Moral Perfectionism: Ethical Theory from a Pragmatic Approach This article tries to rescue the perfectionist approach to moral theory from the pragmatic tradition and inspiration. Based on the philosophy of Dewey and taking into account authors like H. Putnam or S. Cavell, it tries to defend the idea that pragmatism allows us to understand moral perfectionism in a new way. In that way, perfectionism is bound to a certain interpretation of practical rationality, and a new understanding of moral objectivity (...) and human subjectivity. Finally, moral perfectionism is not a theory that aims to solve all moral dilemmas but provides an understanding of how to face up to the problems of ordinary moral life. (shrink)

Perfectionism, broadly speaking, is the view that the development of certain characteristically human capacities is good. The view gains motivation in part from the intuitive pull of an objective approach to wellbeing, but dissatisfaction with objective list theory. According to objective list theory, goods such as knowledge, achievement, and friendship constitute good in a life. The objective list has terrific intuitive appeal – after all, it’s a list generated by reflecting on the good life. But as a theory, some find (...) it unsatisfying. What justifies presence on the list? On the traditional conception it is just a list and not much of a theory at all. Perfectionism captures the intuitive pull of the objective list and provides a unifying justification: the entries on the list share in common a special relationship to human nature. This essay gives an overview of perfectionism. (shrink)

Confucian scholars should satisfy two conditions insofar as they think their theories enable Confucianism to make contributions to liberal politics and social policy. The liberal accommodation condition stipulates that the theory in question should accommodate as many reasonable conceptions of the good and religious doctrines as possible while the intelligibility condition stipulates that the theory must have a recognizable Confucian character. By and large, Joseph Chan’s Confucian perfectionism is able to satisfy the above two conditions. However, contrary to Chan and (...) many other Confucian scholars, I argue that any active promotion of Confucianism will violate the liberal accommodation condition. I propose the “wide view of moderate perfectionism,” which enables Confucianism to shed light on a wide range of political and social issues without promoting Confucianism actively. Thus, I present a new approach to the long-standing question of how Confucianism may improve political and social development in a liberal society. (shrink)

Perfectionism about well-being is, at a minimum, the view that people’s lives go well when, and because they realize their capacities. It is common to link perfectionism with an idea of human essence or nature, to yield the view that what constitutes people’s well-being is the development and exercise of characteristically human capacities. The first part of this paper considers the very serious problems associated with the idea of human nature or essence, and argues that perfectionism would be more plausible (...) if it abandons reliance on it and focuses instead on the unfolding of some valuable capacities that need not be unique to, or shared by all human beings. This revised perfectionism is evaluative all the way down, pragmatic but not unprincipled, and holistic. In its second part, the paper articulates this account in terms of the dignitarian approach—the view that we have reason to organize our personal and social life in such a way that we respond appropriately to the valuable features of individuals that give rise to their dignity. Dignity is a non-conventional, normative status based on a diverse and disjunctive set of valuable capacities. The dignitarian approach helps develop, defend, and identify the implications of the revised perfectionism suggested in the previous part of the paper while also allowing us to make sense of the role of some generalizations that animated some of the plausibility of traditional perfectionism—and this without the pitfalls of reliance on an idea of human nature. On this paper’s proposed view—Dignitarian Perfectionism—human individuals’ well-being consists, at least in part, in developing and exercising the capacities at the basis of their dignity. (shrink)

In her paper “Human Flourishing and Technology Affordances”, Avigail Ferdman argues that our descriptions and analyses of the relationship between digital technology, and the capacities approach to human flourishing, can be enriched by building ‘affordances’ into those descriptions and analyses. This commentary article serves as a supplement to Ferdman’s paper. Here I argue that, in building affordances into the capacities approach, Ferdman has developed the foundations of a method by which perfectionist ethics can be built into action-theoretic accounts of (...) technical function. However, this is possible only if she is willing to expand the ambit of her theory beyond digital technologies and into technology more generally. (shrink)

Contemporary political philosophy - especially in the works of Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls and Amartya Sen - has assumed that it can separate itself off from other philosophical positions and frameworks. In this book, Den Uyl and Rasmussen challenge this trend by moving from the liberalism they advocate in their earlier work to what they call 'individualistic perfectionism' in ethics. They continue to challenge the assumption that a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework cannot support a liberal, non-perfectionist political theory by filling (...) in the nature of the perfectionist ethical approach utilised in their previous political theorising. By developing the central features and principles of individualistic perfectionism they show that it is a major and powerful alternative to much contemporary ethical thinking - particularly to constructivism - and that it is capable of overcoming standard objections to perfectionism. (shrink)

