Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness, but this remains a relatively unexamined precept. First, a review of the role of consciousness disruption in delirium is revised from an historical and diagnostic perspective. Second, consciousness measurement in routine assessment of delirium is considered. Conscious levels, comprising alertness and arousal, are most commonly used but are not representative of the multidimensionality of consciousness. Third, a justification for the exploration of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Three candidate dimensions of phenomenal consciousness (...) are identified as the pre-reflective state, phenomenal experience, and reflective thought. Finally, the clinical implications of a deeper understanding of delirium through measurement of phenomenal consciousness is considered. (shrink)

Using data obtained during a retrospective interview study of 30 women who had undergone genetic testing—BRCA1/2mutation searching—this paper describes how women, previously diagnosed with breast/ovarian cancer, perceive their role in generating genetic information about themselves and their families. It observes that when describing their motivations for undergoing DNA testing and their experiences of disclosing genetic information within the family these women provide care based ethical justifications for their actions. Finally, it argues that generating genetic information and disclosing this information to (...) kin raise different types of ethical issues. The implications of these findings for ethical debates about informed choice in the context of genetic testing are discussed. (shrink)

This paper argues that the trends in advertising and corporatization in dentistry since the 1970s have resulted in processes of de-professionalization and de-regulation, respectively.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Asian Eels and Global Warming:A Posthumanist Perspective on Society and the EnvironmentAndrew Pickering (bio)My idea in this essay is to talk about how some recent developments in my field—science and technology studies—might pass over into environmental studies. In particular, I want to talk about a certain posthumanist perspective, as I call it, on the relation between people and things, because I think that it transfers nicely from thinking about (...) people and machines to thinking about people and the environment.1 I want to say in advance that while the word 'posthumanist' might sound a bit peculiar, the posthumanist perspective is straightforward enough. If scholars have taken a long time to arrive it, the difficulty lies, I believe, in a disciplinary division of labor rather than in any intrinsic incomprehensibility. And I can start with a few general remarks about that.The basic point to note is that the academic disciplines carve up the visible world in a systematic way. On the one hand, the natural sciences, engineering, and so on, like to talk about a world of things from which people are notably absent. This is clear in fields like physics and chemistry, but it is probably true enough in the environmental sciences, too. Human beings might disturb ecosystems, say, but the job of the ecologist [End Page 29] is to understand the systems themselves, not the disturbances. The social sciences and humanities, in contrast, like to talk about people but not about things. Durkheimian sociology is a great example. Durkheim insisted that the social was a separate reality, sui generis, and that the social therefore has its own pure dynamics, cut off from, say, the material world.We find, then, a beautiful disciplinary dualism: to the harder sciences goes the world of things; to the softer sciences goes the world of people. What about the interface of people and things, the zone of intersection? This is of no concern to the hard sciences: one can easily imagine the world of things going on without people. But what about the soft sciences? One can't really imagine a world of people without things. Here various maneuvers have traditionally served to maintain the humanist purity of disciplines like sociology; I will just mention one. We encounter the material world, it is said, not in its raw state (as studied by physicists or ecologists, say) but as drenched in meaning. The world means something, or many different things, to us. And the point to note is that 'meaning' functions here as a cut-off, a circuit-breaker. Meanings are in our heads and in society; they are not in the material world. So, sociologists can go ahead and study the meanings that people attach to machines or nature without encroaching on the territory of the hard sciences, and the disciplinary division of labor, enshrined in the universities since the 19th century, can live on. The social sciences are about the human meanings of, or attitudes towards, machines, the environment, or whatever; the hard sciences are about things in themselves. That is the basic split that I want to focus on in what follows—actually, to undo it. But I can quickly mention one further twist for the sake of clarity.The basic split between meanings and things-in-themselves is an index of a certain realism—a bow from the soft sciences to the harder sciences, an acknowledgment that the latter somehow gets things right and that what the soft sciences study is a soggy social residue. But some social scientists have refused to bend the knee. They argue that we are all humans, even hard scientists. Therefore we can never get beyond meanings. And therefore we should think of the material world as itself somehow constructed in social practice. The harder sciences find this view absurd, but it is manifest in a split in the social sciences between 'realists' [End Page 30] and 'constructivists'—a split which shows up in many places, including geography and environmental studies. The point I would stress, however, is that the social retains its purity, even in social constructivism—it is simply that there 'the social' expands without limit to encompass... