In this volume, three aspects are examined: a) normal subjects, where new findings on spatial behavior are described. b) brain-lesioned subjects, where the ...

In the first two sections of the paper, some basic terminological distinctions regarding “freedom of the will” as a philosophical problem are expounded and discussed. On this basis, the third section focuses on the examination of two neurophysiological experiments (one by Benjamin Libet and one by William Grey Walter), which in recent times are often interpreted as providing an empirical vindication of determinism and, accordingly, a refutation of positions maintaining freedom of the will. It will be argued that both experiments (...) fall short in this respect, and that in general—for methodical reasons—the prospects of ever deciding the dispute about freedom of the will through empirical research are rather poor. (shrink)

Philosophers and neuroscientists often suggest that we perceptually represent objects and their properties. However, they start from very different background assumptions when they use the term “perceptual representation”. On the one hand, sometimes philosophers do not need to properly take into consideration the empirical evidence concerning the neural states subserving the representational perceptual processes they are talking about. On the other hand, neuroscientists do not rely on a meticulous definition of “perceptual representation” when they talk about this empirical evidence that (...) is supposed to show that we perceptually represent such and such properties. It seems that, on both sides, something is missed. My aim is to show that, in the light of empirical evidence from neuroscience, the case of action properties is a good candidate in order to properly talk of perceptually represented properties. My claim is that the neurophysiological states encoding action properties are perceptual processes and that these perceptual processes are representational processes. That is, in the case of those neurophysiological states involved in the detection of action properties, it is correct to speak of perceptual representational states, and hence, ipso facto, of perceptually represented properties. First, I describe a reasonable and widely agreed upon conception of perceptual representation in the philosophical literature. Then, I report evidence from vision and motor neuroscience concerning the perception of action properties, which is subserved by the ventro-dorsal stream, a portion of the dorsal visual system. Finally, I show that a strong connection can be found between the philosophical idea of perceptual representation I have reported before and the neuroscientific evidence concerning the activity of the ventro-dorsal stream, whose job is, as said, to detect action properties. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to reveal the main methodological problems of neuroethics in the course of its development as an interdisciplinary approach to the study of morality, as well as to propose a critical analysis of the results of cognitive science (neurophysiol­ogy) in the context of moral philosophy. For this purpose, the author analyzes the modern subject field of neuroethical research from the point of view of philosophical ethics and discusses the main conceptions in which the results of (...) neurophysiological studies of the moral decision-making process are summarized. The author describes a general divi­sion of the subject field in terms of “neuroethics No. 1” (a part of bioethics) and “neu­roethics No. 2” (a proclaimed part of moral philosophy). The object of research of this ar­ticle is neuroethics No. 2. It is argued that in neuroethics No. 2 the conceptualization of the moral decision-making process is carried out everywhere in accordance with the scheme of “double processes”: intuitive / quick / associative and discursive / slow / calculation-based. Even if the role of intuition is denied, duality is still preserved. This is so because emotions, as an extra-rational part of the psyche, are considered the basis of a quick decision. It is shown that a non-reflexive borrowing of concepts and concep­tions of moral philosophy is carried out both at the level of formation of the subject of re­search and at the level of method. The qualitatively meaningful meaning of concepts is blurred or substituted. Such a language transition outside the boundaries of the subject area of neurophysiology only simulates the presence of interdisciplinarity. The research remains in the frames of the study of cognitive processes, without their moral component. It is concluded that for the development of neuroethics as an interdisciplinary direction, we need to obtain a synthesis of the meanings developed in the course of cultural devel­opment and of the data on human biological development. Further, in accordance with such a synthetic subject we need to adjust the research method, also we must avoid sub­stituting the concepts of philosophical ethics. (shrink)

The excellent and highly interesting commentaries address the following concerns: (1) neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of catatonia; (2) cognitive-motor deficits in catatonia; (3) conceptual issues; (4) general methodology in neuropsychiatric research; and (5) neurophilosophical implications. The specific problems, issues, and aspects raised by the different commentators are grouped under these categories in Table R1 presented below. These five areas of concern are then discussed in the order listed in the five sections of the Response.

Behav. and Brain Sci., 8, 558-566. Libet, B. (1987). 'Consciousness: Conscious, Subjective Experience.' In Encyclopedia of Neuroscience , ed. G. Adelman. ...

We briefly describe ways in which neuroeconomics has made contributions to its contributing disciplines, especially neuroscience, and a specific way in which it could make future contributions to both. The contributions of a scientific research programme can be categorized in terms of (1) description and classification of phenomena, (2) the discovery of causal relationships among those phenomena, and (3) the development of tools to facilitate (1) and (2). We consider ways in which neuroeconomics has advanced neuroscience and economics along each (...) line. Then, focusing on electrophysiological methods, we consider a puzzle within neuroeconomics whose solution we believe could facilitate contributions to both neuroscience and economics, in line with category (2). This puzzle concerns how the brain assigns reward values to otherwise incomparable stimuli. According to the common currency hypothesis, dopamine release is a component of a neural mechanism that solves comparability problems. We review two versions of the common currency hypothesis, one proposed by Read Montague and colleagues, the other by William Newsome and colleagues, and fit these hypotheses into considerations of rational choice. (shrink)

BackgroundPrenatal and early postnatal choline supplementation reduces cognitive and behavioral deficits in animal models of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder. In a previously published 9-month clinical trial of choline supplementation in children with FASD, we reported that postnatal choline was associated with improved performance on a hippocampal-dependent recognition memory task. The current paper describes the neurophysiological correlates of that memory performance for trial completers.MethodsChildren with FASD who were enrolled in a clinical trial of choline supplementation were followed for 9 months. Delayed (...) recall on a 9-step elicited imitation task served as the behavioral measure of recognition memory. Neurophysiological correlates of memory were assessed via event-related potentials.ResultsDelayed recall on EI was correlated with two ERP components commonly associated with recognition memory in young children: middle latency negative component and positive slow wave. No significant ERP differences were observed between the choline and placebo groups at the conclusion of the trial.ConclusionAlthough the small sample size limits the ability to draw clear conclusions about the treatment effect of choline on ERP, the results suggest a relationship between memory performance and underlying neurophysiological status in FASD. This trial was registered.1. (shrink)

Over the last decade in Germany, a number of neuroscientists—and among them most prominently Wolf Singer—have claimed to be able to offer scientific evidence derived from neurophysiologic findings to conclusively negate the existence of human free will. In this paper, Singer’s position is examined according to its principal characteristics in order to answer the question whether it is a novel position as opposed to a position pertaining to one of the traditions of western philosophy and anthropology. Furthermore, we try to (...) judge whether the neurobiological findings Singer and others use to justify their position are apt to satisfy the criteria for the presence of scientific evidence, i.e., if they are good reasons to believe that human will is unfree. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that neurophysiological materialism - the thesis that all of our mental contents are caused by non-mental, purely physical brain states - is epistemically self-refuting, and ought to be rejected even if it cannot be otherwise disproved.