The foundation scheme in set theory asserts that every nonempty class has an ∈\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\in $$\end{document}-minimal element. In this paper, we investigate the logical strength of the foundation principle in basic set theory and α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\alpha $$\end{document}-recursion theory. We take KP set theory without foundation as the base theory. We show that KP-\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} (...) \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$^-$$\end{document} + Π1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Pi _1$$\end{document}-Foundation + V=L\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$V=L$$\end{document} is enough to carry out finite injury arguments in α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\alpha $$\end{document}-recursion theory, proving both the Friedberg-Muchnik theorem and the Sacks splitting theorem in this theory. In addition, we compare the strengths of some fragments of KP. (shrink)

We generalize the construction of lattice-valued models of set theory due to Takeuti, Titani, Kozawa and Ozawa to a wider class of algebras and show that this yields a model of a paraconsistent logic that validates all axioms of the negation-free fragment of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.

We construct two recursive models of fragments of set theory. We also show that the fragments of Kripke-Platek set theory that prove -induction for -formulas have no recursive models but the standard model of the hereditarily finite sets.

We identify complete fragments of the simple theory of types with infinity and Quine’s new foundations set theory. We show that TSTI decides every sentence ϕ in the language of type theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s1⋯∃ylslθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables, s1>⋯>sl, and θ is quantifier-free, ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s⋯∃ylsθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables and θ is quantifier-free. This shows that NF decides every stratified sentence ϕ (...) in the language of set theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns distinct values to all of the variables y1,…,yl, ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns the same value to all of the variables y1,…,yl. (shrink)

It is proved that in a suitable intuitionistic, locally classical, version of the theory ZFC deprived of the axiom of infinity, the requirement that every set be finite is equivalent to the assertion that every ordinal is a natural number. Moreover, the theory obtained with the addition of these finiteness assumptions is equivalent to a theory of hereditarily finite sets, developed by Previale in "Induction and foundation in the theory of hereditarily finite sets." This solves some (...) problems stated there. The analysis is undertaken using for each of these results a limited fragment of the relevant theory. (shrink)

Given a model \ of set theory, and a nontrivial automorphism j of \, let \\) be the submodel of \ whose universe consists of elements m of \ such that \=x\) for every x in the transitive closure of m ). Here we study the class \ of structures of the form \\), where the ambient model \ satisfies a frugal yet robust fragment of \ known as \, and \=m\) whenever m is a finite ordinal in (...) the sense of \ Our main achievement is the calculation of the theory of \ as precisely \-\. The following theorems encapsulate our principal results:Theorem A. Every structure in \ satisfies \-\.Theorem B. Each of the following three conditions is sufficient for a countable structure \ to be in \: \ is a transitive model of \-\. \ is a recursively saturated model of \-\. \ is a model of \.Theorem C. Suppose \ is a countable recursively saturated model of \ and I is a proper initial segment of \ that is closed under exponentiation and contains \. There is a group embedding \ from \\) into \\) such that I is the longest initial segment of \ that is pointwise fixed by \ for every nontrivial \.\)In Theorem C, \\) is the group of automorphisms of the structure X, and \ is the ordered set of rationals. (shrink)

A theoretical development is carried to establish fundamental results about rank-initial embeddings and automorphisms of countable non-standard models of set theory, with a keen eye for their sets of fixed points. These results are then combined into a “geometric technique” used to prove several results about countable non-standard models of set theory. In particular, back-and-forth constructions are carried out to establish various generalizations and refinements of Friedman’s theorem on the existence of rank-initial embeddings between countable non-standard models of (...) the fragment \ + \-Separation of \; and Gaifman’s technique of iterated ultrapowers is employed to show that any countable model of \ can be elementarily rank-end-extended to models with well-behaved automorphisms whose sets of fixed points equal the original model. These theoretical developments are then utilized to prove various results relating self-embeddings, automorphisms, their sets of fixed points, strong rank-cuts, and set theories of different strengths. Two examples: The notion of “strong rank-cut” is characterized in terms of the theory \, and in terms of fixed-point sets of self-embeddings. (shrink)