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Asian Eels and Global Warming:A Posthumanist Perspective on Society and the EnvironmentAndrew Pickering (bio)My idea in this essay is to talk about how some recent developments in my field—science and technology studies—might pass over into environmental studies. In particular, I want to talk about a certain posthumanist perspective, as I call it, on the relation between people and things, because I think that it transfers nicely from thinking about (...) people and machines to thinking about people and the environment.1 I want to say in advance that while the word 'posthumanist' might sound a bit peculiar, the posthumanist perspective is straightforward enough. If scholars have taken a long time to arrive it, the difficulty lies, I believe, in a disciplinary division of labor rather than in any intrinsic incomprehensibility. And I can start with a few general remarks about that.The basic point to note is that the academic disciplines carve up the visible world in a systematic way. On the one hand, the natural sciences, engineering, and so on, like to talk about a world of things from which people are notably absent. This is clear in fields like physics and chemistry, but it is probably true enough in the environmental sciences, too. Human beings might disturb ecosystems, say, but the job of the ecologist [End Page 29] is to understand the systems themselves, not the disturbances. The social sciences and humanities, in contrast, like to talk about people but not about things. Durkheimian sociology is a great example. Durkheim insisted that the social was a separate reality, sui generis, and that the social therefore has its own pure dynamics, cut off from, say, the material world.We find, then, a beautiful disciplinary dualism: to the harder sciences goes the world of things; to the softer sciences goes the world of people. What about the interface of people and things, the zone of intersection? This is of no concern to the hard sciences: one can easily imagine the world of things going on without people. But what about the soft sciences? One can't really imagine a world of people without things. Here various maneuvers have traditionally served to maintain the humanist purity of disciplines like sociology; I will just mention one. We encounter the material world, it is said, not in its raw state (as studied by physicists or ecologists, say) but as drenched in meaning. The world means something, or many different things, to us. And the point to note is that 'meaning' functions here as a cut-off, a circuit-breaker. Meanings are in our heads and in society; they are not in the material world. So, sociologists can go ahead and study the meanings that people attach to machines or nature without encroaching on the territory of the hard sciences, and the disciplinary division of labor, enshrined in the universities since the 19th century, can live on. The social sciences are about the human meanings of, or attitudes towards, machines, the environment, or whatever; the hard sciences are about things in themselves. That is the basic split that I want to focus on in what follows—actually, to undo it. But I can quickly mention one further twist for the sake of clarity.The basic split between meanings and things-in-themselves is an index of a certain realism—a bow from the soft sciences to the harder sciences, an acknowledgment that the latter somehow gets things right and that what the soft sciences study is a soggy social residue. But some social scientists have refused to bend the knee. They argue that we are all humans, even hard scientists. Therefore we can never get beyond meanings. And therefore we should think of the material world as itself somehow constructed in social practice. The harder sciences find this view absurd, but it is manifest in a split in the social sciences between 'realists' [End Page 30] and 'constructivists'—a split which shows up in many places, including geography and environmental studies. The point I would stress, however, is that the social retains its purity, even in social constructivism—it is simply that there 'the social' expands without limit to encompass... (shrink)

During the mid-18th century, when electricity was coming into its own, natural philosophers began to entertain the possibility that electricity is the mysterious nerve force. Their attention was first drawn to several species of strongly electric fish, namely torpedoes, a type of African catfish, and a South American "eels." This was because their effects felt like those of discharging Leyden jars and could be transmitted along known conductors of electricity. Moreover, their actions could not be adequately explained by popular mechanical (...) theories. Many of the early documents supportive of the hypothesis of animal electricity were associated with the Dutch colonies in South America. This article presents and examines those documents, and shows how Dutch scientists on both sides of the Atlantic conducted experiments and communicated with each other in the 1750s and 1760s. It reveals the important roles played by inquisitive physicians and lovers of nature in South America, and by natural philosophers and collectors of exotic specimens in the Netherlands—learned men who began to make a credible case for animal electricity in some exciting places at a pivotal moment in time. (shrink)