In education, character education is a burgeoning field; however, it is also the target of considerable criticism. Amongst criticisms of character education, the political criticism that character education is a form of indoctrination stands out. In particular, the charge is made against character education that it breaches the principle of liberal neutrality about the good. In this article I discuss liberal approaches to character education. I outline the two most prominent liberal approaches to character education in school, liberal (...) neutralism and liberal perfectionism, as we find it in the work of Clayton (neutralism) and Levinson (liberal perfectionism). I hold that the two standard liberal approaches do not distinguish carefully enough between two possible forms of character education – moral character education and intellectual character education. Drawing on recent work in virtue epistemology, I hold that the liberal position tacitly demands intellectual character education. Regarding moral character education, however, I hold that the picture appears different. In the final analysis, I advocate a new form of perfectionism regarding character education that I call ‘intellectual perfectionism’. According to intellectual perfectionism, schools should be perfectionist regarding children's intellects, but neutralist regarding their morals. (shrink)

In this article, I articulate and explore a novel constructivist approach to metanormativity that is inspired by David Hume’s metaesthetics. This view, which I call perfectionist Humean constructivism, rejects the claim that practical reasons are constructed by each individual’s valuing attitudes, holding instead that they are constructed by humanity’s shared evaluative nature. I hold that this approach can plausibly respond to a persistent worry for extant versions of Humean constructivism without embracing the commitments of either a Kantian constructivism or (...) a metaphysically robust form of metanormative realism. (shrink)

Although the problem of adaptiveness plays an important motivating role in her work on human capabilities, Martha Nussbaum never gives a clear account of the controversial concept of adaptive preferences on which she relies. In this paper, I aim both to reconstruct the most plausible account of the concept that may be attributed to Nussbaum and to provide a critical appraisal of that account. Although her broader work on the capabilities approach moves progressively towards political liberalism as time passes, I (...) aim to show that her account of adaptive preferences continues to maintain her earlier commitment to perfectionism about the good. I then distinguish between two obligatory kinds of respect for persons, which I call, respectively, primary and secondary recognition respect. This distinction allows us to see that her perfectionist account of adaptive preferences allows her to show persons primary but not secondary recognition respect. Ultimately, I claim that an acceptable account of adaptive prefer.. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Stanley Cavell’s moral perfectionism places the task of cultivating richer self-understanding and self-expression at the center of corporate life. We show how his approach reframes business as an opportunity for moral soul-craft, achieved through the articulation of increasingly reflective inner life in organizational culture. Instead of norming constraints on business activity, perfectionism opens new possibilities for conducting commercial exchange as a form of conversation, leading to personal growth. This approach guides executives in designing businesses that foster genius and channel creativity, (...) while giving all stakeholders a meaningful voice within a culture of trust. We first give an account of Cavellian perfectionism. Then, we explain how this underrepresented strand of moral reflection challenges and enriches, but does not supplant, prevailing ethical theories—including other versions of perfectionism. We then demonstrate the salience of Cavellian perfectionism to business ethics through examples from marketing, human resources, and executive organizational design and development. (shrink)

Thomas Hurka has argued that Nietzsche’s positive ethical views can be formulated as a version of perfectionism that posits an objective conception of the good as the maximization of power and assigns to all agents the same goal of maximizing the perfection of the best. I show that Hurka’s case for both parts of this interpretation fails on textual grounds and that the kind of theory he proposes is in conflict with Nietzsche’s general approach to morality. The alternative reading for (...) which I argue defends a form of perfectionism as the value perspective of a ‘noble type’ that may emerge in the wake of a revaluation of all values. The basis of this perfectionism is an individual’s projection of an ideal of life to which she ascribes intrinsic value and in terms of which the value of other things is assessed. Justifying this reading requires drawing a distinction between life-denying ideals – forms of the ‘ascetic ideal’ – and life-affirming ‘counterideals’. It also requires recognizing that the perfection of the noble type is expressed in an individual ideal that cannot be shared with others, as opposed to a common ideal of human perfection. (shrink)

Robert Sparrow recently argues that state-driven moral bioenhancement is morally problematic because it inevitably invites moral perfectionism. While sharing Sparrow’s worry about state-driven moral bioenhancement, I argue that his anti-perfectionism argument is too strong to offer useful normative guidance. That is, if we reject state-driven moral bioenhancement because it cannot remain neutral between different conceptions of the good, we might have to conclude that all forms of moral enhancement program ought not be made compulsory, including the least controversial and most (...) popular state-driven program: compulsory (moral) education. -/- In this paper, I argue that instead, the spirit of Sparrow’s worry should be recast in the language of the capability approach – an approach that strives to enhance people’s capabilities to develop their own conceptions of the good by restricting itself from endorsing thick conceptions of the good. The distinction made regarding thick and thin conceptions of the good helps better capture sentiments against state-driven bioenhancement programs without falling prey to the issues I raise against Sparrow’s anti-perfectionist arguments. (shrink)