By a classical theorem of Harvey Friedman, every countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of a sufficiently strong fragment of ZF has a proper rank-initial self-embedding j, i.e., j is a self-embedding of $\mathcal {M}$ such that $j[\mathcal {M}]\subsetneq \mathcal {M}$, and the ordinal rank of each member of $j[\mathcal {M}]$ is less than the ordinal rank of each element of $\mathcal {M}\setminus j[\mathcal {M}]$. Here, we investigate the larger family of proper initial-embeddings j of models $\mathcal {M}$ of fragments (...) of set theory, where the image of j is a transitive submodel of $\mathcal {M}$. Our results include the following three theorems. In what follows, $\mathrm {ZF}^-$ is $\mathrm {ZF}$ without the power set axiom; $\mathrm {WO}$ is the axiom stating that every set can be well-ordered; $\mathrm {WF}$ is the well-founded part of $\mathcal {M}$ ; and $\Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $ is the full scheme of dependent choice of length $\alpha $.Theorem A.There is an $\omega $ -standard countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\mathrm {ZF}^-+\mathrm {WO}$ that carries no initial self-embedding $j:\mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$ other than the identity embedding.Theorem B.Every countable $\omega $ -nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\ \mathrm {ZF}$ is isomorphic to a transitive submodel of the hereditarily countable sets of its own constructible universe $L^{\mathcal {M}}$.Theorem C.The following three conditions are equivalent for a countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\mathrm {ZF}^{-}+\mathrm {WO}+\forall \alpha \ \Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $. There is a cardinal in $\mathcal {M}$ that is a strict upper bound for the cardinality of each member of $\mathrm {WF}$. $\mathrm {WF}$ satisfies the powerset axiom.For all $n \in \omega $ and for all $b \in M$, there exists a proper initial self-embedding $j: \mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$ such that $b \in \mathrm {rng}$ and $j[\mathcal {M}] \prec _n \mathcal {M}$. (shrink)

This is an introductory paper to a series of results linking generic absoluteness results for second and third order number theory to the model theoretic notion of model companionship. Specifically we develop here a general framework linking Woodin’s generic absoluteness results for second order number theory and the theory of universally Baire sets to model companionship and show that (with the required care in details) a $$\Pi _2$$ -property formalized in an appropriate language for second order number (...) theory is forcible from some $$T\supseteq \mathsf {ZFC}+$$ large cardinals if and only if it is consistent with the universal fragment of T if and only if it is realized in the model companion of T. In particular we show that the first order theory of $$H_{\omega _1}$$ is the model companion of the first order theory of the universe of sets assuming the existence of class many Woodin cardinals, and working in a signature with predicates for $$\Delta _0$$ -properties and for all universally Baire sets of reals. We will extend these results also to the theory of $$H_{\aleph _2}$$ in a follow up of this paper. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a theory of finite sets FST with a strong negation of the axiom of infinity asserting that every set is provably bijective with a natural number. We study in detail the role of the axioms of Power Set, Choice, Regularity in FST, pointing out the relative dependences or independences among them. FST is shown to be provably equivalent to a fragment of Alternative Set Theory. Furthermore, the introduction of FST is motivated in (...) view of a non-standard development. MSC: 03E30, 03E35. (shrink)

Frege's Grundgesetze was one of the 19th century forerunners to contemporary set theory which was plagued by the Russell paradox. In recent years, it has been shown that subsystems of the Grundgesetze formed by restricting the comprehension schema are consistent. One aim of this paper is to ascertain how much set theory can be developed within these consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze, and our main theorem shows that there is a model of a fragment of the Grundgesetze (...) which defines a model of all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of the power set axiom. The proof of this result appeals to G\"odel's constructible universe of sets, which G\"odel famously used to show the relative consistency of the continuum hypothesis. More specifically, our proofs appeal to Kripke and Platek's idea of the projectum within the constructible universe as well as to a weak version of uniformization (which does not involve knowledge of Jensen's fine structure theory). The axioms of the Grundgesetze are examples of abstraction principles, and the other primary aim of this paper is to articulate a sufficient condition for the consistency of abstraction principles with limited amounts of comprehension. As an application, we resolve an analogue of the joint consistency problem in the predicative setting. (shrink)