The phrase ἐγχέλυές τε καὶ ἰχθύες (‘eels and fish’) appears twice inIliadBook 21, in descriptions of actions involving the river Xanthus:τὸν μὲν ἄρ’ ἐγχέλυές τε καὶ ἰχθύες ἀμφεπένοντο (203)the eels and fish dealt with him [sc. Asteropaeus].τείροντ᾽ ἐγχέλυές τε καὶ ἰχθύες οἱ κατὰ δίνας (353)distressed were the eels and fish beneath the eddies.The context in which these verses appear is not that important here, as this combination of words itself raised an interpretative problem in the minds of some ancient Homeric (...) scholars: why did Homer distinguish eels and fish when eels are a kind of fish? For instance, according to Aristonicus, Aristarchus flagged both passages ‘because Homer distinguished the eels from the fish’—and Homer would not have done that, is the implication, or it is puzzling that he did so, as he must have known that eelsarea kind of fish. (shrink)

During the mid-18th century, when electricity was coming into its own, natural philosophers began to entertain the possibility that electricity is the mysterious nerve force. Their attention was first drawn to several species of strongly electric fish, namely torpedoes, a type of African catfish, and a South American "eels." This was because their effects felt like those of discharging Leyden jars and could be transmitted along known conductors of electricity. Moreover, their actions could not be adequately explained by popular mechanical (...) theories. Many of the early documents supportive of the hypothesis of animal electricity were associated with the Dutch colonies in South America. This article presents and examines those documents, and shows how Dutch scientists on both sides of the Atlantic conducted experiments and communicated with each other in the 1750s and 1760s. It reveals the important roles played by inquisitive physicians and lovers of nature in South America, and by natural philosophers and collectors of exotic specimens in the Netherlands—learned men who began to make a credible case for animal electricity in some exciting places at a pivotal moment in time. (shrink)

Explanations are supposed to provide us with understanding. It is common to make a distinction between genuine, scientific understanding, and the phenomenological, or ‘aha’ notion of understanding, where the former is considered epistemically relevant, the latter irrelevant. I argue that there is a variety of phenomenological understanding that does play a positive epistemic role. This phenomenological understanding involves a similarity between bodily sensations that is used as evidence for mechanistic hypotheses. As a case study, I will consider 17th and 18th (...) century research into the mechanism behind the electric eel’s power to shock. Se supone que las explicaciones nos dotan de comprensión. Es habitual hacer una distinción entre compresión cientifica, genuina, y la noción fenomenológica, o ‘ahá’, de comprensión, donde la primera se considera epistemológicamente relevante y esta última irrelevante. Argumento que hay un tipo de compresión fenomenológica que sí juega un papel positivo epistémico. Esta comprensión epistemológica conlleva cierta semejanza con las sensaciones corporales que se usan como evidencia de algunas hipótesis mecanicistas. Como caso de estudio, consideraré la investigación en los siglos xvii y xviii del mecanismo tras la capacidad de la anguila eléctrica para provocar un shock. (shrink)

Recent discussion of the problems associated with glacie has been copious. It has arisen out of Housman's note, which runs as follows: ‘glacie nemini, quantum scio, praeterquam mini et Schradero et Hadriano Valesio admirationem mouit: ceteris exploratum est frigore pisces maculosos fieri, eos praesertim qui torrentem cloacam, locum frigidissimum, penetrare soleant.’ In his 1931 reprint he added : ‘Ruperti took exception to glacie, but only to its case’. Housman's ironically stated objection to the sense is indeed a formidable difficulty; though (...) the other—the fact of the two ablatives and the vagueness of the former—is itself serious enough to provide an additional indication of corruption. (shrink)

During the summer of 1774, five “electric eels” survived the voyage from Surinam to Charles Towne (Charleston), South Carolina. Naturalists knew that these river fish actually only resembled eels. They also knew that that Carl Linnaeus had recently classified them as Gymnotus electricus (Linnaeus 1766; today they are Electrophorus electricus). But to most people, and even among natural philosophers, they were (and still are) loosely referred to as “eels.” For those willing to pay, a group that included physicians, gentlemen-scientists, and (...) other inquisitive minds, there was an opportunity to observe them. A promotional piece in the June 20, 1774, edition of the South-Carolina Gazette informs interested .. (shrink)

