The importance of ethical consumerism to many companies worldwide has increased dramatically in recent years. Ethical consumerism encompasses the importance of non-traditional and social components of a company's products and business process to strategic success - such as environmental protectionism, child labor practices and so on. The present paper utilizes a random utility theoretic experimental design to provide estimates of the relative value selected consumers place on the social features of products.

Nearly all studies of consumers’ willingness to engage in ethical or socially responsible purchasing behavior is based on unconstrained survey response methods. In the present article we ask the question of how well does asking consumers the extent to which they care about a specific social or ethical issue relate to how they would behave in a more constrained environment where there is no socially acceptable response. The results of a comparison between traditional survey questions of “intention to purchase” and (...) estimates of individuals willingness-to-pay for social attributes in products reveal that simple survey questions are too “noisy” to provide operationally meaningful information and overstate intentions to a considerable extent. (shrink)

... The purpose of this paper is to try to clarify the extent to which consumers “value” ethical product features when making purchases by utilizing a distinctive methodology – structured choice experiments ( Louviere et al., 2000) – that What Will Consumers Pay ... Jordan J. Louviere ... \n.

The most plausible type of panpsychism explains high-level consciousness as a compound of basic conscious properties instantiated by basic bottom-level physical objects. Arguments for panpsychism stand little chance in the absence of an account that makes sense of basic bottom-level experience; and explains how basic bottom-level experiences yield high-level experiences. This paper tackles the first task. It develops a method for investigating basic bottom-level experience: it identifies constraints, motivated by scientific and philosophical considerations, that force a unique account. Then it (...) applies this method, using quarks as stand-ins for basic but conscious physical objects. It concludes that quark-consciousness is maximally simple ; multiple ; and internal. (shrink)

But still I think some account has to be given of the application of CM to tides and cannon balls etc. etc. It seems to me that Einstein's and Bohr's analysis was essentially correct: we make the connection, and thus apply the mathematical statements of CM to macroscopic features of the world about us, by constructing, within the mathematical framework,. macroscopic conglomerates of the elementary particles and fields that should have the general appearance of tides and billiard, looked at from (...) a distance, and that would respond to the probings of mathematical models of measuring devices, whose "pointers" we can see from afar, in the ways that waves and billiard balls do. I think a look at how CM has been used and applied since the time of Newton and Galileo shows that the mathematical theory is linked into our experiences of the world in this nonproblematic way, and that this correspondence at this nonproblematic level is part of classical mechanics in the broad sense in which it is understood by people who use it. (shrink)

Phenomenology has contributed to healthcare by providing resources for understanding the lived experience of the patient and their situation. But within a burgeoning literature on the characteristic features of illness, there has not yet been an account appropriate to describe congenital illnesses: conditions which are present from birth and cause suffering or medical threat to their bearers. Congenital illness sits uncomfortably with standard accounts in phenomenology of illness, in which concepts such as loss, doubt, alienation and unhomelikeness presuppose prior health. (...) These accounts reflect, in different ways, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s assumption that the ways of living of the ill contain allusions to fundamental, healthy functions. The originality of congenital illness complicates this assumption and demands its own original phenomenology. In this paper, I sketch my personal experience living with a single-ventricle heart condition. While some of this story may reflect my own idiosyncratic experience, I hope that much of it will resonate with the congenital illness experience. I argue that the phenomenological literature on illness, grounded in the notion of loss, does not describe the congenital illness experience. I show how a number of other patient-centred theories of health and illness which have been influential on phenomenology can and cannot elucidate congenital illness. In particular, I consider Georges Canguilhem’s account of the normal and the pathological; debates in disability; and the notion of illness as biographical disruption. I show that congenital illness results in the preadmission of its patients to a paradoxical logic of medical palliation, one product of which is existential maturity. (shrink)

This peer commentary opens with setting the context for decisions on the edge of viability through an autoethnographic account (Bochner and Ellis 2016) of the author’s experience of such a situatio...