We study the long-standing open problem of giving$\forall {\rm{\Sigma }}_1^b$separations for fragments of bounded arithmetic in the relativized setting. Rather than considering the usual fragments defined by the amount of induction they allow, we study Jeřábek’s theories for approximate counting and their subtheories. We show that the$\forall {\rm{\Sigma }}_1^b$Herbrandized ordering principle is unprovable in a fragment of bounded arithmetic that includes the injective weak pigeonhole principle for polynomial time functions, and also in a fragment that includes the surjective (...) weak pigeonhole principle for FPNPfunctions. We further give new propositional translations, in terms of random resolution refutations, for the consequences of$T_2^1$augmented with the surjective weak pigeonhole principle for polynomial time functions. (shrink)

It is well known that number theory can be interpreted in the usual set theories, e.g. ZF, NF and their extensions. The problem I posed for myself was to see if, conversely, a reasonably strong set theory could be interpreted in number theory. The reason I am interested in this problem is, simply, that number theory is more basic or more concrete than set theory, and hence a more concrete foundation for mathematics. A partial solution (...) to the problem was accomplished by WTN in [2], where it was shown that a predicative set theory could be interpreted in a natural extension of pure number theory, PN, (i.e. classical first-order Peano Arithmetic). In this paper, we go a step further by showing that a reasonably strong fragment of predicative set theory can be interpreted in PN itself. We then make an attempt to show how to develop predicative fragments of mathematics in PN.If one wishes to know what is meant by reasonably strong and fragment please read on. (shrink)

In this paper we consider some fragments of $$\textsf{IOpen}$$ (Robinson arithmetic $$\mathsf Q$$ with induction for quantifier-free formulas) proposed by Harvey Friedman and answer some questions he asked about these theories. We prove that $$\mathsf {I(lit)}$$ is equivalent to $$\textsf{IOpen}$$ and is not finitely axiomatizable over $$\mathsf Q$$, establish some inclusion relations between $$\mathsf {I(=)}, \mathsf {I(\ne )}, \mathsf {I(\leqslant )}$$ and $$\textsf{I} (\nleqslant )$$. We also prove that the set of diophantine equations solvable in models of $$\mathsf I (=)$$ (...) is (algorithmically) decidable. (shrink)

We consider fragments of uniform reflection for formulas in the analytic hierarchy over theories of second order arithmetic. The main result is that for any second order arithmetic theory $T_0$ extending $\mathsf {RCA}_0$ and axiomatizable by a $\Pi ^1_{k+2}$ sentence, and for any $n\geq k+1$, $$\begin{align*}T_0+ \mathrm{RFN}_{\varPi^1_{n+2}} \ = \ T_0 + \mathrm{TI}_{\varPi^1_n}, \end{align*}$$ $$\begin{align*}T_0+ \mathrm{RFN}_{\varSigma^1_{n+1}} \ = \ T_0+ \mathrm{TI}_{\varPi^1_n}^{-}, \end{align*}$$ where T is $T_0$ augmented with full induction, and $\mathrm {TI}_{\varPi ^1_n}^{-}$ denotes the schema of transfinite induction (...) up to $\varepsilon _0$ for $\varPi ^1_n$ formulas without set parameters. (shrink)

Fragments of Modernity provides a critical introduction to the work of three of the most original German thinkers of the early 20th century. In their different ways, all three illuminated the experience of the modern in urban life, whether in mid-19th-century Paris or in Berlin at the turn of the century or later as the vanguard city of the Weimar Republic. They related the new modes of experiencing the world to the maturation of the money economy (Simmel), the process of (...) rationalization of capital (Kracauer), and the fantasy world of commodity fetishism (Benjamin) - in each case focusing on those fragments of social experience that could best capture the sense of modernity.David Frisby is Reader in Sociology at Glasgow University. Fragments of Modernity is included in the series Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy. (shrink)

An ω-model (a model in which all natural numbers are standard) of the predicative fragment of Quine's set theory "New Foundations" (NF) is constructed. Marcel Crabbe has shown that a theory NFI extending predicative NF is consistent, and the model constructed is actually a model of NFI as well. The construction follows the construction of ω-models of NFU (NF with urelements) by R. B. Jensen, and, like the construction of Jensen for NFU, it can be used to (...) construct α-models for any ordinal α. The construction proceeds via a model of a type theory of a peculiar kind; we first discuss such "tangled type theories" in general, exhibiting a "tangled type theory" (and also an extension of Zermelo set theory with Δ 0 comprehension) which is equiconsistent with NF (for which the consistency problem seems no easier than the corresponding problem for NF (still open)), and pointing out that "tangled type theory with urelements" has a quite natural interpretation, which seems to provide an explanation for the more natural behaviour of NFU relative to the other set theories of this kind, and can be seen anachronistically as underlying Jensen's consistency proof for NFU. (shrink)

