Speech act theory is one of the more lasting products of the linguistic movement in philosophy of the mid−Twentieth century. Within philosophy itself the movement's products did not in general prove so durable. Particularly striking in this respect is the perceived fate of what was one of the most characteristic applications of the linguistic turn in philosophy, namely the view that many traditional philosophical problems are such as to yield to an understanding of the distinctive function of a particular part (...) of language. Most typically, the crucial insight was held to be that despite appearances, the function of the part of language in question is not assertoric, or descriptive, and that the traditional problems arose at least in part from a failure to appreciate this point. Thus problems in moral philosophy were thought to yield to an appreciation that moral discourse is expressive rather than descriptive, problems in the philosophy of mind to an understanding of distinctive r×le of psychological ascriptions, and so on. The philosophical journals of the 1950s are rich with views like these. (No general term for this approach seems to have become widely accepted at the time. I shall call it "non−factualism", for what it denies, most characteristically, is the fact−stating r×le of language of a certain kind.). (shrink)

Dreamwork, Anthropology and the Curing Professions:. Cultural Approach to Dreamwork. Ian R. Edgar. Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1995. ix. 145 pp. £29.95.

We tend to assume that progress in answering the ‘hard question’ of consciousness will be accompanied by a subjective feeling of greater understanding. However, in order to feel we understand how one state of affairs arises from another, we have to deceive ourselves into thinking we have found a type of causal link which in reality may not exist . I draw from and expand upon Rosch's model, which specifies the conditions under which this self-deceptive kind of causal attribution arises. (...) I argue that the mind-body relationship may not meet these conditions, especially because of its potential novelty and uniqueness. We should not therefore expect to subjectively feel we understand consciousness. (shrink)

One major success of studying neural cell development in tissue culture has been the discovery of the O‐2A cell. This bipotential cell generates oligodendrocytes or, under certain conditions, a type of astrocyte. This essay considers the evidence that the characteristic properties demonstrated by the O‐2A cells in vitro are an accurate reflection of oligodendrocyte development in vivo.

New protocols have been developed for donors after circulatory death involving early assessment of donor status and premortem supporting treatment in appropriate cases where there is evidence that the patient wished to be an organ donor. These donors are now making an increasingly marked impact on overall deceased donor numbers in the UK. Donors after brainstem death, on the other hand, are much less buoyant yet require the same flexibility in approach in order to improve rates of donation and to (...) realize the wishes of potential deceased organ donors to the proper requisite extent. (shrink)

Ecstasy, Ritual, and Alternate Reality: Religion in. Pluralistic World by Felicitas D. Goodman. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana.University Press, 1988. Pp. 193. ISBN 0‐253‐31899‐8.

This is a review of John Leslie's 'Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology' (OUP, 2001). It was commissioned by the London Review of Books in 2002, but rejected by the commissioning editor, apparently because he disliked its anti-theological stance. (See the Postscript to the present version for more details.).

(1992). The agonic and hedonic modes: Definition, usage, and the promotion of mental health. World Futures: Vol. 35, Socio-Mental Bimodality, pp. 87-113.

Mayerfeld’s aim in this work is to defend “the claim that we are subject to a prima facie duty to relieve suffering” and to clarify “the content of that duty”. In his analysis, Mayerfeld takes suffering in a psychological sense, that is, in the sense of how it feels to individuals. He denies the hedonistic utilitarian’s claim that only happiness and suffering are relevant to wellbeing or, for that matter, to morality. Nevertheless, Mayerfeld embraces a hedonistic conception of happiness and (...) suffering, identifying these experiences with “overall states of feeling at a particular moment”. (shrink)

This paper discusses the relation between Crispin Wright’s alethic pluralism and my global expressivism. I argue that on many topics Wright’s own view counts as expressivism in my sense, but that truth itself is a striking exception. Unlike me, Wright never seems to countenance an expressivist account of truth, though the materials needed are available to him in his approaches to other topics.