In this paper, we reconsider the highly underrated Carnap–Sellars relationship, arguing that Sellars might be able to provide an interesting resolution to some of Carnap’s finest problems around explication by offering a grand-scale picture of science/common-sense or manifest interactions. The narrative developed here points toward the need for some stratification and re-evaluation of a field of scholarship that all too often still engages in challenging and contradictory dichotomies, undermining the genuine intentions of scholars who were collaborating with, as well as (...) living and researching in parallel with each other. We would like to explore what these figures can offer to each other, and whether, for example, a truly Sellarsian perspective could illuminate any problematic points in Carnap that have not yet been problematized by Carnapians but could still improve the original system. (shrink)

We study a real-effort environment, where a delegator has to decide if and to whom to delegate a task. Applicants send cheap-talk messages about their past performance before the delegator decides. We experimentally test the theoretical prediction that information transmission does not occur in equilibrium. In our experiment, we vary the message space available to the applicants and compare the information transmitted as well as the level of efficiency achieved. Depending on the treatment, applicants can either submit a Number indicating (...) past performance, an Interval in which past performance falls, or a free Text message. We observe that messages contain information in all treatments. Interestingly, information transmission occurs only in the treatments where messages are intervals or free text. Social welfare is higher if messages are intervals or free text than precise numbers. Gender and ethnicity stereotypes only influence delegation in the Number treatment, where no information transmission takes place. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science by Matias SlavovKrisztián PeteMatias Slavov. Hume’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Pp. 216. Hardcover. ISBN 9781350087866, £95.Although the relationship between Hume and Newton is a recurring theme in the Hume literature, Matias Slavov’s book does not seek to contribute to the debate between the traditional (Hume imitated Newton’s natural philosophy) and the critical (Hume (...) intended his “science of Man” as the foundation of all other sciences) approaches regarding the nature of this relation. The book is intended to be a summary of Hume’s natural philosophy—or rather an aggregation of his comments on natural philosophical topics—pursued by exploring and analysing themes and issues that were prominent in the natural philosophy of the early modern period. In this respect it is a pioneering undertaking.Of course, Slavov does not claim in his book that Hume is a natural philosopher. “[F]irst and foremost... [h]e is not; for his main objective is to establish a new science of human nature” (1). But Slavov does claim that Hume’s natural philosophical views can be understood and valued in themselves and in the philosophical-scientific context of his time as well. The book is not a discussion of the natural philosophical dimensions of the “science of human nature,” but rather, of the natural philosophical views which are reconcilable with his main objective. In this respect, the book is not a methodological approach to Hume’s supposed natural philosophy, but a synthesis of certain elements of Hume’s philosophy that can feature in a consistent natural philosophy. Although his arguments are generally indirect and are more about what Hume seems to be committed to and what follows from his epistemological position rather than his actual positions, Slavov’s conclusions seem mostly convincing.Thus, Slavov’s point is not that the empiricist method is compatible in every detail with Newtonian mechanics, but rather that Hume seems to be committed more to a Cartesian natural philosophy. Slavov does not write about the possibility and significance of applying natural philosophical methods to moral philosophy; rather, he wants to build a complete philosophy of nature around some of Hume’s basic ideas to “fill the gap for a book on Hume’s relation to natural philosophy and philosophy of physical science” (2).The book has two “equally important aims” (ix): to shed more light onto Hume’s relationship to natural philosophy, and to demonstrate that physics and philosophy have overlapping domains. Hume was hardly concerned with physics, so Slavov’s strategy of defining natural philosophy as an overlap between physics and philosophy (chapter 1) does, to some extent, explain the lack of textual evidence in this area. The definition of natural philosophy chosen by Slavov is also intended to ensure [End Page 170] that these two goals are intertwined, since according to Slavov’s definition, natural philosophy is “a grey area between philosophy and physics” (12).Personally, I do not feel comfortable with this definition because it is not informative enough; it says that natural philosophy is more than modern physics (mathematized natural science), but it is not quite philosophy. While the first implication is very agreeable, and a number of scholars have addressed the issue, to assess the second implication, we would need to know exactly what philosophy is in this context. Perhaps the best candidate is metaphysics, even if Slavov keeps the reader somewhat in the dark on this point, despite the fact that chapter 2 is intended to establish precisely that point. Yet, the metaphysics of this period was usually (with the possible exception of Spinoza) used to support natural scientific explanations. I believe that natural philosophy is more than a “grey area” (9, 12, 22), or a contact zone; it is a complex enterprise that evolved in different forms with different emphases: Cartesian mechanics still sought to understand nature, pursuing the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge, albeit rejecting Aristotelian methods, while empiricists increasingly envisaged a more instrumentalist role for natural explanations. Newton himself was caught between the two.In this context it is intriguing whether Hume carries forward Berkeley... (shrink)

Hypothesis-driven approaches identified important characteristics that differentiate violent from non-violent radicals. However, they produced a mosaic of explanations as they investigated a restricted number of preselected variables. Here we analyzed without a priory assumption all the variables of the “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States” database by a machine learning approach. Out of the 79 variables considered, 19 proved critical, and predicted the emergence of violence with an accuracy of 86.3%. Typically, violent extremists came from criminal but not (...) radical backgrounds and were radicalized in late stages of their life. They were followers in terrorist groups, sought training, and were radicalized by social media. They belonged to low social strata and had problematic social relations. By contrast, non-violent but still criminal extremists were characterized by a family tradition of radicalism without having criminal backgrounds, belonged to higher social strata, were leaders in terrorist organizations, and backed terrorism by supporting activities. Violence was also promoted by anti-gay, Sunni Islam and Far Right, and hindered by Far Left, Anti-abortion, Animal Rights and Environment ideologies. Critical characteristics were used to elaborate a risk-matrix, which may be used to predict violence risk at individual level. (shrink)