I intend to criticize Evelyn Pluhar’s allegedly egalitarian ethic, presented in her recent work Beyond Prejudice, partly by way of contrasting it with what she calls “perfectionism” and partly by demonstrating that, in fact, her ethic schizophrenically embraces a defective form of perfectionism. My analysis suggests that knotty animal-rights dilemmas are best approached not from a stance of viewing animals and humans as morally equal but rather from a framework more flexible and adaptive to the complexity of real-life scenarios. Such (...) adaptability in a theory need not condone cruelty, and it avoids the unintuitive and absurdly demanding features of a rigid egalitarian perspective. (shrink)

Perfectionism has been studied for almost 30 years. In the present study, we investigated the internal validity of The Perfectionism Inventory in an occupation that encourages perfectionistic tendencies in own behavior or in students' behavior. We collected data from a large sample of schoolteachers recruited using a snowball sampling approach, and we analyzed the factor structure of the PI using confirmatory factor analyses. We found that the 8-factor structure of PI provided a reasonable fit root mean square error of approximation (...) [RMSEA = 0.055, 90% CI = ; SRMR = 0.071]. However, additional analyses revealed problematic divergent validity only in the case of the scales associated with self-evaluative perfectionism, not in the case of the scales associated with conscientious perfectionism. We found that teachers displayed distinguishably different forms of perfectionism only when it referred to own person, not when it referred to perfectionism imposed to others. Based on these findings, we suggested that the PI could provide a useful framework for investigating the role of conscientious-related forms of perfectionism in the development of teacher beliefs regarding their school behavior. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The historical context of early post-Kantian debates on politics reveals the emergence of a new type of perfectionist ethics no longer based on the state-sponsored promotion of happiness, as the dominant German tendency in the eighteenth century had been, but on individual freedom. Post-Kantian perfectionism focused on maintaining and enhancing the conditions for rightful interaction among self-defining individuals. Rather than isolating and alienating, Kantian negative freedom enabled a new conception of social interaction based on the idea of right (...) and the progressive extension of rightful relations. Humboldt, Schiller, Fichte, and Marx exemplified this new approach, despite their differences. (shrink)

The versatile construct of perfectionism has been heavily debated, e.g., its nature or measurement constituents, how it influences performances or, most importantly, our health. Conventional linear analyses seem inadequate to address such challenges. Hence, we used a latent variable and a person-centered approach to identify different patterns of perfectionism, and their relationships with psychological health as outcome among early adolescents (13-14 years) attending conventional or elite sports-/performance-oriented lower secondary schools (14 schools, 832 students, 53% girls). All students completed two perfectionism (...) scales, i.e., the Child-Adolescent Perfectionism Scale (CAPS) and the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (FMPS). The criterion-related variables of psychological health included anxiety, depression, eating disorder problems, self-worth and resilience, respectively. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses yielded a four-factor representation of perfectionism. Using latent class analysis extracted five profiles of perfectionism, which were related to the criterion variables. Three profiles were clear indicators of either low or high perfectionism score patterns. Two profiles showed a mixed picture of high and low scores, whereas one represented a psychological healthy subgroup. About four of ten adolescents in the ordinary schools matched the two most debilitating perfectionism profiles compared to two of ten in the elite schools. How these results align with international findings is discussed along with the relevance for early interventions aimed at preventing the potential downsides of perfectionism. Longitudinal studies are needed to explore profile trajectories as well as possible health consequences. (shrink)

This paper presents some of the behavioral and emotional challenges many of us have faced during the COVID-19 pandemic; the emotional reasoning that has or can undermine rational coping; and how the philosophical practice approach of Logic-Based Therapy & Consultation can help.

