In a recent paper in this Journal San Pedro I formulated a conjecture relating Measurement Independence and Parameter Independence, in the context of common cause explanations of EPR correlations. My conjecture suggested that a violation of Measurement Independence would entail a violation of Parameter Independence as well. Leszek Wroński has shown that conjecture to be false. In this note, I review Wroński’s arguments and agree with him on the fate of the conjecture. I argue (...) that what is interesting about the conjecture, however, is not whether it is true or false in itself, but the reasons for the actual verdict, and their implications regarding locality. (shrink)

We provide and interpret a new measure independent characterization of the Gödel speed-up phenomenon. In particular, we prove a theorem that demonstrates the indifference of the concept of a measure independent Gödel speed-up to an apparent weakening of its definition that is obtained by requiring only those measures appearing in some fixed Blum complexity measure to participate in the speed-up, and by deleting the “for all r” condition from the definition so as to relax the required amount of speed-up. We (...) interpret our results as correlating the relative difficulty of mechanically recognizing theories with the relative power and the relative abstractness of the theories. We conclude by providing two open problems concerning possible similarities and relationships between the Blum speedability and Gödel speed-up phenomena. MSC: 03D15, 03F20. (shrink)

We study the measure independent character of Godel speed-up theorems. In particular, we strengthen Arbib's necessary condition for the occurrence of a Godel speed-up [2, p. 13] to an equivalence result and generalize Di Paola's speed-up theorem [4]. We also characterize undecidable theories as precisely those theories which possess consistent measure independent Godel speed-ups and show that a theory τ 2 is a measure independent Godel speed-up of a theory τ 1 if and only if the set of undecidable sentences (...) of τ 1 which are provable in τ 2 is not recursively enumerable. (shrink)

This paper examines definitions of independence for events and variables in the context of full conditional measures; that is, when conditional probability is a primitive notion and conditioning is allowed on null events. Several independence concepts are evaluated with respect to graphoid properties; we show that properties of weak union, contraction and intersection may fail when null events are present. We propose a concept of “full” independence, characterize the form of a full conditional measure under full (...) class='Hi'>independence, and suggest how to build a theory of Bayesian networks that accommodates null events. (shrink)

The article advances a new way of thinking about classifications in general and the classification of mental disorders in particular. By applying insights from measurement practice to the context of classification, I defend a notion of epistemic accuracy that allows one to evaluate and improve classifications by comparing different classifying methods to each other. Progress in classification arises from the mutual development of classification systems and classifying methods. Based on this notion of accuracy, the article illustrates with an example (...) how psychiatric classifications can be improved via circumscribed comparisons of different perspectives on mental disorders, without relying on complete models of their complex aetiology. When applying this strategy, the traditional opposition between symptom-based and causal approaches is of little consequence for making progress in the epistemic accuracy of psychiatric classification. (shrink)

After decades of debates about species concepts, there is broad agreement that species are evolving lineages. However, species classification is still in a state of disorder: different methods of delimitation lead to competing outcomes for the same organisms, and the groups recognised as species are of widely different kinds. This paper considers whether this problem can be resolved by developing a unitary scale for evolutionary independence. Such a scale would show clearly when groups are comparable and allow taxonomists to (...) choose a conventional threshold of independence for species status. Existing measurement approaches to species delimitation are typically shot down by what I call the heterogeneity objection, according to which independently evolving groups are too heterogeneous to be captured by a single scale. I draw a parallel with the measurement of temperature to argue that this objection does not provide sufficient reasons to abandon the measurement approach, and that such an approach may even help to make the vague notion of evolutionary independence more precise. (shrink)

I shall offer some very plausible assumptions for the measure of confirmation and show that they imply that E confirms H relative to background K to degree f/PK), where f is a strictly increasing function. An additional assumption about how measures of confirmation combine then makes f be proportional to a logarithm.

