El presente trabajo describe los diferentes significados que la forma ychakat, en sus diversas combinatorias, tiene en la obra de Valdivia (1607) sobre la lengua allentiac. Más específicamente, se propone que esta forma puede: a) ocurrir postpuesta a (pro)nombres con significados intensificador y reflexivo; b) antepuesta a verbos con un significado reflexivo y c) sufijada a verbos con significados reflexivo y pasivo. A partir de la identificación de dichos significados, se propone una reconstrucción de dos procesos diacrónicos experimentado por esta (...) forma, examinando para dicha propuesta los diferentes caminos que se han propuesto en perspectiva tipológica sobre el tema. Finalmente, se propone que es posible que la tendencia de cambios hacia la sufijación tenga que ver con el contacto con otras lenguas del área andina; sin embargo, el camino semántico seguido es exclusivo del allentiac y no se comparte con otras lenguas del área, por lo que es probable que sea un cambio de naturaleza interna. (shrink)

This article uses data from the 2020 TIAA Institute-GFLEC Personal Finance Index to show that many American families were financially fragile well before the COVID-19 pandemic hit the U.S. economy. Financial fragility is particularly severe among specific demographic groups, such as African-Americans and those with low income. The article also shows that financial fragility is strongly linked to financial literacy and that many Americans are ill-equipped to deal with the financial decisions needed to navigate through a financial crisis. Suggestions are (...) provided to deal with personal finance decisions in times of emergency. (shrink)

El perfecto es un aspecto de perspectiva retrospectiva que codifica la vigencia en el momento de habla de una eventualidad anterior. El presente trabajo propone la existencia de una categoría semántica y gramatical de antiperfecto que, en contraste con el perfecto, codifica la no vigencia en el momento de habla de una eventualidad pasada. Debido a que, al igual que el perfecto, el antiperfecto es sensible a la vigencia de una eventualidad anterior en el momento de habla, proponemos que se (...) trata de un segundo tipo de aspecto de perspectiva retrospectiva. Tras revisar las nociones de perfecto en Comrie, Dik y Nishiyama y Koenig y la noción de pasado discontinuo en Plungian y Van der Auwera, se observa el modo en que la categoría propuesta se realiza, codificada gramaticalmente, en la lengua mapuche, mediante el morfema -fu, con especial énfasis en su caracterización semántico-pragmática, su relación con la aktionsart y el papel del contexto en su interpretación. The perfect aspect is a retrospective aspect that encodes the current relevance of a previous event. In this work, we propose a semantic and grammatical category labeled as antiperfect that, in contrast to the perfect aspect, encodes the non-validity of a previous eventuality in speech time. Given that, as the perfect aspect, the antiperfect is subject to the current relevance of a previous situation, we propose that this is a second type of retrospective aspect. After reviewing the descriptions of perfect by Comrie, Dik and Nishiyama & Koenig, and the description of discontinuous past by Plungian & van der Auwera, we analyze how the antiperfect is grammatically encoded in Mapudungun by means of the morpheme -fu. We focus the analysis of this category on its semantic-pragmatic description, its relation to aktionsart, and the role of context in its interpretation. (shrink)

Drawing on work of the past decade, this volume brings together articles from the philosophy, history, and sociology of science, and many other branches of the biological sciences. The volume delves into the latest theoretical controversies as well as burning questions of contemporary social importance. The issues considered include the nature of evolutionary theory, biology and ethics, the challenge from religion, and the social implications of biology today (in particular the Human Genome Project).

Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.

This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the property dualism argument, tacitly assume that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. It is argued that, the property that does the work in explaining the (...) possibility of a posteriori identities need not be a first-order property of the referent in question. On his view, the property dualism argument requires only a weaker semantic premise, which allows that the property in question be a higher order property. A refined version of the property dualism argument is formulated, which uses the weaker premise, and defends the argument against various objections. (shrink)

Neuroscience is a multidisciplinary effort to understand the structures and functions of the brain and brain-mind relations. This effort results in an increasing amount of data, generated by sophisticated technologies. However, these data enhance our descriptive knowledge, rather than improve our understanding of brain functions. This is caused by methodological gaps both within and between subdisciplines constituting neuroscience, and the atomistic approach that limits the study of macro- and mesoscopic issues. Whole-brain measurement technologies do not resolve these issues, but rather (...) aggravate them by the complexity problem. The present article is devoted to methodological and epistemic problems that obstruct the development of human neuroscience. We neither discuss ontological questions nor review data, except when it is necessary to demonstrate a methodological issue. As regards intradisciplinary methodological problems, we concentrate on those within neurobiology and psychology. As regards interdisciplinary problems, we suggest that core disciplines of neuroscience can be integrated using systemic concepts that also entail human-environment relations. We emphasize the necessity of a meta-discussion that should entail a closer cooperation with philosophy as a discipline of systematic reflection. The atomistic reduction should be complemented by the explicit consideration of the embodiedness of the brain and the embeddedness of humans. The discussion is aimed at the development of an explicit methodology of integrative human neuroscience, which will not only link different fields and levels, but also help in understanding clinical phenomena. (shrink)

In Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, leading figures in the fields of virtue ethics and ethics come together to present the first ...