This study uses best–worst scaling experiments to examine differences across six countries in the attitudes of consumers towards social and ethical issues that included both product related issues (such as recycled packaging) and general social factors (such as human rights). The experiments were conducted using over 600 respondents from Germany, Spain, Turkey, USA, India, and Korea. The results show that there is indeed some variation in the attitudes towards social and ethical issues across these six countries. However, what is more (...) telling are the similarities seen and the extent to which individual variation dominates observable demographics and country-based variables. (shrink)

There would seem to be a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding in the public mind about the life stance of modern humanism and its philosophical underpinnings. As a committed humanist Pat Duffy Hutcheon has made many invaluable contributions to the clarification of the nature and origin of evolutionary naturalism as a necessary component of modern humanism. This collection of topical essays is the most recent addition to her ongoing pursuit, following her analysis of cultural development in Building Character and (...) Culture (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999) and her earlier seminal work tracing the evolution of the naturalistic basis of social-scientific thought in Leaving the Cave (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1996). This, her newest book presents the ideas in the context of their time, of some of the most prominent thinkers who have, in one way or another, shaped the evolving philosophy of humanism over the centuries. It is a much needed and most welcome resource for any thoughtful person who wants to better appreciate the naturalistic view of human existence rather than the supernatural or mystical approaches that so regrettably dominate the current scene. (shrink)

Because psychiatry deals specifically with ‘mental’ suffering, its efforts are always centrally involved with the meaningful world of human reality. As such, it sits at the interface of a number of discourses: genetics and neuroscience, psychology and sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and the humanities. Each of these provides frameworks, concepts, and examples that seek to assist our attempts to understand mental distress and how it might be helped. However, these discourses work with different assumptions, methodologies, values, and priorities. Some are in (...) dispute with one another. At various times in the history of psychiatry, a particular form of understanding has become dominant and worked to marginalize .. (shrink)

This article—the first of a linked set of three outlining the development and practice of a different approach to science/religion dialogue—begins with an overview of some persistent tensions in the field. Then, using a threefold heuristic of encounter, engagement, and expression, it explores the routes taken by James Ashbrook and Andrew Newberg to develop a dialogue between theology and neuroscience, discussing some of the problems associated with these and their implications for attempts to further develop neurotheology. Finally, it proposes a (...) different way of thinking about this enterprise and points toward a new methodology for supporting this endeavor. (shrink)

This third of three articles outlining a different approach to science/religion dialogue generally and to engagement between theology and the neurosciences specifically, gives a brief account of the model in practice. It begins by introducing the question to be investigated—whether the experience of relational connection can affect health outcomes by directly moderating immune function. Then, employing the same threefold heuristic of encounter, exchange, and expression used previously, it discusses how the transversal model set out in these articles has been used (...) to investigate this question and to develop a theoretical physiological model for the proposed link between relationality and health. (shrink)

This second of three articles outlining the development and practice of a different approach to neurotheology discusses the construction of a suitable methodology for the project based on the work of J. Wentzel van Huyssteen. It explores the origin and contours of his concept of postfoundational rationality, its potential as a locus for epistemological parity between science and religion and the distinctive and unique transversal space model for interdisciplinary dialogue which he builds on these. It then proposes a further development (...) of the model which has the potential to produce a very different type of additional and original dialogical outcome. While such “transversal” outputs may initially seem counter and strange they not only flow naturally from the models’ own inherent dynamics but also open up the possibility of a distinctively different form of neurotheology. (shrink)

This study uses best–worst scaling experiments to examine differences across six countries in the attitudes of consumers towards social and ethical issues that included both product related issues (such as recycled packaging) and general social factors (such as human rights). The experiments were conducted using over 600 respondents from Germany, Spain, Turkey, USA, India, and Korea. The results show that there is indeed some variation in the attitudes towards social and ethical issues across these six countries. However, what is more (...) telling are the similarities seen and the extent to which individual variation dominates observable demographics and country-based variables. (shrink)

This short essay examines the relationship between academic research and policy with particular emphasis on the question of whether a critical criminology can engage in academic critique at the same time as engaging in policy oriented research. Recognising that critical criminology falls between theory and politics criminologists are urged to adopt pragmatic, strategic positions as they negotiate their role in contentious debates and practical minefields. It is concluded that a critical criminology must try not only to think the unthinkable about (...) crime, but also to speak the unspeakable about the conditions in which and by which it is known. (shrink)

This paper argues that emergent conscious properties can't bestow emergent causal powers. It supports this conclusion by way of a dilemma. Necessarily, an emergent conscious property brings about its effects actively or other than actively. If actively, then, the paper argues, the emergent conscious property can't have causal powers at all. And if other than actively, then, the paper argues, the emergentist finds himself committed to incompatible accounts of causation.