The existing EELS literature has usefully identified the scope of ethical issues posed by pharmacogenetic and pharmacogenomic research. The time has come for in-depth examination of particular ethical issues. The involvement of racial and ethnic communities in pharmacogenetic and pharmacogenomic research is contentious precisely because it touches upon the science and politics of studying racial and ethnic difference. To date, the ethics literature has not seriously taken account of the fact that such research impinges upon the interests of communities, and (...) that taking such interests seriously requires that we both protect and empower communities in research. We propose a framework that rests upon the recognition that communities are heterogeneous human associations and differing policies are appropriate for differing communities. Community consent and consultation and community consultation alone are neither appropriate nor required for all pharmacogenetic and pharmacogenomic research. Rather, application of these policy protections must take into account particulars of both planned research and the communities involved. (shrink)

Those philosophers who gave a negative answer to all four questions were called "eel-wrigglers" by the Buddhists. It was impossible to fix their position either for approval or for rejection. They would criticize any view, positive or negative, but would not themselves hold any. And it was difficult for a serious person to enter into any controversy with them.

Anyone who picks up a collection of fragments of comic poetry is likely to be struck by the large number of references to eating fish. There are shopping-lists for fish, menus for fish and recipes for fish-dishes, with the ingredients and method of preparation graphically described. Aristophanes and others dwell in several places on the charms of eel wrapped in beet-leaves. Other writers describe preparations for a great fish-soup, or the dancing movements of fish as they are fried. Undoubtedly Athenaeus (...) is responsible for this preponderance among the fragments of Comedy of passages concerned primarily with food, especially fish, but some of the fragments are rather long in themselves and indicate, at the very least, that cooks were important characters in many plays, and that dinner-parties must have figured significantly in many plots. Outside Comedy, references to fish-consumption are somewhat fewer in number, but perhaps even more surprising when they do occur. It seems strange that Demosthenes, in discussing Philocrates' betrayal of his city, should think it at all relevant to state that he spent his ill-gotten gains on fish, or that Aeschines, attacking Timarchus on a capital charge, should dwell on his fondness for fish. Moreover, references to fish occur also in philosophy and the Hippocratic corpus. In fact, the frequency with which ancient authors seem to have written about fish reveals almost a preoccupation. The consumption offish clearly held a significance for the Athenians which needs to be uncovered and explained. (shrink)

The laboratory creation scene in Branagh’s film is brilliant….Even more frenzied and overwrought than Whale’s, Branagh’s creation scene is filmed with dozens of quick cuts, each shot full of movement across the frame. Victor races along his attic hall, cape flying before he discards it to appear bare-chested and vigorous. While pulleys move, bottles clank, and blue volts of electricity rise in glass Tesla tubes, the naked body on the gurney is raised into a copper vat. Electric eels dispense their (...) powerful shocks, a brown sac-like bellows "breathes" air or heat, and finally Victor stares close-up at the Creature’s eyes. The eyes are seen through a porthole in the vat: this, our first glimpse of the monster occurs nearly an hour into the film. "Live, live, live, live...." Victor chants, then "YES!" (much in the old Colin Clive mode) as it opens its eyes briefly. Nothing more occurs, though, and Victor walks away in despair; but, like us, he is brought suddenly to attention by a sharp and surprising snap of the monster’s fingers, which we also see close-up through a porthole (in a clear allusion to the Karloff monster’s birth scene). The next sequence drives home the fact that this is a real birth scene, as the vat is smashed open (the "water breaks") and Victor lifts out his huge new "baby," smacking its chest to clear its lungs. We watch an extended scene of birth struggle while Victor works to "deliver" his huge, naked, and hairless "baby" by lifting it out of the slime. Giving birth is not only very hard labor here; it’s messy, too. (shrink)

