Is there such a thing as mental causation? Is it possible for the mental to have causal influence on the physical? Or has the old “mind over matter” question been rendered obsolete by the advent of brain science? Whatever our answers to these questions, it seems that we cannot systematically pursue them without considering what makes mental causation problematic in the first place: The causal closure of the physical world. This paper revisits the problem of mental causation by drawing on (...) a classical debate between Dharmakirti and the Indian materialists. The main argument of the paper is that expanding our conception of causality to accommodate phenomenal content can cast new light on the problem of mental causation. A satisfactory solution to the problem of mental causation must reject the completeness of the physical principle in favor of conceptions of causality that allow for phenomenal properties to play a causal-explanatory function. (shrink)

In challenging the physicalist conception of consciousness advanced by Cārvāka materialists such as Bṛhaspati, the Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita addresses a series of key issues about the nature of causality and the basis of cognition. This chapter considers whether causal accounts of generation for material bodies are adequate in explaining how conscious awareness comes to have the structural features and phenomenal properties that it does. Arguments against reductive physicalism, it is claimed, can benefit from an understanding of the structure of phenomenal (...) consciousness that does not eschew causal-explanatory reasoning. Against causal models that rely on the concept of potentiality, the Buddhist principle of “dependent arising” underscores a dynamic conception of efficient causality, which allows for elements defined primarily in terms of their capacity for sentience and agency to be causally efficacious. (shrink)

One of the terminological constants in the philosophical work of Gilles Deleuze is the word 'immanence', and it has therefore become a foothold for those wishing to understand exactly what 'Deleuzian philosophy' is. Deleuze's philosophy of immanence is held to be fundamentally characterised by its opposition to all philosophies of 'transcendence'. On that basis, it is widely believed that Deleuze's project is premised on a return to a materialist metaphysics. Christian Kerslake argues that such an interpretation is fundamentally misconceived, and (...) has led to misunderstandings of Deleuze's philosophy, which is rather one of the latest heirs to the post-Kantian tradition of thought about immanence. This will be the first book to assess Deleuze's relationship to Kantian epistemology and post-Kantian philosophy, and will attempt to make Deleuze's philosophy intelligible to students working within that tradition. But it also attempts to reconstruct our image of the post-Kantian tradition, isolating a lineage that takes shape in the work of Schelling and Wronski, and which is developed in the twentieth century by Bergson, Warrain and Deleuze. (shrink)

This introductory text is a critical theory toolkit on how to how to make use of Karl Marx's ideas in media, communication and cultural studies. Karl Marx's ideas remain of crucial relevance, and in this short, student-friendly book, leading expert Christian Fuchs introduces Marx to the reader by discussing fifteen of his key concepts and showing how they matter for understanding the digital and communicative capitalism that shapes human life in 21st century society. Key concepts covered include: the dialectic, (...) class='Hi'>materialism, commodities, capital, capitalism, labour, surplus-value, the working class, alienation, means of communication, the general intellect, ideology, socialism, communism, and class struggles. Students taking courses in Media, Culture and Society; Communication Theory; Media Economics; Political Communication and Cultural Studies will find Fuchs' concise introduction an essential guide to Marx. (shrink)

This essay asks why Chinese and North Vietnamese agricultural scientists in the 1950s and 1960s willingly adopted the Soviet agricultural sciences represented not only by agronomists Ivan Michurin and Trofim Lysenko but soil scientist Vasili Williams. The answer, I argue, is that they were fascinated by the promise of Soviet agrobiology that I conceptualize as a combination of dialectical materialism and voluntarist productivism: if one masters the interconnectivity between plants, microbes, organic and inorganic materials, and soil, one can overcome (...) the given biological and environmental limits, manipulate and optimize the material flow, and ceaselessly maximize agricultural production. Engaging the historiographical debate about Lysenkoism—which has mostly paid attention to the Euro-American cases, genetic controversies, and geopolitical specificities of each locale—as a global phenomenon, I shed fresh light on the understudied Chinese and North Vietnamese cases, the intersection between Lysenko’s theories and Williamsian soil science, and epistemic commonality across national differences. (shrink)

Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-1875) author of a famous History of Materialism and Critique of Its Present Significance (1866, English transI. 1877-79, repr. 1925 with introduction by Bertrand Russell), was also interested in the epistemological foundations of formal logic. Part I of his intended two-volume Logische Studien was published posthumously in 1877 by Hermann Cohen, head of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. Lange, departing from Kant, claims that spatial intuition is the source of the apodeictic character not only of the (...) truths of mathematics, but also of the truths of logic. He aims at showing this by basing validity and invalidity of syllogistic inferences on an interpretation of the standard forms (of proposition in assertoric syllogistic) with the help of the five kinds of possible relations (in fact what is known today as the Gergonne-Euler relations) between extensions of concepts given to us as areas in a plane, i.e.in space. Generality is achieved by considering all possible variations within each type of spatial relation, exhibiting a connection between concept and intuition reminding Lange of the Kantian "schema". Lange is well aware of the contemporary English "algebraic" logic, but he considers its approach as the appropriate one for a logic of content (Inhaltslogik) and not for a logic of extension (Umfangslogik). Lange did not live to enjoy the recognition by some leading logicians (amongst them John Venn, to whose reference in 1881 to Lange's "admirable Logische Studien" the present paper owes it title), nor could he respond to the many critics of his proposed foundation of logic. Its radicality as well as its broad reception (and discussion up to at least 1959) seem to entitle Lange's Logische Studien to an, if modest, place in the history of logic in the 19th century. (shrink)

Friedrich Albert Lange author of a famous History of Materialism and Critique of Its Present Significance, was also interested in the epistemological foundations of formal logic.Part I of his intended two‐volume Logische Studienwas published posthumously in 1877 by Hermann Cohen“head”of the Marburg school of neo‐Kantianism.Lange, departing from Kant, claims that spatial intuition is the source of the apodeictic character not only of the truths of mathematics, but also of the truths of logic.He aims at showing this by basing validity (...) and invalidity of syllogistic inferences on an interpretation of the standard forms with the help of the five kinds of possible relations between extensions of concepts given to us as areas in a plane, i.e.in space.Generality is achieved by considering all possible variations within each type of spatial relation, exhibiting a connection between concept and intuition reminding Lange of the Kantian “schema”. Lange is well aware of the contemporary English “algebraic” logic, but he considers its approach as the appropriate one for a logic of content and not for a logic of extension Lange did not live to enjoy the recognition by some leading logicians, nor could he respond to the many critics of his proposed foundation of logic.Its radicality as well as its broad reception seem to entitle Lange’s Logische Studiento an, if modest, place in the history of logic in the 19th century. (shrink)

Hill and Montag’s The Other Adam Smith confirms many of the Left’s established positions on Adam Smith, but does so by framing the philosopher as a standard-bearer of the Scottish Enlightenment, and not just as an arch-capitalist and proto-Hayekian. The book makes a strong case, but also strong-arms its readers into choosing between the Scottish Enlighteners and the Spinozism that its authors prefer.

This groundbreaking book proposes that the universe around us is literally alive and conscious. This worldview restores a sense of the sacred to modern lives that have too long insisted that mind, spirit, and consciousness must be divorced from body, nature, and matter. Going back to the earliest days of Western philosophy, this book illustrates how the notion of intrinsically sentient matter is thousands of years old and has only recently been challenged by the currently dominant paradigm of materialism. (...) By recognizing that matter feels, one can more closely relate to our bodies, planet, and cosmic environment as magnificent creations brimming with spirit and meaning. (shrink)

This paper examines two objections by Colin McGinn to panexperientialist metaphysics as a solution to the mind-body problem. It begins by briefly stating how the `ontological problem' of the mind-body relationship is central to the philosophy of mind, summarizes the difficulties with dualism and materialism, and outlines the main tenets of panexperientialism. Panexperientialists, such as David Ray Griffin, claim that theirs is one approach to solving the mind-body problem which does not get stuck in accounting for interaction nor in (...) the difficulties with emergentism and epiphenomenalism . McGinn attacks panexperientialism on two fronts: the Whiteheadian distinction between `consciousness' and `experience' and the notion of consciousness emerging from `non-conscious experience'; and the implicit `absurdities' inherent in the notion of experience and self-agency in the fundamental particles of physics. Griffin's defence fails to satisfactorily address challenge ; though a model is presented by the author which may offer panexperientialism a way out. McGinn's challenge is an attempted reductio which Griffin rejects: that panexperientialism contradicts the evidence of modern quantum- relativistic physics. The author's analysis of the opposing positions shows that both philosophers are arguing from incompatible `geometries of discourse' and radically inconsistent metaphysical assumptions. The paper concludes that a resolution of both the mind-body problem in general, and of the McGinn-Griffin dispute in particular, needs to involve an epistemological shift to include extra-rational ways of knowing. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: Sometimes, after years of painstaking work, someone presents a startling argument that seems to suddenly snatch the ground right out from under your feet. And it's back to square one. Such a conceptual trapdoor caught me by surprise a few years ago. For decades, I had been convinced it is simply inconceivable that subjectivity -- the interior experience of how consciousness feels -- could possibly emerge from a previously wholly objective world, that mind could evolve from ‘dead’ matter. (...) It seemed to me that the arguments of materialist philosophers, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists invariably missed the point. They always began with an assumption of ontological objectivity or physicality, and proceeded to show that that must be the source of consciousness. Well, of course, it had to be -- given their starting assumption. But what they were talking about wasn't consciousness at all. It was usually either some neural correlation, some computer analogue, or some complex and abstract linguistic deconstruction. Whatever their approach, the first-person experience of consciousness -- it's subjective feel -- always slipped through their grasp. They were looking at the problem from the third-person perspective -- from objectivity. And you can't get to here from there. (shrink)

