Plato's Philebus contains an intricate difficulty. Plato seems to hold both (a) that all pleasures are processes of becoming, a crucial premise in the argument that no pleasure is good (53c?55c) and (b) that some pleasures contribute in their own right to the goodness of the best life (64c?67b). Since it seems also plausible that only things which are good can contribute to the goodness of the best life in their own right, Plato's view seems to be (...) inconsistent. Interpreters usually reject either (a) or (b). As Plato seems firmly committed to both (a) and (b), I propose a third way of dealing with the inconsistency. The apparent inconsistency highlights a vital contrast between what is independently good (good per se), what is dependently good (good through participating in what is independently good), and what is derivatively good (good through standing in a certain relation to dependent goods). I argue that while pleasure's being a process of becoming marks it out as derivatively good, some kinds of pleasure are also dependent goods in virtue of their objects ? irrespective of their being processes of becoming. (shrink)

This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways (...) in which pleasure can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities. Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity. I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation. (shrink)

The so-called ‘Olympian’ proof in Plato's Republic contains one of the first explicit distinctions between the nature of intellectual and bodily pleasures. The argument for the superiority of the former rests on a) identifying pleasure and pain with certain kinds of filling and emptying, and b) differentiating between bodily and intellectual pleasures according to the kind of filling: Bodily depletions differ from depletions of the soul in the kind of lack and, accordingly, in the kind of thing that fills (...) the lack: hunger and thirst are bodily lacks which food and drink can cure, whereas ignorance and folly are cured by intelligence.Thus,, the kind of lack, together with the kind of filler, and derivatively the method of filling determine the kind of filling.Kinds of filling differ in truth: filling A is truer than filling B if and only if the kind of fillers used in A are more than the kind of fillers used in B and the kind of thing filled via A is more than the kind of thing filled via B.Fillers of the soul are more than bodily fillers.The soul is more than the body.Therefore,, filling of the soul is truer than bodily filling, that is, filling of the soul is more really a filling. (shrink)

§ 1. “To the mind of the philosopher”, according to Plato,1 “there belongs a vision of all time and all being"; and certainly many of the great thinkers have made it their business to speculate about the omnitudo realitatis or the ens realissimum—about the universe as a whole and in its wholeness, or about that which is supremely real—in short about ‘ the Absolute ‘. It may be that this interest in the Whole lies at the heart of all (...) genuine philosophy, giving to it its distinctive inspiration and character. It may be, on the other hand, that it is a misdirected solicitude—an anxiety to solve the inherently insoluble. The Absolute, we shall perhaps be told, is a vox nihili—a name for that which, being nothing, has no attributes ; or we, at least, can never hope to characterize it. All our available predicates, being drawn of necessity from a limited field, must ‘ come short‘must prove inadequate for so immense and so august a subject. (shrink)

How should we understand ‘philosophy' in Plato’s Republic? Sarah Broadie develops a thoroughly practical notion of the philosopher's activity. Her interpretation helps with the old puzzle about the philosopher's qualification to rule. It also addresses a new problem, namely that Plato ought to have subdivided the rational part of the soul into two parts if the philosophers engage in both theoretical and practical thinking. By conceiving of wisdom in practical terms, Broadie downplays the possible conflict between theory and (...) praxis. I argue that her account of the philosopher's conflict between needing to rule and wanting to theorise does not hold up. Therefore, ‘philosophy’ in the Republic should not be understood in purely practical terms. (shrink)

By comparing chemistry to art, chemists have recently made claims to the aesthetic value, even beauty, of some of their products. This paper takes these claims seriously and turns them into a systematic investigation of the aesthetics of chemical products. I distinguish three types of chemical products - materials, molecules, and molecular models - and use a wide variety of aesthetic theories suitable for an investigation of the corresponding sorts of objects. These include aesthetics of materials, idealistic aesthetics from (...) class='Hi'>Plato to Kant and Schopenhauer, psychological approaches of Ernst Gombrich and Rudolf Arnheim, and semiotic aesthetics of Nelson Goodman and Umberto Eco. Although the investigation does not support recent claims, I point out where aesthetics does and can play an import role in chemistry. Particularly, Eco's approach helps us understand that and how aesthetic experience can be a driving force in chemical research. (shrink)

About the relationship of the two traditions of Platonic interpretation the indirect and the direct traditions, the written dialogues and the unwritten doctrines.