"...{The first edition of Professor Cryer's book was} absolutely outstanding, in four main respects. First, it is comprehensive in its scope, covering everything from applying to undertaking a research degree. Second, it is applicable to PhDs across the board. Third, the book is exceptionally well written and highly readable. Finally, at each stage Pat Cryer has included questions and exercises to enable readers to reflect on their practice, check out whether they are on track and, if not, discover how they (...) might return themselves to it. Overall, Pat Cryer has made a major contribution to the field and produced a quite exceptional book. It ought to be compulsory reading for intending or actual postgraduates and for academic staff teaching research training programmes." - Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education The second edition of this Open University set book is, like the first edition, for postgraduate research students wherever the language of instruction is English. Irrespective of their field of study, it will make their research programmes and day-to-day lives more productive and enjoyable. The book is easy to dip into and is in conversational style. Interest and realism are added through anecdotes, extracts from the literature and pithy quotations. The second edition is a complete revision of the original. New emphases include: the needs of the growing number of part time postgraduates; a wider understanding of the term 'research student' to embrace all postgraduate students undertaking research, whether for traditional PhDs and MPhils or within programmes such as professional doctorates, 'taught' masters degrees, diplomas and certificates; information technology as a day-to-day tool. There are also two new chapters: one on options for postgraduate study and research and the other on skills development and employment issues. There is a foreword by Professor Sir Martin Harris, Chair of the National UK Review of Postgraduate Education. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.1 (2002) 1-21 [Access article in PDF] Turning Kant Against the Priority of Autonomy: Communication Ethics and the Duty to Community Pat J. Gehrke Communication ethics scholars afford Immanuel Kant significantly less attention than one might expect. This may be because, as Robert Dostal notes, Kant argues that rhetoric merits no respect whatsoever (223). This rejection of rhetoric, Dostal writes, is grounded in the significant emphasis (...) given to Kant's concept of autonomy (232). The focus on autonomy and, hence, rhetoricians' relative neglect of Kant's ethical theory are both connected to the separation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (hereinafter CPuR) from his subsequent ethical and moral philosophy. Kenneth Burke writes that Kant's first critique has no ethical implications, "no 'wills,' 'oughts,' 'shoulds,' or 'thou shalt nots'... nothing but an inevitable is, a description of conditions as they necessarily are for human experience" (191; emphasis in original). Such readings lose much of the richness and complexity of Kant's thought and tend instead to produce simple moral duties, such as Mike Markel's assertion that technical communicators must be truthful.Perhaps the most critical element of Kant's work lost in our focus on autonomy is his articulation of a ground for a duty to community. While Kant makes clear the importance of community for his metaphysics in the first critique (CPuR), the importance of community in Kant's moral philosophy often is overlooked. Some scholars claim that an ethical duty to community is either rejected by Kant's emphasis on the autonomy of will or simply ignored. This article combines a reading of Kant's metaphysics of experience with his moral philosophy to articulate a communication ethic grounded in community. This argument is made in three parts: first, the community of objects in experience—the Third Analogy of Experience—is an organizing principle of and a necessary condition for the possibility of all experience; second, this metaphysical principle of community is relevant [End Page 1] to community as developed in Kant's ethical writings; and finally, Kant's own work undermines the primacy of autonomy and better supports a communication ethic grounded in a duty to community.Scholars interested in Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action have special reason to take note of Kant's work. Kant is not only a figure that Habermas sees reflected in his own work, 1 but a constant point of contrast. Craig Calhoun writes that much of Habermas's own philosophy emerges by rejecting Kant's epistemology and elements of his metaphysics while still giving credence to Kantian moral philosophy (2). However, like most communication scholars and philosophers, Habermas believes that autonomy governs Kantian ethics: "Formalistic ethics (Kant) binds the criterion of generality of norms to the further criterion of autonomy, that is, independence from contingent motives" (Habermas, Legitimation 89). Since autonomy excludes or represses the contingent, if our readings of Kant give primacy to autonomy we leave little room for any notion of community as manifest in experience. In no small part, it is the criticism of Kant for privileging autonomy that has given Habermasians their break from Kantian ethics. However, if we turn to the first critique to guide our reading of the moral philosophy, there is another way to understand the role of autonomy and community in Kant's thought. By linking Kant's metaphysics with his moral philosophy, this article turns Kant away from the primacy of autonomy and uses Kant's own works to argue that autonomy is but one half of an antinomy that is organized under the principle of community. Thus, this article recuperates the possibility of deploying Kantian metaphysics and moral philosophy together as grounds for a communication ethic that privileges community and recovers the value of rhetoric.For rhetorical scholars, the resistance to the priority of autonomy may be related to the frequent expression of community through appeal to commonality, sameness, or identification. Today, feminist, race, postmodern, and poststructural communication scholars are questioning the value of commonality as a ground for ethics (e... (shrink)