This article reconsiders how to judge judicial independence by using the Japanese judicature, one of the allegedly-most dependent judiciary branches. In their influential work, Ramseyer and Rasmusen argue that judges who once belonged to a leftist group take longer to reach a under the long-term conservative rule of Japan. Their method does not, however, deal appropriately with the possibility of judges not reaching this position because the judge dies, retires early, or is still at the early stage of her (...) career. Ramseyer and Rasmusen also mistakenly assume that all judges will eventually obtain this position. This article develops a survival analysis model of judicial careers and attempts to solve the problems of censoring, left truncation, and split population. We also offer a way to utilize a matching procedure to estimate average treatment effects on censored time-to-event as well as event occurrence. We re-analyze a corrected version of Ramseyer and Rasmusen's data using their and our methods. One of the most important findings is that, contrary to what Ramseyer and Rasmusen argue, leftist judges are not discriminated against in terms of the timing of promotion. (shrink)

The functional independence measure is a clinical scale which is used to evaluate the amount of assistance disabled persons need to conduct their daily living activities. Drawing on 65 video-recorded rehabilitation team meetings and medical records collected from a Japanese hospital, this article utilizes ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to uncover how Japanese rehabilitation team members use the FIM to track changes in the functional status of patients and decide the length of stay in ongoing interactional sequences. Analysis shows that (...) a series of the FIM scores assembled and arranged in situ provide a sequential framework for members to understand the progress of rehabilitation and predict the plateau phase. Moreover, a particular expert is asked about patients’ capacity for further improvements and his or her opinions are treated as a basis for clinical decisions. In this way, diagnostic and clinical decision-making is produced through the ongoing collaborative work of various specialists. (shrink)

We address the classification of the possible finitely-additive probability measures on the Boolean algebra of definable subsets of M which are invariant under the natural action of $\operatorname{Aut}(M)$ . This pursuit requires a generalization of Shelah's forking formulas [8] to "essentially measure zero" sets and an application of Myer's "rank diagram" [5] of the Boolean algebra under consideration. The classification is completed for a large class of ℵ 0 -categorical structures without the independence property including those which are stable.

An analysis is presented of the significance and consequent limitations on the applicability of the von Neumann measurement postulate in quantum mechanics. Directly observable quantities, such as the expectation value of the velocity operator, are distinguished from mathematical constructs, such as the expectation value of the canonical momentum, which are not directly observable. A simple criterion to distinguish between the two types of operators is derived. The non-observability of the electromagnetic four-potentials is shown to imply the non-measurability of the (...) canonical momentum. The concept of a mechanical gauge is introduced and discussed. Classically the Lagrangian is nonunique within a total time derivative. This may be interpreted as the freedom of choosing a “mechanical” (M) gauge function. In quantum mechanics it is often implicitly assumed that the M-gauge vanishes. However, the requirement that directly observable quantities be independent of the arbitrary mechanical gauge is shown to lead to results analogous to those derived from the requirement of electromagnetic gauge independence of observables. The significance of the above to the observability of transition amplitudes between field-free energy eigenstates in the presence (and absence) of electromagnetic fields is discussed. E- and M-gauge independent transition amplitudes between field-free energy eigenstates in the absence of electromagnetic fields are defined. It is shown that, in general, such measurable amplitudes cannot be defined in the presence of externally applied time-dependent fields. Transition amplitudes in the presence of time-independent fields are discussed. The path dependence of previous derivations of E-gauge independent Hamiltonians and/or transition amplitudes in the presence of electromagnetic fields are related to the inherent M-gauge dependence of these quantities in the presence of such fields. (shrink)

The ethical frameworks of consequentialism and formalism predict moral awareness and behavior in individuals, but current measures either do not treat these frameworks as independent or lack sufficient theoretical underpinnings and statistical dependability. This paper presents the development and validation of a new scale to measure consequentialism and formalism that is well grounded in prior research. The Ethical Standards of Judgement Questionnaire is validated via six studies. Measurement items are developed in the first three studies, which also confirm the (...) need to eliminate a unidimensional measure and evaluate these frameworks separately. The fourth study addresses discriminant validity and the two remaining studies provide insight into how consequentialism and formalism predict the degree to which behaviors are deemed acceptable by individuals in the context of consumer beliefs and religious beliefs. Suggested uses for the scale in both academia and organizations are presented. (shrink)

The ethical frameworks of consequentialism and formalism predict moral awareness and behavior in individuals, but current measures either do not treat these frameworks as independent or lack sufficient theoretical underpinnings and statistical dependability. This paper presents the development and validation of a new scale to measure consequentialism and formalism that is well grounded in prior research. The Ethical Standards of Judgement Questionnaire is validated via six studies. Measurement items are developed in the first three studies, which also confirm the (...) need to eliminate a unidimensional measure and evaluate these frameworks separately. The fourth study addresses discriminant validity and the two remaining studies provide insight into how consequentialism and formalism predict the degree to which behaviors are deemed acceptable by individuals in the context of consumer beliefs and religious beliefs. Suggested uses for the scale in both academia and organizations are presented. (shrink)