With the late Author’s kind permission, the present text is published here in a somewhat abbreviated and modified translation that has been given appropriate subheadings and supplemented with an extensive bibliography. Its German original from 1996 has been translated into French and English. The purpose of the present translation is to make the Polish reader acquainted with the important and innovative account of Plato’s philosophy that has been put forward by the Tübingen School whose one of the most prominent (...) co-founders was Hans Joachim Krämer. While this text is devoted to Plato’s critique of writing, it also presents Plato’s agrapha dogmata as an important supplement to the written dialogues. A fuller overview of the major assumptions of this new interpretation is to be found in the recently published Gesammelte Ansätze zu Platon. (shrink)

It will be useful to connect the following survey with Giovanni Reale’s important book on Plato, because it reflects forcefully and lucidly the current state of Platonic scholarship. According to Reale, the three historical models of Plato—the Neoplatonic, the Romantic and the currently emerging one—are all paradigms or “disciplinary matrices” in the sense of Thomas Kuhn’s work on scientific theories. This view is fundamentally correct. Reale has adduced sufficient evidence to support it, and Kuhn himself is said to (...) regard favorably the application of his theory to Plato. In the succession of the three paradigms, we may further see a development in which the new view of Plato, which I shall sketch here, assumes the role of a synthesis of the Neoplatonic thesis and its Romantic antithesis in the work of Schleiermacher and Schlegel. Avoiding equally the extremes of too much and too little, the new view neither succumbs to the unhistorical adaptation and systematic transformation of Plato, as does Neoplatonism, nor does it abbreviate his philosophy to the extant literary corpus, as do the Romantics. It takes instead a mediate, historically scrupulous and balanced position between the allegorical interpretation, which prevailed into the eighteenth century, and the subsequently dominant literary interpretation by combining the doxographic tradition, which has its origin in Plato’s oral teaching, with the dialogues and the epistles. This view is careful to include and preserve all the tenable elements of the Romantic paradigm, as, for instance, the correct elements of Schleiermacher’s theory of the dialogue-form. The relation of the new paradigm to the older ones may thus be seen as the correction of the latter and their integration as partial theorems into a more comprehensive general theory. (shrink)

Ever since the proposal of Giovanni Reale, it has been useful to distinguish three “paradigms,” or models of “normal science,” in Thomas Kuhn’s sense, in the history of Platonic scholarship, each of which are relatively distinct from the others in their historical succession: the Neoplatonic model which persisted into modern times; the “Romantic” model which replaced it and whose foundations were formulated around 1800 by Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher, and which was until recently the guiding model for history, philology (...) and philosophy; and lastly the model that takes both the literary and indirect Platonic traditions, integrates them, uses them to supplement one another, and so in part preserves and in part modifies the second model by a perspectival “paradigm shift”. The new research program justified itself in view of the surplus of anomalies left by the old program, which had to leave certain central portions of the tradition unexplained or else forcefully reinterpret them. Meanwhile, the new program promised to progressively work off the explanatory deficit. The new program was also able to emerge as an alternative because the explanatory abilities of the old program had visibly declined into a state of stagnation and exhaustion. That program had not achieved the hoped-for explanatory goals: neither the extraction of the philosophical content of Platonic dialogues by an analysis of form, nor the evaluation of the relative chronology of the dialogues for the inner development of their philosophical thought. (shrink)

Diese kleine Rechtsphilosophie bemillit sich, die heutige rechts­ philosophische Problematik in den groBen Rahmen der Geschichte der Rechtsphilosophie hineinzustellen. Ein derartiges Unterfangen macht eine strenge Auswahl erforderlich, und jeder wird bei einer solchen zum Teil davon beeinfluBt sein, was er im Hinblick auf die Problema­ tik der Gegenwart als wesentlich empfindet. Viel Interessantes muB notwendigerweise unberiicksichtigt bleiben; als MaBstab fiir die Auswahl habe ich dabei im wesentlichen die Originalitat des rechtsphilosophischen Beitrags angesehen. Eine Ausnahme· bilden die Naturrechtler des 18. Jahrhunderts. (...) Man wird gewiB auch hier iiber vieles streiten Mnnen. Ich mochte an dieser Stelle dem Herausgeber, meinem Freunde WOLFGANG KUNKEL, fiir die groBe Millie danken, die er sich im ganzen Verlauf der Arbeit gemacht hat. Cambridge, Mass., Friihjahr 1955. CARL J OACBlM FRIEDRICH. Inhaltsverzeichnis. Erster Teil. Die Geschichte. Selta I. Einleitung......................... 1 II. Das Recht aIs Wille Gottes: Die Erbschaft des Alten Testaments. 4 III. Das Recht aIs Teilhabe an der Idee der Gerechtigkeit: Plato und Aristoteles......................... 7 IV. Das Recht aIs Ausdruck der Gesetzlichkeiten menschlicher Natur: Die Stoa. und das romische Naturrecht............ 16 V. Das Recht als Friedensordnung der Liebesgemeinschaft: Augustin 21 VI. Das Recht aIs Teil und Spiegel der gottlichen Weltordnung: Thomas Aquinas und die Scholastik................. 25 VII. Das Recht aIs Geschichtsphii. nomen: Die Humanisten....... 30 VIII. Gesetztes Recht gegen Naturrecht: Die Souverinitatslehre bei Bodin, Althusius, Grotius..................... 34 IX. (shrink)

