In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. However, Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central (...) problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction. (shrink)

To know is to believe but to believe is not necessarily to know. The latter, unfortunate fact gives rise quite naturally to the question: How can we distinguish between those beliefs that qualify as items of knowledge and those that do not? The standard reply given to this question by philosophers is that knowledge is justified belief. Although the reply sounds eminently reasonable it does not really answer the question. Rather than settling the issue it succeeds instead in stirring (...) up a host of philosophical problems of the most thorny and baffling kind. So difficult do these problems become that they have driven many philosophers to the skeptical conclusion that it is impossible to provide any justification for our beliefs at all. My main object in this paper will be to pursue what seems to me to be the most important and difficult of these problems and to examine some of the recent solutions that philosophers have offered for it. Before beginning this task, however, it might be well to clarify the notion of knowledge a bit more fully. Just what qualifies a belief as a justified belief and thus as an item of knowledge? (shrink)

The author discusses what he feels to be a significant way of testing beliefs, Namely, The process in which people judge attitudes and the beliefs supporting those attitudes favourably or unfavourably in the light of the social situations which they take to be the outcome of the attitudes, And of the potentialities for the future which they take to be foreshadowed by those situations. (staff).

This paper analyzes berkeley's philosophy in the light of modern epistemology and philosophy of mind. It is shown that our knowledge of spatio-Temporal bodies cannot be certain. Certainty is restricted to the realm of sensory ideas themselves. But there is hardly any reason to be interested in ideas as such. Berkeley is a common sense thinker who wants to know the world and its scientific laws. Bodies are constructed on the basis of both real and imaginary ideas. This topic is (...) analyzed starting from pappas's and pitcher's views. It is shown that bodies are complete complexes of ideas and that imagination plays an essential role here. The continuity of bodies is discussed. The methods of making a distinction between real and imaginary ideas are analyzed. Concerning berkeley's philosophy of mind--It is shown that one can reach absolute certainty in this field but one cannot find much information concerning the various parts and functions of the mind. The difference between the active and the passive mind is discussed. The relations between ideas and the mind is explored briefly. (shrink)

In this critical examination of recent accounts of the nature of science and of its justification given by Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, and Newton-Smith, Banner contends that models of scientific rationality which are used in criticism of religious beliefs are in fact often inadequate as accounts of the nature of science. He argues that a realist philosophy of science both reflects the character of science and scientific justifications, and suggests that religious belief could be given a justification (...) of the same sort. (shrink)

Preservationism is a dominant account of the justification of beliefs formed on the basis of memory. According to preservationism, a memory belief is justified only if that belief was justified when it was initially held. However, we now know that much of what we remember is not explicitly stored, but instead reconstructed when we attempt to recall it. Since reconstructive memory beliefs may not have been continuously held by the agent, or never held before at all, a (...) purely preservationist account of memory does not allow for justified reconstructed memory beliefs. In this essay, I show how a process reliabilist account can maintain preservationism about reproductive memory beliefs while accommodating the justification of reconstructive memory beliefs. I argue that reconstructive memory is an inferential process, and that therefore the beliefs it produces are justified in the same way that other inferential beliefs are justified. Accordingly, my process reliabilist account combines a preservationist account of reproductive memory with an inferential account of reconstructive memory. I end by defending this view against objections. (shrink)

The present article analyzes and compares the idea of divine revelation to justify religious beliefs from the viewpoints of Paul Moser and Mulla Sadra. Moser suggests a kind of moral transformation experience that includes direct cognition and internal experience of self-revelation and God’s unselfish love while he considers mere theoretical reason to be inefficient and emphasizes God’s authority and His attributes and goals as well as the axis of divine revelation. Knowledge-by-presence and direct experience of God in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy (...) which is the only way to access true recognition of God is close to divine revelation. The present article shows that, considering the relationship between love and salvation, and knowledge-by-presence and the practical intellect, in Sadrian belief in God, Moser’s approach is close to Mulla Sadra’s even though the method of argumentation of these two philosophers in representing this type of cognition is not completely the same. Considering the commonalities and differences between Moser and Mulla Sadra in justifying belief in God, it seems possible to revise Moser’s approach with a Sadrian reading with a combination of innate nature arguments and self-knowledge. (shrink)

