Different reasons give rise to the question, what philosophy really is, and by tradition we know many answers. Plato’s answer can be found by examining his explicit statements about philosophy in his dialogues, or by analyzing his representation of Socrates – philosophy become fl esh. But an other way to fi nd an answer to the question lies in examining the things which – according to Plato – we cannot do without. There are three of them, namely the idea, logos (...) and aporia. These three taken together – the insight that we orient ourselves according to some unity in our different fi elds of life; that we cannot dismiss dialogue and debate; and questions outlive answers – paint a picture of philosophy as «unbehauptendes Denken»1 [undogmatic thought]. Such «unbehauptendes Denken» does not aim to insist on new claims against old ones, but instead seeks to analyze and to refl ect upon old views. (shrink)

In Platons Dialog Sophistes wird nach der Definition des Sophisten gefragt; das führt zum Begriff des Nichtseienden und schließlich unter dem Stichwort 'Dialektik' auf die Frage nach dem Seienden. Daß Platon dabei von der sophistischen Methode ausgeht, das Seiende als bloße Spitze einer Begriffspyramide zu deuten, haben seine Interpreten seit jeher als irgendwie widersprüchlich empfunden. Dieser Kommentar ist für Leser gedacht, die bereit sind, den Sophistes genau zu studieren, aber dabei einen Begleiter haben möchten, der ihnen in möglichst (...) direkter und knapper Form hilft, den oft schwierigen einzelnen Schritten zu folgen und zugleich die Übersicht über das nicht weniger schwierige Ganze zu behalten. Er will nicht in die kaum noch überschaubare wissenschaftliche Diskussion einführen, sondern nur das dort zunehmend ins Hintertreffen geratende unmittelbare Verständnis des Wortlauts sicherstellen. Er ist "kritisch", weil er zum unbefangenen Lesen anhalten möchte. Damit wendet er sich nicht gegen die idealistische Interpretation von Platons Dialogen, der Platon seinen Ruhm als Philosoph verdankt, sondern will zeigen, daß es falsch wäre, den Platon, der im Sophistes Grundlegendes u. a. über Begriffsbildung und Sprache zu sagen hat, darüber zu vernachlässigen. (shrink)

In dieser Marburger Vorlesung aus dem Wintersemester 1924/25 stellt sich Heidegger die Aufgabe, Platons Spatdialog "Sophistes" im Ausgang von Aristoteles verstandlich zu machen. Zentrum des einleitenden Aristoteles-Teils ist die Folge der dianoethischen Tugenden im VI. Buch der "Nikomachischen Ethik", in der Heidegger die sich aufsteigernde Stufenfolge eines Entbergens erkennt und demgemass den Primat der "Physis" aus der Uberlegenheit ihres Entbergens begrundet. Damit legt Heidegger die Zusammengehorigkeit von Sein und Wahrheit als Horizont des aristotelisch-griechischen Philosophierens frei und gewinnt so den (...) "Boden", aus dem die platonische Seinsforschung, wie sie im "Sophistes" vorliegt, erwachsen ist. Dementsprechend stellt sich Heidegger im Hauptteil die Aufgabe, in fortlaufender Interpretation des "Sophistes" konkret zu zeigen, dass und wie Platons Ontologie aus dem Entbergen erwachsen ist. Die Vorlesung bezeugt, dass Heidegger die in seinem fruhen Hauptwerk "Sein und Zeit" gestellte Frage nach dem "Sinn von Sein", d.h. nach der Un-verborgenheit des Seins in der Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen Uberlieferung gewonnen hat. (shrink)

This volume contains the text of a lecture course Heidegger presented in Marburg in the winter semester of 1924/25, just a year before completing his work on the manuscript for Being and Time. A lengthy introductory section examines the concept of truth in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics. The "Main Section" presents a detailed commentary on the Greek text of Plato's Sophist. Part 1 deals with the various attempts made at the beginning of the dialogue to define "the factical existence (...) of the sophist." Part 2 is devoted to the ontological discussion which arises out of these attempts. (shrink)