This essay investigates the thought of self-overcoming (Selbst-Überwindung, sich überwinden) in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and its relation to Nietzsche’s Emersonian perfectionism in Schopenhauer as Educator. It is a conceptual study focused on key passages on self-overcoming in Zarathustra and related problems – most notably how to combine the demand for boundless affirmation with the demand for total critique in Nietzsche’s project of critical transvaluation. The main thesis is that Zarathustra’s response depends on his addressees: with regard to the mob, the (...) rabble or Gesindel, he advocates a limit in negation under the sign of mildness (Milde); with regard to others engaged in self-overcoming, he advocates a limited negation in the form of love-hate. Connections with the perfectionism of Schopenhauer as Educator are made throughout the essay, which then draws them together in a comparative analysis of self-overcoming in Zarathustra and Nietzsche’s untimely perfectionism. The essay closes with some methodological reflections on the risks and benefits of its “prismatic” approach, focused on key passages in relation to other works in abstraction from the overall composition and narrative of the book. (shrink)

In political philosophy, perfectionism is the view that it is the job of the state to best enable its citizens to live good or flourishing lives. It claims that certain lives can be judged to be sound, and thus instructs governments to promote those lives using state institutions etc. Anti-perfectionism denies this. It says that it is not the job of the state to promote good lives. Instead it should restrict itself to securing basic rights and duties, a threshold level (...) of resources and so on. Citizens should be left to adopt pursuits however they see fit. For some anti-perfectionists, this is precisely because we cannot judge any putative life to be sound. However, many are not sceptics, and justify state neutrality for other reasons. All accounts of anti-perfectionism must overcome what has been called the asymmetry objection: what justifies the imbalance inherent in anti-perfectionism? Why believe that the state is permitted to act on judgements about justice, but not on judgements about flourishing? My thesis argues that attempts to respond to the asymmetry objection have failed thus far. Further, I offer an account of political morality that can overcome the problem. The first four chapters of the thesis clarify the debate between perfectionists and anti-perfectionists, narrowing the former down into its most plausible form. Chapters five and six focus on two failed attempts to vindicate anti-perfectionism – Brian Barry’s argument from scepticism and Jonathan Quong’s Rawlsian approach. In the final chapter I put forward a much more promising argument in favour of anti-perfectionism – justice as a set of constraints. (shrink)

In his book Liberalism Without Perfection, Jonathan Quong challenges liberal perfectionists to show whether their favoured doctrine is capable of generating distinctive distributive principles whilst retaining a valid conception of personal responsibility. In this article I develop this challenge into a dilemma and show that liberal perfectionists can escape by illustrating how arguments for the value of personal autonomy may entail a specific and distinct treatment of choice and responsibility. I develop this claim into a sufficientarian approach to the promotion (...) of autonomy as self-authorship. In doing so I show how differing conceptions of both autonomy and the person employed by liberal perfectionists and political liberals entail different distributive outcomes. (shrink)

This essay presents an approach to understanding improvised music, finding in the work of certain outstanding jazz musicians an emblem of Ralph Waldo Emerson's notion of self-trust and of Stanley Cavell's notion of moral perfectionism. The essay critiques standard efforts to interpret improvised solos as though they were composed, contrasting that approach to one that treats the procedures of improvisation as derived from our everyday actions. It notes several levels of correspondence between our interest in jazz improvisations and the particular (...) demands of Emerson's writing, and ends by considering how exemplary moments of instruction in jazz are expressive of Emersonian self-trust. (shrink)

Liberal institutions should respect citizens as autonomous agents. But what does this mandate require and how should it shape the demands of liberal legitimacy? I trace the contemporary disagreement between liberal perfectionist and anti-perfectionist accounts of legitimacy back to this requirement to respect the autonomy of citizens in order to weigh up how well each approach fulfils this mandate. I argue that further reflection over the nature of respect for the value of personal autonomy gives liberals reason to (...) favour moderate forms of perfectionism and be sceptical of criticisms of perfectionism grounded in concerns over respect. (shrink)

Exercise plays an important role in the process of socialization among young people and children by providing a context in which children can be exposed to the existing rules and values of society. However, the increasing news of unethical behaviors reported in competitive scenarios led the public to suspect the view “sports shape great characters.” To investigate the issue and explore potential influencing factors, the study examined the relationship among athletes’ perfectionism, achievement goals, and sports ethics based on the achievement (...) goal theory. A total of 243 young athletes were recruited. The multidimensional perfectionism, achievement goals, and sports ethics were measured by a battery of questionnaires. A direct effect model that did not include mediation variables and a mediation effect model that included mediation variables were analyzed by structural equation modeling. Results indicated that perfectionistic strivings may positively predict sports ethics, whereas perfectionistic concerns may negatively predict sports ethics. Mastery approach and mastery avoidance may positively predict sports ethics, whereas the performance approach and performance avoidance may negatively predict sports ethics. Achievement goals may partially mediate the relationship between perfectionism and sports ethics. Perfectionistic strivings may negatively predict sports ethics through performance approach and positively predict sports ethics through mastery approach. Perfectionistic concerns may negatively predict sports ethics through performance avoidance and positively predict sports ethics through mastery avoidance. To prevent athletes from using unethical behaviors, strategies should be developed to reduce perfectionistic concerns and increase their perfectionistic strivings. (shrink)

