This article questions whether philosophical considerations play any substantial role in the actual process of scientific research. Using examples mostly from the nineteenth century, it suggests that scientists generally choose their basic theoretical orientation, and their research strategies, on the basis of non-rationalized feelings which might be described as instinct or intuition. In one case where methodological principles were the driving force (Charles Lyell's uniformitarian geology), the effect was counterproductive.

An exploration of the scientific mindset—such character virtues as curiosity, veracity, attentiveness, and humility to evidence—and its importance for science, democracy, and human flourishing. Exemplary scientists have a characteristic way of viewing the world and their work: their mindset and methods all aim at discovering truths about nature. In An Instinct for Truth, Robert Pennock explores this scientific mindset and argues that what Charles Darwin called “an instinct for truth, knowledge, and discovery” has a tacit moral structure—that it (...) is important not only for scientific excellence and integrity but also for democracy and human flourishing. In an era of “post-truth,” the scientific drive to discover empirical truths has a special value. Taking a virtue-theoretic perspective, Pennock explores curiosity, veracity, skepticism, humility to evidence, and other scientific virtues and vices. He explains that curiosity is the most distinctive element of the scientific character, by which other norms are shaped; discusses the passionate nature of scientific attentiveness; and calls for science education not only to teach scientific findings and methods but also to nurture the scientific mindset and its core values. Drawing on historical sources as well as a sociological study of more than a thousand scientists, Pennock's philosophical account is grounded in values that scientists themselves recognize they should aspire to. Pennock argues that epistemic and ethical values are normatively interconnected, and that for science and society to flourish, we need not just a philosophy of science, but a philosophy of the scientist. (shrink)

According to the standard, accepted view of Husserl, the notion of a Husserlian account of the instincts appears paradoxical. Is not Husserl the proponent of a philosophy conducted by a “pure” observer? Instincts relate to the body, but the reduction seems to leave us with a disembodied Cartesian ego. Quotations are not lacking to support this view.

At the beginning of the 1950s most students of animal behavior in Britain saw the instinct concept developed by Konrad Lorenz in the 1930s as the central theoretical construct of the new ethology. In the mid 1950s J.B.S. Haldane made substantial efforts to undermine Lorenz''s status as the founder of the new discipline, challenging his priority on key ethological concepts. Haldane was also critical of Lorenz''s sharp distinction between instinctive and learnt behavior. This was inconsistent with Haldane''s account of (...) the evolution of language, and, according to Haldane, inconsistent with elementary genetics. British attitudes to the instinct concept changed dramatically in the wake of Daniel S. Lehraman''s 1953 critique of Lorenz, and by the 1960s Lorenz drew a clear distinction between his own views and those of the English-speaking ethologists. The inconsistencies between Lorenz''s ideas and the trends in contemporary evolutionary genetics that are reflected in Haldane''s critiques may help to explain why the Lorenzian instinct concept was unable to maintain itself in Britian. (shrink)

The need to create art is found in every human society, manifest in many different ways across many different cultures. Is this universal need rooted in our evolutionary past? The Art Instinct reveals that it is, combining evolutionary psychology with aesthetics to shed new light on fascinating questions about the nature of art.

The question of Ruyer’s relationship to Bergson remains under-theorized. This article attempts to address that problem by introducing a little-known essay written by Ruyer on the topic of B...

Human beings’ moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man’s innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions. Theoretically, preference for the former will lead to naturalism and for the latter to culturalism, but this is the reality of man’s moral life. Moreover, there may be a parallel (...) relation between the moral structure of human life and the grammatical structure of human language. (shrink)

Introduction -- Landscape and longing -- Art and human nature -- What is art? -- But they don't have our concept of art -- Art and natural selection -- The uses of fiction -- Art and human self-domestication -- Intention, forgery, dada : three aesthetic problems -- The contingency of aesthetic values -- Greatness in the arts.

The problem before us is the question: How far is the term ‘ instinct ‘ applicable in ethics? How far is it true to say that instincts are the determinants of the good, or moral, life? And if it is true at all to say they are determinants, how Far is it true?

Human beings' moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man's innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions. Theoretically, preference for the former will lead to naturalism and for the latter to culturalism, but this is the reality of man's moral life. Moreover, there may be a parallel (...) relation between the moral structure of human life and the grammatical structure of human language. /// 人类道德生活形式可以大致分为两种:一种是出自道德本能的，一种是出自 道德判断的。前者是不假思索的，后者是依据评价判断的。它们最终可以归结为人 类的先天道德本性和后天道德约定。在理论上，对前者的偏好会导向自然主义，对 后者的偏好会导向文化主义。但这是人类道德生活的现实。此外，在人类生活的道 德结构与人类语言的句法结构之间，很可能存在着一种平行的关系。. (shrink)

The problem before us is the question: How far is the term ‘ instinct ‘ applicable in ethics? How far is it true to say that instincts are the determinants of the good, or moral, life? And if it is true at all to say they are determinants, how Far is it true?