ABSTRACTCorrespondence and Shalqvist theories for Modal Logics rely on the simple observation that a relational structure is at the same time the basis for a model of modal logic and for a model of first-order logic with a binary predicate for the accessibility relation. If the underlying set of the frame is split into two components,, and, then frames are at the same time the basis for models of non-distributive lattice logic and of two-sorted, residuated modal logic. This suggests that (...) a reduction of the first to the latter may be possible, encoding Positive Lattice Logic as a fragment of Two-Sorted, Residuated Modal Logic. The reduction is analogous to the well-known Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski translation of Intuitionistic Logic into the S4 system of normal modal logic. In this article, we carry out this reduction in detail and we derive some properties of PLL from corresponding properties of First-Order Logic. The reduction we present is extendible to the case of lattices with operators, making use of recent results by this author on the relational representation of normal lattice expansions. (shrink)

Dialectic of Enlightenment is undoubtedly the most influential publication of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Written during the Second World War and circulated privately, it appeared in a printed edition in Amsterdam in 1947. "What we had set out to do," the authors write in the Preface, "was nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism." Yet the work goes far beyond a mere critique (...) of contemporary events. Historically remote developments, indeed, the birth of Western history and of subjectivity itself out of the struggle against natural forces, as represented in myths, are connected in a wide arch to the most threatening experiences of the present. The book consists in five chapters, at first glance unconnected, together with a number of shorter notes. The various analyses concern such phenomena as the detachment of science from practical life, formalized morality, the manipulative nature of entertainment culture, and a paranoid behavioral structure, expressed in aggressive anti-Semitism, that marks the limits of enlightenment. The authors perceive a common element in these phenomena, the tendency toward self-destruction of the guiding criteria inherent in enlightenment thought from the beginning. Using historical analyses to elucidate the present, they show, against the background of a prehistory of subjectivity, why the National Socialist terror was not an aberration of modern history but was rooted deeply in the fundamental characteristics of Western civilization. Adorno and Horkheimer see the self-destruction of Western reason as grounded in a historical and fateful dialectic between the domination of external nature and society. They trace enlightenment, which split these spheres apart, back to its mythical roots. Enlightenment and myth, therefore, are not irreconcilable opposites, but dialectically mediated qualities of both real and intellectual life. "Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology." This paradox is the fundamental thesis of the book. This new translation, based on the text in the complete edition of the works of Max Horkheimer, contains textual variants, commentary upon them, and an editorial discussion of the position of this work in the development of Critical Theory. (shrink)

Expropriation is a hotly debated issue in international investment law. This is the first study to provide a detailed analysis of its norm-theoretical dimension, setting out the theoretical foundations underlying its understanding in contemporary legal scholarship and practice. Jörg Kammerhofer combines a doctrinal discussion with a theoretical analysis of the structure of the law in this area, undertaking a novel approach that critically re-evaluates existing case-law and writings. His approach critiques the arguments for a single expropriation norm based on custom, (...) interpretation and arbitral precedents within international investment law, drawing also on generalist international legal thought, to show that both cosmopolitan and sovereigntist arguments are largely political, not legal. This innovative work will help scholars to understand the application of theory to investment law and help specialists in the field to improve their arguments. (shrink)