Sind platonische Ideen oder Formen wirklich in dem Sinn als „eingestaltig“ konzipiert, dass sie nicht aus Teilen bestehen können? Ganz und gar nicht! Christoph Hochholzer zeigt, dass die Relation von Teil und Ganzem einer Form neben der Relation der Teilhabe an Formen zu den zentralen Grundannahmen der Ideenlehre gehört. Von diesem Befund ausgehend, entwickelt die detaillierte Textanalyse eine ganz neuartige Interpretation des Sophistes. Der eleatische Fremde, der Sokrates in dem Spätdialog als Gesprächsführer ablöst, präsentiert demnach eine ausgereifte Variante von (...) Platons Philosophie, mit deren Hilfe er unterschiedlichste Fragen präzise beantwortet: Was ist die Bedeutung von „... ist seiend“ oder „... ist verschieden von...“? Gibt es Nicht-Seiendes? Können auch Formen an Formen teilhaben? Was genau sind eigentlich Sophisten und wieso kann Sokrates ihnen nicht helfen? Die Untersuchung beinhaltet eine streng logische Rekonstruktion des Textes ohne die literarische Form des Dialogs und seine Stellung in Platons Gesamtwerk zu vernachlässigen. Sie bietet eine neue Übersetzung und einen philologisch gründlichen Kommentar. Daraus werden eine Vielzahl von neuen Positionen zu klassischen Forschungsfragen, wie die nach der Selbstprädikation oder dem Mythos, entwickelt. (shrink)

In the Sophist Plato introduces a very peculiar character, the eleatic stranger who plays both for Theaetetus and for us the role of a perfect sophist. His terrific power simply comes of his refusal to understand the examples. He just requires his interlocutors that absolutely all what is to be understood by them must be explicitly said. And “all” means really all: even the most evident for everybody, all what is not necessary to say and perhaps is not possible either. (...) The eleatic visitor, in order to hunt the sophist whose role himself is playing, trays to say all indeed, even the most difficult: the meaning of words as being, not-being, same, other or similarity. In this way, the language shows oneself as a play of likeness and unlikeness. (shrink)

There are two basic ways in which the phenomenon of learning is explicated in the Platonic dialogues: First, by means of an analogy with vision, and second, by arguing that the acquisition of knowledge is really anamnesis. The analogy with vision is the more common of the two and occurs throughout the dialogues. The passage in the Republic comparing the sun and the good is the best known instance of this approach to the clarification of learning. The basic point of (...) this explication is that the mind, like the eye, in order to discover truth must be turned in the right direction and be trained to apprehend and distinguish the characters of the objects it beholds. In this context, the acquisition of knowledge is clearly a discovery of that which was not previously known, just as the man who escapes from the cave sees what he had not previously seen, and at the end of the ascent of the heavenly ladder one “begins to see” what he has not seen before. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to reconstruct the method of division depicted in the two late, methodological Platonic dialogues, i.e. Sophist and Statesman. The undertaken analysis consists in uncovering assumptions and principles of the method. A comparison of the methods of enquiry reconstructed from both dialogues shows that they differ in various ways. In Sophist we find series of subsequent divisions of terms which lead to a definition of angler and several definitions of sophist. Interrelated with the method of collection (...) last account of division in the dialogue finally enables the Stranger from Elea and his interlocutors to describe sophist as a specific type of imitator. On their way to achieve this definition disputants follow Stranger’s advices to ‘cut through the middle’ and ‘always go right’. This instructions signify what we call a dichotomous and right-sided method of division which describe what a thing being defined is by ongoing addition of its new characteristics. In Statesman, however, we witness a series of significant departures from this clearly stated principles. Although, in the first part of the dialogue politician is defined on the way of the dichotomous divisions it seems to the interlocutors that the definition ‘lacks its clarity’ and therefore misses to express what a statesman really is. We also read that statesmanship, if it is to be defined properly, must be distinguished from other shepherd-like types of human activity in society. The Stranger suggests that they need to change a paradigm which underlies their enquiry. He then introduces a paradigm of weaver which enables disputants to define statesman successfully as a governing ruler who interweaves courageous and well-behaved characters into a durable social fabric. In both definitions of the weaver and statesman we notice terms being divided in more than two parts and on the both sides of a division tree. This leads us to a conclusion that in Statesman we find a non-dichotomous, left- and right-sided division serving to describe what a particular thing is by eliminating what it is not. Key words PLATO, METHOD, DIAIRESIS. (shrink)