Any panpsychism building complex consciousness out of basic atoms of consciousness needs a theory of ‘mental chemistry’ explaining how this building works. This paper argues that split-brain patients show actual mental chemistry or at least give reasons for thinking it possible. The paper next develops constraints on theories of mental chemistry. It then puts forward models satisfying these constraints. The paper understands mental chemistry as a transformation consistent with conservation of consciousness rather than an aggregation perhaps followed by the creation (...) of something in addition. The paper suggests that this kind of mental chemistry alone yields a workable panpsychism. (shrink)

The evolution of reciprocal altruism probably involved the evolution of mechanisms to detect cheating and remember cheaters. In a well-known study, Mealey, Daood, and Krage (1996) observed that participants had enhanced memory for faces that had previously been associated with descriptions of acts of cheating. There were, however, problems with the descriptions that were used in that study. We sought to replicate and extend the findings of Mealey and colleagues by using more controlled descriptions and by examining the possibility of (...) enhanced altruist recognition. We also examined whether individual differences in cheating tendencies were related to cheater and altruist recognition. In the first experiment, 164 undergraduates saw 40 faces that were paired with character descriptions representing the categories of cheater, trustworthy, altruist, or neutral, for individuals who had either low or high social status. One week later participants reported which faces they recognized from the previous week (among 80 faces). Overall, the results failed to replicate the findings of Mealey and her colleagues, as there was no enhanced memory for cheaters. In addition, there was no enhanced memory for altruists, and no effect of participants’ cheating tendencies. A second experiment using a slightly different methodology produced similar results, with some evidence for enhanced memory for altruists. (shrink)

Phenomenology has a rich tradition of interpreting technology, medicine, and the life sciences. It has not yet had much to say about the medical devices which have always been central to bioethics. In this chapter, I outline what is meant by medical devices, and connect the sense of intention in made-object design with the notion of intentionality in phenomenology. I survey three basic ways of characterising medical devices grounded in the phenomenological literature: Albert Borgmann’s device paradigm, Don Ihde’s human-machine relations, (...) and Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject. Engaging with these approaches could help bring to analyses of medical devices the uniquely whole-of-context view of which phenomenology is capable, and better inform all stakeholders about their phenomenal consequences. (shrink)

Nowhere is current controversy over biological explanations for human behaviour more striking than in debates over violence. New theories are being formulated, and biological markers are being identified in new ways. The terms of discourse and debate are being changed. Violence may be represented as a pathological biological syndrome, or as natural, especially for men. Why the growing interest now in biological explanations of violence? Is the biology of violence suggestive of a new brand of biological determinism? This latter, broader (...) question poses a challenge to the argument that current biological theories of behaviour are different and better than faulty, often racist and eugenicist, theories which have gone before. New theories do not reduce to linear cause-and-effect explanations, and there are no `genes for crime'. Nevertheless, there is a question of geneticism, `the doctrine of the primacy of the genetic make-up in determining every aspect of the human mind, constitution and social behaviour...' (Medawar, 1984: 255). (shrink)

