In his early experimental work with Suppes, Davidson adopted rationality assumptions, not as necessary constraints on interpretation, but as practical conceits in addressing methodological problems faced by experimenters studying decision making under uncertainty. Although the content of their theory has since been undermined, their methodological approach—a Galilean form of methodological rationalism—lives on in contemporary psychological research. This article draws on Max Weber’s verstehen to articulate an account of Galilean methodological rationalism; explains how anomalies faced by Davidson’s early experimental (...) work gave rise to his later, canonical claims about rationality and interpretation; and reclaims this Galilean framework for use in contemporary psychological research. (shrink)

The Galilean explanatory style is characterized by the search for the underlying structure of phenomena, the positing of "deep" explanatory principles, and a view of the relation between theory and data, on which the search for "crucial data" is of primary importance. In this paper, I trace the dynamics of adopting the Galilean style, focusing on the science of episodic memory. I argue that memory systems, such as episodic and semantic memory, were posited as underlying competences producing the (...) observable phenomena of memory. Considered in idealized isolation from other systems, episodic memory was taken to underlay the ability of individuals to remember events from their personal past. Yet, in reality, memory systems regularly interact, standing in many-to-many relations to actual memory tasks and experiences. Upon this backdrop, I explore a puzzle about the increasing prominence of the notion of autonoetic consciousness in Tulving's theory of episodic memory. I argue that, contrary to widespread belief, the prominence is not best explained by the purported essential link between autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory. Rather, it is explained by the fact that autonoetic consciousness, hypothesized to uniquely accompany episodic retrieval, was considered a source of crucial data, predictable only from theories positing a functionally distinct episodic memory system. However, with the emergence of a new generation of theories, positing wider memory systems for remembering and imagination, the question of the relation between episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness has been reopened. This creates a pressing need for de-idealization, triggering a new search for crucial data. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky pursues a methodology in linguistics that abstracts from substantial amounts of data about actual language use in a way that has met considerable resistance from many other linguists. This chapter argues that Chomsky's observation in fact accords with good explanatory practice elsewhere in science, but it does conflict with a traditional methodology in linguistics. It's striking that the main features of Chomsky's Galilean style are independently taken to be rather obvious features of scientific method in contemporary philosophy (...) of science. The chapter first looks in more detail at the roles that idealization plays in contemporary generative grammar. It then proceeds to explore the congruence between the Galilean style in linguistics and aspects of good scientific methodology. Finally, the chapter sets out and responds briefly to some of the arguments that have been raised against the Galilean style. (shrink)

In 1950, Alan Turing proposed his iconic imitation game, calling it a ‘test’, an ‘experiment’, and the ‘the only really satisfactory support’ for his view that machines can think. Following Turing’s rhetoric, the ‘Turing test’ has been widely received as a kind of crucial experiment to determine machine intelligence. In later sources, however, Turing showed a milder attitude towards what he called his ‘imitation tests’. In 1948, Turing referred to the persuasive power of ‘the actual production of machines’ rather than (...) that of a controlled experiment. Observing this, I propose to distinguish the logical structure from the rhetoric of Turing’s argument. I argue that Turing’s proposal of a crucial experiment may have been a concession to meet the standards of his interlocutors more than his own, while his construction of machine intelligence rather reveals a method of successive idealizations and exploratory experiments. I will draw a parallel with Galileo’s construction of idealized fall in a void and the historiographical controversies over the role of experiment in Galilean science. I suggest that Turing, like Galileo, relied on certain kinds of experiment, but also on rhetoric and propaganda to inspire further research that could lead to convincing scientific and technological progress. (shrink)

Questions concerning the epistemological status of computer science are, in this paper, answered from the point of view of the formal verification framework. State space reduction techniques adopted to simplify computational models in model checking are analysed in terms of Aristotelian abstractions and Galilean idealizations characterizing the inquiry of empirical systems. Methodological considerations drawn here are employed to argue in favour of the scientific understanding of computer science as a discipline. Specifically, reduced models gained by Dataion are acknowledged as (...) Aristotelian abstractions that include only data which are sufficient to examine the interested executions. The present study highlights how the need to maximize incompatible properties is at the basis of both Abstraction Refinement, the process of generating a cascade of computational models to achieve a balance between simplicity and informativeness, and the Multiple Model Idealization approach in biology. Finally, fairness constraints, imposed to computational models to allow fair behaviours only, are defined as ceteris paribus conditions under which temporal formulas, formalizing software requirements, acquire the status of law-like statements about the software systems executions. (shrink)

