Eyewitnesses are susceptible to recollecting that they experienced an event in a way that is consistent with false information provided to them after the event. The effect is commonly called the misinformation effect. Because jurors tend to find eyewitness testimony compelling and persuasive, it is argued that jurors are likely to give inappropriate credence to eyewitness testimony, judging it to be reliable when it is not. It is argued that jurors should be informed about psychological findings on (...) the misinformation effect, to ensure that they lower the credence that they give to eyewitness testimony to reflect the unreliability of human memory that is demonstrated by the effect. Here I present a new argument, the overcritical juror argument, to support the conclusion that eyewitnesses are likely to make inappropriate credence assignments to eyewitness testimony. Whereas previously authors have argued that jurors will tend to give too much credence to eyewitness testimony, I identify circumstances in which jurors will give too little credence to some pieces of testimony. In my view jurors should be informed by psychological findings relating to the misinformation effect to ensure that they do not lower the credence that they give to eyewitness testimony when they should not. (shrink)

In experiments concerning the misinformation effect, participants first watch some original material, e.g. a video clip, and read a description that in the experimental group contains information inconsistent with the video clip. Afterwards, all participants answer questions about the video. Typically, the misled group more often reports erroneous misleading information than the non-misled one.Theoretical explanations of this effect are usually formulated in terms of the cognitive theories of memory. This article presents three experiments that demonstrate that the (...) misinformation effect can occur even if the memory of the original and postevent materials is correct. In the experiments, after watching a video clip, reading a narrative about it, and answering questions about the video, the participants were debriefed and required to indicate questions in which they noticed differences between the video and the narrative, as well as provide answers about the original and postevent materials. A substantial number of the participants yielded to the misinformation effect in the memory test even though they had correct memory about the original materials. The discussion emphasizes the need of the social influence framework to explain these results. Key message: the misinformation effect is important for applied forensic eyewitness psychology. To get a better understanding of this effect, there is a need to study it not only in terms of the cognitive psychology of memory, but also from the perspective of social psychology, because in many cases witnesses give wrong answers even when remembering the correct information. (shrink)

In a typical experiment on the misinformation effect, subjects first watch some event, afterwards read a description of it which in the experimental group includes some incorrect details, and answer questions relating to the original event. Typically, subjects in the misled experimental group report more false details than those from the control group. The main purpose of the presented study was to compare two methods of reducing the misinformation effect, namely - warning against misinformation and (...) reinforced self-affirmation. The reinforced self-affirmation consists of two elements: the participants recall their greatest achievements of life, and are being given a positive feedback about their performance in a memory task. The obtained results showed that the reinforced self-affirmation was more effective than warning, although the latter also caused a significant reduction of the vulnerability to misinformation. (shrink)

Purpose Health misinformation poses severe risks to people’s health decisions and outcomes. A great deal of research in this area has focused on debunking misinformation and found limited effects of correctives after misinformation exposure. The research on prebunking strategies has been inadequate. Most has focused on forewarning and enhancing literacy skills and knowledge to recognize misinformation. Part of the reason for the inadequacy could be due to the challenges in conceptualizing and measuring knowledge. This study intends (...) to fill this gap and examines various types of knowledge, including subjective knowledge, cancer literacy, persuasion knowledge and media literacy. This study aims to understand how knowledge may moderate the effect of misinformation exposure on misbeliefs. Design/methodology/approach An online experiment with a basic experimental design (misinformation exposure: health misinformation vs factual health message) was conducted. The authors measured and tested the moderating role of different types of knowledge (subjective knowledge, cancer literacy, persuasion knowledge and media literacy) separately to improve the understanding of their role in combatting online health misinformation. Findings This study found that a higher level of cancer literacy and persuasion knowledge helped people identify misinformation and prevented them from being persuaded by it. A higher level of subjective knowledge, however, reduced the recognition of misinformation, thereby increasing the likelihood of being persuaded by it. Media literacy did not moderate the mediation path. Originality/value This study differentiates the role different types of knowledge may have played in moderating the influence of health misinformation. It contributes to a strategic development of interventions that better prepare people against the influence of health misinformation. (shrink)

