Les rapports sociaux de race, de genre, de sexe sont inextricablement mêlés : telle est une idée centrale du féminisme décolonial tel qu’il se déploie depuis Abya Yala, du nom que le peuple kuna donnait au continent américain. L’article situe l’importance de renommer les femmes et féministes d’origine autochtone, une manière de défaire les discours coloniaux (parfois tenus par des universitaires féministes) sur les pratiques de genre avant la colonialité/modernité. Ochy Curiel illustre cette idée à partir de l’expérience du (...) GLEFAS (Groupe latino-américain de formation et d’action féministe) : le décolonial n’y est pas seulement une critique du savoir académique, il est profondément ancré dans des pratiques autogestionnaires de luttes anticapitalistes, dans le lesbianisme politique, dans la rue, dans les associations, dans les organisations communautaires. (shrink)

Moral philosophers agree that welfare matters. But they disagree about what it is, or how much it matters. In this vital new work, Wayne Sumner presents an original theory of welfare, investigating its nature and discussing its importance. He considers and rejects all notable theories of welfare, both objective and subjective, including hedonism and theories founded on desire or preference. His own theory connects welfare closely with happiness or life satisfaction. Reacting against the value pluralism that currently dominates moral philosophy, (...) he advances welfare as the only basic ethical value. He concludes by discussing the implications of this thesis for ethical and political theory. Written in clear, non-technical language, and including a definitive survey of other work in this area, Sumner's book is essential reading for moral philosophers, political theorists, and welfare economists. (shrink)

Posterior a Hiroshima y Nagasaki se hizo visible hacia dónde conducirían la obtención y uso de conocimientos y creación de artefactos que no se correspondieran a las metas de subsistencia y mejoramiento humanos, emergieron movimientos y estudios relacionados con los impactos sociales de la ciencia y la tecnología. Surgió en ese contexto el campo denominado Ciencia- Tecnología- Sociedad (CTS), centrado en las complejas interrelaciones que la ciencia y la tecnología y la sociedad. El presente texto tiene el objetivo de profundizar (...) en el trabajo de fundamentación teórica a partir del reconocimiento de algunas ideas como: la relación de los seres humanos con sus entornos es socio- tecno- cognitiva, la interacción conocimiento- sociedad es contradictoria, y es preciso reconocer la complejidad del conocimiento CTS. Por último, una nueva propuesta, en las circunstancias actuales un acrónimo más abarcador que el de CTS puede ser SOCITEI (So: sociedad, CI: conocimiento, Te: tecnología, In: innovación). After Hiroshima and Nagasaki the destiny of the obtaining and use of knowledge as well as the creation of artifacts that were not according to the goals of human subsistence and improvement became visible, movements and studies related to the social impacts of science and technology emerged. The field called science - technology - society (CTS) (Spanish acronym) arose in that context, focused on the complex interrelationships in science technology and society. This text aims to deepen the work of theoretical foundation in recognition of some ideas like: the relationship of human beings with their environments is socio-techno - cognitive, interaction knowledge - society is contradictory, and we must recognize the complexity of knowledge CTS. Finally, in the new circumstances a new proposal a more encompassing acronym than the CTS can be SOCITEI (SO: society, CI: knowledge, TE: technology, IN: innovation) (Spanish acronyms). (shrink)

One can (for the most part) formulate a model of a classical system in either the Lagrangian or the Hamiltonian framework. Though it is often thought that those two formulations are equivalent in all important ways, this is not true: the underlying geometrical structures one uses to formulate each theory are not isomorphic. This raises the question of whether one of the two is a more natural framework for the representation of classical systems. In the event, the answer is yes: (...) I state and sketch proofs of two technical results—inspired by simple physical arguments about the generic properties of classical systems—to the effect that, in a precise sense, classical systems evince exactly the geometric structure Lagrangian mechanics provides for the representation of systems, and none provided by Hamiltonian. The argument not only clarifies the conceptual structure of the two systems of mechanics, but also their relations to each other and their respective mechanisms for representing physical systems. It also shows why naïvely structural approaches to the representational content of physical theories cannot work. [Lagrange] grasped that he had gained a method of stating dynamical truths in a way, which is perfectly indifferent to the particular methods of measurement employed in fixing the positions of the various parts of the system. Accordingly, he went on to deduce equations of motion, which are equally applicable whatever quantitative measurements have been made, provided that they are adequate to fix positions. The beauty and almost divine simplicity of these equations is such that these formulae are worthy to rank with those mysterious symbols which in ancient times were held directly to indicate the Supreme Reason at the base of all things. (Whitehead [1948], p. 63)1. Introduction2.Classical Systems3. The Possible Interactions of a Classical System and the Structure of Its Space of States4. Classical Systems Are Lagrangian5. Classical Systems Are Not Hamiltonian6. How Lagrangian and Hamiltonian Mechanics Represent Classical Systems7. The Conceptual Structure of Classical Mechanics. (shrink)

In Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, leading figures in the fields of virtue ethics and ethics come together to present the first ...