Certain scarce resources seem indivisible, unlike, e.g., land and cattle. But some such resources can be, and have been, turned into private property. In offshore fishing grounds, individual tranferable quotas have been issued to fishing firms that have, as a result, become custodians of fish stocks in those grounds. In the eel fishery on the Danish coast owners of farms by the coast had traditional rights to lay eeltraps leasing those rights out to professional fishermen. In the 1920’s in the (...) U.S., individual firms were gradually being granted, by court decision, exclusive broadcasting rights in a certain area and on a certain frequency. Grazing rights in Iceland were, from the beginning, allocated by quotas belonging to individual farmers. Fishing rights in Icelandic salmon rivers were also alocated by tradition to individual farmers.Certaines ressources rares semblent être indivisibles, contrairement à la terre et aux bovins par exemple. Mais de telles ressources peuvent devenir, et sont devenues, des biens privés. Dans le domaine des zones de pêche offshore, des quotas individuels transférables ont étés accordés aux entreprises de pêche qui sont devenues les gardiennes des stocks de poissons dans ces zones. Dans les pêcheries d’anguilles sur les côtes danoises, les propriétaires des fermes côtières avaient traditionnellement des droits pour poser des pièges et pouvaient louer ces droits à des pêcheurs professionnels. Dans les années 20 aux Etats Unis, des décisions de justice ont graduellement accordé à des entreprises individuelles des droits exclusifs de radiodiffusion sur certaines zones et sur certaines fréquences. Les droits de pâturage en Islande furent originellement alloués par quotas à des fermiers individuels. Les droits de pêche dans les rivières peuplées de saumons en Islande furent aussi alloués de manière traditionnelle à des fermiers individuels. (shrink)

��………………………………………………………... 3 Acorn Barnacle ………………………………………………………. 4 Spiny Pink Sea Star ………………………………………………….. 8 Decorator Crab ………………………………………………………. 9 Orange Sea Pen ……………………………………………………… 11 California Sea Cucumber ……………………………………………. 13 Dungeness Crab …………………………………………………….. 15 Boring Sulfur Sponge ………………………………………………. 19 Moon Snail …………………………………………………………. 22 Opalescent Nudibranch …………………………………………….. 24 Moon Jellyfish ……………………………………………………... 27 Bay Pipefish ……………………………………………………….. 31 Green Surf Anemone ………………………………………………. 34 Spot Prawn …………………………………………………………. 35 Sea Urchin …………………………………………………………. 37 Shiner Perch ……………………………………………………….. 39 Sunflower Sea Star ………………………………………………… 41 Squat Lobster ………………………………………………………. 43 Plumose Anemone …………………………………………………. 45 (...) Ochre Sea Star ……………………………………………………… 47 Wolf Eel ……………………………………………………………. 49 Sand Dollar ………………………………………………………… 51 2 Introduction.. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 5 - 22 Erasmus’ famous elusiveness can be linked to a marked preference for media and genres that allowed for a _persona_, a mask, behind which the ‘real’ Erasmus could disappear at will. This article seeks to identify the literary, rhetorical and above all dialectical patterns Erasmus made use of in order to separate man and argument and to distance speaker and enunciation. This does not only refer to Erasmus’ familiarity with satirical and (...) rhetorical devices, but also to his ingenious emulation of debating techniques that were common practice among the schoolmen he attacked so fervently. Erasmus’ famous ambiguity and eel-like quality is, at least in some high-profile cases, owed to his ambition of establishing declamation as an equivalent to scholastic controversial formats. Some of his most famous texts are testimony to the attempt of constructing a debating arena in print. (shrink)

According to an editor of The Economist, the world produced, in the years since World War II, seven times more goods than throughout all history. This is well appreciated by lay people, but has hardly affected social scientists. They do not have the conceptual apparatus for understanding accelerated material-technical change and its meaning for people's personal lives, for their ways of relating to them-selves and to the outside world. Of course, a great deal of speculation about emerging life forms in (...) industrialised societies exists and social scientists with a futuristic bend have projected their diverse visions upon public debates, ranging from thc Efficient Hedonism of "post-industrialist' society a la Daniel Bell to the “Responsible Convivialism” of 'post-materialist" critics such as Fritz Schumacher. Competing images of the coming "services society" or "self-service society" share a central concern: the ongoing relation between tile spheres of large organisations and personal lifestyles, between salaried work arid private consumption. They also share a eel-tau' implausibility: few people recognize themselves in either projection. And they sham ubiquitous reference to "technology", without accounting for it in real terms. A good diagnostic of what is actually happening seems to me to be Jonathan Gershuny, who sees a drift toward a particular type of self-service economy: a quite radical shift in the mode of provision of social services, as he calls it, based on new kinds of consumer technologies. Industrialization used to be partial, but is becoming total fast. This process obviously has many facets, the one I am interested in here is the intrusion of modern technology into spheres of life which in the past have been relatively little dependent on it. (shrink)

