Hurford’s Constraint (Hurford, Foundations of Language, 11, 409–411, 1974) states that a disjunction is infelicitous if its disjuncts stand in an entailment relation: #John was born in Paris or in France. Gazdar (Pragmatics, Academic Press, NY, 1979) observed that scalar implicatures can obviate the constraint. For instance, sentences of the form (A or B) or (Both Aand B) are felicitous due to the exclusivity implicature of the first disjunct: A or B implicates ‘not (A and B)’. Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (...) (Handbook of semantics, 2008) use the obviation of Hurford’s Constraint in these cases to argue for a theory of local implicature. I present evidence indicating that the constraint needs to be modified in two ways. First, implicatures can obviate Hurford’s Constraint only in earlier disjuncts, not later ones: #(Both A and B) or (A or B). Second, the constraint rules out not only disjuncts that stand in an entailment relation, but also disjuncts that are even mutually consistent: #John is from Russia or Asia. I propose to make sense of these facts by providing an incremental evaluation procedure which checks that each new disjunct to the right is inconsistent with the information to its left, before the disjunct can be strengthened by local implicature. (shrink)

A new system of dynamic logic is introduced and motivated, witha novel approach to variable binding for incremental interpretation. Thesystem is shown to be equivalent to first order logic and complete.The new logic combines the dynamic binding idea from DynamicPredicate Logic with De Bruijn style variable free indexing. Quantifiersbind the next available variable register; the indexing mechanismguarantees that active registers are never overwritten by newquantifiers actions. Apart from its interest in its own right, theresulting system has certain advantages (...) over Dynamic Predicate Logic orDiscourse Representation Theory. It comes with a more well behaved(i.e., transitive) consequence relation, it gives a more explicitaccount of how anaphoric context grows as text gets processed, and ityields new insight into the dynamics of anaphoric linking in reasoning.Incremental dynamics also points to a new way of handling contextdynamically in Montague grammar. (shrink)

The present event‐related potential (ERP) study used picture–sentence verification to investigate the neurolinguistic correlates of the online processing of compositional‐semantic information. To this end, we examined context effects on sentences involving temporal adverbial quantification likeJana war jeden Morgen schwimmen an den Arbeitstagen (“Jana went for a swim every morning during the working week”). We tested whether the conceptual complexity associated with quantifying over time intervals leads to delayed predictions regarding the upcoming words in a sentence. The present study replicated previous (...) results relating to quantification over individuals, which are conceptually less complex than time intervals. Analogous to previous studies, false vs. true sentences elicited an N400 whenever contextual cues did not permit a potential revision of a locally assigned truth value. The present results are compatible with an approach under which contextual cues are immediately considered for predicting how a sentence continues. The fact that the contextual complexity did not lead to processing delays indicates that the processing system quickly abstracts away from the conceptual complexity associated with the linguistic input if such an abstraction is possible. (shrink)

Japanese exhibits the Multiple Nominative Construction (MNC), where more than one nominative-marked NP appear within a single clause. Though the MNC has been extensively investigated in the syntax literature, its relation to rightward-displacement constructions has hardly been discussed. In the present article, we provide new sets of MNC data relating to the three types of right-displacement constructions: relatives, clefts, and postposing. The generalisation is that for the linearly ordered nominative-marked NPs in an MNC string, only the leftmost NP may be (...) right-displaced (that is, relativised, clefted, postposed). This pattern is shown to follow as an outcome of modelling incremental parsing, without stipulations specifically made for the observed data. We propose an account of MNCs in the light of an incremental grammar, formalising it within Dynamic Syntax. In this account, an MNC sentence is parsed on a word-by-word basis, and its interpretation is gradually built up, modelled as the growth of a semantic structure. In cases where a right-displacement is permitted, the right-displaced NP is successfully parsed against the structure built by the preceding part of the sentence. In cases where a right-displacement is disallowed, the right-displaced NP cannot be properly processed because the preceding part of the sentence has created no structural position into which the content of the right-displaced NP is reflected. As theoretical implications of the proposed account, we suggest the concept of time-linear grammaticality. (shrink)

This study attempts to describe the notion of the ‘self’ using dynamical systems language based on the results of our robot learning experiments. A neural network model consisting of multiple modules is proposed, in which the interactive dynamics between the bottom-up perception and the top-down prediction are investigated. Our experiments with a real mobile robot showed that the incremental learning of the robot switches spontaneously between steady and unsteady phases. In the steady phase, the top-down prediction for the bottom-up (...) perception works well when coherence is achieved between the internal and the environmental dynamics. In the unsteady phase, conflicts arise between the bottom-up perception and the top-down prediction; the coherence is lost, and a chaotic attractor is observed in the internal neural dynamics. By investigating possible analogies between this result and the phenomenological literature on the ‘self', we draw the conclusions that the structure of the ‘self’ corresponds to the ‘open dynamic structure’ which is characterized by co-existence of stability in terms of goal-directedness and instability caused by embodiment; the open dynamic structure causes the system's spontaneous transition to the unsteady phase where the ‘self’ becomes aware. (shrink)