"Why should we care about having true beliefs? And why do demonstrably false beliefs persist and spread despite consequences for the people who hold them? Philosophers of science Cailin O’Connor and James Weatherall argue that social factors, rather than individual psychology, are what’s essential to understanding the spread and persistence of false belief. It might seem that there’s an obvious reason that true beliefs matter: false beliefs will hurt you. But if that’s right, then why is it irrelevant to many (...) people whether they believe true things or not? In an age riven by "fake news," "alternative facts," and disputes over the validity of everything from climate change to the size of inauguration crowds, the authors argue that social factors, not individual psychology, are what’s essential to understanding the persistence of false belief and that we must know how those social forces work in order to fight misinformation effectively."–Publisher’s description. (shrink)

The issue of how best to combat the negative impacts of misinformation distributed via social media hangs on the following question: are there methods that most individuals can reasonably be expected to employ that would largely protect them from the negative impact that encountering misinformation on social media would otherwise have on their beliefs? If the answer is “yes,” then presumably individuals bear significant responsibility for those negative impacts; and, further, presumably there are feasible educational remedies for the (...) problem of misinformation. However, I argue that the answer is “no.” Accordingly, I maintain that individuals do not bear significant responsibility for the negative impacts at issue; and, further, I maintain that the only effective remedies for the problem of misinformation involve changing the information environment itself. (shrink)

This book argues that misinformation poses a multi-faceted threat to knowledge, while arguing that some forms of content moderation risk exacerbating these threats. It proposes alternative forms of content moderation that aim to address this complexity while enhancing human epistemic agency. The proliferation of fake news, false conspiracy theories, and other forms of misinformation on the internet and especially social media is widely recognized as a threat to individual knowledge and, consequently, to collective deliberation and democracy itself. This (...) book argues that misinformation presents a three-pronged threat to knowledge. While researchers often focus on the role of misinformation in causing false beliefs, this deceptive potential of misinformation exists alongside the potential to suppress trust and to distort the perception of evidence. Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of this threat is essential to the development of effective measures to mitigate the harms associated with misinformation. The book weaves together work in analytic epistemology with emerging empirical work in other disciplines to offer novel insights into the threats posed by misinformation. Additionally, it breaks new ground by systematically assessing different forms of content moderation from the perspective of epistemology. Misinformation, Content Moderation, and Epistemology will appeal to philosophers working in applied and social epistemology, as well as scholars and advanced students in disciplines such as communication studies, political science, and social psychology who are researching misinformation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPeople often continue to rely on misinformation in their reasoning after they have acknowledged a retraction; this phenomenon is known as the continued-influence effect. Retractions can be particularly ineffective when the retracted misinformation is consistent with a pre-existing worldview. We investigated this effect in the context of depressive rumination. Given the prevalence of depressotypic worldviews in depressive rumination, we hypothesised that depressive rumination may affect the processing of retractions of valenced misinformation; specifically, we predicted that (...) the retraction of negative misinformation might be less effective in depressive ruminators. In two experiments, we found evidence against this hypothesis: in depressive ruminators, retractions of negative misinformation were at least as effective as they were in control participants, and more effective than retractions of positive misinformation. Findings are interpreted in terms of an attentional bias that may enhance the sali... (shrink)

Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more (...) susceptible to believing Covid-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US sample, n = 998) in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths and misinformation about Covid-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic vice is associated with susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology. (shrink)

Misinformation can have significant societal consequences. For example, misinformation about climate change has confused the public and stalled support for mitigation policies. When people lack the expertise and skill to evaluate the science behind a claim, they typically rely on heuristics such as substituting judgment about something complex (i.e. climate science) with judgment about something simple (i.e. the character of people who speak about climate science) and are therefore vulnerable to misleading information. Inoculation theory offers one approach to (...) effectively neutralize the influence of misinformation. Typically, inoculations convey resistance by providing people with information that counters misinformation. In contrast, we propose inoculating against misinformation by explaining the fallacious reasoning within misleading denialist claims. We offer a strategy based on critical thinking methods to analyse and detect poor reasoning within denialist claims. This strategy includes detailing argument structure, determining the truth of the premises, and checking for validity, hidden premises, or ambiguous language. Focusing on argument structure also facilitates the identification of reasoning fallacies by locating them in the reasoning process. Because this reason-based form of inoculation is based on general critical thinking methods, it offers the distinct advantage of being accessible to those who lack expertise in climate science. We applied this approach to 42 common denialist claims and find that they all demonstrate fallacious reasoning and fail to refute the scientific consensus regarding anthropogenic global warming. This comprehensive deconstruction and refutation of the most common denialist claims about climate change is designed to act as a resource for communicators and educators who teach climate science and/or critical thinking. (shrink)

The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do (...) not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader “information effect”. (shrink)