An energy condition, in the context of a wide class of spacetime theories, is, crudely speaking, a relation one demands the stress-energy tensor of matter satisfy in order to try to capture the idea that "energy should be positive". The remarkable fact I will discuss in this paper is that such simple, general, almost trivial seeming propositions have profound and far-reaching import for our understanding of the structure of relativistic spacetimes. It is therefore especially surprising when one also learns that (...) we have no clear understanding of the nature of these conditions, what theoretical status they have with respect to fundamental physics, what epistemic status they may have, when we should and should not expect them to be satisfied, and even in many cases how they and their consequences should be interpreted physically. Or so I shall argue, by a detailed analysis of the technical and conceptual character of all the standard conditions used in physics today, including examination of their consequences and the circumstances in which they are believed to be violated. (shrink)

Every physical theory has two different forms of mathematical equations to represent its target systems: the dynamical and the kinematical. Kinematical constraints are differentiated from equations of motion by the fact that their particular form is fixed once and for all, irrespective of the interactions the system enters into. By contrast, the particular form of a system's equations of motion depends essentially on the particular interaction the system enters into. All contemporary accounts of the structure and semantics of physical theory (...) treat dynamics, i.e., the equations of motion, as the most important feature of a theory for the purposes of its philosophical analysis. I argue to the contrary that it is the kinematical constraints that determine the structure and empirical content of a physical theory in the most important ways: they function as necessary preconditions for the appropriate application of the theory; they differentiate types of physical systems; they are necessary for the equations of motion to be well posed or even just cogent; and they guide the experimentalist in the design of tools for measurement and observation. It is thus satisfaction of the kinematical constraints that renders meaning to those terms representing a system's physical quantities in the first place, even before one can ask whether or not the system satisfies the theory's equations of motion. (shrink)

Although black holes are objects of central importance across many fields of physics, there is no agreed upon definition for them, a fact that does not seem to be widely recognized. Physicists in different fields conceive of and reason about them in radi- cally different, and often conflicting, ways. All those ways, however, seem sound in the relevant contexts. After examining and comparing many of the definitions used in practice, I consider the problems that the lack of a universally accepted (...) definition leads to, and discuss whether one is in fact needed for progress in the physics of black holes. I conclude that, within reasonable bounds, the profusion of different definitions is in fact a virtue, making the investigation of black holes possible and fruitful in all the many different kinds of problems about them that physicists consider, although one must take care in trying to translate results between fields. (shrink)

Much controversy surrounds the question of what ought to be the proper definition of 'singularity' in general relativity, and the question of whether the prediction of such entities leads to a crisis for the theory. I argue that a definition in terms of curve incompleteness is adequate, and in particular that the idea that singularities correspond to 'missing points' has insurmountable problems. I conclude that singularities per se pose no serious problem for the theory, but their analysis does bring into (...) focus several problems of interpretation at the foundation of the theory often ignored in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

I explain the difficulty of making various concepts of and relating to probability precise, rigorous and physically significant when attempting to apply them in reasoning about objects living in infinite-dimensional spaces, working through many examples from cosmology. I focus on the relation of topological to measure-theoretic notions of and relating to probability, how they diverge in unpleasant ways in the infinite-dimensional case, and are even difficult to work with on their own. Even in cases where an appropriate family of spacetimes (...) is finite-dimensional, and so admits a measure of the relevant sort, however, it is always the case that the family is not a compact topological space, and so does not admit a physically significant, well behaved probability measure. Problems of a different but still deeply troubling sort plague arguments about likelihood in that context, which I also discuss. I conclude that most standard forms of argument used in cosmology to estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of various properties or behaviors of spacetimes have serious mathematical, physical and conceptual problems. (shrink)