The concept of Galilean Idealization is based on a pragmatically grounded relation between universes of so-called real and idealized entities. The concept was developed in the course of a critical discussion of different explications of the concept of idealization (e.g. by W. F. Barr, C. G. Hempel and L. Nowak), these being attempts to specify sufficient syntactic and semantic criterions for idealization. But this line of argument shall not be followed here. Instead, first the concept of (...) Pragmatic Idealization, and as its special case the Galilean one, is presented (1.) and certain aspects of the application of an idealized theory are discussed (2.). Then, working within the Strucuralist View of theories, definitions of the idealized variants of the diachronic theory-element and theory-net are presented (3.). (shrink)

This article reviews the recent literature on idealization, specifically idealization in the course of scientific modeling. We argue that idealization is not a unified concept and that there are three different types of idealization: Galilean, minimalist, and multiple models, each with its own justification. We explore the extent to which idealization is a permanent feature of scientific representation and discuss its implications for debates about scientific realism.

What reasons can a physicist have to reject the principle of a mathematical method, which he nonetheless uses and which he used frequently in his unpublished works? We are concerned here with Galileo’s doubts and objections against Cavalieri’s “geometry of indivisibles.” One may be astonished by Galileo’s behaviour: Cavalieri’s principle is implied by the Galilean mathematization of naturally accelerated motion; some Galilean demonstrations in fact hinge on it. Yet, in the Discorsi Galileo seems to be opposed to this (...) principle. e fundamental reason of Galileo’s reluctance with respect to Cavalieri’s geometry is to be sought in Galileo’s ideal of intelligibility. It is true that Galilean physics, and more particularly Galileo’s theories of motion and matter, faces deep paradoxes, which Cavalieri’s geometry succeeds to avoid, thanks to a clear determination of the concept of “aggregatum.” But while avoiding these difficulties, Cavalieri does not furnish any solution for the problems raised by Galilean physics. (shrink)

This article reviews the recent literature on idealization, specifically idealization in the course of scientific modeling. We argue that idealization is not a unified concept and that there are three different types of idealization: Galilean, minimalist, and multiple models, each with its own justification. We explore the extent to which idealization is a permanent feature of scientific representation and discuss its implications for debates about scientific realism.

Many explanations in physics rely on idealized models of physical systems. These explanations fail to satisfy the conditions of standard normative accounts of explanation. Recently, some philosophers have claimed that idealizations can be used to underwrite explanation nonetheless, but only when they are what have variously been called representational, Galilean, controllable or harmless idealizations. This paper argues that such a half-measure is untenable and that idealizations not of this sort can have explanatory capacities.

This paper examines geometrical arguments from Galileo's Mechanics and Two New Sciences to discern the influence of the Aristotelian Mechanical Problems on Galileo's dynamics. A common scientific procedure is found in the Aristotelian author's treatment of the balance and lever and in Galileo's rules concerning motion along inclined planes. This scientific procedure is understood as a development of Eudoxan proportional reasoning, as it was used in Eudoxan astronomy rather than simply as it appears in Euclid's Elements. Topics treated include the (...) significance of the circle in Galileo's demonstrations, the substitution of rectilinear elements for heterogeneous factors like weight and curvilinear distance, and the way in which elements of a motion are used to measure other elements of the same motion. The indirectness of Galileo's proofs, his conception of speed as relative and comparative, and the meaning of his concept of moment all come into clearer focus. Conclusions are drawn about Galilean idealization, and also about the contrast of literal versus figural modes of explanation in Galileo's science. (shrink)

Modern science relies heavily on Galilean idealization, which establishes ceteris paribus laws—laws about what happens when a factor operates unimpeded. But these laws are of little direct use since factors seldom do operate unimpeded. The follow‐up to Galilean idealization is abstraction—we talk simply of what the factor does. The best way to understand this abstraction is as an ascription of a capacity, not in terms of any kind of laws. Even the process of ‘de‐idealization’ or (...) of ‘concretization’ that results in a concrete phenomenological law inevitably involves further concepts in the capacity family. (shrink)