The theme of the dissertation is that we should not be too cautious about engaging in metaphysics of modality; what may appear to be a refusal to engage in metaphysical speculation may instead involve a commitment to epistemic consequences that we should not accept. In Part I, I argue that David Lewis's modal realism implies that scepticism towards induction is rationally unavoidable. I conclude that his theory must be rejected. ;While not endorsing Lewis's account of the nature of possible worlds, (...) I argue that the recombination principle is what is causing the problems, and that this principle will cause problems when combined with any theory of modality according to which there are objective matters of fact as to what is possible or necessary. ;I conclude that we must reject the recombination principle, and that any principle we accept in its place must be one which will not lead to inductive scepticism. This suggests that we cannot countenance any objective possibilities that contravene actual natural laws. ;In Part II, I argue that one sort of explanation is closely connected with objective possibility: A fundamental explanation for some state of affairs involves saying something about its nature that has implications for what is objectively possible. I defend a weak form of the principle of sufficient reason, according to which every state of affairs has a fundamental explanation ;I go on to recast and defend a version of the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God. This argument, on my view, is plausible only when taken as an inductive argument, and indeed, as an inference to the best explanation. I argue that the theistic hypothesis deserves to be taken seriously on its merits as an explanation; more generally, I claim that it is not sufficient grounds for rejecting any hypothesis simply to say that it involves commitments as to what is possible or necessary. A willingness to accept some such commitments is an unavoidable consequence of what we normally take to be rational ways of forming beliefs. (shrink)

The Contours of Christian Philosophy series will consist of short introductory-level textbooks in the various fields of philosophy. These books will introduce readers to major problems and alternative ways of dealing with those problems. These books, however, will differ from most in that they will evaluate alternative viewpoints not only with regard to their general strength, but also with regard to their value in the construction of a Christian world and life view. Thus, the books will explore the implications of (...) the various views for Christian theology as well as the implications that Christian convictions might have for the philosophical issues discussed. It is crucial that Christians attain a greater degree of philosophical awareness in order to improve the quality of general scholarship and evangelical theology. (shrink)

Can belief in God be rationally justified? Reviewing in detail traditional and modern arguments for and against the existence of God, Professor Plantinga concludes that they must all be judged unsuccessful. He then turns to the related philosophical problem of the existence of other minds, and defends the so-called analogical argument against current criticisms. He goes on to show, however, that although this argument affords us the best reasons we have for belief in other minds, it finally succumbs (...) to the same malady that afflicts the teleological argument of God. (shrink)

This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption (...) of people’s truthfulness we cannot interpret their utterances as testimony with propositional contents. This paper contends that the epistemic subject can interpret utterances as testimony with propositional contents without presupposing the credibility of testimony, and that evidence available to the normal epistemic subject can justify her trust in testimony. (shrink)

What justifies our beliefs about what other people say? According to epistemic inferentialism​, the justification of comprehension-based beliefs depends on the justification of other beliefs, e.g., beliefs about what words the speaker uttered or even what sounds they produced. According to epistemic non-inferentialism, the justification of comprehension-based beliefs ​does not depend on the justification of other beliefs. This paper offers a new defense of epistemic non-inferentialism. First, I discuss three counterexamples to epistemic non-inferentialism provided recently by (...) Brendan Balcerak Jackson. I argue that only one of Balcerak Jackson’s counterexamples is effective, and that it is effective against only one version of epistemic non-inferentialism, viz. language comprehension dogmatism. Second, I propose an alternative version of epistemic non-inferentialism, viz. comprehension-process reliabilism, which is immune to these counterexamples. I conclude that we should follow Balcerak Jackson in his rejection of language comprehension dogmatism but not all the way to the endorsement of epistemic inferentialism. Comprehension-process reliabilism is superior to both these alternatives. (shrink)