I approach this encounter with Joseph Chan’s important work on Confucian perfectionism from a fundamentally sympathetic standpoint. Most basically, I agree with two of his key premises. Confucianism is more than a rich historical tradition: it is a live strand of political theory, able to criticize and contribute to our lives today. But for modern Confucianism to be plausible and attractive, it must find a way to embrace the idea of limited government or constitutionalism in a deeper fashion than it (...) did historically. There are many other issues that Joseph covers in his book, and on many of these I am also in agreement with him. But my interest here is in the grounding of limited... (shrink)

Many philosophers find welfare perfectionism implausible because it is arguably underinclusive, as it fails to count as good certain acts, events, and things that intuitively improve one's quality of life. Likewise, philosophers intuit that the experience of pleasure directly contributes to well-being. The problem for welfare perfectionism is straightforward: neither desire-satisfaction nor the experience of pleasure seem to perfect one's nature. This leaves two options for the welfare perfectionist. He can “bite the bullet” and argue that these intuitions are (...) mistaken and that pleasure and desire-satisfaction don't impact well-being. Alternatively, he can explain how such intuitive goods can directly contribute to well-being, despite initial appearances. I advance the latter approach. I argue that at least for some perfectionists, desire-satisfaction and pleasure both directly contribute to well-being. One cannot argue that welfare perfectionism necessarily neglects the intuitive importance of desire-satisfaction and pleasure. (shrink)

This article explores the theme of moral rationality by examining two distinct philosophical approaches, those of perfectionism and pragmatism broadly construed. It does this by comparing Cora Diamond's reading of J. M. Coetzee's novel The Lives of Animals with an imaginary reading of the same novel tuned to a moral sensibility closer to Deweyan pragmatism. By comparing a real account with an imaginary one, the article intends to press Diamond's perfectionist understanding of problematic moral experience into confrontation with (...) a pragmatist account of the same phenomenon. This reading becomes the starting point for a broader confrontation between two larger philosophical conceptions: perfectionism and pragmatism. By this comparison, the article means to extend a dialogue begun more than a century ago, showing in particular that integrating both perspectives within a common moral epistemology provides new insights into our understanding of moral experience. The general claim is that their differences notwithstanding, perfectionism and pragmatism share a common moral sensibility, although they part ways on some decisive issues that the article makes explicit. (shrink)

This investigation is intended to explore the effect of the digital environment as well as perfectionism during the COVID-19 pandemic on anxiety and depression. The study used a mixed-methods design; a mixed research methodology was used regarding explanatory design by using a qualitative sub-sample from quantitative sample data. The researcher conducted the study on a sample of 980 students and non-students smartphone and internet users using both qualitative and quantitative approach. Three different questionnaires were used: The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, Beck (...) Depression, and Beck Anxiety Inventory. On the other hand, the researcher designed a self-reported interview for the qualitative part that included 5 major questions and 10 sub-questions. The gathered data were investigated using SPSS version 22 to analyze the collected data for this study, and simple descriptive statistics and coding were used. The results denote that the digital environment is significantly correlated with multidimensional perfectionism in a low positive manner for students. However, the correlation effects for non-students are significantly high as evidenced by a significant positive correlation. Another finding suggests that there is a positive significant association between perfectionism and being depressed and anxious. (shrink)

In his article, Ismaili M’hamdi argues that a neutralist approach in public health policy might turn into a gap that separates citizens who endure preventable poor conditions from the state...

This article focuses on the following three novel and original philosophical approaches to classical liberalism: Den Uyl and Rasmussen’s perfectionist argument from meta-norms, Gaus’s justificatory model, and Kukathas’s conscience-based theory of authority. None of these three approaches are utilitarian or consequentialist in character. Neither do they appeal to the notion of a rational bargain as it is typical within contractarianism. Furthermore, each of these theory rejects the idea that classical liberalism should be grounded on considerations of interpersonal (...) justice such as those that are central to the Lockean tradition. It is argued that these three theories, despite their many attractive features, fail to articulate in a convincing manner some central classical liberal concerns. (shrink)