This chapter argues that mental fictionalism can only be a successful account of our ordinary folk-psychological practices if it can in some way preserve its original function, namely its explanatory aspect. A too strong commitment to the explanatory role moves fictionalism unacceptably close to the realist or eliminativist interpretation of folk psychology. To avoid this, fictionalists must degrade or dispense with this explanatory role. This motivation behind the fictionalist movement seems to be rather similar to that of Sellars when he (...) came up with the Myth of Jones, his proto-theory of mental concepts. He was faced with the problem of preserving the explanatory status of mental concepts without turning them into proper theoretical entities. By introducing the Sellarsian proto-theory of concepts related to the mental and outlining its main points, this chapter aims to provide a critique of the two versions of mental fictionalism that are arguably the strongest: Adam Toon’s prop-oriented pretence theory and Tamás Demeter’s expressive storyism. (shrink)

Még 2013 májusában került sor arra a Metafora című nyelvészeti és filozófiai workshopra, amelynek a keretein belül elhangzottak a jelen kötetben helyet kapott tanulmányok alapját képező, az Erasmus Kollégium nyelvfilozófiai kutatócsoportjának tagjai által jegyzett előadások. Ezeknek, s így a mostani összeállításnak is kiemelt témája a relevanciaelmélet, amellyel (pontosabban annak metaforafelfogásával) részletesen foglalkozik a bevezető dolgozat, illetve az azt követő három írás. Ezek közül az elsőben Pete Krisztián a teória klasszikus vonulatát állítja párhuzamba az átdolgozott, továbbfejlesztett változatokkal, majd Zvolenszky Zsófia - (...) részben ehhez kapcsolódva - a konvencionális és költői metaforák témáját illetően kritikával illeti a modern megközelítést. Kuti Judit a Sperber-Wilson- és a Harald Weinrich-féle metaforaelméletet hasonlítja össze. A folytatásban olyanok metaforaleméleteivel ismerkedhetünk meg, mint Donald Davidson és Paul Ricoeur; Kálmán László egy hagyományos irányzatból kinövő, mégis új nyelvfelfogást és metaforaelemzést mutat be; Kiss Angelika és Jellinek Sára egy-egy nyelvhasználati jelenséget és metaforikus beszédmódot mutat be (a japán és koreai nyelv, és a humor nyelvfilozófiai vonatkozásai kapcsán); Nemesi Attila László a filmes és mozgóképes trópusokról, s azok csoportosításáról ír; Molnár Cecília Sarolta pedig a mai modern dalszövegek metaforakészletét elemzi. A mutatóval záruló kiadvány nyelvészeti szakgyűjteményekbe javasolható beszerzésre. (shrink)

The first look at the philosophical issues behind Charlaine Harris's _New York Times_ bestsellers _The Southern Vampire Mysteries_ and the _True Blood_ television series Teeming with complex, mythical characters in the shape of vampires, telepaths, shapeshifters, and the like, _True Blood_, the popular HBO series adapted from Charlaine Harris's bestselling _The Southern Vampire Mysteries_, has a rich collection of themes to explore, from sex and romance to bigotry and violence to death and immortality. The goings-on in the mythical town of (...) Bon Temps, Louisiana, where vampires satiate their blood lust and openly commingle with ordinary humans, present no shortages of juicy metaphysical morsels to sink your teeth into. Now _True Blood and Philosophy_ calls on the minds of some of history's great thinkers to perform some philosophical bloodletting on such topics as Sookie and the metaphysics of mindreading; Maryann and sacrificial religion; werewolves, shapeshifters and personal identity; vampire politics, evil, desire, and much more. The first book to explore the philosophical issues and themes behind the _True Blood_ novels and television series Adds a new dimension to your understanding of _True Blood_ characters and themes The perfect companion to the start of the third season on HBO and the release of the second season on DVD Smart and entertaining_, True Blood and Philosophy_ provides food—or blood—for thought, and a fun, new way to look at the series. (shrink)

NEW BLOOD EDITION: Contains three new chapters from Season 3. This new edition is available as an E-BOOK ONLY and contains three chapters not found in the print book! The first look at the philosophical issues behind Charlaine Harris's _New York Times_ bestsellers _The Southern Vampire Mysteries_ and the _True Blood_ television series! Teeming with complex, mythical characters in the shape of vampires, telepaths, shapeshifters, and the like, _True Blood_, the popular HBO series adapted from Charlaine Harris's bestselling The Southern (...) Vampire Mysteries, has a rich collection of themes to explore, from sex and romance to bigotry and violence to death and immortality. The goings-on in the mythical town of Bon Temps, Louisiana, where vampires satiate their blood lust and openly commingle with ordinary humans, present no shortages of juicy metaphysical morsels to sink your teeth into. Now _True Blood and Philosophy_ calls on the minds of some of history's great thinkers to perform some philosophical bloodletting on such topics as Sookie and the metaphysics of mindreading; Maryann and sacrificial religion; werewolves, shapeshifters and personal identity; vampire politics, evil, desire, and much more. The first book to explore the philosophical issues and themes behind the _True Blood_ novels and television series Adds a new dimension to your understanding of _True Blood_ characters and themes The perfect companion to the start of the third season on HBO and the release of the second season on DVD Smart and entertaining_, True Blood and Philosophy_ provides food -- or blood -- for thought, and a fun, new way to look at the series. (shrink)