This paper examines geometrical arguments from Galileo's Mechanics and Two New Sciences to discern the influence of the Aristotelian Mechanical Problems on Galileo's dynamics. A common scientific procedure is found in the Aristotelian author's treatment of the balance and lever and in Galileo's rules concerning motion along inclined planes. This scientific procedure is understood as a development of Eudoxan proportional reasoning, as it was used in Eudoxan astronomy rather than simply as it appears in Euclid's Elements. Topics treated include the (...) significance of the circle in Galileo's demonstrations, the substitution of rectilinear elements for heterogeneous factors like weight and curvilinear distance, and the way in which elements of a motion are used to measure other elements of the same motion. The indirectness of Galileo's proofs, his conception of speed as relative and comparative, and the meaning of his concept of moment all come into clearer focus. Conclusions are drawn about Galilean idealization, and also about the contrast of literal versus figural modes of explanation in Galileo's science. (shrink)

This concise book introduces nonphysicists to the core philosophical issues surrounding the nature and structure of space and time, and is also an ideal resource for physicists interested in the conceptual foundations of space-time theory. Tim Maudlin's broad historical overview examines Aristotelian and Newtonian accounts of space and time, and traces how Galileo's conceptions of relativity and space-time led to Einstein's special and general theories of relativity. Maudlin explains special relativity using a geometrical approach, emphasizing intrinsic space-time structure rather than (...) coordinate systems or reference frames. He gives readers enough detail about special relativity to solve concrete physical problems while presenting general relativity in a more qualitative way, with an informative discussion of the geometrization of gravity, the bending of light, and black holes. Additional topics include the Twins Paradox, the physical aspects of the Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction, the constancy of the speed of light, time travel, the direction of time, and more.Introduces nonphysicists to the philosophical foundations of space-time theory Provides a broad historical overview, from Aristotle to Einstein Explains special relativity geometrically, emphasizing the intrinsic structure of space-time Covers the Twins Paradox, Galilean relativity, time travel, and more Requires only basic algebra and no formal knowledge of physics. (shrink)

The modal-Hamiltonian interpretation belongs to the modal family of interpretations of quantum mechanics. By endowing the Hamiltonian with the role of selecting the subset of the definite-valued observables of the system, it accounts for ideal and non-ideal measurements, and also supplies a criterion to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable measurements in the non-ideal case. It can be reformulated in an explicitly invariant form, in terms of the Casimir operators of the Galilean group, and the compatibility of the MHI with (...) the theory of decoherence has been proved. Nevertheless, perhaps its main advantage in the eyes of a scientist is given by its several applications to well-known physical situations, leading to results compatible with experimental evidence. The purpose of this paper is to add a new application to the list: the case of optical isomerism, which is a central issue for the philosophy of physics and of chemistry since it points to the core of the problem of the relationship between physics and chemistry. Here it will be shown that the MHI supplies a direct and physically natural solution to the problem, a solution that does not require putting classical assumptions in “by hand.”. (shrink)

Husserl's (1970) discussion of "Galilean science" is often dismissed as naïvely instrumentalist and hostile to science. He has been explicitly criticized for misunderstanding idealization in science, for treating the lifeworld as a privileged conceptual framework, and for denying that science can in principle completely describe the world (because ordinary prescientific concepts are irreplaceable). I clarify Husserl's position concerning realism, and use this to show that the first two criticisms depend upon misinterpretations. The third criticism is well taken. Nevertheless, (...) this is consistent with Husserl's fundamental claim that the manifestations of things are important to discuss, but are inaccessible to empirical science. (shrink)

This book is a collection of essays on Husserl's _Crisis of European Sciences_ by leading philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last work has never received the attention its author's prominence demands. In the _Crisis_, Husserl considers the gap that has grown between the "life-world" of everyday human experience and the world of mathematical science. He argues that the two have become disconnected because we misunderstand our own scientific past—we confuse mathematical (...) idealities with concrete reality and thereby undermine the validity of our immediate experience. The philosopher's foundational work in the theory of intentionality is relevant to contemporary discussions of _qualia_, naive science, and the fact-value distinction. The scholars included in this volume consider Husserl's diagnosis of this "crisis" and his proposed solution. Topics addressed include Husserl's late philosophy, the relation between scientific and everyday objects and "worlds," the history of Greek and Galilean science, the philosophy of history, and Husserl's influence on Foucault. (shrink)

