge in accordance with the growth of the love between God and man. The love of (...) God gives an orientation to human knowledge. Through the love of God human knowledge is structured from disoriented cogitatio to oriented meditatio as a spiritual ascent to the divine things supported by virtues, then finally to contemplatio, which culminates in ecstasy with true spiritual pleasure. So the essence of true spiritual pleasure reflects the structural key of the highest knowledge, contemplatio, namely the love of God. (shrink)

Los esfuerzos por demostrar la influencia de la filosofía nominalista en la teoría política de Marsího de Padua no han tenido éxito. Otras corrientes de pensamiento y escuelas filosóficas, como el aristotelismo heterodoxo, el corporativismo medieval e incluso la concepción orgánica de la sociedad tienen más influencia en el Defensor pacis, concebido y escrito varios años antes de ser compañero de Ockham en la Corte imperial de Luis de Baviera. El artículo examina los textos en los que se ha basado (...) la interpretación nominalista del pensamiento de Marsilio. La conclusión es que la teoría de la civitas que expone Marsilio no está basada en la concepción nominalista de la sociedad. En su lucha contra la plenitud o potestatis del Papado, Marsihio construye una civitas, en la que no cabe el poder eclesiástico diferente del secular. El resultado son dos modelos de sociedad distintos: dualista el de Ockham; mucho más monolítico el de Marsilio, que no reconoce a los ciudadanos individuales ni a las partes de la civitas capacidad para actuar autónomamente. (shrink)

Among Greek grammarians a distinction is recognized between a class of nouns capable of referring to several nouns and a class referring to just one proper name. This distinction is very poorly (and problematically) attested in the works of Latin grammarians. This paper explores and discusses some connections so far overlooked, and tries to correct some misinterpretations. In the light of the distinction of proper vs. common epithets, the controversial phrase mediae potestatis is elucidated, by stressing that it refers (...) to the ‘semantic incompleteness’ of the adjective. Finally, the assumption that the concept of ‘adjective’ was not known within Latin grammatical tradition before the fourth century is revised. We bring forward evidence against this assumption implying an early ‘linguistic’ tradition with respect to the adjective which was to some degree independent from the well-known ‘rhetorical’ doctrine on epithets. (shrink)

In line with his theory of secularization according to which all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts, Carl Schmitt argues in Constitutional Theory that people’s (Volk) constitution-making power in modern democracy is analogical to God’s potestas constituens in medieval theology. It is also undoubtedly possible to find a resemblance between Schmitt’s constitution-making power and God’s power as it is described in medieval theology. In the same sense as the constitution-making power is absolutely free (...) from all normative ties, God’s potestas constituens, or rather, God’s potentia absoluta is free from such ties. Yet, unlike the Schmittian constitution-making power, God’s potentia absoluta was not, in medieval theology, originally intended as a description of some form of divine action: the absolute power of God referred to the total possibilities initially open to God. However, when the canonists started to employ the term potentia absoluta in their speculations concerning the papal plenitude of power (plenitude potestatis) by the end of the thirteenth century, they used it in a different sense than the theologians previously. According to certain canonists, the pope, by his potentia absoluta, could grant de facto dispensations from divine and ecclesiastical laws. Later on, this notion became a theological notion as well, but given its origin in juridical discourse, the constitution-making power, rather than being a secularized theological notion, is a theologized juristic notion. (shrink)