Hate speech and misinformation are rife. How to respond? Counterspeech proposals say: with more and better speech. This paper considers the treatment of counterspeech in Maxime Lepoutre’s Democratic Speech In Divided Times. Lepoutre provides a nuanced defence of counterspeech. Some counterspeech, he grants, is flawed. But, he says: counterspeech can be debugged. Once we understand why counterspeech fails – when fail it does – we can engineer more effective counterspeech strategies. Lepoutre argues that the failures of counterspeech can be (...) theorised using the ideology of salience. Negative counterspeech fails because it reinforces the salience of the very ideas or associations that it contests. His solution? Positive counterspeech – a form of counterspeech which avoids the salience trap. I argue that the salience paradigm is ill-suited to theorise the failures of counterspeech. I suggest some alternatives. Further, I show that these alternative paradigms make importantly different practical recommendations – recommendations concerning how we ought to engineer our counterspeech – from those issued by the salience paradigm. (shrink)

The debate on whether and why misinformation is bad primarily focuses on the spread of false beliefs as its main harm. From the assumption that misinformation primarily causes harm through the spread of false beliefs as a starting point, it has been contended that the problem of misinformation has been exaggerated. Its tendency to generate false beliefs appears to be limited. However, the near-exclusive focus on whether or not misinformation dupes people with false beliefs neglects other (...) epistemic harms associated with it. Specifically, I show that misinformation also causes trouble for the epistemic goods of truth attainment, intellectual autonomy and debate pluriformity. Moreover, for each of these goods, I argue that emphasizing error-avoidance exacerbates, rather than mitigates, the harms caused by misinformation. These oversights and dilemmas show that prioritizing error-avoidance in the fight against misinformation is not a neutral default policy or necessarily a net positive. A shift in focus away from the spread of false beliefs as the main harm of misinformation is needed to better understand and counter its negative effects. (shrink)

There is a growing movement in online social networks and within some governments to deny the long-established scientific consensus regarding climate change. Scientific research has shown that a series of climatic events in Latin America, and especially in Brazil, are being exacerbated by global warming. These events have had a profound impact on populations. Disruptions to Brazilian rainfall patterns with their devastating environmental and economic effects on agriculture have been directly linked with Amazonian deforestation. Furthermore, the Bolsonaro government, with its (...) erratic environmental policies and ardent followers, has promoted misinformation about climate change and conservation of the Amazon. It is necessary to simultaneously inform society about scientific misunderstandings regarding the environment and the way these misunderstandings are amplified via the internet and social networks. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic poses an unprecedented threat to global human wellbeing, and the proliferation of online misinformation during this critical period amplifies the challenge. This study examines consequences of exposure to online misinformation about COVID-19 preventions. Using a three-wave panel survey involving 1,023 residents in Singapore, the study found that exposure to online misinformation prompts engagement in self-reported misinformed behaviors such as eating more garlic and regularly rinsing nose with saline, while discouraging evidence-based prevention behaviors such as (...) social distancing. This study further identifies information overload and misperception on prevention as important mechanisms that link exposure to online misinformation and these outcomes. The effects of misinformation exposure differ by individuals’ eheath literacy level, suggesting the need for a health literacy education to minimize the counterproductive effects of misinformation online. This study contributes to theory-building in misinformation by addressing potential pathways of and disparity in its possible effects on behavior. (shrink)

The world is swimming in misinformation. Conflicting messages bombard us every day with news on everything from politics and world events to investments and alternative health. The daily paper, nightly news, websites, and social media each compete for our attention and each often insist on a different version of the facts. Inevitably, we have questions: Who is telling the truth? How would we know? How did we get here? What can we do? Beyond Fake News answers these and other (...) queries. It offers a technological and market-based explanation for how our informational environment became so polluted. It shows how purveyors of news often have incentives to mislead us, and how consumers of information often have incentives to be misled. And it chronicles how, as technology improves and the regulatory burdens drop, our information-scape becomes ever more littered with misinformation. Beyond Fake News argues that even when we really want the truth, our minds are built in such a way so as to be incapable of grasping many facts, and blind spots mar our view of the world. But we can do better, both as individuals and as a society. As individuals, we can improve the accuracy of our understanding of the world by knowing who to trust and recognizing our limitations. And as a society, we can take important steps to reduce the quantity and effects of misinformation. (shrink)