Life appears to be a natural property of matter, but the problem of its origin only arose after early scientists refuted continuous spontaneous generation. There is no chance of life arising ‘all at once’, we need the standard scientific incremental explanation with large numbers of small steps, an approach used in both physical and evolutionary sciences. The necessity for considering both theoretical and experimental approaches is emphasized. After describing basic principles that are available (including the Darwin-Eigen cycle), the search (...) for origins is considered under four main themes. These are the RNA-world hypothesis; potential intermediates between an RNA-world and a modern world via the evolution of protein synthesis and then of DNA; possible alternatives to an RNA-world; and finally the earliest stages from the simple prebiotic systems to RNA. The triplicase/proto-ribosome theory for the origin of the ribosome is discussed where triples of nucleotides are added to a replicating RNA, with the origin of a triplet code well-before protein synthesis begins. The length of the code is suggested to arise from the early development of a ratchet mechanism that overcomes the problem of continued processivity of an RNA-based RNA-polymerase. It is probable that there were precursor stages to RNA with simpler sugars, or just two nucleotides, but we do not yet know of any better alternatives to RNA that were likely to arise naturally. For prebiotic stages (before RNA) a flow-reactor model is suggested to solve metabolism, energy gradients, and compartmentation simultaneously – thus the intense interest in some form of flow reactor. If an autocatalytic cycle could arise in such a system we would be major steps ahead. The most likely physical conditions for the origin of life require further clarification and it is still unclear whether the origin of life is more of an entropy (information) problem (and therefore high temperatures would be detrimental), rather than a kinetic problem (where high temperatures may be advantageous). (shrink)

This dissertation interprets Leibniz’ notion of perception through abilities, agency, and action. In chapter 1, I characterize the differences between kinds of Leibnizian perception by considering their relationship to different abilities. I focus on lower cognition, where Leibniz distinguishes bare perception from sensation by their degrees of distinctness and memory. I read this relationship, between kinds of perception and qualities of perception, through actions. I begin with complete lacks of distinctness and memory and how they relate to stupors as an (...) inability to act. I then turn to a range of incrementally more advanced cases of perceptions and actions to highlight the role of distinctness and memory in each. The cases reveal how differences in kinds of action depend on differences in kinds of perception in Leibniz’ system. My approach breaks with traditional readings that invoke consciousness to account for the differences, and it builds in some ways on readings that lead with representation. I also comment on the prospects of such an abilities based approach for 21st century theories of perception. In chapter 2, I articulate the point of view or perspectival nature of Leibnizian perception through expression and agency. I establish some conditions that Leibniz sets on perspectival expression for individual perceivers, and on the particular way that perceptions belong to their perceivers in Leibniz’ system. I argue that spatial, geometrical notions of perspective, though useful, ultimately give way to a deeper, agential notion of perspective for Leibniz. I make a case for including an agential side of POV in perception, beyond the phenomenal flow of perception. I then articulate how agency is unique and fundamental to Leibniz’ notion of perspective or point of view, both in internal action and in the activity and passivity of external action. In chapter 3, I ask about the limits of perceivers in Leibniz’ system—where they arise and where they don’t. I set the question adjacent to Leibniz' celebrated mill argument. I consider readings of the argument that invoke action, and build on them to include questions about how action relates to interaction in different kinds of perceivers. One question concerns the lack of perception in primary matter, and another concerns the lack of perception in an aggregate of secondary matter. After milling through some considerations, I settle on a notion of organic unity, underpinned by a notion of action, that can draw lines between Leibnizian perceivers and non-perceivers. (shrink)

Providing a compositional interpretation procedure for discourses in which descriptions of complex dependencies between interrelated objects are incrementally built is a key challenge for formal theories of natural language interpretation. This paper examines several quantificational phenomena and argues that to account for these phenomena, we need richly structured contexts of interpretation that are passed on between different parts of the same sentence and also across sentential boundaries. The main contribution of the paper is showing how we can (...) add structure to contexts in an incremental way, starting with the basic notion of context in classical first-order logic, i.e., interpretation contexts formalized as single total variable assignments. (shrink)

