Pasibaigus Šaltajam karui smarkiai išaugęs tarptautinių konfliktų skaičius bei identifikuotos naujos grėsmės paskatino tarptautines organizacijas, tokias kaip Jungtinių Tautų organizacija (toliau – JTO) ir Šiaurės Atlanto sutarties organizacija (toliau – NATO) peržiūrėti Šaltojo karo metu taikytą jėgos panaudojimo praktiką, poreikį ir priemones reaguoti į konfliktus. Tokiomis priemonėmis kaip tik ir tapo vadinamieji „mėlynieji šalmai“, kurie Jungtinių Tautų valstybių narių yra priskiriami Jungtinių Tautų Saugumo Tarybos sankcionuotoms operacijoms vykdyti. Nors priskirtos pajėgos vykdydamos tarptautines operacijas dėvi (...) Jungtinių Tautų simboliką, tačiau jų pavaldumas savo valstybei išlieka visą laiką. Analizuodami valstybių dalyvavimo tarptautinių organizacijų sankcionuotose tarptautinėse operacijose teisinius pagrindus, straipsnio autoriai per jėgos panaudojimo prizmę analizuoja Jungtinių Tautų Saugumo Tarybos ir apskritai tarptautinių organizacijų vaidmenį sankcionuojant jėgos panaudojimą pagal Jungtinių Tautų Chartijos nuostatas bei tarptautinių operacijų vykdymo raidą. Straipsnyje taip pat detaliai apžvelgiami siuntimo į tarptautines operacijas nacionaliniai teisiniai pagrindai ir procedūros bei Lietuvos Respublikos praktika. Šis straipsnis yra skirtas visiems besidominties tarptautinėmis operacijomis ir jų sankcionavimo nacionaliniais ir teisiniais pagrindais. Straipsnio struktūra susideda iš trijų dalių. Pirmojoje šio straipsnio dalyje yra nagrinėjamas jėgos panaudojimas pagal Jungtinių Tautų Chartijos nuostatas, antroje ‒ aptariami dalyvavimo Jungtinių Tautų Organizacijos ir Šiaurės Atlanto Sutarties Organizacijos vadovaujamose tarptautinėse operacijose raida ir teisiniai pagrindai, o paskutinėje dalyje yra nagrinėjamas nacionalinis siuntimo į tarptautines operacijas reglamentavimas. (shrink)

The present article discusses a well-known religious philosophical and partially legal doctrine of the “Just war”, developed in the Christian tradition by St. Augustine, St. Tomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vittoria, Francisco Suarez, Hugo Grotius and many other thinkers. The main thesis of the doctrine is that war will be just only if it corresponds to certain criteria, such as autoritas principi (waged by the sovereign), justa causa (on just aim) and with recta intentio (animus) or the aim and will to (...) wage war in order to restore justice and not because of personal hate, revenge, lust for glory, etc. However, the impact of the doctrine was not limited by the Middle Ages and the Christian philosophic discourse. This doctrine shaped both emerging international law and international humanitarian law in one or another way. Even though it did not survive intact through the changing reality of the world, it is not so hard to trace the reflections of this doctrine even in contemporary international law. For example, while evaluating the armed conflict we still use the autoritas principi principle (armed conflicts may be fought only by defined subjects such as states or militarily - politically organised dissidents), moreover, when we are dealing with the concept of combatancy, the same principle applies in establishing whether a person is a legal fighter in the conflict or not, because his status directly stems from his belonging to the party of the conflict. With its strictly limited possibilities to use force, the contemporary jus contra bellum also somewhat resembles the doctrine, not only in the sense of justa causa (such as a possibility of unilateral use of force by the state only in self-defence) but also in recta intentio (e.g. the United Nations Security Council may order the use of force only with the intention to re-establish peace). Therefore, even though the doctrine is the product of the Middle Ages thought, it is not forgotten in our days. The possible military strike against Iran in order to stop it from developing nuclear weapon is already discussed in the light of this doctrine. Moreover, authors (though mainly not lawyers) discussing inadequacies of current international legal framework for the use of force (e.g. the need for humanitarian intervention) find their inspiration in the doctrine. (shrink)