Warning against warnings: Alerted subjects may perform worse. Misinformation, involvement and warning as determinants of witness testimony The article presents experiments exploring the memory misinformation effect. Subjects heard a recording and afterwards read a description of it, which included, in the misled group, some details inconsistent with the recording; finally thay answered questions about the recording. The aim of the research was to replicate the tainted truth effect, consisting in poor memory functioning of non-misled warned subjects (...) and to check whether a subject's involvement in the issue moderates this effect. Highly involved subjects were more resistant to the misinformation effect than those lowly involved. In the case of highly involved participants, warning was effective in reducing the misinformation effect, but it also caused more errors in the case of non-misled subjects. Thus, warning witnesses about nonexising discrepancies between what they saw/heard and what they were told, might lead to less accurate testimony. (shrink)

Misinformation about the novel coronavirus is a pressing societal challenge. Across two studies, one preregistered, we assess the efficacy of two ‘prebunking’ interventions aimed at improving people’s ability to spot manipulation techniques commonly used in COVID-19 misinformation across three different languages. We find that Go Viral!, a novel five-minute browser game, increases the perceived manipulativeness of misinformation about COVID-19, improves people’s attitudinal certainty in their ability to spot misinformation and reduces self-reported willingness to share misinformation (...) with others. The first two effects remain significant for at least one week after gameplay. We also find that reading real-world infographics from UNESCO improves people’s ability and confidence in spotting COVID-19 misinformation. Limitations and implications for fake news interventions are discussed. (shrink)

BackgroundUse of modified texture diets—thickening of liquids and modifying the texture of foods—in the hope of preventing aspiration, pneumonia and choking, has become central to the current management of dysphagia. The effectiveness of this intervention has been questioned. We examine requirements for a valid informed consent process for this approach and whether the need for informed consent for this treatment is always understood or applied by practitioners.Main textValid informed consent requires provision of accurate and balanced information, and that agreement is (...) given freely by someone who knows they have a choice. Current evidence, including surveys of practitioners and patients in different settings, suggests that practice in this area is often inadequate. This may be due to patients’ communication difficulties but also poor communication—and no real attempt to obtain consent—by practitioners before people are ‘put on’ modified texture diets. Even where discussion occurs, recommendations may be influenced by professional misconceptions about the efficacy of this treatment, which in turn may poison the well for the informed consent process. Patients cannot make appropriate decisions for themselves if the information provided is flawed and unbalanced. The voluntariness of patients’ decisions is also questionable if they are told ‘you must’, when ‘you might consider’ is more appropriate. Where the decision-making capacity of patients is in question, inappropriate judgements and recommendations may be made by substitute decision makers and courts unless based on accurate information.ConclusionResearch is required to examine the informed consent processes in different settings, but there is ample reason to suggest that current practice in this area is suboptimal. Staff need to reflect on their current practice regarding use of modified texture diets with an awareness of the current evidence and through the ‘lens’ of informed consent. Education is required for staff to clarify the importance of, and requirements for, valid informed consent and for decision making that reflects people’s preferences and values. (shrink)

In this article I investigate online misinformation from a media philosophy perspective. I, thus move away from the debate focused on the semantic content, concerned with what is true or not about misinformation. I argue rather that online misinformation is the effect of an informational climate promoted by user micro-behaviours such as liking, sharing, and posting. Misinformation online is explained as the effect of an informational environment saturated with and shaped by techno-images in which (...) most users act automatically under the constant assault of stirred emotions, a state resembling what media philosopher Vilém Flusser has called techno-magical consciousness. I describe three ways in which images function on social media to induce this distinctive, uncritical mode of consciousness, and complement Flusser’s explanation with insights from the phenomenology of emotions. (shrink)

This study examines the effectiveness of the inoculation strategy in countering vaccine-related misinformation among Hong Kong college students. A three-phase between-subject experiment was conducted to compare the persuasive effects of inoculation messages, supportive messages, and no message control. The results show that inoculation messages were superior to supportive messages at generating resistance to misinformation, as evidenced by more positive vaccine attitudes and stronger vaccine intention. Notably, while we expected the inoculation condition would produce more resistance than the control (...) condition, there was little evidence in favor of this prediction. Attitudinal threat and counterarguing moderated the experimental effects; issue involvement and political trust were found to directly predict vaccine attitudes and intention. The findings suggest that future interventions focus on developing preventive mechanisms to counter misinformation and spreading inoculation over the issue is an effective strategy to generate resistance to misinformation. Interventions should be cautious about using health advocacy initiated by governments among populations with low political trust. (shrink)