I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the ontological character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue that the hole argument does not bear on the debate, because it provides no clear criterion to distinguish the positions. I propose two such precise criteria and construct separate arguments based on each to yield contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like relationalism and the other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one must fix an (...) investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of existence about spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself to argue that it is more fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality, a notion that lends itself to several different explications, all of philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of the others. I conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to the broader debate between realists and instrumentalists. 1 Introduction2 The Hole Argument3 Limits of Spacetimes4 Pointless Constructions5 The Debate between Substantivalists and Relationalists6 Existence and Physicality: An Embarassment of Spacetime Structures7 Valedictory Remarks on Realism and Instrumentalism, and the Structure of Our Knowledge of Physics. (shrink)

All accounts of causality that presuppose the propagation or transfer or some physical stuff to be an essential part of the causal relation rely for the force of their causal claims on a principle of conservation for that stuff. General Relativity does not permit the rigorous formulation of appropriate conservation principles. Consequently, in so far as General Relativity is considered and fundamental physical theory, such accounts of causality cannot be considered fundamental. The continued use of such accounts of causality ought (...) not be proscribed, but justification is due from those who would use them. (shrink)

This article introduces a different insight on the role of leadership in the process to develop sustainability and achieve lasting improvement in quality of life. Authors bring together the societal, organizational and individual levels of sustainability in one conceptual framework and discuss the interconnectedness among these three levels. The conclusion is that an effective approach to sustainability starts from the inside, i.e. from the individual level. This implies a decisive role for personal leadership in the change path towards sustainability. It (...) brings new challenges and responsibilities for higher education in the preparation of a new generation of managers and leaders who can think and act from a sustainability perspective. (shrink)

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic prompted the need for a teleneuropsychology protocol for the cognitive assessment of older adults, who are at increased risk for both COVID-19 and dementia. Prior recommendations for teleneuropsychological assessment did not consider many of the unique challenges posed by COVID-19. The field is still in need of clear guidelines and standards of care for the assessment of older adults under the current circumstances. Advantages of teleneuropsychological assessment during the COVID-19 pandemic include reduced risk of contracting (...) the virus, eliminating travel time and reducing cost, and more rapid access to needed services. Challenges include disparities in technology access among patients, reduced control over the testing environment, impeded ability to make behavioral observations, and limited research on valid and reliable cognitive assessment measures. The aim of this perspective review is to propose a teleneuropsychological protocol to facilitate neuropsychological assessment utilizing a virtual platform. The proposed protocol has been successful with our clinical and research populations and may help neuropsychologists implement teleneuropsychology services without compromising validity or reliability. However, there is increasing need for research on teleneuropsychological assessment options for both clinical and research purposes. (shrink)

The question of the existence of gravitational stress-energy in general relativity has exercised investigators in the field since the inception of the theory. Folklore has it that no adequate definition of a localized gravitational stress-energetic quantity can be given. Most arguments to that effect invoke one version or another of the Principle of Equivalence. I argue that not only are such arguments of necessity vague and hand-waving but, worse, are beside the point and do not address the heart of the (...) issue. Based on a novel analysis of what it may mean for one tensor to depend in the proper way on another, which, en passant, provides a precise characterization of the idea of a "geometric object", I prove that, under certain natural conditions, there can be no tensor whose interpretation could be that it represents gravitational stress-energy in general relativity. It follows that gravitational energy, such as it is in general relativity, is necessarily non-local. Along the way, I prove a result of some interest in own right about the structure of the associated jet bundles of the bundle of Lorentz metrics over spacetime. I conclude by showing that my results also imply that, under a few natural conditions, the Einstein field equation is the unique equation relating gravitational phenomena to spatiotemporal structure, and discuss how this relates to the non-localizability of gravitational stress-energy. (shrink)

In this timely book L.W. Sumner addresses these issues within the wider context of palliative care for patients in the dying process.