Sometimes, after years of painstaking work, someone presents a startling argument that seems to suddenly snatch the ground right out from under your feet. And it's back to square one. Such a conceptual trapdoor caught me by surprise a few years ago. For decades, I had been convinced it is simply inconceivable that subjectivity -- the interior experience of how consciousness feels -- could possibly emerge from a previously wholly objective world, that mind could evolve from ‘dead’ matter. It seemed (...) to me that the arguments of materialist philosophers, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists invariably missed the point. They always began with an assumption of ontological objectivity or physicality, and proceeded to show that that must be the source of consciousness. Well, of course, it had to be -- given their starting assumption. But what they were talking about wasn't consciousness at all. It was usually either some neural correlation, some computer analogue, or some complex and abstract linguistic deconstruction. Whatever their approach, the first-person experience of consciousness -- it's subjective feel -- always slipped through their grasp. They were looking at the problem from the third-person perspective -- from objectivity. And you can't get to here from there. (shrink)

This collection of papers, Consciousness and its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, edited by Anthony Freeman presents seventeen responses to Galen Strawson’s keynote paper which claims that the only plausible way to be a real physicalist is to accept that the intrinsic properties of the physical are experiential in character, i.e., the doctrine of panpsychism. The book concludes with Strawson’s reply to these responses. This “real physicalism” is, according to Strawson, the only way of dealing with what Chalmers (...) calls the “hard problem of consciousness.” This problem lies in the fact that the experiential nature of our conscious experience is a puzzling phenomenon for the materialist. It is of an apparently fundamentally different nature from the rest of the physical world, hence the problem of integrating it into a satisfactory naturalistic world-picture. (shrink)

From Plato's eidos, to Descartes' cogito, to Kant's numenon, our understanding of reality has faltered at a seemingly impossible, double-edged, impasse. First, an ontological 'hard problem': If mind and matter are so radically different and separate, how do they ever interact? Second, a related epistemological conundrum: How is it possible for mind to ever know anything about matter--including whether it even exists? Then came Whitehead. By shifting the mind-matter relation from substances interacting in space to complementary phases in process, he (...) offered a way through, or at least around, the Kantian impasse. His panpsychist ontology came hand-in-glove with an epistemology of intersubjectivity: We can know the objective physical world because the actual world is not just physical, and because it necessarily and intimately informs and constitutes our subjective experience. But is this panpsychism or idealism? And how does it avoid the interaction problem that bedevils dualism or the problem of emergence that embarrasses materialism? (shrink)

Denis Diderot’s ideas about war and peace crystalize many of the contradictions in the world that he identified. On the one hand, war is a natural product of contradictions between natural law and human developments. On the other hand, it can and should always be subject to moral judgment based on a wide-ranging knowledge of history and context. War can be good if it eliminates tyranny, and bad if it limits freedom, equality, and prosperity. Peace can be good if it (...) cultivates the latter, and bad if it freezes inequality. Diderot never allows himself to rest on universal judgments for all times and all places, but insists upon never-ending comparisons and contrasts between the moral world and the natural world. Philosophical materialism provides the basis for his understanding of the world, but morals provide the instruments of judgment. (shrink)

George Santayana appears emotionally distant and personally uncommitted in many of his writings. In what may have been a related phenomenon, he does not seem to have committed to any school of philosophy, but rather to draw from many of the available schools when it suited him. In this article, we assess his constantly changing use of different philosophies and its implications for both philosophy and politics.