The design and reporting of data-driven studies seeking to measure misinformation are patchy and inconsistent, and these studies rarely measure associations with, or effects on, behaviour. The consequence is that data-driven misinformation studies are not yet useful as an empirical basis for guiding when to act on emerging misinformation threats, or for deciding when it is more appropriate to do nothing to avoid inadvertently amplifying misinformation. In a narrative review focused on examples of health-related misinformation, (...) we take a critical perspective of data-driven misinformation studies. To address this problem, we propose a curated and open library of misinformation examples and describe its structure and how it might be used to support actionable surveillance. We draw on experiences with other curated repositories to speculate on the likely challenges related to achieving critical mass and maintaining data consistency. We conclude that an open library of misinformation could help improve the consistency of data-driven misinformation study design and reporting, as well as provide an empirical basis from which to make decisions about how to act on new and emerging misinformation threats. (shrink)

Many of our beliefs are acquired online. Online epistemic environments are replete with fake news, fake science, fake photographs and videos, and fake people in the form of trolls and social bots. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the threat that such online fakes pose to the acquisition of knowledge. I argue that fakes can interfere with one or more of the truth, belief, and warrant conditions on knowledge. I devote most of my attention to the effects of (...) online fakes on satisfaction of the warrant condition, as these have received comparatively little attention. I consider three accounts of the conditions under which fakes compromise the warrant condition. I argue for the third of these accounts, according to which the propensity of fakes to exist in an environment threatens warrant acquisition in that environment. Finally, I consider some limitations on the epistemic threat of fakes and suggest some strategies by which this threat can be mitigated. (shrink)

One of the most significant aspects of Internet, in comparison with other sources of information, such as libraries, books, journals, television, radio etcetera, is that it makes expert knowledge much more accessible to non‐experts than the other traditional sources. This phenomenon has often been applauded for its democratizing effects. Unfortunately, there is also a disadvantage. Expert information that was originally intended for a specific group of people ‐ and not in any way processed or adapted to make it fit for (...) a broader audience ‐ can easily be misunderstood and misinterpreted by non‐experts and, when used as a basis for decisions, lead to unhappy consequences. Can these risks be diminished without limiting the informational freedoms of the information providers and without imposing paternalistic measures regarding the receivers of the information? (shrink)

In this paper, we critically consider the analogy between “infodemic” and “pandemic”, i.e. the spread of fake news about COVID-19 as a medial virus and the infection with the biological virus itself from the perspective of cultural evolutionary theory (CET). After confronting three major shortcomings of the ‘infodemic’ concept, we use CET as a background framework to analyze this phenomenon. To do so, we summarize which bi-ases are crucial for transmission in terms of cultural selection and how transmission is restricted (...) by filter bubbles or echo chambers acting as TRIMS (transmission isolating mechanisms) post “infection”, which isolate false from trustworthy scientific information in the context of the Corona pandemic. This is followed by a demonstration of the threat to biological fitness posed by the effects of an infection with fake news, which leads to a reduced willingness to vaccinate and follow health measures. We identify fake news on Covid as pseudoscience, trying to immunize itself from external influences. We then address the question of how to combat the infodemic. Since debunking strategies, such as warnings by fact-checking, have proven relatively ineffective in combating fake news, the inoculation theory from psychology might offer an alternative solution. Through its underlying ‘prebunking strategy’, which educates individuals about the risks and tactics of fake news prior to a potential infection, they could be ‘immunized’ in advance, similar to a virological vaccination. Although we recognize that the pandemic/infodemic analogy is in fact far from perfect, we believe that CET could provide a theoretical underpinning in order to give much more semantic depth to the concept ‘infodemic’. (shrink)

An increased focus on fake news and misinformation is currently emerging. But what does it mean when information is designated as “fake?” Research on deception has focused on lies of commission, in which people disclose something false as true. However, people can also lie by omission, by withholding important yet true information. In this research, we investigate when people are more likely to tell a lie of omission. In three studies, with tests among undergraduates, online sample respondents, and candidates (...) for U.S. Senate, we found that people in a gain frame were more likely to lie by omission (vs. commission), and vice versa for a loss frame. Moreover, participants rated lies of commission in a gain frame as the least acceptable type of deception, suggesting why people may avoid telling this kind of lie. Overall, our results emphasize that from frame-to-frame, lying is not only different in degree but different in kind. (shrink)

