Normic laws have the form "if A, then normally B". This paper attempts to show that if a philosophical analysis of normic laws (1, 4) is combined with certain developments in nonmono- tonic logic (2, 3), the following problems in philosophy of science can be seen in a new pers- pective which, at least in many cases, allows to improve their received analysis: explanation and individual case understanding in the humanities (1, 2), an evolution-theoretic foundation of (...) normic laws which explains their omnipresence and establishes a the connection between prototypi- cal and statstical normality, (¤4), ceteris paribus laws (¤5), differences between physical versus non-physical sciences (¤6) and finally, theory-protection through auxiliary hypotheses (¤7). (shrink)

I critically discuss Gerhard Schurz’ improved version of Hempel’s covering law model as the model appropriate for human action explanation in the historical sciences. Schurz takes so-called “normic laws” as the best means to save Hempel’s covering law model from the objection that there are no strict laws in historiography. I criticize Schurz approach in two respects: 1) Schurz falsely takes Dray’s account of historical explanations to be a normic law account. 2) Human action explanation in (...) terms of goals and means-ends-beliefs are not based on normic laws at all, for the explanandum in an explanation follows from the volitional and doxastic premises alone. To show this, I argue that there is a conceptual connection between volition and action, rooted in our actual usage of volitional concepts. Ultimately, a difference in principle between the methods of explanation in science and historiography has to be acknowledged. (shrink)

Normic laws have the form "if A, then normally B." They are omnipresent in everyday life and non-physical 'life' sciences such as biology, psychology, social sciences, and humanities. They differ significantly from ceteris-paribus laws in physics. While several authors have doubted that normic laws are genuine laws at all, others have argued that normic laws express a certain kind of prototypical normality which is independent of statistical majority. This paper presents a foundation (...) for normic laws which is based on generalized evolution theory and explains their omnipresence, lawlikeness, and reliability. It is argued that the fact that normic laws are a product of evolution must establish a systematic connection between prototypical and statistical normality. (shrink)

Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why (...) the understanding of the individual case is so important here. After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality. (shrink)

It has not been sufficiently considered in philosophical discussions of ceteris paribus (CP) laws that distinct kinds of CP-laws exist in science with rather different meanings. I distinguish between (1.) comparative CP-laws and (2.) exclusive CP-laws. There exist also mixed CP-laws, which contain a comparative and an exclusive CP-clause. Exclusive CP-laws may be either (2.1) definite, (2.2) indefinite or (2.3) normic. While CP-laws of kind (2.1) and (2.2) exhibit deductivistic behaviour, CP-laws (...) of kind (2.3) require a probabilistic or non-monotonic reconstruction. CP-laws of kind (1) may be both deductivistic or probabilistic. All these kinds of CP-laws have empirical content by which they are testable, except CP-laws of kind (2.2) which are almost vacuous. Typically, CP-laws of kind (1) express invariant correlations, CP-laws of kind (2.1) express closed system laws of physical sciences, and CP-laws of kind (2.3) express normic laws of non-physical sciences based on evolution-theoretic stability properties. (shrink)

In the first part I argue that normic laws are the phenomenological laws of evolutionary systems. If this is true, then intuitive human reasoning should be fit in reasoning from normic laws. In the second part I show that system P is a tool for reasoning with normic laws which satisfies two important evolutionary standards: it is probabilistically reliable, and it has rules of low complexity. In the third part I finally report results (...) of an experimental study which demonstrate that intuitive human reasoning is in well accord with basic argument patterns of system P. (shrink)

Why can testimony alone be enough for findings of liability? Why statistical evidence alone can’t? These questions underpin the “Proof Paradox” (Redmayne 2008, Enoch et al. 2012). Many epistemologists have attempted to explain this paradox from a purely epistemic perspective. I call it the “Epistemic Project”. In this paper, I take a step back from this recent trend. Stemming from considerations about the nature and role of standards of proof, I define three requirements that any successful account in line with (...) the Epistemic Project should meet. I then consider three recent epistemic accounts on which the standard is met when the evidence rules out modal risk (Pritchard 2018), normic risk (Ebert et al. 2020), or relevant alternatives (Gardiner 2019 2020). I argue that none of these accounts meets all the requirements. Finally, I offer reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects of having a successful epistemic explanation of the paradox. I suggest the discussion on the proof paradox would benefit from undergoing a ‘value-turn’. (shrink)

Normality judgements are frequently used in everyday communication as well as in biological and social science. Moreover they became increasingly relevant to formal logic as part of defeasible reasoning. This paper distinguishes different kinds of normality statements. It is argued that normality laws like “Birds can normally fly” should be understood essentially in a statistical way. The argument has basically two parts: firstly, a statistical semantic core is mandatory for a descriptive reading of normality in order to explain the (...) logical features of normality laws. Secondly, a statistical justification of normality statements can be derived by game theoretic considerations if the normality law is understood as communication convention. (shrink)