Ancient cynicism was a moralistic school of ascetic and anti-materialistic gadflies and critics. Modern cynicism is generally understood as amoral, selfish, and manipulative. This article explores the change in meaning that led from one to the other, and what each kind of cynicism could mean for contemporary life. It is very unlikely that most people would ever adopt the values and ways of the ancient cynics, but there may still be something to be gained from the few who might engage (...) in this mode of life: possibly more environmentalism, and if nothing else, more humor in our lives. Modern cynicism may have little of positive value to contribute to life and politics, although at least it undermines the self-righteous moralists. In any case, it is worth understanding in order to cope with it. Along the way, we learn that since Diogenes of Sinope a wide variety of thinkers from Socrates, Machiavelli, and Spinoza through Rousseau and Nietzsche to Wittgenstein have been credited with cynicism. That suggests that it may be more important to our intellectual life than many of us realize. (shrink)

In dem vorliegenden Band werden Arbeiten zusammengefafh, die sich kritisch mit Fragen von aus dem Marxschen Ideologiebegriff abgeleiteten Gesellschaftstheorien ebenso befassen wie mit der Komplexitat des Marxschen Ideologiebegriffs selbst, den orthodox-marxistischen und den marxistisch-revisionistischen Ideologietheorien, ihrem Wandel, ihren politisch-ideologischen Funktionen in unterschiedlichen histo­ risch-gesellschaftlichen Beziigen und, nicht zuletzt, ihrer theoretisch-methodologi­ schen Verwendbarkeit fiir das Verstandnis von Geist und Geschichte einerseits, Poli­ tik und Gesellschaft andererseits. Die hier versammelten Studien sind in den Jahren von 1960 bis 1975 entstanden. Sie beruhen zum (...) Teil auf Vorarbeiten, die bis in die Jahre 1954/55 zuriickreichen. Zwei Arbeiten sind bisher unveroffentlicht: der Einleitungsaufsatz »Ideologie und Ideologiebegriff. Dberlegungen zu ihrer metatheoretischen und immanent-kriti­ schen Aufarbeitung« (S. XIII-XVIII u. 1-21) und die Abhandlung »Entwurf einer Typologie des Ideologiebegriffs« (S. 82-102); aIle anderen Arbeiten sind, an ver­ streuten Stellen, bereits erschienen. 1m Laufe des letzten Jahrzehnts hat sich die theoretische Position des Verfassers insofern geklart, als er heute bestimmte Perspektiven der Wissenssoziologie und der Ideologiekritik mit einem historisch-soziologisch orientierten Funktionalismus in seinen metatheoretischen, d. h. theoretischen und forschungspraktischen, Beziigen systematisch aufzuweisen sucht. Damit wird einmal versucht, die These von der hi­ storisch-sozialen Bedingtheit von Theoriebildungen praziser als in der alteren Wis­ senssoziologie zu begriinden und historisches BewuBtsein durch positive Forschung neu zu fundieren. Mit einem solchen Ansatz versucht der Verfasser zweitens, die Kluft zwischen normativ-praskriptiven und empirisch-deskriptiven Forschungsan­ satzen, die in den Sozialwissenschaften weiterhin besteht, zu iiberbriicken. (shrink)

The reticence of scholars of ethics to enter into fundamental moral reasoning is well known. William Casebeer’s ambitious new book, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition, which is the publication of his 2001 University of California, San Diego, Ph.D. dissertation, stands in stark contrast. Casebeer, who teaches philosophy at the U.S. Air Force Academy, has undertaken the project of developing a comprehensive moral theory derived from what he terms “methodological naturalism.” Methodological naturalism, he explains, is a system of (...) moral reasoning derived exclusively from the empirically verifiable claims of science. His ethic starts with the materialist premise that all reality is reducible to matter and energy; since matter and energy are sufficiently explainable in terms of facts derived from the scientific method; morality too, as real—he is undeniably a moral realist—must be sufficiently explained in terms of such facts. With particular attention given to the cognitive sciences and evolutionary biology, Casebeer’s naturalism boldly asserts that ethics is reducible to science, moral norms to empirical facts, and practical judgments to theoretical propositions. This of course implicates the author in what critics refer to as the “naturalistic fallacy,” that is, the illicit inference from facts to norms. Aware of this, Casebeer attempts to show that such an inference is not only not illicit but itself the substance of fundamental moral reasoning. Unfortunately his refutation of the naturalistic fallacy is selective. He reduces the entire complex discussion to a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, then successfully throws into doubt the existence of such a distinction and judges himself done with the whole question. Using David Hume and G. E. Moore as his principal foils, his refutation entirely ignores the most enduring and plausible argument against deriving “ought” from “is,” proposed by the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas and his contemporary expositor, the Oxford philosopher John Finnis. (shrink)