This paper addresses the critiques based on trade-offs and normativity presented in response to our target article proposing the Public Health Emergency Risk and Crisis Communication (PHERCC) framework. These critiques highlight the ethical dilemmas in crisis communication, particularly the balance between promoting public autonomy through transparent information and the potential stigmatization of specific population groups, as illustrated by the discussion of the mpox outbreak among men who have sex with men. This critique underscores the inherent tension between communication effectiveness and (...) autonomy versus fairness and equity. In response, our paper reiterates the adaptability of the PHERCC framework, emphasizing its capacity to tailor messages to diverse audiences, thereby reducing potential stigmatization and misinformation. Through community engagement and feedback integration, the PHERCC framework aims to optimize the effectiveness of communication strategies while addressing ethical concerns. Furthermore, by involving affected communities in the communication strategy from the onset, the framework seeks to minimize ethical trade-offs and enhance the acceptance and effectiveness of public health messages. (shrink)

There is a debate at the highest levels of government about how to classify the risks of research studies that evaluate therapies that are in widespread use. Should the risks of those therapies be considered as risks of research that is designed to evaluate those therapies? Or not? The Common Rule states, “In evaluating risks and benefits, the IRB should consider only those risks and benefits that may result from the research.” ). By contrast, the Office of Human Research Protections, (...) in a proposed “guidance” states, “The reasonably foreseeable risks of research include already-identified risks of the standards of care being evaluated as a purpose of the research.”.In this paper, I argue that the Common Rule got it right and OHRP got it wrong. When treatments are in widespread use, the risks of those treatments are ever-present for all patients. By enrolling in formal studies that use rigorous methods to compare one treatment with another and that carefully monitor outcomes and adverse events, patients are protected from the risks of idiosyncratic practice variation. Their risks are decreased, rather than increased.If OHRP's approach becomes the law of the land, patients will be misinformed about the relative risks of treatment and research in ways that undermine autonomy rather than promoting it and that make truly informed consent impossible. (shrink)

The use of language and images in the media may have a strong effect on people’s political cognition. In this regard, conspiracy theories and misinformation about the COVID-19 vaccine can lead to reluctant uptake of the vaccine even among medical staff. In two experiments, this article tests the hypothesis that the public’s willingness to get vaccinated against the novel coronavirus depends on the framings they are presented with. Two hundred thirty-two female Saudi students are exposed to either pro- (...) or anti-vaccination messages. In Experiment 1, they are asked to read semi-artificial news stories, and in Experiment 2 political cartoons. The results show that readers of the news articles, but not of the cartoons, are susceptible to framing effects. We consider the implications of how issues are framed for journalists and health professionals. (shrink)

The book takes a critical look at the phenomenon of disinformation by identifying the historical, technological and human elements that contribute to the current success of disinformation strategies. The author examines the origin of the word "Dezinformatsiya", used by Russian planners in the 1950s, to understand how military strategy has transformed into militarization of information. The book pays particular attention to the power of algorithmic platforms on the selection and dissemination of digital content and their role in the spread of (...) misinformation. This influences traditional editorial practices, disintermediating the production and distribution of news and amplifying a particular human cognitive mechanism: confirmation bias. The author investigates the Italian case to identify general archetypes, and typical and salient elements of disinformation strategies. The results offer a further interpretative aspect to studying disinformation, which represents a fracture in the digital public sphere, a kind of irrational object circulating in a space believed to be governed by rational engagement norms. The book conclusively shows how polarizing narratives used in disinformation strategies are the expression of complex ideological undergrowth embodied in extremes of the political spectrum. This highly topical book is for students and researchers from across the social sciences and media interested in the disinformation phenomenon. (shrink)

Misinformation is a serious concern for societies across the globe. To design effective interventions to combat the belief in and spread of misinformation, we must understand which psychological processes influence susceptibility to misinformation. This paper tests the widely assumed – but largely untested – claim that emotionally provocative headlines are associated with worse ability to identify true versus false headlines. Consistent with this proposal, we found correlational evidence that overall emotional response at the headline level is associated (...) with diminished truth discernment, except for experienced anger which was associated with increased truth discernment. The second set of studies tested a popular emotion regulation intervention where people were asked to apply either emotional suppression or emotion reappraisal techniques when considering the veracity of several headlines. In contrast to the correlation results, we found no evidence that emotion regulation helped people distinguish false from true news headlines. (shrink)