In the Copenhagen interpretation the Heisenberg inequality ΔQΔP≥ℏ/2 is interpreted as the mathematical expression of the concept of complementarity, quantifying the mutual disturbance necessarily taking place in a simultaneous or joint measurement of incompatible observables. This interpretation was criticized a long time ago and has recently been challenged in an experimental way. These criticisms can be substantiated by using the generalized formalism of positive operator-valued measures, from which an inequality, different from the Heisenberg inequality, can be derived, precisely illustrating (...) the Copenhagen concept of complementarity. The different roles of preparation and measurement in creating uncertainty in quantum mechanics are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the adequacy of no-conspiracy conditions employed in the usual derivations of the Bell inequality in the context of EPR correlations. First, I look at the EPR correlations from a purely phenomenological point of view and claim that common cause explanations of these cannot be ruled out. I argue that an appropriate common cause explanation requires that no-conspiracy conditions are reinterpreted as mere common cause-measurement independence conditions. In the right circumstances then, violations of (...) class='Hi'>measurement independence need not entail any kind of conspiracy (nor backwards in time causation). To the contrary, if measurement operations in the EPR context are taken to be causally relevant in a specific way to the experiment outcomes, their explicit causal role provides the grounds for a common cause explanation of the corresponding correlations. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the adequacy of no-conspiracy conditions employed in the usual derivations of the Bell inequality in the context of EPR correlations. First, I look at the EPR correlations from a purely phenomenological point of view and claim that common cause explanations of these cannot be ruled out. I argue that an appropriate common cause explanation requires that no-conspiracy conditions are re-interpreted as mere common cause-measurement independence conditions. In the right circumstances then, violations of (...) class='Hi'>measurement independence need not entail any kind of conspiracy (nor backwards in time causation). To the contrary, if measurement operations in the EPR context are taken to be causally relevant in a specific way to the experiment outcomes, their explicit causal role provides the grounds for a common cause explanation of the corresponding correlations. (shrink)

Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. In each framework we use extensive measurement to introduce novel (...) domain restrictions, independence conditions, and constraints on social evaluation. We prove a welfarism theorem for these domains and characterize the social welfare functions that satisfy the axioms of extensive measurement at both the individual and social levels. The main results are simple axiomatizations of strong dictatorship in the Arrovian framework and classical utilitarianism in the generalized framework. (shrink)

I flesh out the sense in which the informational approach to interpreting quantum mechanics, as defended by Pitowsky and Bub and lately by a number of other authors, is (neo-)Bohrian. I argue that on this approach, quantum mechanics represents what Bohr called a “natural generalisation of the ordinary causal description” in the sense that the idea (which philosophers of science like Stein have argued for on the grounds of practical and epistemic necessity) that understanding a theory as a theory of (...) physics requires that one be able to “schematise the observer” within it is elevated in quantum mechanics to the level of a postulate in the sense that interpreting the outcome of a measurement interaction, as providing us with information about the world, requires as a matter of principle, the specification of a schematic representation of an observer in the form of a ‘Boolean frame’—the Boolean algebra representing the yes-or-no questions associated with a given observable representative of a given experimental context. I argue that the approach’s central concern is with the methodological question of how to assign physical properties to what one takes to be a system in a given experimental context, rather than the metaphysical question of what a given state vector represents independently of any context, and I show how the quantum generalisation of the concept of an open system may be used to assuage Einstein’s complaint that the orthodox approach to quantum mechanics runs afoul of the supposedly fundamental methodological requirement to the effect that one must always be able, according to Einstein, to treat spatially separated systems as isolated from one another. (shrink)

Reward and punishment sensitivity seem important traits in understanding behavior in general and psychopathology in particular. Though the definitions used for reward and punishment sensitivity differentiate between responsivity and motivation, the measures thus far used to assess these constructs do not. Further, specificity of the type of reward and punishment in questionnaires might result in measurement bias especially when examining the relationship with psychopathology. Therefore, we developed a stimulus-independent multidimensional questionnaire of reward and punishment sensitivity that differentiates between responsivity (...) and motivation. This study addresses the psychometric qualities of this newly developed reward and punishment responsivity and motivation questionnaire. On the basis of exploratory ordinal factor analysis that was used to examine the quality of the initial pool of 39 items, the number of items was reduced to 18. Confirmatory ordinal factor analysis on the remaining items in an independent sample supported a 18-item four-factor model, and showed acceptable to good internal reliability. The relationship between the subscales of the RPRM-Q and often used questionnaires was examined in the combined sample, which showed some first support for the ability of the new questionnaire to differentiate between responsivity and motivation to approach/avoid. The findings indicate that the RPRM-Q might be a helpful instrument to further test the relevance of punishment and reward sensitivity in psychopathology. (shrink)