While investigating the value of achievements, Dunkle claims that lucky achievements are possible. For instance, if a person does great works, then it is possible that the works have the status of achievements, even if luck plays a crucial role in doing the great works. Rather than examining Dunkle’s claim, this paper proceeds discussion under the assumption that lucky achievements are possible. In particular, based on this assumption, this paper suggests a new approach to the nature of achievement named the (...) Comparative Value Approach. According to the comparative value approach, a product can have the status of an achievement if the product is valuable in an achievement-relevant domain, and in that domain the product is valuable more than most other items which either have been achieved or can be achieved by others. This paper shows that the comparative value approach successfully explains the cases of achievements, including the cases of lucky achievements. Besides this reason, this paper provides three more reasons to show that the comparative value approach is a feasible view of achievements. The comparative value approach can accommodate the fact that there are various kinds of achievements; the approach can explain the relation between the nature of achievement and the achievement-value of a product; and the approach can show why in determining the status of a product it matters that for average people achieving a similar kind of product is sufficiently difficult. Based on these four reasons, this paper concludes that the comparative value approach is a plausible understanding of achievements. (shrink)

Who gets to decide what it means to live a healthy lifestyle, and how important a healthy lifestyle is to a good life? As more governments make preventing obesity and diet-related illness a priority, it's become more important to consider the ethics and acceptability of their efforts. When it comes to laws and policies that promote healthy eating--such as special taxes on sugary drinks and the banning of food deemed unhealthy--critics argue that these policies are paternalistic, and that they limit (...) individual autonomy over food choices. In Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach, Anne Barnhill and Matteo Bonotti show that both paternalistic justifications for healthy eating efforts and anti-paternalistic arguments against them can be grounded in perfectionist views that overly prioritize some values over others. The authors therefore propose a more inclusive, public reason approach to healthy eating policy that will be appealing to those who take pluralism and cultural diversity seriously, by providing a framework through which different kinds of values, including but not limited to autonomy and health, can be factored into the public justification for healthy eating efforts. Additionally, the book adopts a 'farm to fork' approach to the ethics of healthy eating efforts: it engages with theories and debates in political philosophy, considers the implications of different theoretical positions for healthy eating efforts, and then develops a concrete tool for assessing policies that will be of interest to both scholars and policymakers. As well as offering a novel normative analysis of healthy eating policy, the authors offer a new theoretical framework that will be applicable to a wide range of public policy scenarios. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Gleam of Light: Moral Perfectionism and Education in Dewey and EmersonMichael J. McGandyNaoko Saito The Gleam of Light: Moral Perfectionism and Education in Dewey and Emerson American Philosophy Series. Foreword by Stanley CavellNew York: Fordham University Press, 2005. xvi + 210 pp.This book presents the reader with a tantalizing and sometimes frustrating mixture of philosophical enterprises. Saito examines the role of imagination in personal growth and education (...) as presented in the philosophies of Ralph Waldo Emerson (who coined the expression "gleam of light" in "Self-Reliance") and John Dewey. She also joins in conversation the 19th century Emerson, the early 20th century Dewey, and the contemporary Stanley Cavell. Finally, Saito offers insights that will aid educators as they balance the sometime contrary aims of achieving educational standards and inspiring personal development.These are all worthy projects. There is no doubt that each project has relations to the other two and that each gains force and clarification from those relations. Yet it is evident that, within the compass of 160 pages, it is not easy to do all three things and do them well. It is then principally as a standard academic monograph addressing education and imagination in the works of Emerson, Dewey, and Cavell that The Gleam of Light should be considered. Libraries and scholars of American philosophy will want this book on their shelves as a resource on these crucial topics and as a new reading of these important figures in philosophy.Saito is at her best when she engages in textual analysis and comparison in order to bridge the gulf that Cavell claims (see Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome) exists between Dewey and Emerson. Scholars of Emerson and Dewey (and perhaps of Cavell) will find The Gleam of Light an interesting study that highlights important connections among Emerson's concept of imagination, Dewey's idea of impulse, and Cavell's theme of Emersonian moral perfectionism. The book is rich in presentations of texts well-known as well as obscure. The upshot of Saito's reading is that the Emersonian concern for the project of moral perfection is found to be quite alive in Dewey's pedagogical outlook and that questions regarding the goals of Deweyan education can be addressed from the standpoint of the cultivation of the native imaginative capacities of individuals. In sum: Education is a matter of identifing, cultivating, and, when necessary, retrieving the gleam of light intrinsic to each person.Readers interested in Saito's creative and fine reading of these three philosophers will have to be wary, however. In the course of drawing their works into relationship she cannot resist the anachronistic impulse to bring all three into conversation as if they were contemporaries fully aware of each one's respective body of writing. This is interesting rhetorically, but questionable in a work that is firmly grounded in the history of philosophy. Moreover, as it is only Saito who is in the position to create this three-way [End Page 303] conversation, her anachronistic gestures occur at times when she should forthrightly join that conversation and make her own claims.Taking a step back from Saito's close reading of the major texts of these three philosophers, readers will also find a larger argument for ameliorating differences between pragmatism and idealism via an aesthetic analysis of human experience and action. This might be Saito's principal contribution. Looking to Dewey's Experience and Nature and Art as Experience, Saito finds that these works lay more emphasis on individual experience and imagination. It is when one considers experience from the first-person standpoint (appropriately infused with aesthetic categories) that the apparent scientistic quality of Dewey's philosophy is constrained and the Emersonian theme of personhood is highlighted. The claim undergirding this approach is that while idealism and pragmatism differ widely when considered from the standpoints of epistemology and metaphysics, it is in aesthetics that there are grounds for conceptual reconciliation. This is a provocative thesis that bears further consideration by Saito and others.The Gleam of Light is less satisfying when one considers the book from the standpoint of pedagogical theory. Saito aims to contribute to the discussion regarding goal-oriented... (shrink)