We provide a translation of Binet and Henri’s pioneering 1894 paper on the influence of suggestibility on memory. Alfred Binet is famous as the author who created the IQ test that bears his name, but he is almost unknown as the psychological investigator who generated numerous original experiments and fascinating results in the study of memory. His experiments published in 1894 manipulated suggestibility in several ways to determine effects on remembering. Three particular modes of suggestion were employed to induce false (...) recognitions: indirect suggestion by a preconceived idea; direct suggestion; and collective suggestion. In the commentary we suggest that Binet and Henri’s paper written over 115 years ago is still highly relevant even today. In particular, Binet’s legacy lives on in modern research on misinformation effects in memory, in studies of conformity, and in experiments on the social contagion of memory. (shrink)

At the time of writing, social media is rife with misinformation and disinformation, having very real effects on our political processes and on the vaccination efforts of the COVID pandemic. As the effort to pass new laws and regulations on social media companies gains momentum, concerns remain about how to balance free speech rights and even who, if anyone, should be the one to regulate social media. Drawing on Dewey’s conception of the public, I argue for the regulation of (...) social media companies by the state as part of the effort to curb misinformation and disinformation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTComparative effectiveness studies, referred to here as “usual-care” trials, seek to compare current medical practices for the same medical condition. Such studies are presumed to be safe and involve only minimal risks. However, that presumption may be flawed if the trial design contains “unusual” care, resulting in potential risks to subjects and inaccurately informed consent. Three case studies described here did not rely on clinical evidence to ascertain contemporaneous practice. As a result, the investigators drew inaccurate conclusions, misinformed research participants, (...) and subjects’ safety was compromised. Before approving usual-care protocols, IRBs and scientific review committees should evaluate the quality and completeness of information documenting usual-care practices. Guidance from governmental oversight agencies regarding evidence-based documentation of current clinical practice could prevent similar occurrences in future usual-care trials. Accurate information is necessary to ensure that trials comply with government regulations that require minimizing research risks to subjects and accurate informed consent documents. (shrink)

Proponents of deliberative democracy believe deliberation provides the best chance of finding effective and legitimate climate policies. However, in many societies there is substantial evidence of biased cognition and polarisation about climate change. Further, many appear unable to distinguish reliable scientific information from false claims or misinformation. While deliberation significantly reduces polarisation about climate change, and can even increase the provision of reliable beliefs, these benefits are difficult to scale up, and are slow to affect whole societies. In response, (...) I propose a combined strategy of ‘thinking and nudging’. While deliberative theorists tend to view nudging askance, combining deliberation with nudges promises to be a timelier and more effective response to climate change than deliberation alone. I outline several proposals to improve societal deliberative capacity while reducing climate risks, including media reform, strategic communication and framing of debates, incentivising pro-climate behaviour change, and better education about science. (shrink)

The internet has become an ubiquitous epistemic source. However, it comes with several drawbacks. For instance, the world wide web seems to foster filter bubbles and echo chambers and includes search results that promote bias and spread misinformation. Richard Heersmink suggests online intellectual virtues to combat these epistemically detrimental effects . These are general epistemic virtues applied to the online environment based on our background knowledge of this online environment. I argue that these online intellectual virtues also demand a (...) particular view of cognitive integration. Online intellectual virtues are incompatible with a popular conception of extended minds proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers . I suggest that if we want to hold on to both a conception of online intellectual virtues and some conception of the extended mind, we have to accept a more gradual theory of cognitive integration along the lines of second-wave theories of the extended mind. (shrink)

This paper describes the ways in which trolls and bots impede the acquisition of knowledge online. I distinguish between three ways in which trolls and bots can impede knowledge acquisition, namely, by deceiving, by encouraging misplaced skepticism, and by interfering with the acquisition of warrant concerning persons and content encountered online. I argue that these threats are difficult to resist simultaneously. I argue, further, that the threat that trolls and bots pose to knowledge acquisition goes beyond the mere threat of (...) online misinformation, or the more familiar threat posed by liars offline. Trolls and bots are, in effect, fake persons. Consequently, trolls and bots can systemically interfere with knowledge acquisition by manipulating the signals whereby individuals acquire knowledge from one another online. I conclude with a brief discussion of some possible remedies for the problem of fake persons. (shrink)

Given the risks of misinformation, addressees need to calibrate their trust towards communicators effectively. One way to do this is to evaluate the evidence speakers rely on (their evidential warrant) or claim to have (their evidential claims) when providing testimony. We review key findings in experimental psychology and experimental pragmatics to uncover the mechanisms underlying this form of trust calibration. This will ultimately shed light on the psychological foundations of principles that guide the evaluation of testimony in legal contexts, (...) such as the law against hearsay. (shrink)