The indefensible ideas of Aristotle with which we shall be dealing are ideas such as that eels arise, not from eels, but from mud and slime, that the faculty of reason is not seated in the brain or in any other bodily organ, and that some humans are slaves by nature, ideas that are known, some twenty-three hundred years after they were written down, to be false. These ideas are a problem for a contemporary Aristotelian if they have been validly (...) derived from the general principles of Aristotle’s philosophy. For in that case the indefensibility of the idea will stem from one or more of his general principles. This might, and probably should, lead one to conclude that no reasonable person should be an Aristotelian in the twenty-first century. No dedicated Aristotelian, including this one, can welcome this conclusion. Hence, the goal of this paper is to show how it can be avoided. (shrink)

Why Can a Japanese Unagi-Sentence Be Used in a Request? The objective of this paper is to reveal why the so-called Unagi-sentence in Japanese can be widely used in the context of request within the framework of cognitive linguistics and cognitive pragmatics. The Unagi-sentence, which is known as a representative sentence of the Japanese language, has been analyzed for years in various manners from various viewpoints. For instance, the sentence "Boku-wa Unagi-da" when literally translated into English reads I am an (...) eel. One of the most influential reasons for this sentence being regarded as characteristic to Japanese seems to be the clear difference in the sense in that the literally translated version in English means the identification between I and an eel, whereas the Unagi-sentence in Japanese indicates who orders the eel dish or sometimes requests the waiter to put a proper dish in a proper place. This thesis discusses the schematic meaning of the "X-wa Y-da" pattern in Japanese; further, it discusses the tendency for the Japanese language, unlike English, to depend more heavily on contextual information when the construed mental images are encoded. Through the discussion, I will reveal that the study of the Unagi-sentence from the viewpoint of cognitive linguistics sheds a new light on the contrastive studies in the field of pragmatics. (shrink)

Aeneas ends his first speech to Dido as follows: quae te tam laeta tulerunt saecula? qui tanti talem genuere parentes? in freta dum fluuii current, dum montibus umbrae lustrabunt conuexa, polus dum sidera pascet, semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt, quae me cumque uocant terrae. A number of parallels have been cited for 607–9, notably Eel. 1.59f. and the positive statement at Eel. 5.76ff., which even ends with the same line.

Dans cet article je mets en évidence quelques problèmes conceptuels importants posés par le prétendu phénomène de la génération spontanée, en montrant comment ils étaient liés historiquement à la question théorique des origines et de l’ontologie des espèces biologiques. Au XVIe et XVIIe siècle tout particulièrement, la possibilité que des formes organiques soient générées dans la matière inorganique supposait la possibilité que le hasard gouverne non seulement l’apparition d’une anguille ou d’une souris, mais qu’il gouverne l’apparition originelle de leurs espèces (...) mêmes. En outre, dans la conception de la reproduction sexuelle que le mécanisme parvient à répandre, toute génération, des êtres humains aussi bien que des anguilles, menace de ne plus s’expliquer autrement que par ce que Descartes appelle « les causes mineures ». Ainsi, comme je tenterai de le prouver, les problèmes théoriques que la génération spontanée, telle que le début de la modernité la concevait, posaient à la compréhension de l’ontologie des espèces, n’étaient pas essentiellement différents de ceux soulevés par l’explication mécaniste de la reproduction sexuelle, et si nous n’accordons pas à ce fait l’attention nécessaire, nous perdons de vue, je pense, un facteur important dans le rejet ultime de la génération spontanée.In this article I shall draw out some of the important conceptual problems posed by the purported phenomenon of spontaneous generation, showing how these problems were historically connected with the theoretical question of the origins and nature of biological species, and above all with the problem of their boundaries. In the 16th- and 17th- centuries in particular, the possibility of organic forms arising from inorganic matter carried with it the possibility that chance governs not only the emergence of an individual eel or mouse, but indeed governs the original emergence of the mouse- and eel-kinds. Moreover, on the newly ascendant mechanist understanding of sexual reproduction, all generation, whether of eels or of horses and men, now threatened to be exhaustively accounted for in terms of what Descartes called ‘minor causes’. Thus, I argue, the sort of problems that spontaneous generation was perceived to bring about for the early modern understanding of the ontology of species were not in principle any different from the problems posed by the mechanist account of sexual reproduction, and if we fail to note this, I show, we overlook an important factor in the eventual demise of spontaneous-generation theory. (shrink)