This article was written jointly by a philosopher and a mathematician. It has two aims: to acquaint mathematicians with some of the philosophical questions at the foundations of their subject and to familiarize philosophers with some of the answers to these questions which have recently been obtained by mathematicians. In particular, we argue that, if these recent findings are borne in mind, four different basic philosophical positions, logicism, formalism, platonism and intuitionism, if stated with some moderation, are in fact reconcilable, (...) although with some reservations in the case of logicism, provided one adopts a nominalistic interpretation of Plato's ideal objects. This eclectic view has been asserted by Lambek and Scott (LS 1986) on fairly technical grounds, but the present argument is meant to be accessible to a wider audience and to provide some new insights. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:While studying the history of the Liber figurarum by Joachim of Fiore, I have used the distinction among his followers between Joachimist and Joachites,1 that is between the pupils who respected Joachim’s ideas and the ones who re-created his message, combining his ideas with other apocalyptic themes borrowed from different authors or traditions. Both groups considered Joachim to be a starting point in the history of (...) the Church, but in a dissimilar way: this break sometimes encouraged conflicts and struggles. The meeting between Franciscanism and Joachimism was influenced by such quarrels and perhaps stimulated them. Both the Florensians and the Franciscans divided themselves roughly between Joachimists and Joachites.This fluctuation of opinions becomes clear if one follows the diffusion of the Liber figurarum and the transformations in the cycle of illustrations linked to Joachim’s ideas.The Liber figurarum represents the swan song of a civilization based on figurae, which expressed itself in many forms during Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. Joachim’s iconographic tradition is actually perfectly in tune with the early medieval tradition of Southern Italy, rooted in the iconography of late antiquity. The key word to describe its most profound essence is “kaleidoscopic.”2 This word, used by Reeves to define Joachim’s outlook, shows the method and the merit of Joachim’s images, grafted onto the trunk of an ancient plant that had deep roots in Southern Italy. Like a kaleidoscope, an image can easily change into a concept, and the concept can easily turn into an image that is at the same time astonishing and coherent. At the base of this unpredictable metamorphic process is the conviction, widespread in the ancient world, because of Plato, that there was an inseparable link between and idea in itself and its external, sensible manifestation. We have an important application of one such kaleidoscope in the art of memory theories.3This notion of idea and copy helped shape late antiquity and early medieval codices. An example is the conjuring effect of two uncovered facades opening the book; a technique we already find in copies of Cassiodorus’s Institutiones and in the Liber Figurarum. Another example is the fading of text into images as in calligrams; or the text moves around an image, changing the direction of perception in relation to the image. Kaleidoscopes also include figures breaking up into other figures, effects which happen when different geometrical figures cross and can be seen in different ways such as when “realistic” figures split or double before our eyes, like Joachim’s eagle-trees. To underline the amazing appearance of a text’s metamorphosis into an image and vice versa, we can have a figure larger than the written part of a page that goes beyond the layout of the manuscript’s leaves. But we can also have small figures in the white margin set on the same line, like visual notes to the text. Sometimes there are also figures that show where a gloss is, for example in the calligrams of the Cassiodorian codice, in some calligrams of the Liber Figurarum and in the psaltery representations in the margins of the Psalterium Decem Chordarum of ms. 322 of the Biblioteca Antoniana Padova. In this process, in which mnemonic inspiration is really, there is continuous interaction between text and margin, between words and images, which contributes to a better understanding of the meaning. In the same way, the methods we have already described allowed an active, watchful, lively use of the hand written single page. You can take visual possession of it or even take hold of it and move it around to read what is written in the opposite direction of the image. The codex will turn from a lector’s hand to the master’s hand and, from it, to the hand of.. (shrink)

Studie over het werk van de Duitse wijsgeer (1762-1814), met een beknopte levensbeschrijving.