The logos question, one of the most important among the subjects that traverse the Plato's Sophist, has in fact some different aspects: the criticism of father Parmenides' logos, that is unable to speak about the not-being, but also about the being; the relations between logos and its cognates, phantasia, doxa and dianoia; the logos’ complex structure, that is a compound with onoma and rema; the difference between naming and saying, two distinct but inseparable actions; the logical and ontological conditions that (...) make possible to say the truth, or to lie or simply to joke; the necessity of a most flexible logos that allows us to speak about the not-being, and about the being, but at the same time is a logos dangerously similar to the sophist’ one; finally, the identity between the power to produce “spoken images” and the very power to speak. The aim of the present article is giving a systematical view of the matter that grasps all these faces. (shrink)

The logos’ question, one of the most important among the subjects that traverse the Plato’s Sophist, has in fact some different aspects: the criticism of father Parmenides’ logos, that is unable to speak about the not-being, but also about the being; the relations between logos and its cognates, phantasia, doxa and dianoia; the logos’ complex structure, that is a compound with onoma and rema; the difference between naming and saying, two distinct but inseparable actions; the logical and ontological conditions that (...) make possible to say the truth, or to lie or simply to joke; the necessity of a most flexible logos that allows us to speak about the not-being, and about the being, but at the same time is a logos dangerously similar to the sophist’s one; finally, the identity between the power to produce “spoken images” and the very power to speak. The aim of the present article is giving a systematical view of the matter that grasps all these faces. (shrink)

1. La parution d’une nouvelle traduction française du Sophiste fait figure d’événement pour les nombreux amateurs du dialogue, puisque près de trente ans déjà nous séparent de la dernière traduction en date, proposée par Nestor-Luis Cordero (Platon : le Sophiste, Traduction inédite, introduction et notes, Paris, GF Flammarion, 1993). La traduction récente de Létitia Mouze est donc bienvenue, d’autant plus qu’elle arrive accompagnée de ce que l’autrice nomme un « guide de lecture » du dialogue...

Lorsque Platon essaie, dans le Sophiste, de réfuter l'argumentation de Parménide à propos de l'inexistence du non- être, il arrive à une conclusion inattendue : c'est la langue grecque qui, du fait d'identifier « ce qui est » aux étants, rend impossible d'exprimer « ce qui n'est pas ». Or, étant donné que le discours faux, propre à la sophistique, suppose que « ce qui n'est pas » existe, Platon examine les théories des philosophes qui l'ont précédé et il découvre (...) que, mis à part le néant absolu, sur lequel il partage le jugement de Parménide, un certain non- être est possible : celui de la prédication. Fidèle à sa philosophie, Platon propose une Forme comme garantie de ce non- être relatif : l' Altérité. Celle-ci, avec sa Forme complémentaire, l'Identité, assure dorénavant la définition de chaque réalité. When Plato, in the Sophist, tries to turn down Parmenides' argumentation about the existence of non-being, he reaches a most unexpected conclusion : i.e. the Creek language, identifying « what is » to « the beings », makes it impossible to express what is not. Now, since tbe false discours, proper to sophistics, supposes that « that wbich is not » exists, Plato examines the théories of the philosophers who came before him and discovers that, apart from the absolute nothingness — on which he shares Parmenides' judgement —, some kind of a non-being is possible, i.e. that of prédication. True to his philosophy, Plato suggests a Form as warrant of such a « relative » non-being : the Différent. This Form, with its complementary Form, the Identity, guarantees the définition of every reality. (shrink)

Lorsque Platon essaie, dans le Sophiste, de réfuter l’argumentation de Parménide à propos de l’inexistence du non-être, il arrive à une conclusion inattendue : c’est la langue grecque qui, du fait d’identifier « ce qui est » aux étants, rend impossible d’exprimer « ce qui n’est pas ». Or, étant donné que le discours faux, propre à la sophistique, suppose que « ce qui n’est pas » existe, Platon examine les théories des philosophes qui l’ont précédé et il découvre que, (...) mis à part le néant absolu, sur lequel il partage le jugement de Parménide, un certain non-être est possible : celui de la prédication. Fidèle à sa philosophie, Platon propose une Forme comme garantie de ce non-être relatif : l’Altérité. Celle-ci, avec sa Forme complémentaire, l’Identité, assure dorénavant la définition de chaque réalité.When Plato, in the Sophist, tries to turn down Parmenides’ argumentation about the existence of non-being, he reaches a most unexpected conclusion : i.e. the Greek language, identifying « what is » to « the beings », makes it impossible to express what is not. Now, since the false discours, proper to sophistics, supposes that « that which is not » exists, Plato examines the theories of the philosophers who came before him and discovers that, apart from the absolute nothingness – on which he shares Parmenides’ judgement –, some kind of a non-being is possible, i.e. that of predication. True to his philosophy, Plato suggests a Form as warrant of such a « relative » non-being : the Different. This Form, with its complementary Form, the Identity, guarantees the definition of every reality. (shrink)