In addition to being a founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce was a scientist and an empiricist. A core aspect of his thoroughgoing empiricism was a mindset that treats all attitudes as revisable. His fallibilism seems to require us to constantly seek out new information, and to not be content holding any beliefs uncritically. At the same time, Peirce often states that common sense has an important role to play in both scientific and vital inquiry, and that there cannot (...) be any “direct profit in going behind common sense.” Our question is the following: alongside a scientific mindset and a commitment to the method of inquiry, where does common sense fit in? Peirce does at times directly address common sense; however, those explicit engagements are relatively infrequent. In this paper, we argue that getting a firm grip on the role of common sense in Peirce’s philosophy requires a three-pronged investigation, targeting his treatment of common sense alongside his more numerous remarks on intuition and instinct. By excavating and developing Peirce’s concepts of instinct and intuition, we show that his respect for common sense coheres with his insistence on the methodological superiority of inquiry. We conclude that Peirce shows us the way to a distinctive epistemic position balancing fallibilism and anti-scepticism, a pragmatist common sense position of considerable interest for contemporary epistemology given current interest in the relation of intuition and reason. (shrink)

In the seventy years since AI became a field of study, the theoretical work of philosophers has played increasingly important roles in understanding many aspects of the AI project, from the metaphysics of mind and what kinds of systems can or cannot implement them, the epistemology of objectivity and algorithmic bias, the ethics of automation, drones, and specific implementations of AI, as well as analyses of AI embedded in social contexts (for example). Serious scholarship in AI ethics sometimes quotes Asimov’s (...) speculative laws of robotics as if they were genuine proposals, and yet Lem remains historically undervalued as a theorist who uses fiction as his vehicle. Here, I argue that Lem’s fiction (in particular his fiction about robots) is overlooked but highly nuanced philosophy of AI, and that we should recognize the lessons he tried to offer us, which focused on the human and social failures rather than technological breakdowns. Stories like “How the World Was Saved” and “Upside Down Evolution” ask serious philosophical questions about AI metaphysics and ethics, and offer insightful answers that deserve more attention. Highlighting some of this work from The Cyberiad and the stories in Mortal Engines in particular, I argue that the time has never been more appropriate to attend to his philosophy in light of the widespread technological and social failures brought about by the quest for artificial intelligence. In service of this argument, I discuss some of the history and philosophical debates around AI in the last decades, as well as contemporary events that illustrate Lem’s strongest claims in critique of the human side of AI. (shrink)

In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). In this paper I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in (...) Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. As the practical instincts are closely related to pleasure and passions, which are by nature cognitive, my emphasis will be on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate reasoning when conclusions are not readily available. Acting by will, which is related to moral reasoning, and acting by instincts can lead us to the same moral knowledge independently, but they can also complement each other. To illustrate the two alternative ways to reach moral knowledge, I will discuss the case of happiness, which is the goal of all human moral action for Leibniz. (shrink)

The author discusses mcdougall's position on the subject and the "concept of separate patterns of behaviour" in individual and general circumstance. The author concludes that mcdougall was interested in a scientific question concerning innate tendencies in humans but thinks mcdougall posited too many instincts. (staff).

In the current socio‐political climate pedagogies consistent with rationalism are in the ascendancy. One way to challenge the purchase of rationalism within educational discourse and practice is through the body, or by re‐thinking the nature of mind‐body relations. While the orientation of this paper is ultimately phenomenological, it takes as its point of departure recent feminist scholarship, which is demonstrating that attending to physiology can provide insight into the complexity of mind‐body relations. Elizabeth Wilson's account of the role of the (...) gut in psychological processes suggests a far less hierarchical relation between brain and body than rationalism allows. Such insights are also supported by recent phenomenological inquiries into cognition and the body. My question is, what implications do these insights have for how the nature of embodiment is understood, and, by extension, learning? This paper explores how informal, non‐cognitive modes of knowing, or of engaging with the world, inform learning in higher education contexts. More specifically, it raises the question of what role non‐cognitive modes of engagement, such as sensibility, have in augmenting, enabling or delimiting the learning process. (shrink)

The Music Instinct Philip Ball provides the first comprehensive, accessible survey of what is known--and what is still unknown--about how music works its magic, and why, as much as eating and sleeping, it seems indispensable to humanity. --from publisher description.

Human nature and cooperation -- Tucson knows all about that -- Featuring interviews with Curtis A., Renø M., and Alanna C. -- Democracy and Sproul Plaza -- The people's library -- Featuring interviews with Zachary L. and Jaime T. -- Barcelona to Greensboro -- Student loan debt -- Featuring an interview with professor George Caffentzis -- Solidarity.

Draws on a broad range of scientific evidence to theorize an evolutionary basis for religion, considering how religion may have served as an essential component of early society survival and that the brain may be inherently inclined toward religious behavior.

