I present an outline of the Omega Point theory, which is a model for an omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, evolving, personal God who is both transcendent to spacetime and immanent in it, and who exists necessarily. The model is a falsifiable physical theory, deriving its key concepts not from any religious tradition but from modern physical cosmology and computer science; from scientific materialism rather than revelation. Four testable predictions of the model are given. The theory assumes that thinking is (...) a purely physical process of the brain, and that personality dies with the brain. Nevertheless, I show that the Omega Point theory suggests a future universal resurrection of the dead very similar to the one predicted in the Judeo‐Christian‐Islamic tradition. The notions of “grace” and the “beatific vision” appear naturally in the model. (shrink)

An Omega Point Theory says that reality is making progress from some initial state to some final state. It moves from some Alpha Point (the initial state) to some Omega Point (the final state). The progress is an increase in some quality. For example, reality is making progress from the chaotic to the orderly; or it is making progress from the simple to the complex; or from the mindless to the mental; or from evil to (...) good. Here we focus on the Omega Point theory of Peirce. An Omega Point Theory is an evolutionary cosmology – it says that the universe is evolving from the Alpha Point to the Omega Point. Peirce refers to his evolutionary cosmology as a Cosmogonic Philosophy would suppose that in the beginning – infinitely remote – there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without connection or regularity would properly be without existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a generalizing tendency. Its other sportings would be evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue. Thus the tendency to habit would be started; and from this, with the other principles of evolution, all the regularities of the universe would be evolved. At any time, however, an element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future. (Peirce, Collected Papers , 6.33). (shrink)

An attempt to discover what can be learned from the recent work of Frank Tipler on the Omega Point theory requires an analysis of his framework of understanding from scientific, philosophical, and theological perspectives. A critique of his crucial ideas, and of the salient points raised by some of his critics, can then be undertaken within the compass of his strengths. A critique of the critiques of Tipler's work allows one to evaluate the extent and limitations of his (...) contributions. (shrink)

Summary. The prerequisites of this study have three interwoven sources, the natural sciences and philosophical and socio-political ones. They are trends in the way of being of a modern, technogenic civilization. The COVID-19 pandemic caused significant damage to the image of the omnipotent techno-science that has developed in the mentality of this sociocultural type.Our goal was to study the co-evolutionary nature of this phenomenon as a natural consequence of the nature of the evolutionary strategy of our biological species. Technological civilization (...) as a cultural-civilizational type is one of the evolutionary options of Homo sapiens, the ontological basis of which is a stable evolutionary strategy (SESH). The latter is capable to spontaneous development and is consisting from biological, sociocultural, and techno-rationalistic modules. Evolutionary risks inextricably linked with it. At present, humankind has entered an era when its existence should be ensured by the meta-system engineering of its own cultural and ecological niche. By such artificially created elements, it implies the design and implementation of ecological systems of various levels of complexity, from the design of elements of such systems (which are biological individuals, populations and species) to the design of a global ecological system (biosphere). At the same time, there is a sharp jump in the value of anthropogenic and technological risk due to a sharp increase in the instability of the structure of ecological systems. We are witnessing a third wave of breaking and reconstruction of the existing relations between the elements of such systems after the Neolithic revolution and great geographical discoveries. Technological innovations led to sharp violations of normal social ecodynamics, leading to outbreaks of new infections, in particular. Theuncontested development of all sectors of controlled evolution technology is the way out of the last such crisis and the prevention of similar ones in the future. There are global nature of the organization of modern technological civilization and the transformation of the biosphere not so much into the noosphere (according to Vernadsky) but into the technosphere that determines the effect of a cascade reaction: any local co-adaptive conflict between elements of a cultural, socio-ecological niche tends to turnglobal and systemic problems. Humanity is constantly forced to make a choice between the stability and adaptability of the technosphere. (shrink)