Measurement is said to be the basis of exact sciences as the process of assigning numbers to matter (things or their attributes), thus making it possible to apply the mathematically formulated laws of nature to the empirical world. Mathematics and empiria are best accorded to each other in laboratory experiments which function as what Nancy Cartwright calls nomological machine: an arrangement generating (mathematical) regularities. On the basis of accounts of measurement errors and uncertainties, I will argue for two (...) claims: 1) Both fundamental laws of physics, corresponding to ideal nomological machine, and phenomenological laws, corresponding to material nomological machine, lie, being highly idealised relative to the empirical reality; and also laboratory measurement data do not describe properties inherent to the world independently of human understanding of it. 2) Therefore the naive, representational view of measurement and experimentation should be replaced with a more pragmatic or practice-based view. (shrink)

Derived measurements involve problems of coordination. Conducting them often requires detailed theoretical assumptions about their target, while such assumptions can lack sources of evidence that are independent from these very measurements. In this paper, I defend two claims about problems of coordination. I motivate both by a novel case study on a central measurement problem in the history of physical geodesy: the determination of the earth's ellipticity. First, I argue that the severity of problems of coordination varies according to (...) scientists' predictive and experimental control over perturbations of the measurement process. Second, I identify a methodology by which scientists can solve hard problems of coordination and gradually increase their predictive control over perturbations. I dub this methodology ‘operational pluralism’ since it is driven by the introduction of alternative measurement operations that involve different physical indicators. (shrink)

Drawing upon two independent national samples of 201 and 241 psychology graduate students, this article describes the development and psychometric evaluation of 4 Web-based student self-report scales tapping student socialization in the responsible conduct of research (RCR) with human participants. The Mentoring the Responsible Conduct of Research Scale (MRCR) is composed of 2 subscales assessing RCR instruction and modeling by research mentors. The 2 subscales of the RCR Department Climate Scale (RCR-DC) assess RCR department policies and faculty and student RCR (...) practices. The RCR Preparedness scale (RCR-P) and the RCR Field Integrity scale (RCR-FI) measure respectively students' confidence in their ability to conduct research responsibly and their belief in the RCR integrity of psychology as a discipline. Factor analysis, coefficient alphas, correlations, and multiple regression analyses demonstrated each of the scales had good internal consistency and concurrent and construct validity. (shrink)

Measurement is widely applied because its results are assumed to be more reliable than opinions and guesses, but this reliability is sometimes justified in a stereotyped way. After a critical analysis of such stereotypes, a structural characterization of measurement is proposed, as partly empirical and partly theoretical process, by showing that it is in fact the structure of the process that guarantees the reliability of its results. On this basis the role and the structure of background knowledge in (...) measurement and the justification of the conditions of object-relatedness ("objectivity") and subject-independence ("intersubjectivity") of measurement are specifically discussed. (shrink)

Standard approaches to ontological simplicity focus either on the number of things or types a theory posits or on the number of fundamental things or types a theory posits. In this paper, I suggest a ground-theoretic approach that focuses on the number of something else. After getting clear on what this approach amounts to, I motivate it, defend it, and complete it.

Axiomatizations of measurement systems usually require an axiom--called an Archimedean axiom--that allows quantities to be compared. This type of axiom has a different form from the other measurement axioms, and cannot--except in the most trivial cases--be empirically verified. In this paper, representation theorems for extensive measurement structures without Archimedean axioms are given. Such structures are represented in measurement spaces that are generalizations of the real number system. Furthermore, a precise description of "Archimedean axioms" is given and (...) it is shown that in all interesting cases "Archimedean axioms" are independent of other measurement axioms. (shrink)

We construct a new measure of voting power that yields reasonable measurements even if the individual votes are not cast independently. Our measure hinges on probabilities of counterfactuals, such as the probability that the outcome of a collective decision would have been yes, had a voter voted yes rather than no as she did in the real world. The probabilities of such counterfactuals are calculated on the basis of causal information, following the approach by Balke and Pearl. Opinion leaders whose (...) votes have causal influence on other voters' votes can have significantly more voting power under our measure. But the new measure of voting power is also sensitive to the voting rule. We show that our measure can be regarded as an average treatment effect, we provide examples in which it yields intuitively plausible results and we prove that it reduces to Banzhaf voting power in the limiting case of independent and equiprobable votes. (shrink)