This paper reports research on the influence of corporate and individual characteristics on managers'' social orientation in Germany. The results indicate that mid-level managers expressed a significantly lower social orientation than low-level managers, and that job activity did not impact social orientation. Female respondents expressed a higher social orientation than male respondents. No impact of the political system origin (former East Germany versus former West Germany) on social orientation was shown. Overall, corporate position had a significantly higher impact on social (...) orientation than did the characteristics of the individuals surveyed. (shrink)

Forthcoming guide with brief introductions on methods in analytic philosophy by experts on the relevant topics. With sections on: formal methods, argumentation, inferential methods, thought experiments, intuition, ordinary language philosophy, conceptual analysis, conceptual engineering, naturalism, analytic feminism, experimental philosophy, and progress and disagreement in philosophy.

We investigate the impact of informal arguments on judgments about thought experiment cases in light of Deutsch and Cappelen’s mischaracterization view, which claims that philosophers’ case judgments are primarily based on arguments and not intuitions. If arguments had no influence on case judgments, this would seriously challenge whether they are, or should be, based on arguments at all—and not on other cognitive sources instead, such as intuition. In Experiment 1, we replicated Wysocki’s (Rev Philos Psychol 8(2):477–499, 2017) pioneering study on (...) a Gettier-style case, and we confirmed that the informal arguments used by him had no significant effect. However, we also included an improved argument for ascribing knowledge, which did have a significant effect even in Wysocki’s original design. We therefore followed up with Experiment 2 on three Gettier-style cases, where we used a more natural dialogical format for presenting both case descriptions and informal arguments. Overall, we found a clear impact of prima facie good pro and con arguments on case judgments. The issue of argument impact is thus no obstacle to arguing about thought experiments. (shrink)

Mémoire de Mons. Lange contre cette philosophie -- Réponse préliminaire d'un auteur anonimeà ce mémoire -- Sommaire de la réponse de Mr. Wolf mȩme avec un avis au lecteur de l'histoire de ce nouveau différend.

'Philosophische Anthropologie' meint in dieser Studie nicht eine philosophische Subdisziplin, sondern eine besondere Theorierichtung in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit den Namen Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Erich Rothacker, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann u.v.a. mehr verbunden ist. Der erste Teil erzählt die verwickelte, teils abenteuerliche Entstehungs-, Aufstiegs- und Entfaltungsgeschichte dieser Denkergruppe von 1919 bis 1975 - einschließlich ihrer beachtlichen Wirkungsgeschichte in verschiedenen Disziplinen wie der Soziologie, Psychologie, Biologie und der Philosophie selbst. Im zweiten Teil wird der philosophische Identitätskern (...) dieser Philosophischen Anthropologie als Denkansatz präzisiert. (shrink)

In this paper, I am going to offer a reconstruction of a challenge to intuition-based armchair philosophy that has been put forward by experimental philosophers of a restrictionist stripe, which I will call the 'master argument'. I will then discuss a number of popular objections to this argument and explain why they either fail to cast doubt on its first, empirical premise or do not go deep enough to make for a lasting rebuttal. Next, I will consider two more promising (...) objections, the grounding objection and the expertise objection, which aim at the second, epistemic premise of the argument. Against this background, I will then suggest what I call 'conservative restrictionism' as the most reasonable default reaction to the experimentalist challenge, which is a combination of the two views of local restrictionism and methodological conservativism. (shrink)

In this paper, we first briefly survey the main responses to the challenge that experimental philosophy poses to the method of cases, given the common assumption that the latter is crucially based on intuitive judgments about cases. Second, we discuss two of the most popular responses in more detail: the expertise defense and the mischaracterization objection. Our take on the expertise defense is that the available empirical data do not support the claim that professional philosophers enjoy relevant expertise in their (...) intuitive judgments about cases. In contrast, the mischaracterization objection seems considerably more promising than its largely negative reception has suggested. We argue that the burden of proof is thus on philosophers who still hold that the method of cases crucially relies on intuitive judgments about cases. Finally, we discuss whether conceptual engineering provides an alternative to the method of cases in light of the challenge from experimental philosophy. We argue that this is not clearly the case, because conceptual engineering also requires descriptive information about the concepts it aims to improve. However, its primarily normative perspective on our concepts makes it largely orthogonal to the challenge from experimental philosophy, and it can also benefit from the empirical methods of the latter. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that knowledge in health care is a multidimensional dynamic construct, in contrast to the prevailing idea of knowledge being an objective state. Polanyi demonstrated that knowledge is personal, that knowledge is discovered, and that knowledge has explicit and tacit dimensions. Complex adaptive systems science views knowledge simultaneously as a thing and a flow, constructed as well as in constant flux. The Cynefin framework is one model to help our understanding of knowledge as a personal construct (...) achieved through sense making. Specific knowledge aspects temporarily reside in either one of four domains – the known, knowable, complex or chaotic, but new knowledge can only be created by challenging the known by moving it in and looping it through the other domains. Medical knowledge is simultaneously explicit and implicit with certain aspects already well known and easily transferable, and others that are not yet fully known and must still be learned. At the same time certain knowledge aspects are predominantly concerned with content, whereas others deal with context. Though in clinical care we may operate predominately in one knowledge domain, we also will operate some of the time in the others. Medical knowledge is inherently uncertain, and we require a context-driven flexible approach to knowledge discovery and application, in clinical practice as well as in health service planning. (shrink)