This article focuses on the Omega Point, an essential concept in Teilhard de Chardin’s evolutionary metaphysics. In certain passages about the Omega Point, Teilhard mentions the primeval atom hypothesis, a theory about the beginning of the universe proposed by Georges Lemaître, another contemporary Jesuit priest who was also a scientist. Although Teilhard and Lemaître are essentially evolutionists, besides being Jesuit priests, their evolutionary metaphysics and their philosophies of science are radically divergent, and two important differences are (...) presented here – about the eventual cosmic determinism and about the relationship between scientific knowledge and religious beliefs. This article also shows how Teilhard’s original concept was projected into two cosmological theories in which it reveals an essential transfiguration by losing its initial anthropic and religious matrix – the cosmological anthropic principle, proposed by physicists John Barrow and Frank Tipler, and the Omega Point Theory proposed later by Frank Tipler. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the scientific revolution, believers have had to reconcile their beliefs with science. This has always proved difficult. If an all-perfect God created the universe and its physical laws, why would he have to step in to perform miracles and answer prayers? If, as all the evidence indicates, the universe, including humans and their brains, is matter and nothing more, how can we possibly live forever? Theologians try hard, but never come up with satisfactory answers.

Josef Pieper (1904–1997) wrote his autobiography in three distinct volumes. Composing one volume of his complete works in his Gesammelte Werke (Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995) edited by Berthold Wald, he writes on his early (1904–1945), middle (1945–1964), and late years (1964–1985). Between Ignatius Press and St. Augustine’s Press, Pieper’s autobiographical writings have been translated into English over the last three decades. The first volume, Noch wusste es niemand: Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen 1904–1945 (Kosel-Verlag, 1979), was translated into English as No One Could (...) Have Known: An Autobiography: The Early Years 1904–1945 (Ignatius, 1987). Three decades later the second volume, Noch nicht aller Tage Abend: Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen 1945–1964 (Kosel-Verlag, 1979), was published in English as Not Yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945–1964 (St. Augustine’s Press, 2017). Finally, the third volume, Eine Geschichte wie ein Strahl: Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen seit 1964 (Kosel-Verlag, 1988), has been published under the title A Journey to Point Omega: Autobiography from 1964 (St. Augustine’s Press, 2020). (shrink)

We study the $I$-ultrafilters on $\omega$, where $I$ is a collection of subsets of a set $X$, usually $\mathbb{R}$ or $\omega_1$. The $I$-ultrafilters usually contain the $P$-points, often as a small proper subset. We study relations between $I$-ultrafilters for various $I$, and closure of $I$-ultrafilters under ultrafilter sums. We consider, but do not settle, the question whether $I$-ultrafilters always exist.

The interplay between ultrafilters and unbounded subsets of \ with the order \ of strict eventual domination is studied. Among the tools are special kinds of non-principal ultrafilters on \. These include simple P-points; that is, ultrafilters with a base that is well-ordered with respect to the reverse of the order \ of almost inclusion. It is shown that the cofinality of such a base must be either \, the least cardinality of \-unbounded set, or \, the least cardinality of (...) a \-cofinal set. The small uncountable cardinal \ is introduced. Consequences of \ and of \ are explored; in particular, both imply \. Here \ is the reaping number, and is also the least cardinality of a \-base for a free ultrafilter. Both of these inequalities are shown to occur if there exist simple P-points of different cofinalities and there exist simple \-points and \-points), but this is a long-standing open problem. Six axioms on nonprincipal ultrafilters on \ and the relationships between them are discussed along with various models of set theory in which one or more are known to hold. The strongest of these, Axiom 1, is that for every free ultrafilter \ and for every \-unbounded \-chain C of increasing functions in \, C is also unbounded in the ultraproduct \. The other axioms replace one or both quantifiers with “there exists.” The negation of Axiom 3 in a model provides a family of normal sequentially compact spaces whose product is not countably compact. The question of whether such a family exists in ZFC, even with “normal” weakened to “regular”, is a famous unsolved problem of set-theoretic topology, known as the Scarborough–Stone problem. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper we discuss some aspects of Detlefsen's attempt to save Hilbert's Program from the consequences of Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. His arguments are based on his interpretation of the long standing and well-known controversy on what, exactly, finitistic means are. In his paper [1] Detlefsen takes the position that there is a form of the ω-rule which is a finitistically valid means of proof, sufficient to prove the consistency of elementary number theory Z. On (...) the other hand, he claims that Z with its first-order logic is not strong enough to allow a formalization of such an ω-rule. This would explain why the unprovability of $\operatorname{Con}(Z)$ in Z does not imply that the consistency of Z cannot be proved by finitistic means. We show that Detlefsen's proposal is unacceptable as originally formulated in [1], but that a reasonable modification of the rule he suggest leads to a partial program already studied for many years. We investigate the scope of such a program in terms of proof-theoretic reducibilities. We also show that this partial program encompasses mathematically important theories studied in the "Reverse Mathematics" program. In order to investigate the provability with such a modified rule, we define new consistency and provability predicates which are weaker than the usual ones. We then investigate their properties, including a few that have no apparent philosophical significance but compare interestingly with the properties of the program based on the iteration of our ω-rule. We determine some of the limitations of such programs, pointing out that these limitations partly explain why partial programs that have been successfully carried out use quite different and substantially more radical extensions of finitistic methods with more general forms of restricted reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper we establish the proof-theoretic equivalence of (i) $\hbox {\sf ATR}$ and $\widehat{\hbox{\sf ID}}_{\omega}$ , (ii) $\hbox{\sf ATR}_0+ (\Sigma^1_1-\hbox{\sf DC})$ and $\widehat{\hbox {\sf ID}}_{<\omega^\omega} , and (iii) $\hbox {\sf ATR}+(\Sigma^1_1-\hbox{\sf DC})$ and $\widehat{\hbox {\sf ID}}_{<\varepsilon_0} $.