The view that plural reference is reference to a set is examined in light of George Boolos's treatment of second-order quantification as plural quantification in English. I argue that monadic second-order logic does not, in Boolos's treatment, reflect the behavior of plural quantifiers under negation and claim that any sentence that properly translates a second-order formula, in accordance with his treatment, has a first-order formulation. Support for this turns on the use of certain partitive constructions to assign values to variables (...) in a way that makes Boolos's reading of second-order variables available for a first-order language and, with it, the possibility of interpreting quantification in an unrestricted domain.A first-order theory, T(D), is developed on the basis of Boolos's treatment of simple plural definite descriptions extended to Richard Sharvy's general theory of definite plural and mass descriptions. I introduce a primitive predicate, o, for the relation of the referent of a singular description to that of its plural. If o is simply added to T(D), is definable in T(D), and the result is inconsistent. If o is added to a theory with axioms for the fragment of T(D) I call D-mereology, the result is a natural basis for the development of a pluralized Zermelo set theory. This theory, however, is inconsistent in an unrestricted domain, unless it is recast as a second-order theory of sets interpreted in Boolos's way. (shrink)

Let be the basic set theory that consists of the axioms of extensionality, emptyset, pair, union, powerset, infinity, transitive containment, Δ0‐separation and set foundation. This paper studies the relative strength of set theories obtained by adding fragments of the set‐theoretic collection scheme to. We focus on two common parameterisations of the collection: ‐collection, which is the usual collection scheme restricted to ‐formulae, and strong ‐collection, which is equivalent to ‐collection plus ‐separation. The main result of this paper shows that (...) for all, proves that there exists a transitive model of Zermelo Set Theory plus ‐collection, the theory is ‐conservative over the theory. It is also shown that (2) holds for when the Axiom of Choice is included in the base theory. The final section indicates how the proofs of (1) and (2) can be modified to obtain analogues of these results for theories obtained by adding fragments of collection to a base theory (Kripke‐Platek Set Theory with Infinity plus ) that does not include the powerset axiom. (shrink)

In recent years, the post-truth phenomenon has dominated public and political discourse. This article offers a functional analysis of its mechanisms based on the category of narrative. After providing a brief definition of post-truth as a conceptual foundation, I trace the meaning of the term ‘narrative’ in the works of Jean-François Lyotard, focusing on the elusive category of small narrative. Utilizing terms and concepts of contemporary narrative theory, I propose a general definition of cultural narrative and reconceptualize Lyotard’s petit (...) récit as a particular case of this superordinate category. Drawing on Lyotard’s phrase linguistics as set out in The Differend, I develop the category of epistemic sphere to analyze Donald Trump’s MAGA movement as an example of post-truth politics, the rise of populism and the epistemic fragmentation of society. (shrink)

The problem is addressed of establishing the satisfiability of prenex formulas involving a single universal quantifier, in diversified axiomatic set theories. A rather general decision method for solving this problem is illustrated through the treatment of membership theories of increasing strength, ending with a subtheory of Zermelo-Fraenkel which is already complete with respect to the ∀*∀ class of sentences. NP-hardness and NP-completeness results concerning the problems under study are achieved and a technique for restricting the universal quantifier is presented.

Foundations of Set Theory discusses the reconstruction undergone by set theory in the hands of Brouwer, Russell, and Zermelo. Only in the axiomatic foundations, however, have there been such extensive, almost revolutionary, developments. This book tries to avoid a detailed discussion of those topics which would have required heavy technical machinery, while describing the major results obtained in their treatment if these results could be stated in relatively non-technical terms. This book comprises five chapters and begins with a (...) discussion of the antinomies that led to the reconstruction of set theory as it was known before. It then moves to the axiomatic foundations of set theory, including a discussion of the basic notions of equality and extensionality and axioms of comprehension and infinity. The next chapters discuss type-theoretical approaches, including the ideal calculus, the theory of types, and Quine's mathematical logic and new foundations; intuitionistic conceptions of mathematics and its constructive character; and metamathematical and semantical approaches, such as the Hilbert program. This book will be of interest to mathematicians, logicians, and statisticians. (shrink)