The infant was first an embryo. Its body is neither new nor untried. Its heart, its liver, lungs and brain, all its nerves and tissues, were in existence some time before, constantly exercised in embryonic ways. The new born infant is an old campaigner on quite familiar terrain.The embryo begins as a single cell feeding on the food its mother provides. Almost at once it becomes too large, too sluggish and inefficient for its own good, and must either immediately change (...) its tactics and mode of life or be prepared to die. This is an alternative which all growing things face from time to time. The lowest organisms meet the issue by subdividing into a number of similar, smaller, independent cells, each with a life of its own. The embryo meets it by subdividing into a number of different kinds of cells all of which are capable of developing and living according to individual rhythms, but only a few of which are able to exist or develop all alone. Most of the new cells the embryo makes possible must cling to and remain under its sway if they are to continue and prosper at all. (shrink)

If, as is now commonly believed, there are no impenetrable fences separating science from philosophy, there seems no good reason why scientists and philosophers should not cultivate each other's gardens. It is in this spirit, and not as a mere servant, that Senchuk works to bring down the theory of the instinctive in its various guises and replace it with his own account of conscious flexibility. His primary concern is, I think, with the explanation of human behavior, but frogs, (...) geese, and other beasts are also given their day. The result is a very good book which is densely packed with argument relieved by humor. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that despite Freud's low opinion of philosophy and despite his claim that psychoanalysis avoids value judgements, psychoanalytic theory does contain a moral philosophy.

The familiar Husserlian conception of fulfillment involves a contrast between the same content as being represented emptily and then fully, and also the idea that the empty givenness is rightly conceived in terms of anticipations of fullness. Since perceptual experiences provide a paradigmatic case of such fulfillment, I will call it “P-fulfillment.” Additionally, there is also the fulfillment of our wants, wishes, and desires. Taking wants as the paradigmatic case, I will call it “W-fulfillment.” In this paper, I consider the (...) applicability of these conceptions of fulfillment to Husserl’s views of instincts, and conclude that the fulfillment of instincts is best understood not as P-fulfillment or W-fulfillment, but as sui generis, “I-fulfillment,” which is distinguished by its peculiarly retrospective nature, and by the fact that when it reveals something, it can also give rise to determinacy where previously there was none. (shrink)

Punishment of offenders is one of the most universal features of human behavior. Across time and cultures it has been common for people to punish offenders, and one can easily find examples of punishment among ancient hunter-gatherers, in holy scriptures, in popular culture, and in contemporary courts of law. Punishment is not restricted to criminal offenders, but emerges within all spheres of our social life, including corporations, public institutions, traffic, sports matches, schools, parenting, and more. Punishment strongly influences what we (...) think, how we feel, and what we do. The Moral Punishment Instinct asserts that people possess a hard-wired tendency to aggress against those who violate the norms of their group. We have evolved this instinct because of its power to control behavior by curbing selfishness and free-riding, thereby providing incentives to stimulate the mutual cooperation that ancient hunter-gatherers needed in order to survive in challenging natural environments. In this book, Jan-Willem van Prooijen methodically describes how punishment originates from moral emotions, stimulates cooperation, and shapes the social life of human beings. Guided by a host of recognizable and relatable examples, this book illuminates how the moral punishment instinct manifests itself among a variety of modern human cultures, children, tribes of hunter-gatherers, and even non-human animals-all while accounting for the role of this instinct in religion, war, racial bias, restorative justice, gossip, torture, and radical terrorism. (shrink)

This paper examines the contributions of Daniel S. Lehrman (1919–1972) to animal behavior studies. Though widely cited as a critic of the early ethological program presented by Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, other significant aspects of Lehrman’s career and research have not received historical attention. In this paper, I offer a fuller account of Lehrman’s work by situating his debate with ethologists within the larger context of Lehrman’s early scholarly development under G. K. Noble and T. C. Schneirla, by examining (...) his scientific research on the ring-dove as well as his epistemological views about the best way to understand animal behaviour, and by presenting his leadership in institution and network-building of interdisciplinary approaches to animal behavior. This essay highlights Lehrman’s impact on the evolution of ethology, endocrinology, and developmental biology. (shrink)

Stephen Darwall notes that for Cudworth the fundamental ethical motive is love, but that the Cambridge Platonist tells us little about love’s character, aim and object. In this article I examine Cudworth’s doctrine of ‘superintellectual instinct’ as a natural love for or inclination to the good as it takes shape in two of his unpublished freewill manuscripts. I show that in these manuscripts he assumes a threefold model of how this higher love as a natural or ‘created’ grace fits (...) into the overall moral life of a person, together with human free will and special grace. I argue that although Cudworth adopts an Origenist synergistic position on the question of the relationship between grace and free will, stating that special grace is a necessary condition of salvation conjointly with free will and creation grace, in reality he struggles to show the strict necessity of special grace. (shrink)

Might we have an instinctive tendency to perform helpful actions? This paper explores a model under development in cognitive neuroscience that enables us to understand what instinctive, helpful actions might look like. The account that emerges puts some pressure on key concepts in the philosophical understanding of folk psychology. In developing the contrast, a notion of embodied beliefs is introduced; it arguably fits folk conceptions better than philosophical ones. One upshot is that Humean insights into the role of empathy and (...) instinct in the production of helpful actions are affirmed. (shrink)