I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the ontological character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue that the hole argument does not bear on the debate, because it provides no clear criterion to distinguish the positions. I propose two such precise criteria and construct separate arguments based on each to yield contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like relationalism and the other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one must fix an (...) investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of existence about spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself to argue that it is more fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality, a notion that lends itself to several different explications, all of philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of the others. I conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to the broader debate between realists and instrumentalists. 1 Introduction2 The Hole Argument3 Limits of Spacetimes4 Pointless Constructions5 The Debate between Substantivalists and Relationalists6 Existence and Physicality: An Embarassment of Spacetime Structures7 Valedictory Remarks on Realism and Instrumentalism, and the Structure of Our Knowledge of Physics. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to the recent claims of physicists and philosophers of physics, general relativity requires no interpretation in any substantive sense of the term. I canvass the common reasons given in favor of the alleged need for an interpretation, including the difficulty in coming to grips with the physical significance of diffeomorphism invariance and of singular structure, and the problems faced in the search for a theory of quantum gravity. I find that none of them shows any defect (...) in our comprehension of general relativity as a physical theory. I conclude by comparing general relativity with quantum mechanics, a theory that manifestly does stand in need of an interpretation in an important sense. Although many aspects of the conceptual structure of general relativity remain poorly understood, it suffers no incoherence in its formulation as a physical theory that only an ‘interpretation’ could resolve. *Received November 2007; revised February 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 817 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e‐mail: [email protected] . When science starts to be interpretive it is more unscientific even than mysticism. (D. H. Lawrence, “Self‐Protection”). (shrink)

General relativity poses serious problems for counterfactual propositions peculiar to it as a physical theory. Because these problems arise solely from the dynamical nature of spacetime geometry, they are shared by all schools of thought on how counterfactuals should be interpreted and understood. Given the role of counterfactuals in the characterization of, inter alia, many accounts of scientific laws, theory confirmation and causation, general relativity once again presents us with idiosyncratic puzzles any attempt to analyze and understand the nature of (...) scientific knowledge must face. (shrink)

I argue that all current research programs in quantum gravity conform to the 17th century hypothetico-deductive model of scientific inquiry, perhaps of necessity given the current state of technology. In so far as they do not recognize and advertise the shortcomings of the research method they use, they do a disservice to the integrity of science, for the method admits of far less certainty accruing to its products than one would be led to believe by the pronouncements of researchers in (...) the area. (shrink)

In the course of writing this book, answers to the following questions and many others were given in both narrative and visual form. Most of them were presented rather forcefully, and not when I was expecting them. I understood that I was to share what I learned. What is in store for the geology of North America? How do we create matter every day? What is the nature of nature? How did people live more than a half million years ago? (...) What was space travel like a half million years ago? Where is God? What are our responsibilities as humans? Is Hitler in heaven? How can we go to heaven? (shrink)

A definitive feature of Kant's moral philosophy is its rationalism. Kant insists that moral theory, at least at its foundation, cannot take account of empirical facts about human beings and their circumstances in the world. This is the core of Kant's commitment to ‘metaphysics of morals’, and it is what he sees as his greatest contribution to moral philosophy. The paper clarifies what it means to be committed to metaphysics of morals, why Kant is committed to it, and where he (...) thinks empirical considerations may enter moral theory. The paper examines recent work of contemporary Kantians who argue that there is a central role for empirical considerations in Kant's moral theory. Either these theorists interpret Kant himself as permitting empirical considerations to enter, or they propose to extend Kant's theory so as to allow them to enter. With some qualifications, I argue that these interpretive trends are not supported by the texts, and that the proposed extensions are not plausibly Kantian. Kant's insistence on the exclusion of empirical considerations from the foundations of moral theory is not an incidental feature of his thought which might be modified while the rest remains unchanged. Rather, it is the very centre of his endeavours in moral philosophy. If we disagree with it, I argue, we have grounds for moving to a distinctly different theoretical framework. (shrink)

In the early 1970s it is was realized that there is a striking formal analogy between the Laws of black-hole mechanics and the Laws of classical thermodynamics. Before the discovery of Hawking radiation, however, it was generally thought that the analogy was only formal, and did not reflect a deep connection between gravitational and thermodynamical phenomena. It is still commonly held that the surface gravity of a stationary black hole can be construed as a true physical temperature and its area (...) as a true entropy only when quantum effects are taken into account; in the context of classical general relativity alone, one cannot cogently construe them so. Does the use of quantum field theory in curved spacetime offer the only hope for taking the analogy seriously? I think the answer is `no'. To attempt to justify that answer, I shall begin by arguing that the standard argument to the contrary is not physically well founded, and in any event begs the question. Looking at the various ways that the ideas of ``temperature'' and ``entropy'' enter classical thermodynamics then will suggest arguments that, I claim, show the analogy between classical black-hole mechanics and classical thermodynamics should be taken more seriously, without the need to rely on or invoke quantum mechanics. In particular, I construct an analogue of a Carnot cycle in which a black hole ``couples'' with an ordinary thermodynamical system in such a way that its surface gravity plays the role of temperature and its area that of entropy. Thus, the connection between classical general relativity and classical thermodynamics on their own is already deep and physically significant, independent of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

