The concept of “autonomy”, once at the core of the original enactivist proposal in The Embodied Mind, is nowadays ignored or neglected by some of the most prominent contemporary enactivists approaches. Theories of autonomy, however, come to fill a theoretical gap that sensorimotor accounts of cognition cannot ignore: they provide a naturalized account of normativity and the resources to ground the identity of a cognitive subject in its specific mode of organization. There are, however, good reasons for the contemporary neglect (...) of autonomy as a relevant concept for enactivism. On the one hand, the concept of autonomy has too often been assimilated into autopoiesis and the implications are not always clear for a dynamical sensorimotor approach to cognitive science. On the other hand, the foundational enactivist proposal displays a metaphysical tension between the concept of operational closure, deployed as constitutive, and that of structural coupling ; making it hard to reconcile with the claim that experience is sensorimotorly constituted. This tension is particularly apparent when Varela et al. propose Bittorio as a model of the operational closure of the nervous system as it fails to satisfy the required conditions for a sensorimotor constitution of experience. It is, however, possible to solve these problems by re-considering autonomy at the level of sensorimotor neurodynamics. Two recent robotic simulation models are used for this task, illustrating the notion of strong sensorimotor dependency of neurodynamic patterns, and their networked intertwinement. The concept of habit is proposed as an enactivist building block for cognitive theorizing, re-conceptualizing mental life as a habit ecology, tied within an agent’s behaviour generating mechanism in coordination with its environment. Norms can be naturalized in terms of dynamic, interactively self-sustaining, coherentism. This conception of autonomous sensorimotor agency is put in contrast with those enactive approaches that reject autonomy or neglect the theoretical resources it has to offer for the project of naturalizing minds. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present a bio-physical basis of mathematics. The essence of the theory is that function in the nervous system is mathematical. The mathematics arises as a result of the interaction of energy (a wave with a precise curvature in space and time) and matter (a molecular or ionic structure with a precise form in space and time). In this interaction, both energy and matter play an active role. That is, the interaction results (...) in a change in form of both energy and matter. There are at least six mathematical operations in a simple synaptic region. It is believed the form of both energy and matter are specific, and their interaction is specific, that is, function in most of the nervous system is stereotyped. It is suggested that mathematics be taken out of the mind and placed where it belongs — in nature and the synaptic regions of the nervous system; it results in both places from a precise interaction between energy (in a precise form) and matter (in a precise structure). (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to present a new theory of synaptic function in the nervous system. The basis for this theory is the experimental demonstration that a nerve impulse assumes five different forms as it advances through the synaptic region, and that five basic mathematical operations have been identified as being involved in the transformation of one form into another form. As a result of these data, the synaptic region is regarded as a functional unit where (...) information coming to it is unpacked, processed, stored, and retrieved for transit to another synaptic region or effector site. The data also suggests that a nerve impulse is a bolus of energy, therefore, without substance; that it contains information coded in its shape or form; that it is precisely described mathematically. Furthermore, the data suggests synaptic regions process these nerve impulses by applying mathematical operations to them; that function in the synaptic region is highly stereotyped (programmed); that chemical substances are associated with the mathematical operations. The basic approach of this theory is to regard a significant portion of the nervous system as an interface between the external universe and man himself. As an interface, the nervous system receives and processes information from both the external universe and man himself in a programmed manner. The interface functions by converting the information it receives into a bolus of energy, the nerve impulse, then processes the bolus by converting it into numbers or functions and applying mathematical operation to it. (shrink)

This commentary proposes that “cognitive control” is neither componential nor emergent, but a fundamental feature of behavior. The term “control” requires an operational definition. This is best provided by the negative feedback loop that utilizes behavior to control perception; it does not control behavior per se. In order to model complex cognitive control, Perceptual Control Theory proposes that loops are organized into a dissociable hierarchical network (PCT; Powers, Clark, & McFarland, 1960; Powers, 1973a, 2008). In this way, behavior is (...) dynamically adaptive to environmental disturbances, rather than being formed by, or superimposed upon, learned associations between stimulus and response. (shrink)