Even though the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) does not explicitly address the rights of asylum seekers and refugees, the case law of the European Human Rights Court (ECtHR) confirms that their rights can be successfully defended under this mechanism. In parallel, in its evolving jurisprudence on asylum the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) refers to the Strasbourg case law, where there is a certain interrelationship between these two jurisdictions, in particular (...) given the recent ECtHR pronouncement on “EU Dublin transfers”. The article aims at evaluating protection available for asylum seekers and refugees under the ECHR, while comparing it with protection of asylum relevant fundamental rights under the EU legal order and the most recent jurisprudence of the CJEU in asylum cases. The authors also analyze which of the two systems is more favourable and what are their limitations. Thus, the article offers to students and practitioners a detailed analysis of ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence in asylum cases through a comparative perspective, as well as the key problematic aspects arising in both jurisdictions and their junction. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR reveals that despite the most developed protection from expulsion under Article 3 of the ECHR, it does not sufficiently secure status for the concerned persons. Effective remedy requirements under the ECHR allow for filling the gaps of national asylum procedures, while recognition of vulnerability and special status of asylum seekers by the ECtHR assist in addressing still commonly prevailing detention problems of asylum seekers in Europe. In the context of family protection, the recognition of positive obligations by states to reunite the refugee families is still rudimentary, thus, clearly Article 3 protection in expulsion cases takes over Article 8. At the same time, the jurisprudence of the CJEU in asylum cases is still inconsistent, as the court sometimes takes decisions without including human rights into its’ analysis (Kadzoev, Arslan, K.), while in other cases refers to the Charter (MA and others), verifies if its’ own decision is in line with the ECtHR jurisprudence (Elgafaji) or shapes secondary legislation in line with Strasbourg arguments and findings (N.S.). Quite likely, the ECtHR practice will have an important influence on the developments of subsidiary protection in the EU, at least in the context of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, and serve as an important reference for interpretation of various concepts under the EU Qualification and Procedures Directives. The comparative analysis of pros and cons of the two mechanisms demonstrates that the main advantage of the ECtHR is individual justice possibility, which is not yet accessible under CJEU preliminary judgement procedure and its input in developing asylum law concepts, such as non-state agents of persecution, internal protection or even subsidiary protection regime under EU asylum law. Thanks to the ECtHR, the realistic possibility to question the application of certain EU norms has emerged (Dublin Regulation). While the ECtHR does not have such a specific competence over asylum issues as the CJEU and is clearly a slow and seriously overburdened mechanism, the pilot judgement procedure seems to be increasingly capable of providing guidelines to the states concerning systematic problems in their asylum procedures. Thus, both jurisdictions in their own ways contribute to strengthening asylum seekers’ protection while forming a common oasis for these individuals in Europe. (shrink)

Whilst the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which became part of binding primary EU law on 1 December 2009, constitutes an important codification and clarification of fundamental rights as they exist in the European Union, the field of application of the Charter is limited in a significant way: the Charter only applies when EU law is at stake. When national courts and authorities in the EU Member States are confronted with problems of purely national law, they are (...) not obliged to apply the Charter but should instead rely on the national constitutional Bill of Rights as well as the international human rights instruments which are binding on the Member State in question. The borderline between EU law and national law is not always easy to establish in a concrete case. This article discusses theoretical and practical problems arising out of the application and interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter, according to which the Charter is addressed to the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’. It is suggested to adopt a pragmatic case-by-case approach, asking oneself if there is another norm of Union law than a Charter provision which is directly relevant to a case in concreto. If the answer is yes, also the Charter should be applied, supposing that there is a Charter provision which could influence the outcome of the case. If the answer is in the negative, national courts and authorities are only obliged to apply national law, including the constitutional Bill of Rights and the international human rights obligations of the Member State concerned. (shrink)

The issue of human rights has always been a matter shared by politicians, lawyers, philosophers and sociologists. Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights scholars and human rights activists have discussed whether the Declaration has become a symbol of human rights universality. Two decades later Muslim states have started discussions if human rights are indeed universal. They argued that human rights is a product of western imperialism and therefore the Arab states are not bound by the human (...) rights catalogue proposed by the West. In 2008, the Arab Charter on Human Rights drafted within the framework of the League of Arab States came into force. This fact was welcomed by the international community, non-governmental organizations, and High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Arab Charter on Human Rights was seen as a possibility for the Arab States to confirm the commitment to the universality of human rights. However, the adopted text was disappointing and once again raised the doubt that Arab States are not truly committed to universal human rights. This article analyses the quest for the universality of human rights. (shrink)