Epistemic justification of non-summative group beliefs is studied in this paper. Such group beliefs are understood to be voluntary acceptances, the justification of which differs from that of involuntary beliefs. It is argued that whereas epistemic evaluation of involuntary beliefs can be seen not to require reasons, justification of voluntary acceptance of a proposition as true requires that the agent, a group or an individual, can provide reasons for the accepted view. This basic idea is studied in (...) relation to theories of dialectical justification in which justification is taken to require ability to justify. Since the reasons offered can in principle always be challenged, there is no ultimate end to the dialectical chain of justification. This makes justification of acceptance, and thus group belief, social and, in a way, contextual, but this does not seem to entail strong forms of epistemic relativism. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the epistemological status of testimony and the question of what may confer justification on true testimonial beliefs and enable us to call such beliefs knowledge. In particular, it addresses certain anti-reductionist arguments in the epistemology of testimony and their incompatibility with the grammatical categories of egophoricity (conjunct/disjunct marking) and evidentiality (information source marking) present in the architecture of natural languages. First, the tradition of epistemological individualism and its rationale are discussed, as well as certain (...) attempts within this tradition to include testimony-based beliefs in the body of legitimate and rational beliefs. The next section is concerned with the anti-reductionist approach to testimonial beliefs and some arguments supporting ‘the credulity principle’ grounded in Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense. The last two sections show how the anti-reductionist argumentation is threatened with an insoluble dilemma when considered in the context of languages with the grammatical categories of egophoricity (conjunct/disjunct marking) and evidentiality (information source marking). Special attention is paid to the justificatory role of egophoric and evidential marking; how these grammatical categories may influence the process of belief formation, and consequently, how this bears upon the nature of justification for testimonial beliefs. The final conclusion of the paper is that the anti-reductionist claim concerning the directness and non-inferential nature of testimonial knowledge is bound to meet objections grounded in the structure of many natural languages. This leads to a paradox: in discussion with reductionism, anti-reductionists do seek support for their arguments in common sense beliefs reflected in everyday language, and, on the other hand, their claims are incompatible with the linguistic data found in a number of natural languages. (shrink)

This chapter follows Conee and Feldman in assuming the traditional conception of the mental. Thus, the author takes it that mentalistic evidentialism is inconsistent with process reliabilism. It examines Goldman's critique of evidentialism's account of the justification of memory beliefs and discusses a problem for Goldman's own reliabilist account of memory beliefs. The chapter distinguishes two sorts of epistemic status at issue and not usually clearly separated in these debates, historical justification vs. justification to retain a (...) class='Hi'>belief. It raises doubts about the resources of reliabilism for explaining justification to retain beliefs; and makes a plea for a less ambitious account of justification to retain beliefs, a restricted form of epistemic conservatism. The chapter argues that the conservative account that the author recommend represents a kind of neutral baseline, insofar as there are both reliabilist‐friendly as well as evidentialist‐friendly arguments for it. (shrink)