The concept of dignity plays a foundational role in the more recent versions of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. However, despite its centrality to her theory, Nussbaum’s conception of dignity remains under-theorised. In this paper we critically examine the role that dignity plays in Nussbaum’s theory by, first, developing an account of the concept of dignity and introducing a distinction between two types of dignity, status dignity and achievement dignity. Next, drawing on this account, we analyse Nussbaum’s conception of dignity and (...) contrast it with Kant’s conception of dignity. On the basis of this comparison between Nussbaum and Kant, we highlight tensions between Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism, which is central to her conception of dignity, and her commitment to political liberalism. This leads us to conclude that Nussbaum’s claim that her conception of dignity is only a partial political conception is implausible and that her conception of dignity seems to commit her to a satisficing form of perfectionist liberalism. (shrink)

Recent articles on teaching controversial topics in schools have employed Michael Hand's distinction between “directive teaching,” in which teachers attempt to persuade students of correct positions on topics that are not rationally controversial, and “nondirective teaching,” in which teachers avoid persuading students on topics that are rationally controversial. However, the four methods of directive teaching discussed in the literature — explicit directive teaching, “steering,” “soft-directive teaching,” and “school ethos endorsement” — make rational persuasion problematic, if not self-defeating. In this essay, (...) Maughn Rollins Gregory argues that “procedurally directive teaching” offers an alternative to such approaches because it derives from the intention to guide inquiry rather than to persuade. He demonstrates that the conceptual frameworks of perfectionism and antiperfectionism, which have been proposed for directive teaching on same-sex marriage, can instead be used to generate open questions for student inquiry, as can a third, civil rights framework. Given these considerations, Gregory maintains that pedagogical guidance on this topic should be procedurally directive rather than substantively directive. Further, the fact that legal, political, and ethics scholars disagree about which framework is more appropriate to the issue of same-sex marriage indicates that such arguments cannot be dispositive of the pedagogical issue of how to frame classroom discussions about it. Rather, students should inquire into this meta-level framing dispute for themselves. (shrink)

By considering what we identify as a problem inherent in the ‘nature of the firm’—the risk of abuse of authority—we propound the conception of a social contract theory of the firm which is truly Rawlsian in its inspiration. Hence, we link the social contract theory of the firm with the general theory of justice. Through this path, we enter the debate about whether firms can be part of Rawlsian theory of justice showing that corporate governance principles enter the “basic structure.” (...) Finally, we concur with Sen’s aim to broaden the realm of social justice beyond what he calls the ‘transcendental institutional perfectionism’ of Rawls’ theory. We maintain the contractarian approach to justice but introduce Sen’s capability concept as an element of the constitutional and post-constitutional contract model of institutions with special reference to corporate governance. Accordingly, rights over primary goods and capabilities are granted by the basic institutions of society, but many capabilities have to be turned into the functionings of many stakeholders through the operation of firms understood as post-constitutional institutional domains. The constitutional contract on the distribution of primary goods and capabilities should then shape the principles of corporate governance so that at post-constitutional level anyone may achieve her/his functionings in the corporate domain by exercising such capabilities. In the absence of such a condition, post-constitutional contracts would distort the process that descends from constitutional rights and capabilities toward social outcomes. (shrink)

