ABSTRACTThis article probes Jonathan Israel’s theory about ‘Radical Enlightenment’ inaugurating political modernity by way of explicating the thought of Joseph Priestley. In Israel’s view, despite the inconsistencies plaguing Socinian thought, Priestley, a monist, emerged as an ardent supporter of religious toleration and democratic republicanism. This article seeks to restore the fundamental coherence of Priestley’s theological and metaphysical views, arguing that they were produced as parts of a system founded on the simultaneous adherence to providentialism and necessitarianism. Prized as a prerequisite (...) of the unfolding of the divine plan, the unobstructed expression of religious opinions was the centre of the conception of civil society and civil liberty that Priestley articulated based on these premises and his forays into politics aimed to secure its permanence. A comparison of Priestley’s stance on the issue of manhood suffrage with that of Richard Price reveals not the materialist Priestley, but Price, a dualist, as an advocate of democratization and casts into doubt the applicability of Israel’s scheme in the case of England. The article closes with some suggestions towards reappraising the relationship between Enlightenment and modernity. (shrink)

Introduction -- General clarification of philosophical-scientific concepts -- Science and philosophy -- The analytic and synthetic methods -- The knowledge myth -- Observation and justification -- The soul as mystery -- The knowledge myth in psychology -- Conclusion -- Psychological experience -- Reality in science and philosophy -- Reality of psychological experience -- Conclusion -- Toward a science of the soul -- Verification -- Psychology and the body -- Psychology and the mind -- Psychology and the soul -- Conclusion -- (...) Meaning in psychological experience -- Observation -- Interpretation and formulation -- Conclusion -- Addenda : excerpts from notebooks and letters. (shrink)

Acceptance of elderly or marginal health individuals as kidney donors is debated, with practices varying between centres. Transplant recipients, live kidney donors and health-care professionals caring for patients with renal failure were surveyed regarding their views on live donor kidney transplantation (LDKT) of marginal health (diabetes, hypertension, atherosclerosis, obesity, etc.) and elderly donors. Participants were recruited within a tertiary renal and transplant centre and invited to participate in focus groups and structured interviews. They also completed an anonymous questionnaire. Of 464 (...) participants who completed the questionnaire (36% health-care professionals and 64% patients), 49% and 64%, respectively, stated that marginal and elderly donors should be accepted for LDKT. In the structured interviews, emphasis was given to presenting to donor, recipient and their respective families a calculated risk regarding the effect that either a nephrectomy or transplant has on long-term quality of life. Participants stated that an independent third party in addition to the transplant team should discuss involved risks. Issues of ‘how desperate’ the recipient's situation is should also be considered. Health-care professionals stated that regardless of the strength of will of an individual to donate a kidney (despite age, health problems or personal risk), they should always have the right to say ‘no’ if performing a specific LDKT was against their professional and ethical values. About half of those surveyed considered that marginal health and elderly donors were acceptable for LDKT. Emphasis was given to the explanation to donors and recipients of the risks involved in such transplantation. (shrink)

Recent years have seen widespread calls to transform food systems to address complex demands such as feeding a growing global population while reducing environmental impacts. But what is a food system and how can we most effectively work to change it? “Food System” can be found describing more limited dietary regimens as well as sector-specific supply chains going back to the 1930s, but its use to describe very large, dynamic, coupled socio-ecological systems gained traction in academic and civil society publications (...) in the 1990s and this use of the term has increased dramatically in recent years. When the influential food system actors from non-governmental organizations, foundations, consultancies, and the UN that this research focuses on talk about food systems, they seem to be talking about the same thing. Yet the interpretive flexibility of the concept obfuscates that people may have very different framings that may be deeply incompatible. Drawing from interviews, participant observation, and document analysis, this paper examines what food systems thinking does in terms of setting the stage for how we enact the food system and efforts to intervene in it. It reveals that rather than leading to more expansive understanding, the unexamined use of the concept food system might actually serve to sharpen divides. (shrink)