In his dialogue, 'Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum', Plutarch of Chaeronea criticizes Epicurus for not believing that the gods are provident over human affairs and for not believing that our souls survive death. However, Plutarch’s arguments are striking in that they do not offer any theoretical justification for believing either of these religious claims to be true; rather, they aim to establish that we are practically justified in adopting them if we follow Epicurus’s rule that the goal of (...) belief is not truth in its own right, but mental tranquility. I argue that this form of argument assumes a novel justificatory theory of religious belief, based in Epicurean thought, that I call ‘strong doxastic hedonism.’. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest among epistemologists in the nature of understanding, with some authors arguing that understanding should replace knowledge as the primary focus of epistemology. But what is understanding? According to what is often called the standard view, understanding is a species of knowledge. Although this view has recently been challenged in various ways, even the critics of the standard view have assumed that understanding requires justification and belief. I argue that (...) it requires neither. If sound, these arguments have important upshots not only for the nature of understanding, but also for its distinctive epistemic value and its role in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account (...) for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the strategy of justifying doctrinal beliefs by appealing to special revelation. Even if one thinks that belief in God is rationally warranted, it does not follow that one's distinctive religious doctrines are justified. Though theism may be justified, it remains an open question whether or not believers are entitled to believe, for example, that Jesus Christ is God Incarnate or that God is triune. Traditionally, religious believers have claimed that their doctrinal beliefs are justified because they (...) have been revealed by God. ;My assessment of this claim consists of three parts. First I examine the concept of special revelation and defend it against charges of incoherence. But if even it makes sense to say that God can reveal himself, the more philosophically interesting question concerns how we could know that he has in fact done so. Hence the second part of the dissertation assesses criteria for adjudicating revelation claims. Locke's claim that the veracity of revelation is vouchsafed through miracles is examined. I argue that it is preferable to understand our doctrinal beliefs as properly basic rather than attempt to authenticate revelation claims through appeals to miracles. Finally, in part three, I consider and respond to several objections against the claim that our doctrinal beliefs can be justified. The first objection says that the strategy of justifying doctrinal beliefs through appeals to special revelation is undermined by competing claims to revelation. The second criticism claims that appeals to special revelation fail to provide the degree of justification required to underwrite decisive assent to doctrinal beliefs. I argue that neither of these criticisms is effective. (shrink)

This paper challenges the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the job shows that the belief cannot be understood referentially, his ignorance of the coins in his (...) pocket shows that it cannot be understood attributively. An explanation for why Smith appeared to have justified true belief is given by distinguishing between 'belief' and 'belief in truth'. Smith believes the sentence 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' to be true (he mistakenly believes that Jones will get the job, of whom he knows that he has ten coins in his pocket) (hence his 'belief'), the sentence is true (hence 'truth'), and he has sufficient reason to assent to it (hence his 'justification'). But he does not believe the proposition expressed. Hence he does not know it either. (shrink)

This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and (...) so you cannot infer from a premise that you believe the premise unless you do believe it. I argue that this procedure cannot be a source of justification, however, because one can be justified in inferring from p that q only if p amounts to strong evidence that q is true. This is incompatible with the transparency account because p often is not very strong evidence that you believe that p. For example, unless you are a weather expert, the fact that it will rain is not very strong evidence that you believe it will rain. After showing how this intuitive problem can be made precise, I conclude with a broader lesson about the nature of inferential justification: that beliefs, when justified, must be underwritten by beliefs, when justified, must be underwritten by evidential relationships between the facts or propositions which those beliefs represent. (shrink)

In the epistemological trajectory of Philosophy of Religion, contemporary religious epistemologists seem to have undertaken the task of attestation of religious beliefs, their defence, ascertainment and justification, resorting to sanctioned methods of epistemic justification. The models of epistemic justification of religious beliefs they have adopted were intended to bring in a kind of objectivity into religious realm and make meaningful assertions on shared experiences. The acclamation of such esteemed epistemic attempts should be viewed as feverish attempts made (...) by religious epistemologists to subject religious beliefs to standard epistemic treatment. In this paper, three contemporary models of justification of religious beliefs by three outstanding religious epistemologists, namely, Alvin Plantinga whose theory of proper basicality and the warrant, the epistemological holism with the application of Lakatosian principle in Philosophy of Science by Nancey Murphy and the cumulative case evidentialism by Richard Swinburne are critically analyzed using the parameters of logical consistency, methodological acumen, norms of belief formation, the role of subjectivity, features of religious language and the hermeneutic dynamics. (shrink)