A new theory of synaptic function in the nervous system (Dempsher, 1978) is applied to the simplest system for integration of function in the nervous system. This system includes a sensory and motor neuron and three synaptic regions associated with those two neurons; a receptor region, an interneuronal spinal synaptic region linking the two neurons, and an effector region.Information is first received and processed at the receptor region. The processing consists of five components:1. A (...) highly selective mechanism which allows only that information to enter the receptor system which is appropriate. 2. The appropriateness of the information is determined by the alphabet (miniature potentials) already in that area. 3. The information entering the system is assembled in a pattern meaningful for the next processing operation. 4. The assembled information is then disassembled into its subunits and mapped into the alphabet (miniature potentials). 5. These miniature potentials are assembled into another pattern meaningful to fit the role of the receptor region. 6. This new pattern is repacked for transit to the central synaptic region. (shrink)

In this article we introduce and study the notion of operational closure: a transitive set d is called operationally closed iff it contains all constants of OST and any operation f∈d applied to an element a∈d yields an element fa∈d, provided that f applied to a has a value at all. We will show that there is a direct relationship between operational closure and stability in the sense that operationally closed sets behave like Σ1 substructures of (...) the universe. This leads to our final result that OST plus the axiom , claiming that any set is element of an operationally closed set, is proof-theoretically equivalent to the system KP+ of Kripke–Platek set theory with infinity and Σ1 separation. We also characterize the system OST plus the existence of one operationally closed set in terms of Kripke–Platek set theory with infinity and a parameter-free version of Σ1 separation. (shrink)

Here we evaluate our current understanding of the function of the nervous system in Hydra, a non‐bilaterian animal which is among the first metazoans that contain neurons. We highlight growing evidence that the nervous system, with its rich repertoire of neuropeptides, is involved in controlling resident beneficial microbes. We also review observations that indicate that microbes affect the animal's behavior by directly interfering with neuronal receptors. These findings provide new insight into the original role of the (...) nervous system, and suggest that it emerged to orchestrate multiple functions including host‐microbiome interactions. The excitement of future research in the Hydra model now relies on uncovering the common rules and principles that govern the interaction between neurons and microbes and the extent to which such laws might apply to other and more complex organisms. (shrink)

Large numbers of cells with unique neuronal specificity are generated during development of the central nervous system of animals. Here we discuss the events that generate cell diversity during early development of the ventral nerve cord of different arthropod groups. Neural precursors are generated in a spatial array in the epithelium of each hemisegment over a period of time. Spatial cues within the epithelium are thought to evolve as embryogenesis proceeds. This spatiotemporal information might generate diversity among the (...) neural precursors in all arthropod groups, although the mechanisms regulating the positioning of individual precursors have diverged. However, distinct strategies for the generation of neuronal diversity have evolved in the different arthropod lineages that appear to correlate with specific modes of ontogenesis. We hypothesize that an evolutionary trend towards reduced cell numbers and possibly rapid embryogenesis in insects has culminated in the appearance of stereotyped neuroblast lineages. BioEssays 27:874–883, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