Therapeutic misconception involves the failure of subjects either to understand or to incorporate into their own expectations the distinctions in nature and purpose of personally responsive therapeutic care, and the generic relationship between subject and investigator which is constrained by research protocols. Researchers cannot disregard this phenomenon if they are to ensure that subjects engage in research on the basis of genuine informed consent. However, our presumption of patient autonomy must be sustained unless we have compelling evidence of serious misunderstanding. (...) This article argues that the mere expression of aspects of therapeutic misconception should not necessarily displace the presumption of subject autonomy or undermine ethical inclusion in research for at least three reasons. First, some interpretations of the empirical data do not suggest misunderstanding. Second, assessment of misestimation and optimism are delicate and value-laden, and turn quickly from questions of autonomy to questions of judgment. Third, incomplete understanding may yet be sufficient to allow a subject to engage in a substantially autonomous decision-making process. Our point is not to dismiss the possibility of genuine therapeutic misconception, but to question its frequency and fatality to the consent process. (shrink)

Using touch as a medium for exploring the ways in which it is constructed by nurses, the body is here characterized by a plethora of competing and co‐existing terms: disobedient, obedient, mirroring, stigmatized, sinful, post‐mortem, sanitized, angelic, desexualized, dangerous, dominant, dominating, deceitful, submissive, disciplined, postmodern and communicative. We have tried to be provocative by juxtaposing contradictory messages and evoking conflicting emotions, and we hope that the reader will not assume that we believe everything we write, or that everything may be (...) taken only at face value. There are as many messages and meanings in the paper as each reader thinks there are. (shrink)

Pat White, John White; David Cooper's Illusions, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 239–248, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

BACON.3 is a production system that discovers empirical laws. Although it does not attempt to model the human discovery process in detail, it incorporates some general heuristics that can lead to discovery in a number of domains. The main heuristics detect constancies and trends in data, and lead to the formulation of hypotheses and the definition of theoretical terms. Rather than making a hard distinction between data and hypotheses, the program represents information at varying levels of description. The lowest levels (...) correspond to direct observations, while the highest correspond to hypotheses that explain everything so for observed. To take advantage of this representation, BACON.3 has the ability to carry out and relate multiple experiments, collapse hypotheses with identical conditions, ignore differences to let similar concepts be treated as equal, and to discover and ignore irrelevant variables. BACON.3 has shown its generality by rediscovering versions of the ideal gas law, Kepler's third law of planetary motion, Coulomb's law, Ohm's law, and Galileo's laws for the pendulum and constant acceleration. (shrink)

Critical analysis of the commercialization and malpractice current in the profession of medicine.

Pat White; Work-place Democracy and Political Education [1], Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 5–20, https://doi.org/10.