The main topics of this thesis are cardinal invariants, P -points and MAD families. Cardinal invariants of the continuum are cardinal numbers that are bigger than $\aleph _{0}$ and smaller or equal than $\mathfrak {c}.$ Of course, they are only interesting when they have some combinatorial or topological definition. An almost disjoint family is a family of infinite subsets of $\omega $ such that the intersection of any two of its elements is finite. A MAD family is a maximal (...) almost disjoint family. An ultrafilter $\mathcal {U}$ on $\omega $ is called a P-point if every countable $\mathcal {B\subseteq U}$ there is $X\in $ $\mathcal {U}$ such that $X\setminus B$ is finite for every $B\in \mathcal {B}.$ This kind of ultrafilters has been extensively studied, however there is still a large number of open questions about them.In the preliminaries we recall the principal properties of filters, ultrafilters, ideals, MAD families and cardinal invariants of the continuum. We present the construction of Shelah, Mildenberger, Raghavan, and Steprāns of a completely separable MAD family under $\mathfrak {s\leq a}.$ None of the results in this chapter are due to the author.The second chapter is dedicated to a principle of Sierpiński. The principle $\left $ of Sierpiński is the following statement: There is a family of functions $\left \{ \varphi _{n}:\omega _{1}\longrightarrow \omega _{1}\mid n\in \omega \right \} $ such that for every $I\in \left [ \omega _{1}\right ] ^{\omega _{1}}$ there is $n\in \omega $ for which $\varphi _{n}\left [ I\right ] =\omega _{1}.$ This principle was recently studied by Arnie Miller. He showed that this principle is equivalent to the following statement: There is a set $X=\left \{ f_{\alpha }\mid \alpha \alpha $ then $f_{\beta }\cap g$ is infinite. Miller showed that the principle of Sierpiński implies that non $\left =\omega _{1}.$ He asked if the converse was true, i.e., does non $\left =\omega _{1}$ imply the principle $\left $ of Sierpiński? We answer his question affirmatively. In other words, we show that non $\left =\omega _{1}$ is enough to construct an $\mathcal {IE}$ -Luzin set. It is not hard to see that the $\mathcal {IE}$ -Luzin set we constructed is meager. This is no coincidence, because with the aid of an inaccessible cardinal, we construct a model where non $\left =\omega _{1}$ and every $\mathcal {IE}$ -Luzin set is meager.The third chapter is dedicated to a conjecture of Hrušák. Michael Hrušák conjectured the following: Every Borel cardinal invariant is either at most non $\left $ or at least cov $\left $. Although the veracity of this conjecture is still an open problem, we were able to obtain some partial results: The conjecture is false for “Borel invariants of $\omega _{1}^{\omega }$ ” nevertheless, it is true for a large class of definable invariants. This is part of a joint work with Michael Hrušák and Jindřich Zapletal.In the fourth chapter we present a survey on destructibility of ideals and MAD families. We prove several classic theorems, but we also prove some new results. For example, we show that every almost disjoint family of size less than $\mathfrak {c}$ can be extended to a Cohen indestructible MAD family is equivalent to $\mathfrak {b=c}$. A MAD family $\mathcal {A}$ is Shelah–Steprāns if for every $X\subseteq \left [ \omega \right ] ^{<\omega }\setminus \left \{ \emptyset \right \} $ either there is $A\in \mathcal {I}\left $ such that $s\cap A\neq \emptyset $ for every $s\in X$ or there is $B\in \mathcal {I}\left $ that contains infinitely many elements of X $ denotes the ideal generated by $\mathcal {A}$ ). This concept was introduced by Raghavan which is connected to the notion of “strongly separable” introduced by Shelah and Steprāns. We prove that Shelah–Steprāns MAD families have very strong indestructibility properties: Shelah–Steprāns MAD families are indestructible for “many” definable forcings that does not add dominating reals. According to the author’s best knowledge, this is the strongest notion that has been considered in the literature so far. In spite of their strong indestructibility, Shelah–Steprāns MAD families can be destroyed by a ccc forcing that does not add unsplit or dominating reals. We also consider some strong combinatorial properties of MAD families and show the relationships between them.The fifth chapter is one of the most important chapters in the thesis. A MAD family $\mathcal {A}$ is called $+$ -Ramsey if every tree that branches into $\mathcal {I}\left $ -positive sets has an $\mathcal {I}\left $ -positive branch. Michael Hrušák’s first published question is the following: Is there a $+$ -Ramsey MAD family? It was previously known that such families can consistently exist. However, there was no construction of such families using only the axioms of ZFC. We solve this problem by constructing such a family without any extra assumptions.In the fourth and fifth chapters, we introduce several notions of MAD families, in the sixth chapter we prove several implications and non implications between them. We construct several MAD families with different properties.In the seventh chapter we build models without P -points. We show that there are no P -points after adding Silver reals either iteratively or by the side by side product. These results have some important consequences: The first one is that is its possible to get rid of P -points using only definable forcings. This answers a question of Michael Hrušák. We can also use our results to build models with no P -points and with arbitrarily large continuum, which was also an open question. These results were obtained with David Chodounský.prepared by Osvaldo Guzmán GonzálezE-mail : [email protected] : https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.09680. (shrink)