From Einstein’s quest for a unified field theory to Stephen Hawking’s belief that we “would know the mind of God” through such a theory, contemporary science—and physics in particular—has claimed that it alone possesses absolute knowledge of the universe. In a sweeping work of philosophical inquiry, originally published in French in seven volumes, Isabelle Stengers builds on her previous intellectual accomplishments to explore the role and authority of science in modern societies and to challenge its pretensions to objectivity, rationality, and (...) truth. For Stengers, science is a constructive enterprise, a diverse, interdependent, and highly contingent system that does not simply discover preexisting truths but, through specific practices and processes, helps shape them. She addresses conceptual themes crucial for modern science, such as the formation of physical-mathematical intelligibility, from Galilean mechanics and the origin of dynamics to quantum theory, the question of biological reductionism, and the power relations at work in the social and behavioral sciences. Focusing on the polemical and creative aspects of such themes, she argues for an ecology of practices that takes into account how scientific knowledge evolves, the constraints and obligations such practices impose, and the impact they have on the sciences and beyond. This perspective, which demands that competing practices and interests be taken seriously rather than merely tolerated, poses a profound political and ethical challenge. In place of both absolutism and tolerance, she proposes a cosmopolitics—modeled on the ideal scientific method that considers all assumptions and facts as being open to question—that reintegrates the natural and the social, the modern and the archaic, the scientific and the irrational. _Cosmopolitics I_ includes the first three volumes of the original work. _Cosmopolitics II_ will be published by the University of Minnesota Press in Spring 2011. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to argue for the cognitive unity of the mathematical results ascribed by ancient authors to Thales. These results are late ascriptions and so it is difficult to say anything certain about them on philological grounds. I will seek characteristic features of the cognitive unity of the mathematical results ascribed to Thales by comparing them with Galilean physics. This might seem at a first sight a rather unusual move. Nevertheless, I suggest viewing the process (...) of turning geometry into an axiomatic-deductive science as a process of idealization in mathematics that is parallel to the process of idealization in physics. In Kvasz I offered an epistemological reconstruction of the process of idealization in physics during the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. In the present paper I try to employ these epistemological insights in the process of idealization in physics and propose a reconstruction of the cognitive unity of the mathematical results ascribed to Thales, who can, on the basis of these ascriptions, be seen as one of the initiators of idealization in mathematics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Virtue of NonviolenceShyam RanganathanThe Virtue of Nonviolence. By Nicholas F. Gier. SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. Pp. xv + 222. Hardcover $50.00.The Virtue of Nonviolence is Nicholas F. Gier's second book in the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought, edited by the eminent Alfred North Whitehead scholar David Ray Griffin. It is a remarkable exercise in comparative philosophy (...) that attempts to come to terms with M. K. ("Mahatma") Gandhi's moral philosophy in light of the Chinese, European, and Indian traditions.According to Griffin, writing at the beginning of the present volume, Constructive Postmodernism, like the deconstructive, relativistic, and eliminative versions, takes a critical stand toward the modernist, Galilean-Cartesian-Baconian-Newtonian worldview and the associated ideal of a unitary (technologically supported) conception of human progress. Constructive Postmodernism departs from the alternative versions in its efforts to "overcome the modern worldview not by eliminating the possibility of worldviews (or 'metanarratives') as such, but by constructing a postmodern worldview through a revision of modern premises and traditional concepts in the light of inescapable presuppositions of our various modes of practice" (p. xiii). In the place of phenomenalism and the primary-secondary quality bifurcation of the modern period, constructive postmodernism embraces both non-sensory perception and organicism (p. xii). As a contributor to this series, Gier thus sets himself the project of explicating Gandhi's ethics as a species of Constructive Postmodernism.Gier opts to elaborate Gandhian, postmodern ethics in terms of early Buddhist thought (p. 3). This provocative option is motivated for Gier by his twin convictions, which he attempts to argue for throughout the book: (1) that a substance conception of self (characteristic of much Hindu and Jain thought) is not capable of explaining the moral cultivation and progress so essential to Gandhi's program (p. 6), and (2) the "Vedāntist philosophy, particularly the Advaita Vedānta with which Gandhi is usually associated, cannot support [an] action-context" ethics that emphasizes the dynamic importance of both theory and the facts on the ground—a program captured by Gandhi's idea of satyagraha (p. 3).Having stated the parameters of his project in his "Introduction," Gier in his first chapter, "Gandhi as a Postmodern Thinker," argues that "[a]lthough some evidence of a deconstructive postmodernism may be discerned, Gandhi is best allied with the constructive school of postmodernism" (p. 27). Of special interest in evaluating this book is Gier's observation that "if Gandhi is a postmodern thinker, Gandhi stands with Rāmānuja and Whitehead