This paper presents an overview of the process of entanglement at the 25th International Philosophy of Nursing Conference (IPNC) at University of California at Irvine held on August 18, 2022. Representing collective work from the US, Canada, UK and Germany, our panel entitled ‘What can critical posthuman philosophies do for nursing?’ examined critical posthumanism and its operations and potential in nursing. Critical posthumanism offers an antifascist, feminist, material, affective, and ecologically entangled approach to nursing and healthcare. Rather than focusing on (...) the arguments of each of the three distinct but interrelated panel presentation pieces, this paper instead focuses on process and performance (per/formance) and performativity as relational, connected and situated, with connections to nursing philosophy. Building upon critical feminist and new materialist philosophies, we describe intra‐activity and performativity as ways to dehierarchise knowledge making practices within traditional academic conference spaces. Creating critical cartographies of thinking and being are actions of possibility for building more just and equitable futures for nursing, nurses, and those they accompany—including all humans, nonhumans, and more than human matter. (shrink)

Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II (...) class='Hi'>materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the Resurrection of the Body, the Incarnation, and the intermediate state (if there is one). (shrink)

This paper discusses the similarities and differences between sociological and Christian approaches regarding the relationship between materialism and life satisfaction. The theoretical analysis gives reasons that advocate the view that there are resemblances between the two perspectives regarding materialism features and the impact of these values on life satisfaction. Both approaches argue for a less materialistic way of life in order to become generally happier. Nevertheless, if science gives research-based proofs to this relationship, Christianity states that worship (...) of God, and not material goods, is the only way to get true happiness. Finally, the paper attempts to give some possible explanations for these similarities between sociology and Christianity. First, similarly to the Christian religion, some sociologists criticise materialism and consumption society. Second, the scale construction can rely on popular notions of materialism, thus some items can have religious backgrounds. Eventually, the Bible and the Church Fathers’ special concern with the human nature lead to some thoughts about man that have been confirmed by researchers. (shrink)

Demons have the power to cause temptations in us, and Christian materialism implies the supervenience of temptations on brain states. This in turn implies that demons bring about temptations by causally interfering with our brains. But if they have such an ability to affect the physical world, it is mysterious why they do not wreak more havoc than they do both to our brains and in the world more generally. Substance dualism provides an elegant solution: demonic temptation is not (...) a species of soul-to-brain causation, but soul-to-soul, and we don’t need to suppose demons have the power to directly affect the physical world. Materialist solutions, in contrast, are ad hoc. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical exploration of philosopher Kevin Corcoran’s proposed Christian Materialism. Corcoran’s constitution view claimsthat we human persons are constituted by our bodies without being identical with the bodies that constitute us. I will critically evaluate this view and argue that Corcoran has not successfully managed to ground a first-person perspective and intentional states in materialism. Moreover, Corcoran’s property dualism about mental states and the idea of the causally efficacy of such states seem incompatible with (...) class='Hi'>materialism. Corcoran’s view ofimago Deiis also explored and evaluated. Towards the end of the paper I put forward a brief defense of dualism in light of Corcoran’s critique. (shrink)

John Locke asserted that God could have, if he wished, given the ability to think, feel, and love to matter instead of to spirit. The inference he drew from this assertion was that all the "ends of morality and religion" could be accounted for even if people were purely material. Matter and spirit, therefore, are on a par with respect to these ends. I argue for this parity, concluding that it doesn't matter whether Christians are materialists or dualists.

Baker, James and Reader offer new religious engagement with the public sphere via means of interdisciplinary analysis and empirical examples, developing what we call a Relational Christian Realism building upon interaction with contemporary Philosophy of Religion. This book represents an exciting contribution to philosophy and practice of religion on both sides of the Atlantic and aspires to be sufficiently interdisciplinary to also appeal to readerships engaged in the study of modern political and social trends.

Presents a new way of looking at what it means to be human, offering a convincing case that humans are more than immaterial souls or "biological computers".