We give modest upper bounds for consistency strengths for two well-studied combinatorial principles. These bounds range at the level of subcompact cardinals, which is significantly below a κ+-supercompact cardinal. All previously known upper bounds on these principles ranged at the level of some degree of supercompactness. We show that by using any of the standard modified Prikry forcings it is possible to turn a measurable subcompact cardinal into ℵω and make the principle □ℵω,<ω fail in the generic extension. We also (...) show that by using Lévy collapse followed by standard iterated club shooting it is possible to turn a subcompact cardinal into ℵ2 and arrange in the generic extension that simultaneous reflection holds at ℵ2, and at the same time, every stationary subset of ℵ3 concentrating on points of cofinality ω has a reflection point of cofinality ω1. (shrink)

A P-point ultrafilter over \(\omega \) is called an interval P-point if for every function from \(\omega \) to \(\omega \) there exists a set _A_ in this ultrafilter such that the restriction of the function to _A_ is either a constant function or an interval-to-one function. In this paper we prove the following results. (1) Interval P-points are not isomorphism invariant under \(\textsf{CH}\) or \(\textsf{MA}\). (2) We identify a cardinal invariant \(\textbf{non}^{**}({\mathcal {I}}_{\tiny {\hbox {int}}})\) (...) such that every filter base of size less than continuum can be extended to an interval P-point if and only if \(\textbf{non}^{**}({\mathcal {I}}_{\tiny {\hbox {int}}})={\mathfrak {c}}\). (3) We prove the generic existence of slow/rapid non-interval P-points and slow/rapid interval P-points which are neither quasi-selective nor weakly Ramsey under the assumption \({\mathfrak {d}}={\mathfrak {c}}\) or \(\textbf{cov}({\mathcal {B}})={\mathfrak {c}}\). (shrink)