Solovay proved (Israel J Math 25(3–4):287–304, 1976) that the propositional provability logic of any ∑2-sound recursively enumerable extension of PA is characterized by the propositional modal logic GL. By contrast, Montagna proved in (Notre Dame J Form Log 25(2):179–189, 1984) that predicate provability logics of Peano arithmetic and Bernays–Gödel set theory are different. Moreover, Artemov proved in (Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR 290(6):1289–1292, 1986) that the predicate provability logic of a theory essentially depends on the choice of a binumeration (...) of the theory which is used to construct the provability predicate. In this paper, we compare predicate provability logics of I∑ n ’s. For a binumeration α(x) of a recursive theory T, let PL α(T) be the predicate provability logic of T defined by α(x). We prove that for any natural numbers i, j such that 0 < i < j, there exists a ∑1 binumeration α(x) of some recursive axiomatization of I∑ i such that ${{\sf PL}_\alpha({\rm I \Sigma}_i) \nsupseteq \bigcap_{\beta(x)}{\sf PL}_\beta({\rm I \Sigma}_j)}$ and ${{\sf PL}_\alpha({\rm I \Sigma}_i) \nsubseteq \bigcup_{\beta(x)}{\sf PL}_\beta({\rm I \Sigma}_j)}$ , where β(x) ranges over all ∑1 binumerations of recursive axiomatizations of I∑ j. (shrink)

Mathematics depends on proofs, and proofs must begin somewhere, from some fundamental assumptions. For nearly a century, the axioms of set theory have played this role, so the question of how these axioms are properly judged takes on a central importance. Approaching the question from a broadly naturalistic or second-philosophical point of view, Defending the Axioms isolates the appropriate methods for such evaluations and investigates the ontological and epistemological backdrop that makes them appropriate. In the end, a new account (...) of the objectivity of mathematics emerges, one refreshingly free of metaphysical commitments. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to give a purely logical proof of a result of Mostowski [1937] concerning the complete theories of a calculus based on classical propositional logic; and then modestly to generalize it. Mostowski’s result is announced by Tarski on p. 370 of Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics [1956]. (All references to Tarski’s work here are to this book.) Tarski himself provides only a fragment of a proof, and the proof published by Mostowski makes extensive use of topological (...) methods and results. The a proof offered here is undoubtedly longer than Mostowski’s and not by any means independent of it. But it should not be beyond the powers of anyone who has followed assiduously a couple of courses in propositional logic and knows a little set theory. The axiom of choice is assumed, but not the continuum hypothesis. (shrink)

The author discusses a number of issues in the theory of legal sources. The first topic is whether sources should be conceived of as acts or texts. The alternatives are connected with two competing theories of legal interpretation (viz., the cognitive theory and the sceptical theory), which entail different concepts of legal rules and law‐making. The second topic is whether a “formal” or a “material” criterion of recognition of sources should be preferred. The third section is devoted (...) to the analysis of rules of change. Four theories of rules of change are discussed, and five kinds of such rules are distinguished. The fourth section concerns judicial law‐making, with special reference to the creation of new legal rules by constitutional courts. (shrink)

A DO model (here also referred to a Paris model) is a model of set theory all of whose ordinals are first order definable in . Jeffrey Paris (1973) initiated the study of DO models and showed that (1) every consistent extension T of ZF has a DO model, and (2) for complete extensions T, T has a unique DO model up to isomorphism iff T proves V=OD. Here we provide a comprehensive treatment of Paris models. Our results include (...) the following:1. If T is a consistent completion of ZF+V≠OD, then T has continuum-many countable nonisomorphic Paris models.2. Every countable model of ZFC has a Paris generic extension.3. If there is an uncountable well-founded model of ZFC, then for every infinite cardinal κ there is a Paris model of ZF of cardinality κ which has a nontrivial automorphism.4. For a model ZF, is a prime model ⇒ is a Paris model and satisfies AC⇒ is a minimal model. Moreover, Neither implication reverses assuming Con(ZF). (shrink)

Here, we analyse some recent applications of set theory to topology and argue that set theory is not only the closed domain where mathematics is usually founded, but also a flexible framework where imperfect intuitions can be precisely formalized and technically elaborated before they possibly migrate toward other branches. This apparently new role is mostly reminiscent of the one played by other external fields like theoretical physics, and we think that it could contribute to revitalize the interest in (...) set theory in the future. (shrink)

We discuss several axiomatizations of set theory in first order predicate calculus with epsilon and a constant symbol W, starting with the simple system K(W) which has a strong equivalence with ZF without Foundation. The other systems correspond to various extensions of ZF by certain large cardinal hypotheses. These axiomatizations are unusually simple and uncluttered, and are highly suggestive of underlying philosophical principles that generate higher set theory.