A defence of egalitarianism in education against David Cooper's critique of this.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics Committees in HospitalsPat Milmoe McCarrick (bio)(Literature about hospital ethics committees has grown enormously since Scope Note 3 first appeared. This update provides new information about resources and documents now available while continuing to include important earlier sources.)Hospital ethics committees increasingly have taken hold in the United States since 1983, when the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research encouraged their (...) creation in its report, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment (III, 1983, p. 5).The President's Commission report (pp. 160-64) suggested the following roles for ethics committees: 1) review of treatment decisions made on behalf of incompetent, terminally ill patients; 2) review of medical decisions having ethical implications with the option, in cases of disagreement, to refer cases to a court with proper jurisdiction; 3) provision of social, psychological, spiritual, or other counseling for patients, family members, physicians, or other hospital staff; 4) establishing guidelines regarding treatment or other medical decisions; and 5) sponsoring or conducting educational programs to inform all concerned, including the public, about ethical problems in medicine.No exact count of these committees is available. According to estimates cited by Donald F. Phillips, managing editor of Hospital Ethics, about two-thirds to three-fourths of hospitals with more than 200 beds have ethics committees, as do about one-third of hospitals under 200 beds. He thinks that about half of the 6,000 hospitals in the United States now have working ethics committees.Several journal articles and a court decision in the late 1970s influenced their formation. A 1975 journal article by pediatrician Karen Teel (VII A) urged the use of hospital ethics committees to provide for dialogue in individual care situations as an appropriate sharing of responsibility. Another early article suggested that beyond parents and treating physicians, a "disinterested," mixed lay and medical committee could consider cases about defective newborns to improve the ethical decisionmaking process (VII A, Robertson and Fost, 1976). Three 1977 discussions in the Hastings Center Report highlighted this new concept (VII A, Levine; Shannon; Veatch).Produced at the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. It is supported by funds provided under grant number LM04492 from the National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health. Literature available through June 1992 is represented in this Scope Note. [End Page 285]The court decision was the March 31, 1976 ruling by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Karen Quinlan case. The parents of a young woman in a persistent vegetative state had requested that she be taken off a respirator. The court designated a "prognosis" role for the hospital ethics committee and stipulated that the committee must concur that the patient will never return to a "cognitive, sapient state" before the life-support system can be withdrawn (In the Matter of Karen Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)). Shortly after the Quinlan decision, Massachusetts General Hospital's Clinical Care Committee created an ad hoc subcommittee (a psychiatrist, a legal counsel, an ICU nurse, an oncologist/internist, a surgeon, and a lay person who had recovered from serious cancer disease) which looked at 15 cases. Based on the subcommittee's success, establishment of a permanent committee to review treatment of the terminally ill was recommended by the critical care committee (VII A, Clinical Care Committee 1976).In its 1984 Baby Doe rules, the federal government recommended establishment of infant care review committees, which promoted the growth of hospital ethics committees (VII C, Povar 1991). In July 1987 Maryland became the first state to require by law that hospitals establish patient care advisory committees to offer advice about choices available in the care of life-threatening illnesses; this requirement was extended to nursing homes in 1990 [codified as amended at Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. Sections 19-370 to -374 (1990)] (VII C, Hollinger 1991).Recently the role for these committees has been noted in the Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, 1992 Supplement (p. 10, Patient Rights, Section RI. 1.1.6.1) of the Joint Commission... (shrink)

An account of the transition from the Edenic to the state of nature discourse in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries has yet to be written. The contention of this paper is that Hobbes's work is a useful place to begin an investigation of this process of change. Though not the initiator of this transformation, Hobbes must take much of the credit for the eventual eclipse of one discourse by the other. An exposition of the Edenic discourse, kept alive (...) in the theological tracts of English divines, sets the proper context for an appreciation of Hobbes's state-of-nature scheme. As is made evident in a number of his Latin publications, Hobbes came to realize that the viability of his own narrative of political creation required the subversion of traditional glosses on Genesis. By attending to two particular features of the Edenic discourse that Hobbes sought to negate -- the language Adam spoke and the knowledge he possessed and transmitted to his posterity -- important connections are made with Hobbes's general theory of signs and his absolutist theory of sovereignty. (shrink)

The Institute on Religion in an Age of Science has a long history of delivering conferences addressing topics of interest in the field of science and religion. The following papers from the 2013 summer conference on “The Scientific, Spiritual, and Moral Challenges in Solving the World Food Crisis” are, in keeping with the eclectic nature of these conferences, very different in content and approach. Such differences underline the challenges of synergistically combining scientific and religious insights to increase understanding of global (...) problems and their possible solutions. This in turn reflects deeper questions about the purpose and nature of the science/religion dialogue. These papers suggest various ways in which the two perspectives can be combined in the pursuit of building better understandings of food-related issues, as well as highlighting difficulties and limitations which need to be addressed if the fruits of such dialogue are to make a wider impact. As such they serve as useful pointers for how this type of science/religion interaction might be further developed and deployed. (shrink)