We present the results of three experiments investigating the interpretation of comparative constructions involving pronominal reference in which binding Principle C is violated. We show that both children and adults retrieve interpretations that are not predicted. On the one hand, children appear to represent elided pronominal material functionally instead of in a strict identity relation with a pronoun on the surface, generating interpretations that are entirely unexpected from the perspective of the adult grammar. On the other, adult participants often (...) appear to ignore Principle C, being influenced by factors such as prosodic focus, the type of comparative, and structural position of the pronoun. We propose that the way in which the sentence processor is deployed in the incremental processing of such comparative constructions gives rise to so-called acceptable ungrammaticality. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a lot of interest in scientific understanding. There was already a consensus in the philosophy of science about the fact that science provides understanding of the world, but until the 70s there was not a proper and systematic investigation of the matter. This investigation has been notoriously incremental in the last two decades. Nevertheless, there is still no agreed upon way of how to understand “understanding” . Faye’s contribution to the debate proves to (...) be a departure from the previous standard works on explanation and scientific inference. The author’s main purpose is, in his own words, describing “how our human cognitive capacities allow scientists to acquire an understanding of nature by means of representation, interpretation, and explanation” . He starts from a D .. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta a Weber y Habermas como los umbrales o polos de una modernidad que tiene al progreso como horizonte teórico-práctico. El diagnóstico weberiano sobre la modernidad y su proceso de desencantamiento del mundo y la injustificada reducción de la actividad racional a una actividad utilitario-estratégica desprovista de su carácter veritativo y de su orientación valórica, Habermas la utiliza para justificar su propuesta teórico-crítica respecto a la modernidad y la "paradoja de la racionalización", distinguiendo "sistema" y "mundo vital". Aquí (...) "desencantamiento del mundo" y "consenso del proyecto de lamodernidad", se encuentranThis article presents Weber and Habermas like the thresholds or poles of a modernity that has to the progress as theoretical- practical horizon. The diagnosis weberiano on the modernity and his process of disenchantment of the world and the unjustified reduction of the rational activity to a utilitarian-strategic activity devoid of his character of truth, Habermas uses to justify his theoretical-critical offerwith regard to themodernity and the "paradox of the rationalization", distinguishing "system" and "vital world". Here "disenchantment of the world" and "consensus of the project of the modernity", they are. (shrink)

Memory is fleeting. New material rapidly obliterates previous material. How, then, can the brain deal successfully with the continual deluge of linguistic input? We argue that, to deal with this “Now-or-Never” bottleneck, the brain must compress and recode linguistic input as rapidly as possible. This observation has strong implications for the nature of language processing: (1) the language system must “eagerly” recode and compress linguistic input; (2) as the bottleneck recurs at each new representational level, the language system must build (...) a multilevel linguistic representation; and (3) the language system must deploy all available information predictively to ensure that local linguistic ambiguities are dealt with “Right-First-Time”; once the original input is lost, there is no way for the language system to recover. This is “Chunk-and-Pass” processing. Similarly, language learning must also occur in the here and now, which implies that language acquisition is learning to process, rather than inducing, a grammar. Moreover, this perspective provides a cognitive foundation for grammaticalization and other aspects of language change. Chunk-and-Pass processing also helps explain a variety of core properties of language, including its multilevel representational structure and duality of patterning. This approach promises to create a direct relationship between psycholinguistics and linguistic theory. More generally, we outline a framework within which to integrate often disconnected inquiries into language processing, language acquisition, and language change and evolution. (shrink)

To model behavioral and neural correlates of language comprehension in naturalistic environments, researchers have turned to broad‐coverage tools from natural‐language processing and machine learning. Where syntactic structure is explicitly modeled, prior work has relied predominantly on context‐free grammars (CFGs), yet such formalisms are not sufficiently expressive for human languages. Combinatory categorial grammars (CCGs) are sufficiently expressive directly compositional models of grammar with flexible constituency that affords incremental interpretation. In this work, we evaluate whether a more expressive CCG provides (...) a better model than a CFG for human neural signals collected with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while participants listen to an audiobook story. We further test between variants of CCG that differ in how they handle optional adjuncts. These evaluations are carried out against a baseline that includes estimates of next‐word predictability from a transformer neural network language model. Such a comparison reveals unique contributions of CCG structure‐building predominantly in the left posterior temporal lobe: CCG‐derived measures offer a superior fit to neural signals compared to those derived from a CFG. These effects are spatially distinct from bilateral superior temporal effects that are unique to predictability. Neural effects for structure‐building are thus separable from predictability during naturalistic listening, and those effects are best characterized by a grammar whose expressive power is motivated on independent linguistic grounds. (shrink)