M. E. Rudin proved, under CH, that for each P-point p there exists a P-point q strictly RK-greater than p. This result was proved under ${\mathfrak {p}= \mathfrak {c}}$ by A. Blass, who also showed that each RK-increasing $ \omega $ -sequence of P-points is upper bounded by a P-point, and that there is an order embedding of the real line into the class of P-points with respect to the RK-ordering. In this paper, the results cited (...) above are proved under the assumption that $\mathfrak { b}=\mathfrak {c}$. A. Blass asked in 1973 which ordinals can be embedded in the set of P-points, and pointed out that such an ordinal cannot be greater than $ \mathfrak {c}^{+}$. In this paper it is proved, under $\mathfrak {b}=\mathfrak {c}$, that for each ordinal $\alpha < \mathfrak {c}^{+}$, there is an order embedding of $ \alpha $ into P-points. It is also proved, under $\mathfrak {b}=\mathfrak {c}$, that there is an embedding of the long line into P-points. (shrink)

A function is recursive (in given operations) if its values are computed explicitly and uniformly in terms of other "previously computed" values of itself and (perhaps) other "simultaneously computed" recursive functions. Here, "explicitly" includes definition by cases. We investigate those recursive functions on the structure $\mathbf{N} = \langle \omega, 0, \operatorname{succ,pred}\rangle$ that are computed in terms of themselves only, without other simultaneously computed recursive functions.

In his book The Physics of Immortality. Frank Tipler has broken a longstanding intellectual taboo by dealing as a physicist with the theological themes of God and immortality, as well by arguing that theology can provide material for concept formation in the field of physics. His work on the anthropic principle convinced Tipler that, since the emergence of intelligent life is of the essence of the universe as a whole, the future of life is of fundamental significance. His Omega (...) Point theory takes theological theories of the future's significance seriously from a scientific point of view. Theories of computers play a central role in Tipler's theory of immortality, and even though many critics have misunderstood his thrust in these theories, they are worthy of further exploration. Perhaps Tipler's most important contribution is his insistence that the world as described by physics is more open to interaction with biblical and theological perspectives than is often believed. (shrink)

This corrigendum concerns [, § ] on ordered difference existentially closed valued fields where we overlooked the problem of immediate extensions.

We study extensions of Presburger arithmetic with a unary predicate R and we show that under certain conditions on R, R is sparse and the theory of $\langle\mathbb{N}, +, R\rangle$ is decidable. We axiomatize this theory and we show that in a reasonable language, it admits quantifier elimination. We obtain similar results for the structure $\langle\mathbb{Q},+, R\rangle$.

A totally ordered group G is essentially periodic if for every definable non-trivial convex subgroup H of G every definable subset of G is equal to a finite union of cosets of subgroups of G on some interval containing an end segment of H; it is coset-minimal if all definable subsets are equal to a finite union of cosets, intersected with intervals. We study definable sets and functions in such groups, and relate them to the quasi-o-minimal groups introduced in Belegradek (...) et al. . Main results: An essentially periodic group G is abelian; if G is discrete, then definable functions in one variable are ultimately piecewise linear. A group such that every model elementarily equivalent to it is coset-minimal is quasi-o-minimal , and its definable functions in one variable are piecewise linear. (shrink)

It is known today that Hegel's philosophy was at the center of the development of pragmatism. In particular, the relation of Dewey's philosophy to Hegel's has recently been studied with great attention1. Many studies have revealed that the German philosopher had a fundamental influence on the young John Dewey, particularly with regard to his theory of culture, for his logic, as well as for his psychology. These new readings propose a profoundly original view of Dewey and explain why he thought (...) of his philosophy as a "permanent Hegelian deposit".Our work aims to... (shrink)