The central Platonic concept of the mixture is to be situated in the entire transmission of Methexis: ascending from the level of the participation of the sensible things in the forms to the participation of the forms and finally to the participation of the two Platonic Principles. “Mixture” designates on the one hand the relation between the μέγιστα γένη in the Sophist and on the other hand the one between the Limit and the Unlimited in the Philebus . Thereupon the (...) essence of the Mixture is to be examined and rehabilitated as metaphor, namely as transformation of a sensible image in a philosophical one . Our guiding question will be: W hy can the Mixture be legitimated as a better candidate than the Methexis in the frame of the Sophist? The Mixture is to be regarded as well-founded transformation of Methexis in the context of the equioriginal “greatest kinds” . In our interpretation of the Philebus that restores the disputed unity of this Platonic dialogue, we are about to show how the philosopher Plato “saves” the beautiful phenomena: The fourfold division is to be construed as the place where the beautiful appearances are generated. To them does the philosopher return after his ascent to the σύμφυτον two Platonic Principles. They are no longer degraded as “rolling about in the midregion between being and not-being” , but are rather reevaluated as “procreation” .Der in den späteren platonischen Dialogen zentrale Begriff der Mischung wird zunächst in die ganze Übertragung der Methexis eingeordnet: von der Ebene der Teilhabe des W ahrnehmbaren an der Idee zu der innerideellen Teilhabe aufsteigend und von daher zu der Teilhabe der zwei platonischen Prinzipien. Einerseits wird die Beziehung der μέγιστα γένη untereinander, andererseits diejenige zwischen der Grenze und der U nbegrenztheit im Philebos als Mischung bezeichnet . Daraufhin wird ihr W esen als Metapher behandelt und rehabilitiert, nämlich als Transformation eines sinnlichen Bildes in ein philosophisches . Zur Leitfrage unserer Ausführung wird: W arum kann die im Rahmen des Dialogs Sophistes eingeführte Mischung der größten Gattungen miteinander als ein besserer Kandidat als derjenige der Teilhabe gerechtfertigt werden? Die Mischung wird als eine wohlbegründete Verwandlungsform derTeilhabe in den ideellen Zusammenhängen der gleichursprünglichen größten Gattungen betrachtet . Bei unserer die umstrittene Einheit des Philebos wiederherstellende Interpretation wird aufgezeigt, wie der Philosoph Platon die schönen Phänomene rettet: Die vierfache Einteilung des Ganzen wird als Ort der Genese der schönen Erscheinungen interpretiert. Ihnen wendet sich der Philosoph nach dem Aufstieg zum σύμφυτον der zwei platonischen Prinzipien zu, nicht länger sie als “zwischen dem Sein und dem Nicht-Sein herumschweifend” degradierend , sondern als “Zeugung” würdigend .Pojam miješanja, koji je središnji u kasnijim Platonovim dijalozima, ponajprije se smješta u cjeloviti kontekst transponiranja methexisa: od ravni sudjelovanja osjetilnog u ideji uzlazno k sudjelovanju među idejama te odatle k sudjelovanju dvaju platoničkih principa. S jedne strane se kao miješanje označava međusobni odnos μέγιστα γένη, s druge pak onaj između granice i neograničenosti u Filebu . U tu se svrhu razmatra i rehabilitira bit miješanja kao metafore, naime kao transformacija osjetilne slike u filozofijsku . Glavnim pitanjem našeg izvođenja postaje: zašto se uzajamno miješanje “najviših rodova”, koje se uvodi u okviru dijaloga Sofist, može opravdati kao bolji kandidat od sudjelovanja? Miješanje se razmatra kao dobro utemeljena forma preinake sudjelovanja u odnošenjima jednako izvornih “najviših rodova” . U našoj se interpretaciji, koja nanovo uspostavlja osporavano jedinstvo Fileba, prikazuje kako filozof Platon spašava lijepe fenomene: četvorostruka podjela cjeline interpretira se kao mjesto nastajanja lijepih pojava. Njima se filozof vraća nakon uspona k onom σύμφυτον dvaju platoničkih principa, ne degradirajući ih više kao one koji se “potucaju između bitka i ne-bitka” , već ih cijeni kao “rađanje”. (shrink)