While recent studies have shed some light on the significance of the electrical activity of the nervous system, there has been no adequate explanation for the wave formation or synchronization of this electrical activity. Adrian sums up the problem. “The origin of the 10-a-second rhythm is still uncertain, though the evidence points to some widespread organization, probably involving the central masses as well as the cortex. There are abundant nervous connexions for coordinating the beat, and when the (...) rhythm is well developed it is possible to record impulse discharges in phase with it passing to and fro in the nerve fibers of the white matter below the cortex. But in some areas no impulse could be detected entering or leaving the cell layers, though the potential waves keep more or less in step with those elsewhere. There is no proof that the waves are kept in phase by some means which does not involve nervous signalling, for impulses in axons of small diameter might well be missed, but it is not altogether unlikely that the synchronization is due in part to a direct electrical influence of one group of nerve cells on another. Gerard and Libet have shown that synchronization can occur between the two halves of a frog's brain cut in two and then placed in contact, and more recently Arvanitaki has shown that individual nerve cells may influence one another if they are brought close together in a conducting medium. At all events there are many examples of synchronized rhythmic activity in large collections of nerve-or-muscle cells. In the optic ganglion of the water beetle, for instance, there may be both a slow rhythm when the eye is in darkness and a rapid one when the eye is exposed to a bright light. The change from a slow to a fast rhythm is curiously reminiscent of that in the cerebral cortex when a sensory stimulus abolishes the 10-a-second rhythm and substitutes one at 40–60 a second. Such resemblances in preparations of quite different structures may be quite fortuitous, but they make it difficult to resist the suggestion that the rhythms of the brain may be dependent on the general properties of cell masses rather than on any special anatomical arrangement of them. Whatever its origin, the 10-a-second rhythm of the cortex corresponds to the resting, drowsy, or inattentive state and there is no such uniform pulsation when the brain is alert.”. (shrink)

Enhancer detectors are DNA constructs which, when introduced into a eukaryotic genome, respond to nearby genomic transcriptional regulatory elements by means of a reporter gene, revealing the expression pattern of genes in their vicinity. Recent experiments in Drosophila suggest that enhancer detection is a powerful method to identify genes that are expressed in the nervous system. Since enhancer detectors allow a rapid molecular and genetic characterization of genes in their vicinity, the method will greatly facilitate the study of (...) neural development and behavior. (shrink)

The controversy of neuroanatomy on the principal structure of the nervous systems, which took place at the end of the nineteenth century, is described. Two groups of scientists are identified: one that favoured the idea of a discrete cellular organization of the nervous tissue, and one that favoured a syncytial organization. These two interpretations arose from different histological techniques that produced conflicting pictures of the organization of the nervous tissue. In an experimental reexamination of the techniques used (...) at the end of the nineteenth century, the present study concerns the impact of these different histological procedures on the controversy about the principle nature of the nervous tissue. This controversy could not be resolved by neuroanatomy itself until the 1950s when electron microscopy was introduced into neurobiology. Thus, in a critical period of the conceptual development of neurosciences, neuroanatomy failed to establish a proper base for an interpretation of the functional morphology of nervous tissues. (shrink)

Attempts to define life should focus on the transition from molecules to cells and the “closure” aspects of this event. Rather than classifying existing objects into living and non-living entities I believe the challenge is to understand how the transition from non-life to life can take place, that is, the how the closure in Jagers op Akkerhuis’s hierarchical classification of operators, comes about.

The argument from causal closure of the physical is usually considered the most powerful argument in favor of the ontological doctrine of physicalism. Many authors, most notably Papineau, assume that CCP implies that physicalism is supported by physics. I demonstrate, however, that physical science has no bias in the ontological debate between proponents of physicalism and dualism. I show that the arguments offered for CCP are effective only against the accounts of mental causation based on the action of the (...) mental forces of a Newtonian nature, i.e. those which manifest themselves by causing accelerations. However, it is conceivable and possible that mental causation is manifested through the redistribution of energy, momentum and other conserved quantities in the system, brought about by altering the state probability distribution within the living system and leading to anomalous correlations of neural processes. After arguing that a probabilistic, interactionist model of mental causation is conceivable, which renders the argument from causal closure of the physical ineffective, I point to some basic features that such a model must have in order to be intelligible. At the same time, I indicate the way that conclusive testing of CCP can be done within the theoretical framework of physics. (shrink)