THE RELATIONSHIP between the artist, his work, and its audience will become clearer when we realize that works of art are not natural kinds like "eel" and "man," nor are they physical objects, but are instead, what I will call "normative-kinds.".

This paper explores the concept of "inorganic sexuality" in the work of Italian writer and philosopher Mario Perniola. The main objective is to develop the controversial and original aspects of Perniola's thought within his aesthetic theory of feeling. Perniola elaborates the so-called "thing that feels", namely a feeling in which the neutral and impersonal dimensions of the things flow into organic life and vice versa. This perspective, as will be clarified, by dissolving the vitalist and spiritualist drives of the subject, (...) enlarges the horizon of aesthetic feeling by welcoming what is commonly left outside of it: the inorganic and material world, in its surprising aspects, but also in its uncanny and disturbing ones. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to show the significance and the value of neutral sexuality, which opens up a space of experiences beyond the traditional metaphysical oppositions such as masculine/feminine, organic/inorganic, alive/dead, real/virtual, gender/sex. (shrink)

Excerpt from Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen Ellian überfieht hier einen großen 11nterf chieh. 9ille bief e legten enihenten (c)äße, auf hie fich unfer qbiffen grünhet, finh allgeo meine Urteile, hie nicht ergahlen, haß irgenh ettoa8 fei ober gev fchehe, fonhern hie nur fagen, maß ha toiirhe fein ober gefehehen m it ff en, wenn heftimmte ßehingungen eintreten, oher furger: fie hrlicten alle Bloß getoiffe allgemeine $regeln au6' henen mir in her $erfniipfung he8 horftellharen 3nhaltß folgen miiffen. (R)agegen (...) hie (c)äße, auf henen haß eigentiimlichfte 8ntereffe her 2rdigion liegt, g. Haß (c)ott fei, haß er hie fibelt gefehaffen habe, haß hie @eele nach hem $ohe fortlehe te.' finh fämtlirh af f ertorif che Urteile, welche eine heftimmte hartiiulare EI h atf ache hehaupten. I5on feneu allgemeinen (c)äßen faun man hegreifen, haß fie (R)egem ftänhe unmittelbarer @infirht ober @hiheng für un6 fein fönnen; henn fie finh gar nicht6 anhere6 al8 Qlußhriiäe her $hätigteitßformen, in henen {ich unfere >bernunft ihrer eigenen 92atur gemäß hetoegen muß. 'dagegen hiefe affertorifchen @äße he8 (c)lauhenß, toelche eine unferer eigenen 9iatur fremhe $hatfache her 233dteinriehtuug hehaupten, ihnen nicht mit gleichem $recht al6 eine natürliche oberangeborne 2lußftattung unfae8 (c)eifte6 gelten, fonhern fmh auf irgenh eine 28eife Cirgebniffe her fliilhung. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

A User's Guide to Melancholy takes Robert Burton's encyclopaedic masterpiece The Anatomy of Melancholy (first published in 1621) as a guide to one of the most perplexing, elusive, attractive, and afflicting diseases of the Renaissance. Burton's Anatomy is perhaps the largest, strangest, and most unwieldy self-help book ever written. Engaging with the rich cultural and literary framework of melancholy, this book traces its causes, symptoms, and cures through Burton's writing. Each chapter starts with a case study of melancholy - from (...) the man who was afraid to urinate in case he drowned his town to the girl who purged a live eel - as a way into exploring the many facets of this mental affliction. A User's Guide to Melancholy presents in an accessible and illustrated format the colourful variety of Renaissance melancholy, and contributes to contemporary discussions about wellbeing by revealing the earlier history of mental health conditions. (shrink)