The central Platonic concept of the mixture is to be situated in the entire transmission of Methexis: ascending from the level of the participation of the sensible things in the forms to the participation of the forms and finally to the participation of the two Platonic Principles. “Mixture” designates on the one hand the relation between the μέγιστα γένη in the Sophist and on the other hand the one between the Limit and the Unlimited in the Philebus. Thereupon the essence (...) of the Mixture is to be examined and rehabilitated as metaphor, namely as transformation of a sensible image in a philosophical one. Our guiding question will be: W hy can the Mixture be legitimated as a better candidate than the Methexis in the frame of the Sophist? The Mixture is to be regarded as well-founded transformation of Methexis in the context of the equioriginal “greatest kinds”. In our interpretation of the Philebus that restores the disputed unity of this Platonic dialogue, we are about to show how the philosopher Plato “saves” the beautiful phenomena: The fourfold division is to be construed as the place where the beautiful appearances are generated. To them does the philosopher return after his ascent to the σύμφυτον two Platonic Principles. They are no longer degraded as “rolling about in the midregion between being and not-being”, but are rather reevaluated as “procreation”.Der in den späteren platonischen Dialogen zentrale Begriff der Mischung wird zunächst in die ganze Übertragung der Methexis eingeordnet: von der Ebene der Teilhabe des W ahrnehmbaren an der Idee zu der innerideellen Teilhabe aufsteigend und von daher zu der Teilhabe der zwei platonischen Prinzipien. Einerseits wird die Beziehung der μέγιστα γένη untereinander, andererseits diejenige zwischen der Grenze und der U nbegrenztheit im Philebos als Mischung bezeichnet. Daraufhin wird ihr W esen als Metapher behandelt und rehabilitiert, nämlich als Transformation eines sinnlichen Bildes in ein philosophisches. Zur Leitfrage unserer Ausführung wird: W arum kann die im Rahmen des Dialogs Sophistes eingeführte Mischung der größten Gattungen miteinander als ein besserer Kandidat als derjenige der Teilhabe gerechtfertigt werden? Die Mischung wird als eine wohlbegründete Verwandlungsform derTeilhabe in den ideellen Zusammenhängen der gleichursprünglichen größten Gattungen betrachtet. Bei unserer die umstrittene Einheit des Philebos wiederherstellende Interpretation wird aufgezeigt, wie der Philosoph Platon die schönen Phänomene rettet: Die vierfache Einteilung des Ganzen wird als Ort der Genese der schönen Erscheinungen interpretiert. Ihnen wendet sich der Philosoph nach dem Aufstieg zum σύμφυτον der zwei platonischen Prinzipien zu, nicht länger sie als “zwischen dem Sein und dem Nicht-Sein herumschweifend” degradierend, sondern als “Zeugung” würdigend.Pojam miješanja, koji je središnji u kasnijim Platonovim dijalozima, ponajprije se smješta u cjeloviti kontekst transponiranja methexisa: od ravni sudjelovanja osjetilnog u ideji uzlazno k sudjelovanju među idejama te odatle k sudjelovanju dvaju platoničkih principa. S jedne strane se kao miješanje označava međusobni odnos μέγιστα γένη, s druge pak onaj između granice i neograničenosti u Filebu. U tu se svrhu razmatra i rehabilitira bit miješanja kao metafore, naime kao transformacija osjetilne slike u filozofijsku. Glavnim pitanjem našeg izvođenja postaje: zašto se uzajamno miješanje “najviših rodova”, koje se uvodi u okviru dijaloga Sofist, može opravdati kao bolji kandidat od sudjelovanja? Miješanje se razmatra kao dobro utemeljena forma preinake sudjelovanja u odnošenjima jednako izvornih “najviših rodova”. U našoj se interpretaciji, koja nanovo uspostavlja osporavano jedinstvo Fileba, prikazuje kako filozof Platon spašava lijepe fenomene: četvorostruka podjela cjeline interpretira se kao mjesto nastajanja lijepih pojava. Njima se filozof vraća nakon uspona k onom σύμφυτον dvaju platoničkih principa, ne degradirajući ih više kao one koji se “potucaju između bitka i ne-bitka”, već ih cijeni kao “rađanje”. (shrink)