The argument from causal closure of the physical is usually considered the most powerful argument in favor of the ontological doctrine of physicalism. Many authors, most notably Papineau, assume that CCP implies that physicalism is supported by physics. I demonstrate, however, that physical science has no bias in the ontological debate between proponents of physicalism and dualism. I show that the arguments offered for CCP are effective only against the accounts of mental causation based on the action of the (...) mental forces of a Newtonian nature, i.e. those which manifest themselves by causing accelerations. However, it is conceivable and possible that mental causation is manifested through the redistribution of energy, momentum and other conserved quantities in the system, brought about by altering the state probability distribution within the living system and leading to anomalous correlations of neural processes. After arguing that a probabilistic, interactionist model of mental causation is conceivable, which renders the argument from causal closure of the physical ineffective, I point to some basic features that such a model must have in order to be intelligible. At the same time, I indicate the way that conclusive testing of CCP can be done within the theoretical framework of physics. (shrink)

The peripheral nervous system has classically been separated into a somatic division composed of both afferent and efferent pathways and an autonomic division containing only efferents. J. N. Langley, who codified this asymmetrical plan at the beginning of the twentieth century, considered different afferents, including visceral ones, as candidates for inclusion in his concept of the “autonomic nervous system”, but he finally excluded all candidates for lack of any distinguishing histological markers. Langley's classification has been enormously (...) influential in shaping modern ideas about both the structure and the function of the PNS. We survey recent information about the PNS and argue that many of the sensory neurons designated as “visceral” and “somatic” are in fact part of a histologically distinct group of afferents concerned primarily autonomic function. These afferents have traditionally been known as “small dark” neurons or B-neurons. In this target article we outline an association between autonomic and B-neurons based on ontogeny, cell phenotype, and functional relations, grouping them together as part of a common reflex system involved in homeostasis. This more parsimonious classification of the PNS, made possible by the identification of a group of afferents associated primarily with the ANS, avoids a number of confusions produced by the classical orientation. It may also have practical implications for an understanding of nociception, homeostatic reflexes, and the evolution of the nervous system. (shrink)

We continue the work of Blok and Jónsson by developing the theory of structural closure operators and introducing the notion of a representation between them. Similarities and equivalences of Blok-Jónsson turn out to be bijective representations and bijective structural representations, respectively. We obtain a characterization for representations induced by a transformer. In order to obtain a similar characterization for structural representations we introduce the notions of a graduation and a graded variable of an M-set. We show that several deductive (...) systems, Gentzen systems among them, are graded M-sets having graded variables, and describe the graded variables in each case. In the last section we show that, for a sentential logic, having an algebraic semantics is equivalent to being representable in an equational consequence. This motivates the extension of the notion of having an algebraic semantics for Gentzen systems, hypersequents systems, etc. We prove that if a closure operator is representable by a transformer, then every extension of it is also representable by the same transformer. As a consequence we obtain that if one of these systems has an algebraic semantics, then so does any of its extensions with the same defining equations. (shrink)

Context: Neurophenomenology is a relatively new field, with scope for novel and informative approaches to empirical questions about what structural parallels there are between neural activity and phenomenal experience. Problem: The overall aim is to present a method for examining possible correlations of neurodynamic and phenodynamic structures within the structurally-coupled work of Alexander Technique practitioners with their pupils. Method: This paper includes the development of an enkinaesthetic explanatory framework, an overview of the salient aspects of the Alexander Technique, and the (...) presentation of an elicitation interview technique as part of a neurophenomenological method. It will propose a way of testing the hypothesis that if, in the effective practice of Alexander Technique, there is a union between the nervous systems of teacher and pupil, it should be visible neurologically and affective phenomenologically, and thus it should be possible to investigate both its neural and phenomenal signatures. Results: The proposed means of testing the hypothesis is to use the elicitation interview technique alongside neural monitoring during the teaching of the Alexander Technique in four paired sets of subjects. Constructivist content: At the heart of this paper is the claim that all activity is co-activity. I make no assumption of an ontological primacy of mental or physical, or explanatory primacy of any methodology. Implications: This has important ramifications for somatic education and therapies, for establishing frameworks of co-engagement and care in health-care situations, and for understanding empathy. (shrink)