This article explores enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment in reference to modern medicine’s view of the body. Before considering Weber’s enchantment paradigm, I question some core assumptions regarding sociology as methodologically scientific and value-free. Furthermore, I draw on Jenkins who helps to illustrate the difficulty of rooting terms such as enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment; the question remains “which” historical and cultural period is employed as the basis for such sociological terms. Such questions are critical, but not entirely dismissive of modern medicine (...) as “disenchanted”; with some more explicit foundational and presuppositional context, disenchantment can be a helpful notion for approaching questions of the “new body.” St. Gregory Palamas’ Christian materialism and mystical anthropology present such an explicit foundation. Moreover, this Patristic foundation moves past the postmodern aporia of emphasizing either immanence or transcendence—two polar attractions that factor heavily in the way modern medicine views the body. (shrink)

This piece raises a new challenge for Christian materialist accounts of human persons. Revisiting one of the perennial challenges for Christian materialism, explaining the metaphysical compatibility of resurrection and the life everlasting with materialist metaphysics, I argue that resuscitation phenomena reported in scripture undermine van Inwagen’s and Zimmerman’s attempts to reconcile resurrection and materialism. Although this challenge to Christian materialism is not insurmountable, it provides good reason to reject several of the most serious Christian materialist projects and (...) offers a reason for Christians to consider alternatives to materialism. (shrink)

Hud Hudson presents an innovative view of the metaphysics of human persons according to which human persons are material objects but not human organisms. In developing his account, he formulates and defends a unique collection of positions on parthood, persistence, vagueness, composition, identity, and various puzzles of material constitution. The author also applies his materialist metaphysics to issues in ethics and in the philosophy of religion. He examines the implications for ethics of his metaphysical views for standard arguments addressing the (...) moral permissibility of our treatment of human persons and their parts, fetuses and infants, the irreversibly comatose, and corpses. He argues that his metaphysics provides the best foundation in the philosophy of religion for the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Hudson addresses a broad range of metaphysical issues, but among his most strikingly original contributions are his defense of the "Partist" view and his argument for the compatibility of Christianity with a materialistic theory of human persons. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Freud saw Christianity as metaphysical escapism, with Nietzsche calling the religion a "Platonism for the masses" and faulting Paul the apostle for negating more immanent, material modes of thought and political solidarity. Integrating this debate with the philosophies of difference espoused by Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Pier Paolo Pasolini, Ward Blanton argues that genealogical interventions into the political economies of Western cultural memory do not go far enough in relation to the imagined (...) founder of Christianity. Blanton challenges the idea of Paulinism as a pop Platonic worldview or form of social control. He unearths in Pauline legacies otherwise repressed resources for new materialist spiritualities and new forms of radical political solidarity, liberating "religion" from inherited interpretive assumptions so philosophical thought can manifest in risky, radical freedom. (shrink)

Marxism came to China along with the Russian Revolution. Many Chinese scholars and students became interested in Marxism, which was interpreted in terms of patriotism and as an anti-imperialist movement. As a leader of the Christian Youth Student Fellowship of YMCA in Shanghai, YT Wu was deeply concerned with the nature of current thought on campus, and sought dialogue between Christianity and materialism. This article analyzes Wu's thought, especially his proposal of a Christian materialism which would reconcile (...) the two. Like Marxist thinkers in the West, Wu was highly critical of the modernity that was also influencing China. Wu finds the key to theology in an interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, which he understands as a depiction of Christian materialism. (shrink)

Article on recent metaphysical accounts of bodily resurrection.

Increasing involvement of Nigerian youths in cybercrime and fraud, ritual activities, prostitution, human and drug trafficking, kidnapping, robbery and hired killings reveal the growing materialism of a significant number of Nigerian youths, including uncountable numbers of professed Nigerian Christian youths. There is the need to address materialism amongst Nigerian youths with special reference to Nigerian Christian youths. Paul’s moral instructions to Timothy are still relevant for Nigerian Christian youths to emulate. Therefore, this study employs a redaction critical method (...) of biblical exegesis to interpret and apply 1 Timothy 6:6–14 to the problem of materialism amongst Nigerian Christian youths. This study finds that materialism amongst Nigerian Christian youths is consolidating negative implications to their spiritual lives, families, to the mission mandate of the church and to Nigeria as a nation. This study argues that Paul has shown a model of how a Christian youth ought to be guided with regard to material possessions.Contribution: This study explored the issue of materialism amongst countless Nigerian Christian youths that is consolidating negative implications to their spiritual lives, families, to the church and to Nigeria as a nation. The study recommends that Paul’s instructions to Timothy about godliness and love of money are still relevant for Nigeria Christian youths to emulate. (shrink)

Juxtaposing theological inquiry with the philosophical movement of new materialism, Sam Mickey reflects on questions of human embodiment, nonhuman agency, technological innovation, and possible futures for humankind. New Materialism and Theology opens several pathways for thinking about what really matters.