I argue that an adequate semantics for physical theories must be grounded on an account of the way that a theory provides formal and conceptual resources appropriate for---that have propriety in---the construction of representations of the physical systems the theory purports to treat. I sketch a precise, rigorous definition of the required forms of propriety, and argue that semantic content accrues to scientific representations of physical systems primarily in virtue of the propriety of its resources. In particular, neither the adequacy (...) of those representations nor any referential relations their terms may enter into play any fundamental role in the determination of the representation's semantic content. One consequence is that anything like traditional Tarskian semantics is inadequate for the task. (shrink)

Systems of differential equations are used to describe, model, explain, and predict states of physical systems. Experimental and theoretical branches of physics including general relativity, climate science, and particle physics have differential equations at their center. Direct solutions to differential equations are not available in many domains, which spurs on the use of creative mathematics and simulated solutions.

I state and prove, in the context of a space having only the metrical structure imposed by the geometrized version of Newtonian gravitational theory, a theorem analagous to that of Weyl's in a Lorentzian space. The theorem, loosely speaking, says that a projective structure and a suitably defined compatible conformal structure on such a space jointly suffice for fixing the metrical structure of a Newtonian spacetime model up to constant factors. It allows one to give a natural, physically compelling interpretation (...) of the spatiotemporal geometry of a geometrized Newtonian gravity spacetime manifold, in close analogy with the way Weyl's Theorem allows one to do in general relativity. (shrink)

In the early 1970s it is was realized that there is a striking formal analogy between the Laws of black-hole mechanics and the Laws of classical thermodynamics. Before the discovery of Hawking radiation, however, it was generally thought that the analogy was only formal, and did not reflect a deep connection between gravitational and thermodynamical phenomena. It is still commonly held that the surface gravity of a stationary black hole can be construed as a true physical temperature and its area (...) as a true entropy only when quantum effects are taken into account; in the context of classical general relativity alone, one cannot cogently construe them so. Does the use of quantum field theory in curved spacetime offer the only hope for taking the analogy seriously? I think the answer is 'no'. To attempt to justify that answer, I shall begin by arguing that the standard argument to the contrary is not physically well founded, and in any event begs the question. Looking at the various ways that the ideas of "temperature" and "entropy" enter classical thermodynamics then will suggest arguments that, I claim, show the analogy between classical black-hole mechanics and classical thermodynamics should be taken more seriously, without the need to rely on or invoke quantum mechanics. In particular, I construct an analogue of a Carnot cycle in which a black hole "couples" with an ordinary thermodynamical system in such a way that its surface gravity plays the role of temperature and its area that of entropy. Thus, the connection between classical general relativity and classical thermodynamics on their own is already deep and physically significant, independent of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The analysis of theory-confirmation generally takes the deductive form: show that a theory in conjunction with physical data and auxiliary hypotheses yield a prediction about phenomena; verify the prediction; provide a quantitative measure of the degree of theory-confirmation this yields. The issue of confirmation for an entire framework either does not arise, or is dismissed in so far as frameworks are thought not to be the kind of thing that admits scientific confirmation. I argue that there is another form of (...) scientific reasoning that has not received philosophical attention, what I call Newtonian abduction, that does provide confirmation for frameworks as a whole, and does so in two novel ways. I further argue that Newtonian abduction is at least as important a form of reasoning in science as standard deductive and inductive forms. The form is beautifully summed up by Maxwell : “The true method of physical reasoning is to begin with the phenomena and to deduce the forces from them by a direct application of the equations of motion.”. (shrink)

The analysis of theory-confirmation generally takes the deductive form: show that a theory in conjunction with physical data and auxiliary hypotheses yield a prediction about phenomena; verify the prediction; provide a quantitative measure of the degree of theory-confirmation this yields. The issue of confirmation for an entire framework (e.g., Newtonian mechanics en bloc, as opposed, say, to Newton’s theory of gravitation) either does not arise, or is dismissed in so far as frameworks are thought not to be the kind of (...) thing that admits scientific confirmation. I argue that there is another form of scientific reasoning that has not received philosophical attention, what I call Newtonian abduction, that does provide confirmation for frameworks as a whole, and does so in two novel ways. (In particular, Newtonian abduction is not inference to the best explanation, but rather is closer to Peirce’s original idea of abduction.) I further argue that Newtonian abduction is at least as important a form of reasoning in science as standard deductive and inductive forms. The form is beautifully summed up by Maxwell (Proc Camb Philos Soc II:292–294, 1876): “The true method of physical reasoning is to begin with the phenomena and to deduce the forces from them by a direct application of the equations of motion.”. (shrink)