This book demonstrates how children's imagination makes a continuing contribution to their cognitive and emotional development.

Two problems are considered here. One relates to who has moral status, and the other relates to who has moral responsibility. The criteria for mattering morally have long been disputed, and many humans and nonhuman animals have been considered “marginal cases,” on the contested edges of moral considerability and concern. The marginalization of humans and other species is frequently the pretext for denying their rights, including the rights to health care, to reproductive freedom, and to bodily autonomy. There is broad (...) agreement across cultural and philosophical traditions about the capacities and responsibilities of moral agents. I propose an inclusive and expansive way of thinking about moral status, situating it not in the characteristics or capacities of individuals, but in the responsibilities and obligations of moral agents. Moral agents, under this view, are not privileged or entitled to special treatment but rather have responsibilities. I approach this by considering some African communitarian conceptions of moral status and moral agency. I propose that moral agency can also be more expansive and include not just individual moral agents but collective entities that have some of the traits of moral agents: power, freedom, and the capacity to recognize and act on the demands of morality and acknowledge and respect the rights of others. Expanding who and what is a moral agent correspondingly extends moral responsibility for respecting rights and fostering the conditions for the health and well-being of humans and animals onto the collective entities who uniquely have the capacity to attend to global-scale health threats such as pandemics and human-caused climate change. (shrink)

This chapter presents an opinionated account of how to understand the contributions of experience, especially with respect to the role of cognitive science, in developing and assessing metaphysical theories of reality. I develop a methodological basis for the idea that, independently of work in experimental philosophy focused on explications of concepts, contemporary metaphysical theories with a role for experiential evidence can be fruitfully connected to empirical work in psychology, especially cognitive science. My argument is not that cognitive science should replace (...) the metaphysician’s use of a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality. Rather, we should enrich our perspective on a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality by drawing on any relevant work in cognitive science. (shrink)

Our interpretive resources enable us to make sense of, navigate, and communicate about our shared world. These resources not only carve the world up into categories, but also guide how we, individually and collectively, are oriented towards it. In this thesis, I examine how these resources, and the dispositions they guide, may be harmful. A vital kind of interpretive resources are frames, which equip us with unified perspectives on the world. Perspectives are suites of open-ended interpretive (inquisitive, attentional, inferential, evaluative, (...) and affective) dispositions. Frames thereby guide how we interpret, respond to, and navigate the world. I show that these perspectives are epistemically powerful and indispensable. I argue that flawed perspectives, and the distorting frames that produce them, are deeply pernicious and I examine their relationship to oppression. (shrink)

Neural reuse is a form of neuroplasticity whereby neural elements originally developed for one purpose are put to multiple uses. A diverse behavioral repertoire is achieved by means of the creation of multiple, nested, and overlapping neural coalitions, in which each neural element is a member of multiple different coalitions and cooperates with a different set of partners at different times. Neural reuse has profound implications for how we think about our continuity with other species, for how we understand the (...) similarities and differences between psychological processes, and for how best to pursue a unified science of the mind.After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain(2014; henceforthAfter Phrenologyin this Précis) surveys the terrain and advocates for a series of reforms in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. The book argues that, among other things, we should capture brain function in a multidimensional manner, develop a new, action-oriented vocabulary for psychology, and recognize that higher-order cognitive processes are built from complex configurations of already evolved circuitry. (shrink)

Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but rather often about factual questions as well—as seen when looking at the controversy surrounding the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not surprising since the pacifist,legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of an alternative value system, and the quarrel between the two parties about supposedly descriptive matters (...) never ceases, as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue.In my view, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality implicitly obeys three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from the other point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Hone your senses to the uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly to the danger of military escalation leading to another world war"). Objective reality has no way of telling us how far we should go in following these imperatives. Rather, we have to make the decision about how far we are going to take them ourselves. In this way, the pacifist's epistemic imperatives are comparable to Kant's regulative principles. (shrink)

Essays devoted to the work of the late Neil Wilson, Canadian philosopher and contributor to the field of semantic analysis that emerged from the fusion of logic, pragmatism, and ontology. Many of the essays in this volume take their initial inspiration from Wilson's seminal work Substances Without Substrata.