Completed in 1983, this work culminates nearly half a century of the late Alfred Tarski's foundational studies in logic, mathematics, and the philosophy of science. Written in collaboration with Steven Givant, the book appeals to a very broad audience, and requires only a familiarity with first-order logic. It is of great interest to logicians and mathematicians interested in the foundations of mathematics, but also to philosophers interested in logic, semantics, algebraic logic, or the methodology of the deductive sciences, and to (...) computer scientists interested in developing very simple computer languages rich enough for mathematical and scientific applications. The authors show that set theory and number theory can be developed within the framework of a new, different, and simple equational formalism, closely related to the formalism of the theory of relation algebras. There are no variables, quantifiers, or sentential connectives. Predicates are constructed from two atomic binary predicates (which denote the relations of identity and set-theoretic membership) by repeated applications of four operators that are analogues of the well-known operations of relative product, conversion, Boolean addition, and complementation. All mathematical statements are expressed as equations between predicates. There are ten logical axiom schemata and just one rule of inference: the one of replacing equals by equals, familiar from high school algebra. Though such a simple formalism may appear limited in its powers of expression and proof, this book proves quite the opposite. The authors show that it provides a framework for the formalization of practically all known systems of set theory, and hence for the development of all classical mathematics. The book contains numerous applications of the main results to diverse areas of foundational research: propositional logic; semantics; first-order logics with finitely many variables; definability and axiomatizability questions in set theory, Peano arithmetic, and real number theory; representation and decision problems in the theory of relation algebras; and decision problems in equational logic. (shrink)

By a model of set theory we mean a Boolean-valued model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory allowing atoms (ZFA), which contains a copy of the ordinary universe of (two-valued,pure) sets as a transitive subclass; examples include Scott-Solovay Boolean-valued models and their symmetric submodels, as well as Fraenkel-Mostowski permutation models. Any such model M can be regarded as a topos. A logical subtopos E of M is said to represent M if it is complete and its cumulative hierarchy, as defined (...) by Fourman and Hayashi, coincides with the usual cumulative hierarchy of M. We show that, although M need not be a complete topos, it has a smallest complete representing subtopos, and we describe this subtopos in terms of definability in M. We characterize, again in terms of definability, those models M whose smallest representing topos is a Grothendieck topos. Finally, we discuss the extent to which a model can be reconstructed when its smallest representing topos is given. (shrink)

Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds [Cantor, 1883], which I will refer to as the Grundlagen, is Cantor’s first work on the general theory of sets. It was a separate printing, with a preface and some footnotes added, of the fifth in a series of six papers under the title of “On infinite linear point manifolds”. I want to briefly describe some of the achievements of this great work. But at the same time, I want to discuss (...) its connection with the so-called paradoxes in set theory. There seems to be some agreement now that Cantor’s own understanding of the theory of transfinite numbers in that monograph did not contain an implicit contradiction; but there is less agreement about exactly why this is so and about the content of the theory itself. For various reasons, both historical and internal, the Grundlagen seems not to have been widely read compared to later works of Cantor, and to have been even less well understood. But even some of the more recent discussions of the work, while recognizing to some degree its unique character, misunderstand it on crucial points and fail to convey its true worth. (shrink)

We strengthen a result of Harrington and Shelah by showing that, unless ω1 is an inaccessible cardinal in L, a relatively weak fragment of Martin's axiom implies that there exists a δ13 set of reals without the property of Baire.

Constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, CZF, can be interpreted in Martin-Löf type theory via the so-called propositions-as-types interpretation. However, this interpretation validates more than what is provable in CZF. We now ask ourselves: is there a reasonably simple axiomatization of the set-theoretic formulae validated in Martin-Löf type theory? The answer is yes for a large collection of statements called the mathematical formulae. The validated mathematical formulae can be axiomatized by suitable forms of the axiom of choice.The paper builds (...) on a self-interpretation of CZF IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2004 ]) that provides an “inner” model of CZF which also validates the so-called -axiom of choice, . The crucial technical step taken in the present paper is to investigate the absoluteness properties of this model under the hypothesis .It is also shown that CZF plus the -axiom of choice possesses the disjunction property, the numerical existence property and the existence property for an important group of formulae. (shrink)

LN , so f lies in the elementary submodel M'. Clearly co 9 M' . It follows that 6 = {f(n): n em} is included in M'. Hence the ordinals of M' form an initial ...