Given a simple non-trivial finite-dimensional Lie algebra L, fields $K_i$ and Chevalley groups $L(K_i)$ , we first prove that $\Pi_{\mathcal{U}} L(K_i)$ is isomorphic to $L(\Pi_{\mathcal{U}}K_i)$ . Then we consider the case of Chevalley groups of twisted type ${}^n\!L$ . We obtain a result analogous to the previous one. Given perfect fields $K_i$ having the property that any element is either a square or the opposite of a square and Chevalley groups ${}^n\!L(K_i)$ , then $\pu{}^n\!L(K_i)$ is isomorphic to ${}^n\!L(\pu K_i)$ . (...) We apply our results to prove the decidability of the set of sentences true in almost all finite groups of the form L(K) where K is a finite field and L a fixed untwisted Chevalley type. (shrink)

Le présent article examine la façon dont John Dewey a entrepris de poser le problème de la valuation et de ses conséquences au sein de sa théorie de l’éducation. Plus spécifiquement, nous voudrions montrer que son effort pour repenser l’articulation des moyens et des fins du processus de valuation contribue à repenser l’enquête morale. Celle-ci, si elle fait alors l’objet d’une pédagogie qui met au centre l’expérience vécue du sujet, nous oblige à concevoir à nouveaux frais les valeurs que nous (...) accordons aux connaissances apprises. Notre analyse entend démontrer que : 1) de même que dans le domaine éthique, rien n’a de valeur en soi pour le sujet agissant. Mais que 2) la valuation de tout acte est déterminée en situation, alors, 3) dans le domaine de la pédagogie, aucune connaissance n’a de valeur en soi pour l’élève. 4) Ainsi la première tâche de l’enseignant.e est de former l’élève à des processus de valuation efficaces. Cela dans le but que celui-ci puisse à son tour, clairement, déterminer pour lui-même les connaissances qui auront de la valeur. Si notre hypothèse est juste alors cette tâche devient à la fois un point de départ important de la pédagogie pragmatiste et un impératif incontournable de l’éthique enseignante. -/- The present article examines how Dewey addressed the problem of value, as well as the consequences that this solution had for his educational theory. More specifically, I aim to show that Dewey’s effort to rethink means and ends within the process of valuation contributes to a recasting of moral inquiry. If moral inquiry becomes part of a pedagogy that focuses upon the lived experience of the subject, this compels us to rethink the value we attribute to acquired knowledge. My analysis will demonstrate 1) that even within the ethical domain, nothing has value in itself for the acting subject, but that 2) the value of all acts must be determined within specific situations, and therefore 3) within the domain of pedagogy, no knowledge has value in and of itself for the student. 4) Thus the first task of the teacher is to teach students how to evaluate questions of value, which will push them to determine for themselves what knowledge has value. If my hypothesis is correct, this task becomes simultaneously an important starting place for pragmatist pedagogy and a cornerstone of a new ethic of teaching. (shrink)

Given a model-complete theory of topological fields, we considered its generic differential expansions and under a certain hypothesis of largeness, we axiomatised the class of existentially closed ones. Here we show that a density result for definable types over definably closed subsets in such differential topological fields. Then we show two transfer results, one on the VC-density and the other one, on the combinatorial property NTP2.

Paul Tillich and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin both have made contributions to a theology of evolution. In a 2002 essay John Haught expresses doubt that Tilllich's rather classical theology of “being” is radical enough to account for the “becoming” of evolution. Tillich's ontology of being includes the polarity of form and dynamics. Dynamics is the potentiality of being, that is, becoming. Tillich's dynamic dialectic of being and nonbeing is a more descriptive metaphor for the five mass extinctions of evolutionary history (...) than Teilhard's progress. This dialectic is also a more realistic description of cosmic evolution. Tillich's “Kingdom of God” within history as well as “the End of History,” in contrast to Teilhard's Omega Point, does not appear to contradict the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which predicts that the universe will ultimately disintegrate. Haught's contrast/contact modes of relating science and religion would regard Teilhard's Omega Point as an expression of spiritual hope and purpose rather than a scientifically verifiable principle. The contrast/ contact position is consonant with Tillich's description of religion as part of the vertical dimension of ultimate concern and science as part of the horizontal dimension of relationships between finite objects. Tillich did not share Teilhard's optimistic vision of the future. (shrink)

We describe classes of existentially closed ordered difference fields and rings. We show an Ax-Kochen type result for a class of valued ordered difference fields.