Martin Smith has recently proposed, in this journal, a novel and intriguing approach to puzzles and paradoxes in evidence law arising from the evidential standard of the Preponderance of the Evidence. According to Smith, the relation of normic support provides us with an elegant solution to those puzzles. In this paper I develop a counterexample to Smith’s approach and argue that normic support can neither account for our reluctance to base affirmative verdicts on bare statistical evidence nor resolve (...) the pertinent paradoxes. Normic support is, as a consequence, not a successful epistemic anti-luck condition. (shrink)

Inimvajadus seletatavana on empiirilis-teoreetiline mõiste, mille kaudu on sõnastatavad mitmed humanoloogilised normtasemeseadused . Vajadus seletajana on teatavate otsuste õigustaja. Artiklis visandatakse vajaduse teoreetiline mudel, mis kirjeldaks kindlat hulka praktiliselt paratamatuid inimelu fenomene, mida nimetatakse vajadusteks, seletaks vajaduste ilmnemist ja õigustaks vajaduste rahuldamisele ehk kahju vältimisele suunatud tegevust. Mudeli tarvilikud tingimused on vajaduse subjekt - inimisik või inimgrupp; vajaduse objekt ehk otstarve, mis rahuldab vajaduse ja kõrvaldab vajaduspinge; potentsiaalne kahju , mis vältimatult sünnib vajadushüve puudusest; vajaduse vältimatuse tingimused - kindlad sõltuvusseosed (...) inimkeha ja inimvaimu ning materiaalse ja kultuurilise elukeskkonna vahel; vajaduse pingetegur - sõltuvusseostest tulenev sund tegutseda vajaduse rahuldamise sihil. Inimvajadused on liigitatavad kahte kategooriasse ja mitmesse tüüpi. Vahetud vajadused on organismi füsioloogilised ja psüühilised vajadused ning organismi ja isiksuse keskkonna- ja elutingimusvajadused. Vahendlikud ehk funktsionaalsed olukorrakohased vajadused on tarbed vahendite järele, vältimaks või vähendamaks tõsist sattumuslikku kahju (nt kirurgia, ravimid); tarbed vahendite järele, rahuldamaks vahetuid vajadusi (nt toiduainete tööstus); tarbed vahetuid vajadusi rahuldava koostöö ja ressursiallikate järele; lõpuks tarbed innovaatiliste vahendite järele, millega tagada normtasemele vastavat eluviisi (nt elatusraha, osasaamist kultuuripärandist). Sellisena väljendab vajadus teatavat elutähtsat tingimust, mille kestev puudus tekitab vältimatult inimisikule tõsist kahju ja mille potentsiaalne või lühiajaline puudus avaldab inimesele praktiliselt paratamatut motiveerivat survet. Mis tahes vajaduse rahuldamise tõeliseks aluseks on isiksuse tõsise kahjustumise vältimine. Human need is an empirical-theoretical concept allowing formulation of humanological normic-level laws . The author proposes a theoretical model, which is able to describe a certain set of practically necessary phenomena of human life, to explain the appearance of these phenomena, and to justify decisions aiming at need-satisfaction, i.e. avoidance of serious harm . The necessary conditions of the model are a subject of the need (personal or collective), an object of the need (an appropriate operational function (purpose)), the potential harm of an unsatisfied need, nomological and humanological conditions of unavoidability of need , and the tension-factors of the need. There are two categories and several types of human needs. The immediate needs are the physiological and psychological functionality of an organism and the immediate life-conditions of an organism and personality. The intermediate , i.e. functional and circumstantial, needs are for the innovative means of direct harm avoidance and remedy, for the innovative means of the basic need-satisfaction, for the cooperation and for the sources (resources) of the basic need-satisfaction, and for the innovative providers of normal ( normic-level ) life-conditions. Therefore, the need is a vitally important condition, ongoing shortage of which inevitably and seriously harms a person, but a potential or a short-term shortage of which motivates him or her to practically necessary action. The genuine ground of need-satisfaction is the avoidance of causing serious harm to the human personality. (shrink)

There is something puzzling about statistical evidence. One place this manifests is in the law, where courts are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts on evidence that is purely statistical, in spite of the fact that it is perfectly capable of meeting the standards of proof enshrined in legal doctrine. After surveying some proposed explanations for this, I shall outline a new approach – one that makes use of a notion of normalcy that is distinct from the idea of statistical frequency. (...) The puzzle is not, however, merely a legal one. Our unwillingness to base beliefs on statistical evidence is by no means limited to the courtroom, and is at odds with almost every general principle that epistemologists have proposed as to how we ought to manage our beliefs. (shrink)

According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference (...) between ceteris paribus laws and brute statistical generalisations. I go on to discuss, in light of this suggestion, issues such as classical and lottery-driven scepticism as well as the lottery and preface paradoxes. (shrink)