The most habitual and common use of the term natural corresponds to that which is – or could be – property of our experience, irrespective of whether that experience is mental or physical, viz. whatever can be known, perceived, determined and categorized by human mind, after it has bumped into and passed through the channels of our senses. The cooperation between our intellectual and sensual capabilities in relation to the usurpation of what is considered to be “natural”, is extremely crucial (...) for us to presume something as such, even if we are not familiar with – or sympathetic to – the duality of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge. That is inasmuch as the human mind, to be specific, is characterized by the intrinsic ability to conceive and contemplate on beings or events, which anything but belong to the natural order of things, beings such as Pegasus or the Valkyries, for instance, and counterfactual realities like the Purgatory or the Valhalla. (shrink)

The later Stoics, especially – and most notably – Posidonius of Apamea, allegedly the greatest polymath of his age and the last in a celebrated line of great philosophers of the ancient world, gradually developed the belief that all parts of the universe, either ensouled or not, were actually interconnected due to the omnipresent, corporeal, primordial kosmikon pyr which, according to Stoicism, pervades each being as the honey pervades the honeycomb. As for reasonable beings, in particular, kosmikon pyr takes the (...) form of logos. Due to that power, Posidonius believes, the phases of moon, for instance, can affect the succession of tides and ebb–tides; on the same grounds, the signs can have major effect on the course of events and, therefore, allow for divination. That kind of interconnectedness, apart from justifying the interdependentness of all beings to each other, testifies for an utter kinship between them, for sympatheia. In this short paper I intent to show that Posidonius’s approach has been promptly adopted and utilized by modern holistic theories concerning Environmental Ethics, especially by Arne Naess’s Deep Ecology and Ecosophy T, in the context of which notions such as kinship, interconnectedness, interdependentness and identification of all beings are key parameters for the articulation of their argumentation. I also intent to outline some essential – in my opinion – differences in the way Posidonius and Naess make use of the notion of interconnectedness, together with some inconsistencies which can be potentially fatal, at least as far as a system of ethics is concerned. This is because notions such as cosmic sympathy may possibly establish an interesting, even charming and influential cosmology or metaphysics, but when it comes to ethics, in my opinion, they can only provide shaky grounds for establishing a firm one, since they allow for deterministic views, which more or less leave no room for personal responsibility, to wit for personal praise or blame. (shrink)

The European ideals – as well as the idea of Europe per se – are faced with a serious challenge due to recent migration crisis: it is not just the reflexes, the effectiveness and the policies, but also the consistency, the principles and the justification of the notion of the European Union that is in stake. Kant’s concept of universal hospitality could probably provide a good way out of this conundrum: while hospitality has largely been viewed as a solidarity-related imperfect (...) duty towards others, that is, a less compelling duty that allows moral agents for certain latitude concerning the occasions and the degree of its implementation, Kant’s views allow for a totally different perspective, and, in my view, a much more philosophically nuanced one: hospitality might also be considered as an autonomy-based duty owed to others, and in this respect could count as a perfect, morally compelling duty. To the extent that the concept of Europe consists in humanitarian ideals that are based upon a strong philosophical humanistic tradition, I consider my claim to be in perfect harmony with the true spirit of Europe. (shrink)

We investigate a recent proposal for modal hypersequent calculi. The interpretation of relational hypersequents incorporates an accessibility relation along the hypersequent. These systems give the same interpretation of hypersequents as Lellman's linear nested sequents, but were developed independently by Restall for S5 and extended to other normal modal logics by Parisi. The resulting systems obey Došen's principle: the modal rules are the same across different modal logics. Different modal systems only differ in the presence or absence of external structural rules. (...) With the exception of S5, the systems are modular in the sense that different structural rules capture different properties of the accessibility relation. We provide the first direct semantical cut-free completeness proofs for K, T, and D, and show how this method fails in the case of B and S4. (shrink)