We draw insights from Activity Theory within the field of human-computer interaction to quantitatively measure a mobile in-store experience (MIX), which includes the suite of shopping activities and retail services that a consumer can engage in when using their mobile device in brick-and-mortar stores. We developed and validated a nine-item, formative MIX index using survey data collected from fashion consumers in the United States (n= 1,267), United Kingdom (n= 370), Germany (n= 362), and France (n= 219). As survey measures of (...) consumer engagement in omnichannel retailing using a mobile device, the index items with stronger factor loadings described in-store shopping activities whereas those with weaker factor loadings described activities related to behavioral targeting and social networking. These results suggest that retailers should give consumers the autonomy to independently find, evaluate and purchase merchandise in brick-and-mortar stores, thereby enabling them to co-create personalized shopping experiences as active participants within an omnichannel retail servicescape. Our findings also suggest that retailers should provide consumers with more authentic ways to build community and brand affiliations than mobile marketing and social media promotions. In-store activities should not simply be a migration of pre-existing e-commerce capabilities onto mobile devices. An engaging mobile in-store experience should be an amalgam of physical and digital activities that produce a seamless shopping journey and leverage the unique properties of mobile devices – ultra-portability, location sensitivity, untetheredness, and personalization. Retail executives can use the validated MIX index to prepare strategic investments in mobile technology applications and capabilities for retail stores within their omnichannel operations. The nine-item MIX index is also well-suited for consumer surveys, which also makes it an attractive measure of consumer engagement in omnichannel retailing for future academic research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 185-187 [Access article in PDF] Measuring Moral Identities:Psychopaths and Responsibility Gwen Adshead Doctor Ciocchetti examines the responsibility of psychopaths as a function of psychological capacities operating within relationships. He then argues against the punishment of psychopaths. I have some sympathy with both views, but perhaps argued in different ways, and from different standpoints, based on my clinical experience.Doctor Ciocchetti's offers an unusual account (...) of responsibility as a concept that involves at least two people, and perhaps many more than two; and this I would entirely support. In this sense, responsibility is a transitive and dynamic process that involves not only the personal sense of ownership of an action or thought, but also the attribution of responsibility by others. Moral, when applied to intentions, seems to me to suggest that they are intentions that involve another person and that they are held by an active agent who can make choices about those intentions. Responsibility implies not only causal responsibility, but also that the actor owns his own intentions about his behaviors toward others.Responsibility, either as experienced by the actor or attributed by others, is a type of moral judgment; an exercise in moral reasoning. Following Gilligan (1987), I am persuaded that moral reasoning, or the discourse of ought-and-should is relational in nature and must be seen in the context of relationships. I think much of the early work on moral reasoning in offenders is flawed because it assumes that moral reasoning was a capacity like serum bilirubin: normally distributed out there in the population, and able to be measured by an objective observer, in a process independent of the findings. Unsurprisingly, these studies found either that offenders had immature moral reasoning capacities (which we might have guessed already), or they had normal moral reasoning capacity, which was disturbing and puzzling.What we want to understand is how people come to let themselves do horrible things to others. Cioccchetti argues that psychopaths can do these things because they lack the affective capacities needed to respond to others' distress. Ordinary people care about harm to others (including the physical self/body and sentient animals) and demand explanations for the deliberate infliction of suffering on others. It is not only the lack of participant attitudes in the psychopath that bother us; it is our own responses, expressive of our participant attitudes, that tell us something about what this person is, and what is wrong. In my view, this is what punishment is all about for us, the larger social group [End Page 185] forced to respond to the distressing and disturbing actions of others.As Ciocchetti suggests, it is the perceived guilt of the offender that justifies the punishment; it is also the experienced distress of those affected that drives the need for punishment. The distress is part of the relationship between the victim and the offender; the victim is often just as active as the offender.The issue becomes most clear in relation to capital punishment and its supporters, especially those who wish not only to view executions, but also to broadcast them. In considering this, there are two useful sources of information: first, studies of the reactions of those who witness executions, and second, studies of the impact of murder on those related to the murder victim, so-called secondary victims. In those states that have capital punishment in the United States, it is often the secondary victims who witness the execution. They often have testified to the appalling impact of the offender's crime on them; most states give them a right to be present at the execution, even if they do not exercise it. It is hard not to think that it is the enormity of the feelings caused by the offender's wrongdoing that the death sentence is designed to address; the death of the offender changes the relationship between victim and offender, as much as the death of the original victim changes the relationship with their relatives. One might then wonder about the impact of his or her execution on the relatives... (shrink)