Advances in genomic technologies such as CRISPR‐Cas9, mitochondrial replacement techniques, and in vitro gametogenesis may soon give us more precise and efficient tools to have children with certain traits such as beauty, intelligence, and athleticism. In this paper, I propose a new approach to the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering, a human rights approach. This approach relies on two claims that have certain, independent plausibility: (a) human beings have equal moral status, and (b) human beings have human rights to the (...) fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. I first argue that the human rights approach gives us a lower bound of when reproductive genetic engineering would be permissible. I then compare this approach with other approaches such as the libertarian, perfectionist, and life worth living approaches. Against these approaches, I argue that the human rights approach offers a novel, and more plausible, way of assessing the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering. (shrink)

This book takes the thinking of Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit and J. G. A. Pocock on republican liberty and explores the way in which this idea of liberty can be used to illuminate educational practice. It argues that republican liberty is distinct from both positive and negative liberty, and its emphasis on liberty as non-dependency gives the concept of liberty a particularly critical role in contemporary society. Each chapter formulates and expounds the idea that an empire of liberty requires the (...) existence of what are termed 'liberty-bearing agents', and shows how education - with a particular emphasis on knowledge - is needed to foster the human powers which allow people to become liberty-bearing. It is also emphasised, however, that republican liberty is non-perfectionist and non-eudaimonic: the core values enshrined in an empire of liberty centre on non-dependency rather than the promulgation of a certain way of life. Drawing on prominent seventeenth century contract theorists, the link between liberty and authority is explained, suggesting that appropriate authoritative structures need to underpin the provision of education, and especially schooling, if educational practice devoted to the pursuit of liberty is to flourish. Liberty and Education will be of value to both educational theorists unfamiliar with republican theory, as well as republican theorists interested in how their theory might play out in education. It will also be of interest to researchers and students from the fields of politics and the philosophy of education. (shrink)

Khader offers a deliberative perfectionist approach to identifying and responding to adaptive preferences-- deprived people's preferences that perpetuate their deprivation.

A common Western assumption is that animals cannot be persons. Even in animal ethics, the concept of personhood is often avoided. At the same time, many in cognitive ethology argue that animals do have minds, and that animal ethics presents convincing arguments supporting the individual value of animals. Although “animal personhood” may seem to be an absurd notion, more attention needs to placed on the reasons why animals can or cannot be included in the category of persons. Of three different (...) approaches to personhood—the perfectionist approach, the humanistic approach, and the interactive approach—the third approach is the strongest. Personhood defined via interaction opens new doors for animal ethics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose that both Hegel and Peirce are committed to two arguments against the notion that metaphysics is impossible, where not only do they claim metaphysics is possible, but that they also insist on theindispensabilityof this philosophical discipline. In the first argument, both Hegel and Peirce argue that it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical concepts from ordinary language and our scientific practices. In the second argument, both Hegel and Peirce argue that metaphysics is a (...) necessary part of intellectual enquiry on the grounds that metaphysics is indispensable for human development. Such is the philosophical significance of both their views on the indispensability of metaphysics that there is every reason to regard Hegel and Peirce as representing powerful challenges to eliminativist attitudes to metaphysical enquiry. The purpose of my paper is to justify the exercise of metaphysics as a “humanistic discipline”, to use an expression from Bernard Williams. Using perfectionist approaches to ethics as a framework in which to contextualise the question of whether it could ever be desirable to eliminate metaphysics is under-explored and potentially a major avenue through which to explore the way we do metaphysics today. (shrink)

Whatever ethical stance one takes in the debate regarding the ethics of human enhancement, one or more reference points are required to assess its morality. Some have suggested looking at the bioethical notions of safety, justice, and/or autonomy to find such reference points. Others, arguing that those notions are limited with respect to assessing the morality of human enhancement, have turned to human nature, human authenticity, or human dignity as reference points, thereby introducing some perfectionist assumptions into the debate. (...) In this article, we ask which perfectionist assumptions should be used in this debate. After a critique of views that are problematic, we take a positive approach, suggesting some perfectionist elements that can lend guidance to the practice of human enhancement, based on the work of Martha Nussbaum's Capability Approach. We suggest that the central capabilities can be used to define the human aspect of human enhancement and thereby allow a moral evaluation of enhancement interventions. These central capabilities can be maximized harmoniously to postulate what an ideal human would look like. Ultimately, the aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to make explicit the perfectionist assumptions found in the debate and eliminate those that are problematic. Second, the paper clarifies an element that is often neglected in the debate about human enhancement, the view of the ideal human towards which human enhancement should strive. Here, we suggest that some central capabilities that are essential for an ideal human being can be maximized harmoniously and can therefore serve as possible reference points to guide human enhancement. (shrink)