and not with Śaṅkara and Derrida," for Gandhi evokes models of organism absent in the thought of the latter two (p. 25)—an observation I shall return to later.In the second chapter Gier examines the Jain and "Hindu" view of ahiṁsā. Gier correctly notes the uncompromising, unpragmatic conception of ahiṁsā operative in Jain thought, which finds its highest realization in renunciation and not worldly [End Page 115] action—a position that Gier rightly contrasts with Gandhi's politically charged conception of ahiṁsā. This allows Gier to claim that the influence of Jainism on Gandhi's thought is "not as great as he or others have claimed" (p. 31). In contrast, Gier summarizes what he takes to be the "Hindu" view of ahiṁsā, based mainly on the Upaniṣads and Manu's Dharmaśāstra, which he supplements with an examination of the Bhagavad Gītā. Gier argues that from the Gītā Gandhi derives the "philosophy of active nonattachment" embodied in the doctrine of karma yoga. In the Hindu view, according to Gier, ahiṁsā is "relativized"—that is, its nature and scope are defined relative to social and ritual contexts and self-interest (e.g., ritual slaughter is an occasion when the general prohibition against killing is suspended in the context of "Hindu" ethics). However, Gandhi's conception of ahiṁsā is not relativized. Since it cannot be subsumed under a Jain conception, Gier suggests that we must look elsewhere—specifically to a Buddhist pragmatic ethics that would justify Gandhi's political conception, which allowed for the compromise of ahiṁsā for... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Virtue of NonviolenceShyam RanganathanThe Virtue of Nonviolence. By Nicholas F. Gier. SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. Pp. xv + 222. Hardcover $50.00.The Virtue of Nonviolence is Nicholas F. Gier's second book in the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought, edited by the eminent Alfred North Whitehead scholar David Ray Griffin. It is a remarkable exercise in comparative philosophy (...) that attempts to come to terms with M. K. ("Mahatma") Gandhi's moral philosophy in light of the Chinese, European, and Indian traditions.According to Griffin, writing at the beginning of the present volume, Constructive Postmodernism, like the deconstructive, relativistic, and eliminative versions, takes a critical stand toward the modernist, Galilean-Cartesian-Baconian-Newtonian worldview and the associated ideal of a unitary (technologically supported) conception of human progress. Constructive Postmodernism departs from the alternative versions in its efforts to "overcome the modern worldview not by eliminating the possibility of worldviews (or 'metanarratives') as such, but by constructing a postmodern worldview through a revision of modern premises and traditional concepts in the light of inescapable presuppositions of our various modes of practice" (p. xiii). In the place of phenomenalism and the primary-secondary quality bifurcation of the modern period, constructive postmodernism embraces both non-sensory perception and organicism (p. xii). As a contributor to this series, Gier thus sets himself the project of explicating Gandhi's ethics as a species of Constructive Postmodernism.Gier opts to elaborate Gandhian, postmodern ethics in terms of early Buddhist thought (p. 3). This provocative option is motivated for Gier by his twin convictions, which he attempts to argue for throughout the book: (1) that a substance conception of self (characteristic of much Hindu and Jain thought) is not capable of explaining the moral cultivation and progress so essential to Gandhi's program (p. 6), and (2) the "Vedāntist philosophy, particularly the Advaita Vedānta with which Gandhi is usually associated, cannot support [an] action-context" ethics that emphasizes the dynamic importance of both theory and the facts on the ground—a program captured by Gandhi's idea of satyagraha (p. 3).Having stated the parameters of his project in his "Introduction," Gier in his first chapter, "Gandhi as a Postmodern Thinker," argues that "[a]lthough some evidence of a deconstructive postmodernism may be discerned, Gandhi is best allied with the constructive school of postmodernism" (p. 27). Of special interest in evaluating this book is Gier's observation that "if Gandhi is a postmodern thinker, Gandhi stands with Rāmānuja and Whitehead and not with Śaṅkara and Derrida," for Gandhi evokes models of organism absent in the thought of the latter two (p. 25)—an observation I shall return to later.In the second chapter Gier examines the Jain and "Hindu" view of ahiṁsā. Gier correctly notes the uncompromising, unpragmatic conception of ahiṁsā operative in Jain thought, which finds its highest realization in renunciation and not worldly [End Page 115] action—a position that Gier rightly contrasts with Gandhi's politically charged conception of ahiṁsā. This allows Gier to claim that the influence of Jainism on Gandhi's thought is "not as great as he or others have claimed" (p. 31). In contrast, Gier summarizes what he takes to be the "Hindu" view of ahiṁsā, based mainly on the Upaniṣads and Manu's Dharmaśāstra, which he supplements with an examination of the Bhagavad Gītā. Gier argues that from the Gītā Gandhi derives the "philosophy of active nonattachment" embodied in the doctrine of karma yoga. In the Hindu view, according to Gier, ahiṁsā is "relativized"—that is, its nature and scope are defined relative to social and ritual contexts and self-interest (e.g., ritual slaughter is an occasion when the general prohibition against killing is suspended in the context of "Hindu" ethics). However, Gandhi's conception of ahiṁsā is not relativized. Since it cannot be subsumed under a Jain conception, Gier suggests that we must look elsewhere—specifically to a Buddhist pragmatic ethics that would justify Gandhi's political conception, which allowed for the compromise of ahiṁsā for... (shrink)