Many times, what we say proves to be wrong. It might turn out that what we took to be a comforting remark was, in fact, making things worse. Or that a joke was inappropriate. Or that yelling out loud was rude. More importantly for this paper, there are plenty of cases in which what we said turns out to be false: we spoke without paying attention, we were misinformed or tricked, or we made a reasoning mistake. -/- A particular instance (...) of this latter phenomenon is when someone changes their perspective and doesn't find their previous assertions true anymore. For example, imagine that you used to like licorice as a child, and that you went around saying things like "Licorice is tasty." But, growing up, you find licorice too strong and quite boring; your tastes have changed. While the taste of licorice itself has not changed, you are not going around anymore uttering "Licorice is tasty." In fact, in certain cases, you might even think that what you said in your childhood was wrong - at least in light of your present preferences. -/- Sometimes we "take back" the assertions we made when we realize they are no longer true. Such speech acts of taking back can be performed in various ways: more formally, as effected in a court of law or when an official speaks to the press, or more informally in our day-by-day interactions. These acts of taking back are known as retraction. Retraction is usually achieved by employing certain linguistic markers ('I was wrong', 'I was mistaken', 'I retract', "Scratch that' etc.) that signal that the retractor takes their previous speech act to be faulty in a certain way. -/- This phenomenon has formed the basis for a popular argument used by relativists about a variety of natural language expressions (predicates of taste, epistemic modals, moral and aesthetic claims etc.) in support of their view. Recently, several considerations (mostly from contextualists about the same expressions), both from the armchair and based on empirical studies, have been offered to undercut the support retraction was thought to provide for relativism. In this paper, I consider and re-evaluate that support in light of both types of considerations, showing that neither of them decisively undermines it. However, to survive the contextualist counterattack, the relativist needs to pay a price: that is, she will be forced to make some concessions or rethink certain claims. I show what I think those concessions should be and what needs to be rethought (and how). The upshot is that, while the support retraction offers relativism is not as strong as initially believed, appeal to retraction remains a legitimate move in the debate. In section 1, I introduce the views in the debate and clarify the phenomenon of retraction and its dialectical role. Armchair data are investigated in section 2, proper experimental studies in section 3, while section 4 summarizes and concludes. (shrink)

In recent years, misinformation sharing has become the focus of public debate and academic research. We aim to explore whether individuals prefer to share accurate information or not, and discover what factors increase people’s preferences for sharing accurate information. Combining behavioral economics experiments and psychology experiments, we construct “an information search—information sharing—information feedback experiment” to examine individuals’ behavior of sharing accurate information and its influencing factors. A total of 210 students are recruited for the laboratory experiment. Our results show (...) that when individuals can control the accuracy of the information they obtain through their efforts, they are more willing to share accurate information with others. We also find that positive feedback from information receivers can promote the accuracy of information shared by individuals, and this effect works through reciprocity norms. Individuals with higher reciprocity are more willing to share accurate information, especially in the treatment with the role of reciprocity norms enhanced by feedback. These findings indicate that individuals who are willing to obtain accurate information prefer to share information, and information feedback can enhance this preference through reciprocity norms. This study captures individuals’ behavior and preference characteristics with regard to the accuracy of the information they share in the era of highly developed network interaction. (shrink)

This chapter provides a high-level introduction to the topic of propaganda. We survey a number of the most influential accounts of propaganda, from the earliest institutional studies in the 1920s to contemporary academic work. We propose that these accounts, as well as the various examples of propaganda which we discuss, all converge around a key feature: persuasion which bypasses audiences’ rational faculties. In practice, propaganda can take different forms, serve various interests, and produce a variety of effects. Propaganda can aim (...) to affect not only audiences’ beliefs and attitudes, but also their emotions and moods, and in turn how audiences subsequently reason or act. While propaganda is often thought of as false or misinformation, it can instead involve framing effects (“The war on drugs”), covert messaging (“There are Muslims among us”), emotionally charged slogans (“Make America Great Again”), or myths (“The American dream”). These forms of propaganda mislead audiences, not by introducing false information, but by making some beliefs and values, rather than others, salient. In fact, propaganda can even employ straightforwardly true claims (again, as in “There are Muslims among us”) and seemingly objective bureaucratic reports (“Crime has risen 4.2%”). To understand how these and other mechanisms enable propaganda to persuade by arational means, further study is needed. To that end, throughout the chapter we identify a number of places where the study of meaning and communication can help elucidate propaganda, as well as the places where propaganda issues challenges for the study of meaning. (shrink)