Considering the reward and punishment mechanism of the management committee and the complexity of innovation path selection of high-tech and general enterprises, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of independent innovation incentive mechanism in the National Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone of China. Meanwhile, the equilibrium points of the strategy selection are solved for the three. In addition, this paper adopts numerical simulation to analyze the influence of each decision variable on different players’ strategic selections. The results show that the (...) initial willingness of the management committee, high-tech and general enterprises has different influences on each other, and these factors such as independent innovation cost, technology spillover coefficient, and patent royalty significantly affect the strategic selection of enterprises; the reward and punishment mechanism of the management committee can enhance the innovation willingness of high-tech and general enterprises, in which these punitive measures can promote further the independent innovation of the two; the greater the innovation subsidy provided by the management committee to high-tech enterprises, the heavier the punishment for general enterprises, and the better the effect of independent innovation incentives. The results can provide theoretical guidance and practical reference for the management committee to formulate the independent innovation incentive policies in the National Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone. (shrink)

Much research aimed at developing measures for normative criteria to guide the assessment of healthcare resource allocation decisions has focused on health maximization, equity concerns and more recently approaches based on health capabilities. However, a widely embraced idea is that health resources should be allocated to meet health needs. Little attention has been given to the principle of need which is often mentioned as an alternative independent criteria that could be used to guide healthcare evaluations. This paper develops a model (...) and indicator of need satisfaction that aggregates the health needs of a population in a particular time period into a single measure that weights individual health needs by the severity of their ill health. The paper provides a first step towards formalizing the principle of need as a measurable objective for healthcare policy and we discuss some challenges for future research, including incorporating the duration of time into need-based health evaluations. (shrink)

According to what I call the Traditional View, there is a fundamental semantic distinction between counting and measuring, which is reflected in two fundamentally different sorts of scales: discrete cardinality scales and dense measurement scales. Opposed to the Traditional View is a thesis known as the Universal Density of Measurement: there is no fundamental semantic distinction between counting and measuring, and all natural language scales are dense. This paper considers a new argument for the latter, based on a (...) puzzle I call the Fractional Cardinalities Puzzle: if answers to ‘how many’-questions always designate cardinalities, and if cardinalities are necessarily discrete, then how can e.g. ‘2.38’ be a correct answer to the question ‘How many ounces of water are in the beaker?’? If cardinality scales are dense, then the answer is obvious: ‘2.38’ designates a fractional cardinality, contra the Traditional View. However, I provide novel evidence showing that ‘many’ is not uniformly associated with the dimension of cardinality across contexts, and so ‘how many’-questions can ask about other kinds of measures, including e.g. volume. By combining independently motivated analyses of cardinal adjectives, measure phrases, complex fractions, and degrees, I develop a semantics intended to defend the Traditional View against purported counterexamples like this and others which have received a fair amount of recent philosophical attention. (shrink)

A Bayesian account of independent evidential support is outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C. S. Peirce. I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of confirmation satisfy some basic desiderata suggested by Peirce for adequate accounts of independent evidence. I argue that, by considering further natural constraints on a probabilistic account of independent evidence, all but a very small class of Bayesian measures of confirmation can be ruled out. In closing, another application of (...) my account to the problem of evidential diversity is also discussed. (shrink)

Grunbaum has argued that the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction hypothesis is not ad hoc since the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment can be used to provide a test that is significantly different from that provided by the Michelson-Morley experiment. In the first part of the paper, I show that the differences claimed by Grunbaum to hold between these two experiments are not sufficient for establishing independent testability. A dilemma is developed: either the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment, because of experimental realities, cannot test the uncontracted Fresnel aether theory, (...) or if experimental difficulties are ignored, the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment degenerates into a version of the Michelson-Morley experiment. The second part of the paper is a feasibility study of the prospects for defining experimental types according to aims of measurement and determination. This approach is applied to the contraction hypothesis, where it is suggested that the usual analysis of independent testability be modified. (shrink)