This target article draws together two groups of experimental studies on the control of human movement through peripheral feedback and centrally generated signals of motor commands. First, during natural movement, feedback from muscle, joint, and cutaneous afferents changes; in human subjects these changes have reflex and kinesthetic consequences. Recent psychophysical and microneurographic evidence suggests that joint and even cutaneous afferents may have a proprioceptive role. Second, the role of centrally generated motor commands in the control of normal movements and movements (...) following acute and chronic deafferentation is reviewed. There is increasing evidence that subjects can perceive their motor commands under various conditions, but that this is inadequate for normal movement; deficits in motor performance arise when the reliance on proprioceptive feedback is abolished either experimentally or because of pathology. During natural movement, the CNS appears to have access to functionally useful input from a range of peripheral receptors as well as from internally generated command signals. The unanswered questions that remain suggest a number of avenues for further research. (shrink)

Based on anthropological fieldwork in Australia and Colombia, this collection of essays uses the workings of the human nervous system to illustrate concepts of culture.

In this paper, my aim is to understand the origin of experimental and scientific models of pathogeny of the diseases of the nervous system in the Salpêtrière (Paris). I will analyse the role of the contexts of cell theory, microscopy and the advances in histological techniques in the creation of various pathogenic models, based on the concept of the cell, the Wallerian degeneration and the neurone concept. I argue that, as medicine and pathology remain autonomous in their methods (...) and goals, because of the evident degree of complexity of diseases, close and reciprocal interactions with sciences, their practices and theories, make it possible to establish convergences between clinical observations, pathological data and those from the experimental models of pathologies. The search for pathogenic models behaves like an engine, which is efficient in assembling facts, in testing pathogeneses and reforming nosologies, combined with the breakthroughs in biology. This paper is a case study showing the emergence of such interactions in the last decades of the nineteenth-century in Paris. (shrink)

Gooddy, a British neurologist, argues that our sense of time, and relativity in general, is a function of the nervous system. Written for the general reader, the 10 essays discuss atomic, cellular, and glandular "clocks," age, government time vs. personal time, and time disorders (such as being in love). Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

This article, the second of a two-part essay, outlines a solution to certain tensions in Thomist philosophical anthropology concerning the interaction of the human person’s immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous system. Continuing with where the first part left off, I argue that Thomists should not be tempted by strong emergentist accounts of mental operations that act directly on the brain, but should maintain, with (...) Aquinas, that noetic operations directly interact with psychosomatic operations. I develop a Thomist account of noetic–psychosomatic interactions that expands upon the first part’s rapprochement between the new mechanist philosophy of neuroscience and psychology and hylomorphic animalism. I argue that noetic–psychosomatic interactions are best understood as analogous to the way diverse higher and lower order psychosomatic powers interact by actualizing, coordinating, and directing the operations of other psychosomatic powers. I draw on James Ross’s arguments for the immateriality of intellectual operations as realizing definite pure functions in order to elucidate the way noetic operations uniquely actualize, coordinate, and direct the psychosomatic operations they interact with. I conclude with a conjectural sketch of how this presentation of Thomist philosophical anthropology understands the noetic and psychosomatic deficits brought about by damage to the nervous system. (shrink)

In this paper two deductive systems associated with relevance logic are studied from an algebraic point of view. One is defined by the familiar, Hilbert-style, formalization of R; the other one is a weak version of it, called WR, which appears as the semantic entailment of the Meyer-Routley-Fine semantics, and which has already been suggested by Wójcicki for other reasons. This weaker consequence is first defined indirectly, using R, but we prove that the first one turns out to be an (...) axiomatic extension of WR. Moreover we provide WR with a natural Gentzen calculus. It is proved that both deductive systems have the same associated class of algebras but different classes of models on these algebras. The notion of model used here is an abstract logic, that is, a closure operator on an abstract algebra; the abstract logics obtained in the case of WR are also the models, in a natural sense, of the given Gentzen calculus. (shrink)