The extent to which machine metaphors are used in synthetic biology is striking. These metaphors contain a specific perspective on organisms as well as on scientific and technological progress. Expressions such as “genetically engineered machine”, “genetic circuit”, and “platform organism”, taken from the realms of electronic engineering, car manufacturing, and information technology, highlight specific aspects of the functioning of living beings while at the same time hiding others, such as evolutionary change and interdependencies in ecosystems. Since these latter aspects are (...) relevant for, for example, risk evaluation of uncontained uses of synthetic organisms, it is ethically imperative to resist the thrust of machine metaphors in this respect. In addition, from the perspective of the machine metaphor viewing an entity as a moral agent or patient becomes dubious. If one were to regard living beings, including humans, as machines, it becomes difficult to justify ascriptions of moral status. Finally, the machine metaphor reinforces beliefs in the potential of synthetic biology to play a decisive role in solving societal problems, and downplays the role of alternative technological, and social and political measures. (shrink)

Algorithmic predictions are promising for insurance companies to develop personalized risk models for determining premiums. In this context, issues of fairness, discrimination, and social injustice might arise: Algorithms for estimating the risk based on personal data may be biased towards specific social groups, leading to systematic disadvantages for those groups. Personalized premiums may thus lead to discrimination and social injustice. It is well known from many application fields that such biases occur frequently and naturally when prediction models are applied to (...) people unless special efforts are made to avoid them. Insurance is no exception. In this paper, we provide a thorough analysis of algorithmic fairness in the case of insurance premiums. We ask what “fairness” might mean in this context and how the fairness of a premium system can be measured. For this, we apply the established fairness frameworks of the fair machine learning literature to the case of insurance premiums and show which of the existing fairness criteria can be applied to assess the fairness of insurance premiums. We argue that two of the often-discussed group fairness criteria, independence (also called statistical parity or demographic parity) and separation (also known as equalized odds), are not normatively appropriate for insurance premiums. Instead, we propose the sufficiency criterion (also known as well-calibration) as a morally defensible alternative that allows us to test for systematic biases in premiums towards certain groups based on the risk they bring to the pool. In addition, we clarify the connection between group fairness and different degrees of personalization. Our findings enable insurers to assess the fairness properties of their risk models, helping them avoid reputation damage resulting from potentially unfair and discriminatory premium systems. (shrink)

'Philosophische Anthropologie' meint in dieser Studie nicht eine philosophische Subdisziplin, sondern eine besondere Theorierichtung in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit den Namen Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Erich Rothacker, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann u.v.a. mehr verbunden ist. Der erste Teil erzählt die verwickelte, teils abenteuerliche Entstehungs-, Aufstiegs- und Entfaltungsgeschichte dieser Denkergruppe von 1919 bis 1975 - einschließlich ihrer beachtlichen Wirkungsgeschichte in verschiedenen Disziplinen wie der Soziologie, Psychologie, Biologie und der Philosophie selbst. Im zweiten Teil wird der philosophische Identitätskern (...) dieser Philosophischen Anthropologie als Denkansatz präzisiert. (shrink)

“Philosophical Anthropology,” which is reconstructed here, does not deal with anthropology as a philosophical subdiscipline but rather as a particular philosophical approach within twentieth-century German philosophy, connected with thinkers such as Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen. This paper attempts a more precise description of the core identity of Philosophical Anthropology as a paradigm, observes the differences between the authors within the paradigm, and differentiates the paradigm as a whole from other twentieth-century philosophical approaches, such as transcendental philosophy, evolutionary (...) theory or naturalism, existentialism, and hermeneutic philosophy. In determining the human being as “excentric positionality,” Philosophical Anthropology arrives at unique categorical intertwinings between the biological, social and cultural sciences. (shrink)