It is often thought that sensible qualities such as colours do not exist as properties of physical objects. Focusing on the case of colour, I discuss two views: the Galilean view, according to which colours do not exist as qualities of physical objects, and the naive view, according to which colours are, as our perception presents them to be, qualities instantiated by physical objects. I argue that it is far from clear that the Galilean view is better than (...) the naive view. Given the arguments in this paper, the naive view ought to be taken seriously. The discussion here appeals especially to theorists who, like Goff, are already convinced that the quantitative language of physical science fails to capture all qualities. (shrink)

I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non-ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non-ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.

Chomsky’s principle of epistemological tolerance says that in theoretical linguistics contradictions between the data and the hypotheses may be temporarily tolerated in order to protect the explanatory power of the theory. The paper raises the following problem: What kinds of contradictions may be tolerated between the data and the hypotheses in theoretical linguistics? First a model of paraconsistent logic is introduced which differentiates between week and strong contradiction. As a second step, a case study is carried out which exemplifies that (...) the principle of epistemological tolerance may be interpreted as the tolerance of week contradiction. The third step of the argumentation focuses on another case study which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance must not be interpreted as the tolerance of strong contradiction. The reason for the latter insight is the unreliability and the uncertainty of introspective data. From this finding the author draws the conclusion that it is the integration of different data types that may lead to the improvement of current theoretical linguistics and that the integration of different data types requires a novel methodology which, for the time being, is not available. (shrink)

A draft version of Chapter 11 of the edited volume 'Interpreting Bodies. Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics',. The Chapter is devoted to illustrating the group-theoretic approach to the issue of physical objects. In particular, the Chapter discusses the group-theoretic constitution of classical and quantum particles in the nonrelativistic case.

In this article, the author offers a discussion of the evidential role of the Galilean constant in the history of physics. The author argues that measurable constants help theories constrain data. Theories are engines for research, and this helps explain why the Duhem-Quine thesis does not undermine scientific practice. The author connects his argument to discussion of two famous papers in the history of economic methodology, Milton Friedman's 'Methodology of Positive Economics', which appealed to example of Galilean Law (...) of Fall in its argument; and Vernon Smith's 'Economics in the Laboratory'. While the author offers some criticism of Friedman and Smith, most of the article is a friendly reinterpretation of their insights. (shrink)