The question of whether there are laws in ecology is important for a number of reasons. If, as some have suggested, there are no ecological laws, this would seem to distinguish ecology from other branches of science, such as physics. It could also make a difference to the methodology of ecology. If there are no laws to be discovered, ecologists would seem to be in the business of merely supplying a suite of useful models. These models would (...) need to be assessed for their empirical adequacy but not for their ability to capture fundamental truths, or the like. If, on the other hand, ecology does have laws, this prompts further questions about what these laws are and why even the best candidates for ecological laws fall short of what might be expected of laws. (shrink)

The year is 2100. Geena is the proud new owner of Emit, a state-of-the-art robot. She has just unwrapped him, the packaging strewn across the dining room floor. Emit is designed to replicate the outward behaviour of a human being down to the last detail . Emit responds to questions in much the same way humans do. Ask him how he feels and he will say he has had a tough day, has a slight headache, is sorry he broke that (...) vase, and so on. Geena flips the switch at the back of Emit's neck to ‘on’. Emit springs to life. (shrink)

A dialogue investigating whether the usual religious defences of belief in God are really up to the job.

Thinking tools is a regular feature that offers tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

Thinking tools is a regular feature that offers tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

Metaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality; scientists, in terms of symmetry and invariance. In this book van Fraassen argues that no metaphysical account of laws can succeed. He analyzes and rejects the arguments that there are laws of nature, or that we must believe there are, and argues that we should disregard the idea of law as an adequate clue to science. After exploring what this means for general epistemology, the author (...) develops the empiricist view of science as a construction of models to represent the phenomena. (shrink)

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. Here we get to grips with two everyday reasoning errors.

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. Here I tell a cautionary tale about flying saucers and take a brief look at the virtues of ‘open-mindedness’.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. Here we get to grips with two everyday reasoning errors.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. Here l explain some of the techniques commonly used by ‘gurus’ to dupe people into thinking they have something profound to say.

Thinking tools is a regular feature that offers tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. In this installment, we focus, not on faulty reasoning per se, but on an example of how we can be led astray or manipulated without our even realizing what is going on. Our critical faculties are entirely sidestepped!

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. Here we get to grips with an everyday reasoning error: the gambler's fallacy.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

In Causes, Laws, and Free Will, Kadri Vihvelin argues that we can have free will even if everything we do is predictable given the laws of nature and the past. The belief that determinism robs us of free will springs from mistaken beliefs about the metaphysics of causation, the nature of laws, and the logic of counterfactuals.

"What is a military aircraft? John Law shows in his beautiful analysis that it is a constant oscillation between multiplicity and singularity.

Although much recent social science and humanities work has been a revolt against simplification, this volume explores the contrast between simplicity and complexity to reveal that this dichotomy, itself, is too simplistic. John Law and Annemarie Mol have gathered a distinguished panel of contributors to offer—particularly within the field of science studies—approaches to a theory of complexity, and at the same time a theoretical introduction to the topic. Indeed, they examine not only ways of relating to complexity but complexity _in (...) practice._ Individual essays study complexity from a variety of perspectives, addressing market behavior, medical interventions, aeronautical design, the governing of supranational states, ecology, roadbuilding, meteorology, the science of complexity itself, and the psychology of childhood trauma. Other topics include complex wholes in the sciences, moral complexity in seemingly amoral endeavors, and issues relating to the protection of African elephants. With a focus on such concepts as multiplicity, partial connections, and ebbs and flows, the collection includes narratives from Kenya, Great Britain, Papua New Guinea, the Netherlands, France, and the meetings of the European Commission, written by anthropologists, economists, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and scholars of science, technology, and society. _Contributors._ Andrew Barry, Steven D. Brown, Michel Callon, Chunglin Kwa, John Law, Nick Lee, Annemarie Mol, Marilyn Strathern, Laurent Thévenot, Charis Thompson. (shrink)

One of the main challenges confronting Humean accounts of natural law is that Humean laws appear to be unable to play the explanatory role of laws in scientific practice. The worry is roughly that if the laws are just regularities in the particular matters of fact (as the Humean would have it), then they cannot also explain the particular matters of fact, on pain of circularity. Loewer (2012) has defended Humeanism, arguing that this worry only arises if (...) we fail to distinguish between scientific and metaphysical explanations. However, Lange (2013, 2018) has argued that scientific and metaphysical explanations are linked by a transitivity principle, which would undercut Loewer's defense and re-ignite the circularity worry for the Humean. I argue here that the Humean has antecedent reasons to doubt that there are any systematic connections between scientific and metaphysical explanations. The reason is that the Humean should think that scientific and metaphysical explanation have disparate aims, and therefore that neither form of explanation is beholden to the other in its pronouncements about what explains what. Consequently, the Humean has every reason to doubt that Lange's transitivity principle obtains. (shrink)