There is substantial support for the general idea that a formalization of comprehenders' expectations about the likely next word in a sentence helps explaining data related to online sentence processing. While much research has focused on syntactic, semantic, and discourse expectations, the present event‐related potentials (ERPs) study investigates neurolinguistic correlates of pragmatic expectations, which arise when comprehenders expect a sentence to conform to Gricean Maxims of Conversation. For predicting brain responses associated with pragmatic processing, we introduce a formal model of (...) such Gricean pragmatic expectations, using an idealized incremental interpreter. We examine whether pragmatic expectancies derived from this model modulate the amplitude of the N400, a component that has been associated with predictive processing. As part of its parameterization, the model distinguishes genuine pragmatic interpreters, who expect maximally informative true utterances, from literal interpreters, who only expect truthfulness. We explore the model's non‐trivial predictions for an experimental setup which uses picture‐sentence verification with ERPs recorded at several critical positions in sentences containing the scalar implicature trigger some. We find that Gricean expectations indeed affect the N400, largely in line with the predictions of our model, but also discuss discrepancies between model predictions and observations critically. (shrink)

We define and prove a formal semantics divided into two complementary interacting components: the strictly linguistic semantics, we call linguistic agent, and the strictly logical and referential semantics, we call rational agent. This Linguistic \ Rational Agents’ Semantics applies to Deep Dependency trees or more generally, to discourses, i.e. sequences of DD-trees, and interprets them by functional structures we call Meaning Representation Structures, similar to the DRT, but interpreted very differently. LRA semantics incrementally interprets the discourses by minimal finite models, (...) called proto-models, in a monotonic logic of the LA and checks the proto-models with respect to the classical models of the RA. The proto-model is considered as the linguistic sense of the discourse. We define in full detail the LA which, as we believe, must be universal. On the other hand, we don’t propose a particular RA. We only define the scheme of interaction between the two agents and the stimuli of the RA used by the LA. After all, every discourse has in LRA semantics the single meaning and the single sense for every Rational Agent used to interact with the Linguistic Agent. (shrink)

I argue that one central aspect of the epistemology of causation, the use of causes as evidence for their effects, is largely independent of the metaphysics of causation. In particular, I use the formalism of Bayesian causal graphs to factor the incremental evidential impact of a cause for its effect into a direct cause-to-effect component and a backtracking component. While the “backtracking” evidence that causes provide about earlier events often obscures things, once we our restrict attention to the cause-to-effect (...) component it is true to say promoting (inhibiting) causes raise (lower) the probabilities of their effects. This factoring assumes the same form whether causation is given an interventionist, counterfactual or probabilistic interpretation. Whether we think about causation in terms of interventions and causal graphs, counterfactuals and imaging functions, or probability raising against the background of causally homogenous partitions, if we describe the essential features of a situation correctly then the incremental evidence that a cause provides for its effect in virtue of being its cause will be the same. (shrink)

Cet article fournit, dans sa première section, une analyse méthodologique de l’utilisation de corpora, au cours de laquelle je détaille, de manière argumentée ce qu’on peut en attendre et pour quels objectifs, précise ce qu’on ne peut pas en attendre et montre pourquoi. La première partie conclut sur l’inutilité des corpora d’occurrences en sémantique des langues, même s’ils sont indispensables dans d’autres disciplines (comme, par exemple, les études littéraires) ; j’insiste sur le caractère nuisible de leur utilisation en sémantique, sauf (...) dans un cas que je spécifie, utilisation qui réintroduit l’introspection sémantique en la maquillant derrière un appareil technique inspiré des statistiques. Dans la deuxième section, je montre qu’il existe un moyen de sortir du carcan pseudo-méthodologique que la mode présentant les corpora comme unique accès à l’observation empirique tente d’imposer ; ce moyen, qui part de l’idée d’enrichir les corpora par des indications sur l’interprétabilité des échantillons, comporte deux aspects principaux : (i) réhabiliter l’expérimentation empirique et (ii) rechercher des hypothèses théoriques permettant d’engendrer des hypothèses descriptives à tester au moyen des expériences empiriques. On y insiste sur le fait que, conformément à ce que requiert une démarche scientifique rigoureuse, les tests empiriques ne peuvent pas vérifier une hypothèse, mais seulement la réfuter : c’est l’échec de la réfutation qui constitue un indice de validité (provisoire) de l’hypothèse. La troisième section présente, en détail et avec des illustrations, deux tests empiriques permettant des expérimentations destinées à tester les descriptions sémantiques que l’on peut être amené à proposer. On y insiste sur le fait que les corpora nécessaires à ces expérimentations peuvent être petits, mais nécessitent une interaction minimale entre l’observateur et les destinataires des échantillons : ils sont enrichis par une indication non verbale, fournie par les destinataires des échantillons, à propos de l’éventuelle difficulté qu’ils ont eues à les interpréter. Les tests sémantiques utilisant des unités de langue déjà décrites, le chapitre conclut sur l’avantage d’une incrémentation de la descriptibilité des unités de langue s’appuyant sur la récursivité des moyens de tester les descriptions : toute description non réfutée par les tests existants permet de construire de nouveaux tests. (shrink)