In this article, the author offers a discussion of the evidential role of the Galilean constant in the history of physics. The author argues that measurable constants help theories constrain data. Theories are engines for research, and this helps explain why the Duhem-Quine thesis does not undermine scientific practice. The author connects his argument to discussion of two famous papers in the history of economic methodology, Milton Friedman’s “Methodology of Positive Economics,” which appealed to example of Galilean Law (...) of Fall in its argument; and Vernon Smith’s “Economics in the Laboratory.” While the author offers some criticism of Friedman and Smith, most of the article is a friendly reinterpretation of their insights. (shrink)

We consider a space with Generalized Uncertainty Principle which can be obtained in the frame of the deformed commutation relations. In the space with GUP we have found transformations relating coordinates and times of moving and rest frames of reference in the first order over the parameter of deformation. In the non-relativistic case we find the deformed Galilean transformation which is rotation in Euclidian space–time. This transformation is similar to the Lorentz one but written for Euclidean space–time where the (...) speed of light is replaced by some velocity related to the parameter of deformation. We show that for relativistic particle in the space with GUP the coordinates of the rest and moving frames of reference satisfy the Lorentz transformation with some effective speed of light. (shrink)

We apply the Galilean covariant formulation of quantum dynamics to derive the phase-space representation of the Pauli–Schrödinger equation for the density matrix of spin-1/2 particles in the presence of an electromagnetic field. The Liouville operator for the particle with spin follows from using the Wigner–Moyal transformation and a suitable Clifford algebra constructed on the phase space of a (4 + 1)-dimensional space–time with Galilean geometry. Connections with the algebraic formalism of thermofield dynamics are also investigated.

The standard mathematical models in population ecology assume that a population's growth rate is a function of its environment. In this paper we investigate an alternative proposal according to which the rate of change of the growth rate is a function of the environment and of environmental change. We focus on the philosophical issues involved in such a fundamental shift in theoretical assumptions, as well as on the explanations the two theories offer for some of the key data such as (...) cyclic populations. We also discuss the relationship between this move in population ecology and a similar move from first-order to second-order differential equations championed by Galileo and Newton in celestial mechanics. (shrink)

This essay aims to disentangle various types of anti-realism, and to disarm the considerations that are deployed to support them. I distinguish empiricist versions of anti-realism from constructivist versions, and, within each of these, semantic arguments from epistemological arguments. The centerpiece of my defense of a modest version of realism - real realism - is the thought that there are resources within our ordinary ways of talking about and knowing about everyday objects that enable us to extend our claims to (...) unobservable entities. This strategy, the Galilean strategy, is explained using the historical example of the telescope. (shrink)

This essay aims to disentangle various types of anti-realism, and to disarm the considerations that are deployed to support them. I distinguish empiricist versions of anti-realism from constructivist versions, and, within each of these, semantic arguments from epistemological arguments. The centerpiece of my defense of a modest version of realism - real realism - is the thought that there are resources within our ordinary ways of talking about and knowing about everyday objects that enable us to extend our claims to (...) unobservable entities. This strategy, the Galilean strategy, is explained using the historical example of the telescope. (shrink)

Recent methodological debates regarding the place of feasibility considerations in normative political theory are hindered for want of a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier. To address this shortfall, I present an analysis of feasibility that generalizes the economic concept of a production possibility frontier and then develop a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier using the familiar possible worlds technology. I then show that this model has significant methodological implications for political philosophy. On the Target View, a political ideal (...) presents a long-term goal for morally progressive reform efforts and, thus, serves as an important reference point for our specification of normative political principles. I use the model to show that we can- not reasonably expect that adopting political ideals as long-term reform objectives will guide us toward the realization of morally optimal feasible states of affairs. I conclude by proposing that political philosophers turn their attention to the analysis of actual social failures rather than political ideals. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher develops the Galilean Strategy to defend realism against its many opponents. I explore the structure of the Galilean Strategy and consider it specifically as an instrument against constructive empiricism. Kitcher claims that the Galilean Strategy underwrites an inference from success to truth. We should resist that conclusion, I argue, but the Galilean Strategy should lead us by other routes to believe in many things about which the empiricist would rather remain agnostic. 1 Target: empiricism (...) 2 The Galilean Strategy 3 Strengthening the argument 4 Success and truth 5 Conclusion. (shrink)