This thesis concerns the measurement of freedom, and its value. Specifically, I am concerned with three overarching questions. First, can we measure the extent of an individual’s freedom? It had better be that we can, otherwise much ordinary and intuitive talk that we would like to vindicate – say, about free persons being freer than slaves – will turn out to be false or meaningless. Second, in what ways is freedom valuable, and how is this value measured? It matters, (...) for example, whether freedom is valuable only insofar as it enables us to pursue specific ends we happen to value for independent reasons, or whether it is also valuable in itself. In the latter case, but not the former, more freedom will always be better. Likewise, it’s important to get clarity on what ends, exactly, freedom is especially instrumentally valuable in promoting, since this goes to how much we should care about it. And finally, the liberal political tradition asserts that there is a special sphere of personal choices within which individuals should be free to do as they please, for reasons over and above the value of freedom itself. Now, can we measure the extent to which states and individuals respect individual liberties, and can we weigh the importance of respecting liberty against competing values like social welfare? To answer these questions, I follow the axiomatic tradition of social choice theory, and I develop several novel measures of freedom – including the first measure of freedom ever proposed that is sensitive to how modally robustly our options are available – a novel approach to measuring the diversity of an opportunity set, and I develop an account of the value of freedom according to which an important part of why freedom matters is that it enables us to improve our preferences through learning, and I construct ways of measuring the value of freedom along this dimension of value. Finally, in later chapters, I provide a representation result for a measure of illiberalism, i.e. of the degree to which states fail to respect the rights of their citizens, and I extend this result to provide a characterization of moral theories that express concern for respecting the rights of others. The final chapter closes by discussing how this concern may be weighed against concerns for social welfare. (shrink)

Individuals with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) display diverse deficits in social, cognitive and behavioral functioning. To date, there has been mixed findings on the profile of executive function deficits for high-functioning adults (IQ >70) with ASD. A conceptual distinction is commonly made between “cold” and “hot” executive functions. Cold executive functions refer to mechanistic higher-order cognitive operations (e.g., working memory), whereas hot executive functions entail cognitive abilities supported by emotional awareness and social perception (e.g., social cognition). This study aimed to (...) determine the independence of deficits in hot and cold executive functions for high-functioning adults with ASD. Forty-two adults with ASD (64% male, aged 18-66 years) and 40 age and gender matched controls were administered The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT; emotion recognition and social inference), Letter Number Sequencing (working memory) and Hayling Sentence Completion Test (response initiation and suppression). Between-group analyses identified that the ASD group performed significantly worse than matched controls on all measures of cold and hot executive functions (d =.54-1.5). Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that the ASD sample performed more poorly on emotion recognition and social inference tasks than matched controls after controlling for cold executive functions and employment status. The findings also indicated that the ability to recognise emotions and make social inferences was supported by working memory and response initiation and suppression processes. Overall, this study supports the distinction between hot and cold executive function impairments for adults with ASD. Moreover, it advances understanding of higher-order impairments underlying social interaction difficulties for this population which, in turn, may assist with diagnosis and inform intervention programs. (shrink)

We study higher analogues of the classical independence number on $\omega $. For $\kappa $ regular uncountable, we denote by $i(\kappa )$ the minimal size of a maximal $\kappa $ -independent family. We establish ZFC relations between $i(\kappa )$ and the standard higher analogues of some of the classical cardinal characteristics, e.g., $\mathfrak {r}(\kappa )\leq \mathfrak {i}(\kappa )$ and $\mathfrak {d}(\kappa )\leq \mathfrak {i}(\kappa )$. For $\kappa $ measurable, assuming that $2^{\kappa }=\kappa ^{+}$ we construct a maximal $\kappa $ (...) -independent family which remains maximal after the $\kappa $ -support product of $\lambda $ many copies of $\kappa $ -Sacks forcing. Thus, we show the consistency of $\kappa ^{+}=\mathfrak {d}(\kappa )=\mathfrak {i}(\kappa )<2^{\kappa }$. We conclude the paper with interesting open questions and discuss difficulties regarding other natural approaches to higher independence. (shrink)

Shelah's theory of forking is generalized in a way which deals with measures instead of complete types. This allows us to extend the method of forking from the class of stable theories to the larger class of theories which do not have the independence property. When restricted to the special case of stable theories, this paper reduces to a reformulation of the classical approach. However, it goes beyond the classical approach in the case of unstable theories. Methods from ordinary (...) forking theory and the Loeb measure construction from nonstandard analysis are used. (shrink)