This critical review focuses on Smith's recent revision of his 1988 book: Teilhard and the New Religion: A Thorough Analysis of the Teachings of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Curiously, both the revised and original works have been largely ignored. Unfortunately, sometimes the best way to silence critics is to ignore them. This work will look into some of the primary concepts of Teilhard's "scientific theology" and assess Smith's evaluation, including: evolution, the law of complexity and consciousness, the Creative Union, and (...) the Omega Point. (shrink)

We consider the reduct to the module language of certain theories of fields with a non surjective endomorphism. We show in some cases the existence of a model companion. We apply our results for axiomatizing the reduct to the theory of modules of non principal ultraproducts of separably closed fields of fixed but non zero imperfection degree.

With this proposal, we wish to revisit the Idea of the University in the perspective of the democratic project of the American philosopher and pragmatist John Dewey. Our hypothesis consists in the thesis that the deweyen project confronts the problem of the social distribution of knowledge, in the aim of giving us the means to transform the latter. In this way, if we consider that the university is part of this distribution through its student learning function, then our purpose is (...) to demonstrate that this learning is currently guided by an individual intelligence paradigm harms that the development of collective intelligence. For John Dewey, the latter is one of the central means of his democratic project which would reconcile the Idea of a University with real University institutions. Therefore, according to him, if universities want to contribute to the democratic project, we must adopt a new pedagogical orientation promoting individual and collective intelligence. (shrink)

"Philosophy for Children: a Way to Reconcile Disciplinary Teaching and School Life? Drawing mainly on John Dewey's writings, this contribution aims to extend the dualism of a traditional conception of education at the epistemological, pedagogical and organizational levels. This conception was already criticised by this author at the beginning of the 20th century and still remains widely present today among the school community. Through this approach, we demonstrate that the dualist approach is as many obstacles to be removed in the (...) process both to improve and rebuild a better education. The hypothesis defended here consists to demonstrate how philosophy for children, strengthened by its pragmatist heritage, can challenge these dualisms and thereby jeopardize the traditional conception of education. Keywords: John Dewey, philosophy of education, co-curriculum, school life, philosophy for children ". (shrink)

We show that if G is a group of finite Morley rank, then the verbal subgroup is of finite width, where w is a concise word. As a byproduct, we show that if G is any abelian-by-finite group, then Gn= is definable.

Le féminisme est un mouvement théorique et politique pluriel et en perpétuelle évolution. Aussi ce travail se situe dans les champs de la philosophie de l’éducation et plus particulièrement au sein des débats entre plusieurs courants philosophiques se réclamant du féminisme. Il cherche à évaluer l’intérêt de deux de ces approches philosophiques au regard de la construction d’une pédagogie féministe. Se trouve ainsi comparées l’approche de la théorie critique (proche du marxisme matérialiste et de l’école de Francfort) et l’approche pragmatiste (...) (issue des travaux de Jane Addams et John Dewey) par rapport au problème du “consciousness-raising” en pédagogie. Ce dernier présente en effet des difficultés à l’approche critique qui seront exposées dans la première partie de l’argumentation. L’hypothèse de notre travail est que le pragmatisme peut apporter des outils théoriques répondant à ses difficultés et venant ainsi compléter ceux de la théorie critique au profit de la pédagogie féministe. Ainsi la deuxième partie de notre argumentation se concentre sur l’intérêt épistémique de ces outils pédagogiques que propose le pragmatisme. Ces derniers sont rendus possibles par la valorisation épistémique de la perplexité et de l’empathie, et nous verrons en quoi ils permettent d’augmenter l’efficacité du “consciousness-raising” lors des pratiques pédagogiques quotidiennes. (shrink)