I do not think the notion of rigidity in designation can be correct, at least not in any way that can serve to ground a semantics purports both to be fundamental in a semiotical sense and to the best science of the day. A careful examination of both content and the character of our best scientific knowledge not cannot support anything like what the notion of rigidity requires, but actually shows the notion to be, at bottom, incoherent. In particular, the (...) scientific meaning of natural kind terms can be determined only within the context of a fixed scientific framework and not sub specie aeternitatis. Along the way, I provide grounds for the rejection of essentialist views of the ontology of natural kinds. (shrink)

(1982). Fluvial interconnection in the context of Latin American integral development. World Futures: Vol. 18, Alternatives for Humankind: The Role of Latin America, pp. 71-116.

Although black holes are objects of central importance across many fields of physics, there is no agreed upon definition for them, a fact that does not seem to be widely recognized. Physicists in different fields conceive of and reason about them in radically different, and often conflicting, ways. All those ways, however, seem sound in the relevant contexts. After examining and comparing many of the definitions used in practice, I consider the problems that the lack of a universally accepted definition (...) leads to, and discuss whether one is in fact needed for progress in the physics of black holes. I conclude that, within reasonable bounds, the profusion of different definitions is in fact a virtue, making the investigation of black holes possible and fruitful in all the many different kinds of problems about them that physicists consider, although one must take care in trying to translate results between fields. (shrink)

The standard argument for the uniqueness of the Einstein field equation is based on Lovelock's Theorem, the relevant statement of which is restricted to four dimensions. I prove a theorem similar to Lovelock's, with a physically modified assumption: that the geometric object representing curvature in the Einstein field equation ought to have the physical dimension of stress-energy. The theorem is stronger than Lovelock's in two ways: it holds in all dimensions, and so supports a generalized argument for uniqueness; it does (...) not assume that the desired tensor depends on the metric only up second-order partial-derivatives, that condition being a consequence of the proof. This has consequences for understanding the nature of the cosmological constant and theories of higher-dimensional gravity. Another consequence of the theorem is that it makes precise the sense in which there can be no gravitational stress-energy tensor in general relativity. Along the way, I prove a result of some interest about the second jet-bundle of the bundle of metrics over a manifold. (shrink)

Ethical naturalism holds that ethical facts about such matters as good and bad, right and wrong, are part of a purely natural world — the world studied by the sciences. It is supported by the apparent reasonableness of many moral explanations. It has been thought to face an epistemological challenge because of the existence of an “is-ought gap”; it also faces metaphysical objections from philosophers who hold that ethical facts would have to be supernatural or “nonnatural,” sometimes on the grounds (...) that ethical thought has a practical role that no thought about purely natural facts could have. Its defenders have argued resourcefully against these challenges. (shrink)

When medical assistance in dying (MAiD) was legalized in Canada in June 2016, the question of allowing decisionally capable persons to make advance requests in anticipation of later incapacity was reserved for further consideration during the mandatory parliamentary review originally scheduled to begin in June 2020 (but since delayed by COVID-19). In its current form the legislation does not permit such requests, since it stipulates that at the time at which the procedure is to be administered the patient must give (...) “express consent” to receiving it. Since express consent presupposes decisional capacity, this requirement rules out administering MAiD to a patient who has lost capacity. Amendments to the legislation passed by Parliament in March 2021 open the door slightly by allowing advance requests by patients after they have been approved for MAiD, if they fear losing capacity before the procedure can be administered. But this provision would apply only to patients whose natural death was deemed to be “reasonably foreseeable”, and would continue to exclude (a) requests made after diagnosis of a “grievous and irremediable medical condition” but in advance of approval for MAiD, and (b) requests made before such a diagnosis. My aim in this paper is twofold: to explore the ethical and legal issues concerning advance requests for MAiD, and to argue for expanding provision for such requests to include both of these further scenarios. (shrink)