David Cooper explores and defends the view that a reality independent of human perspectives is necessarily indescribable, a "mystery." Other views are shown to be hubristic. Humanists, for whom "man is the measure" of reality, exaggerate our capacity to live without the sense of an independent measure. Absolutists, who proclaim our capacity to know an independent reality, exaggerate our cognitive powers. In this highly original book Cooper restores to philosophy a proper appreciation of mystery-that is what provides a measure of (...) our beliefs and conduct. (shrink)

Word recognition is the Petri dish of the cognitive sciences. The processes hypothesized to govern naming, identifying and evaluating words have shaped this field since its origin in the 1970s. Techniques to measure lexical processing are not just the back-bone of the typical experimental psychology laboratory, but are now routinely used by cognitive neuroscientists to study brain processing and increasingly by social and clinical psychologists (Eder, Hommel, and De Houwer 2007). Models developed to explain lexical processing have also aspired to (...) be statements about the nature of human cognition (e.g., connectionist models, Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, and Patterson 1996). Words were convenient objects to study for cognitive psychologists because they are welldefined and their nature as alphabetic strings was a good fit to analysis with the computer programming languages of the 1970s and 1980s which excelled at string manipulation. But are words actually the privileged unit of mental representation and processing that all of this scientific attention makes them out to be? Like a growing number of other language researchers, our answer is no (see, e.g., (Bybee and Hopper 2001; Wray 2002). We propose that the mental representations for lexical structures form a continuum, from word combinations which have fossilized into single units (nightclub) to those that both exist as independent units and yet have bonds, varying in tightness, with the words with which they frequently co-occur (Harris 1998). The first line of support for this view is the simple observation that fluent speakers easily recognize the familiarity and cohesive quality of word combinations in their language. Examples in English include common noun compounds (last year, brand new), verb phrases (cut down, get a hold of, faced with) and other multi-word expressions such as common sayings and references to cultural concepts (saved by the bell, speed of light; Jackendoff 1995).. (shrink)

Republican and so-called independence conceptions of freedom stand out from other conceptions by embedding strong modal conditions on what it takes for a person to count as being free to do something. For this reason, the extent of one’s freedom, conceived under republican/independentist lights, cannot be measured by any of the measures of freedom that have been developed so far in the literature on freedom, since these do not register the requisite modal constraints. In this paper I propose a (...) measure of freedom that does capture the requisite modal concerns. I do so by relying on work in the semantics of counterfactuals to define a measure of how modally robustly available an option is to an individual. (shrink)

This discussion centers on two desiderata: the role of measurement in information-gathering and physical interaction in scientific practice. By taking inspiration from van Fraassen’s view, we present a methodological account of perspectival measurement that addresses empirical practice where there is complex intervention, disagreeing results, and limited theory. The specific aim of our account is to provide a methodological prescription for developing measurement processes in the context of limited theory. The account should be useful to philosophers of science, (...) who are interested in the intersection between representation and intervention; scientists, who are interested in methodological suggestions for theory-development and reliability; and interdisciplinary researchers, who are interested in the intersections between the pandemic, built environments, and social processes. We apply the process-view of measurement to COVID-19, specifically, measuring replication in the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The aim is to show that our account tracks key elements—manipulation/intervention, independence, invariance, and theory-development—by organizing unfolding measurement processes. Additionally, we use our account to make prescriptive suggestions for measurement practice in the COVID-19 context by discussing the need to broaden measurement perspective on interaction, manipulation, and production. (shrink)

Summary This paper explores the legacy of the great French experimental physicist Victor Regnault through the example of Gabriel Lippmann, whose engagement with electrical standardization during the early 1880s was guided by Regnault's methodological precept to measure ‘directly’. Lippmann's education reveals that the theoretical practice of ‘direct’ measurement entailed eliminating extraneous physical effects through the experimental design, rather than, like physicists in Britain and Germany, making numerical ‘corrections’ to measured values. It also provides, paradoxically, exemplars of the qualitative theoretical (...) practices that sustained Regnault's misguided ambition to avoid theory. By considering the largely negative reactions to Lippmann's proposals for selecting suitable electrical units and methods of measuring the ohm, this paper associates these theoretical practices with the ineffectual rhetorical strategies employed by Lippmann to promote his work, and thereby indicates that the practice of direct measurement was limited to French experimental physics. Whilst this result aligns readily with the existence of divergent nineteenth century British and German cultures of precision, it emerges from a very different disciplinary context in which the practice of precision electrical measurement developed independently of submarine telegraphy. This is because, as this paper illustrates, telegraphic engineering and experimental physics remained separate professions in France. (shrink)