In his book, School Choice and Social Justice, Harry Brighouse attempts to show how a properly designed school–choice plan, guided by his liberal theory of social justice, can enhance equal educational opportunity and provide every child with an education for autonomy. In this paper, I argue that Brighouse is overly confident about the egalitarian potential of school choice. He seems to be defending a policy for what it could be, rather than looking at school choice for what it is: a (...) flawed educational reform that makes things worse in terms of social justice. I question Brighouse’s notion that the kind of school choice he advocates, one that promotes equal educational opportunity and education for autonomy, is politically feasible. (shrink)

Concerning abortion and infanticide, ethics has always seen to each one as quite puzzling an issue. The dilemma expectedly goes like this: “Are they morally good, permissible or acceptable, or are they not?” All three major approaches in ethics, viz. virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism, have fervently exerted themselves in order to settle both. A virtue ethicist is expected to approach the issue wondering: “Is performing abortion and infanticide indicative of virtues, to wit of character traits that the virtuous agent (...) possesses?” A deontologist would bring the dilemma up for discussion asking: “Is conducting abortion and infanticide in accordance with some moral rule or principle?” To an act utilitarian, on the other hand, the same question would strike as: “Do abortion and infanticide promote the best consequences, to wit those in which happiness is maximized?” All three approaches have been applied to the subject matter ever since the classic era, sadly with no remarkable success and, most of the times, even without the slightest suspicion of the promised rigor. (shrink)

Self destruction, inapprehensible an option as it might be, has been a challenging issue for philosophers and scholars since the dawn of time, forcing meditation into a vigorous and everlasting debate. The core question is: could suicide ever be deemed rational a choice? And if so, could it count as a moral alternative, if the circumstances call for it? The Stoics from Zeno up to Epictetus and Seneca regarded suicide as the ultimate resort, as the utmost opportunity for a rational (...) being to maintain his virtue, when all other bridges are burnt. For an act to be moral, it has to be deliberate, as well as the manifestation of an established evaluative hierarchy, however spontaneous and instantaneous might the latter be. In other words, a moral act is one that agents rationally opt for over other possible alternatives, on the subjective basis of their alleged best interests. Modern philosophers as Tom Beauchamp, Margaret Battin and Jacques Choron stress the criterion of rationality as a key issue regarding the ethics of suicide. Utilizing Rorty’s second definition of rationality, the article examines whether self destruction can be the outcome of proper evaluative assessment and deliberation, given that, as T. N. Pelegrinis suggests, such an evaluation seems to rest on a symmetry case, which might hardly be based on sound foundation. (shrink)

A Coletiva Corpos Insubmissos, grupo de pesquisadoras negras, tem entendido cada vez mais a importância de ocuparmos, de forma insubmissa, os lugares de fala, mas também de escrita, um universo bastante desafiador para nós, mulheres negras. Neste sentido, o texto que apresentamos nesta publicação nasce de uma entrevista-conversa realizada com Jess Oliveira em setembro de 2020. Nesse sentido, partindo da importância política da linguagem, dos diálogos transnacionais e da tradução para pensar a luta anticolonial, a Coletiva, entrevistou-conversou com Jess Oliveira (...) sobre a importância da autodefinição, o papel da linguagem, o processo de tradução e a importância das intelectuais negras na produção de práticas de insubmissão. (shrink)

The relation of Isocrates and Aristotle has mostly been defined by scholars as a competition or rivalry between them in a debate over the ends of rhetorical education. This essay investigates Isocrates-quotations in the Rhetoric of Aristotle and calls for a re-evaluation of the relation of Aristotle to Isocrates and to Demosthenes. Aristotle studied thoroughly the Isocratic speeches (especially Helena, Evagoras, Panegyricus, De pace, Antidosis, Philippus) and Isocrates is the only of the canon of ten Attic orators, who is quoted (...) regularly in the Rhetoric. For textual criticism the quotations of Aristotle should be used with caution, as Aristotle often quoted from memory, but his readings must not be excluded a priori. Aristotle recognizes the leading role of Isocrates as a master of literary prose in the development of rhetoric, particularly the epideictic speech. In Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics Isocrates, who exerts influence on the ethos of the reader, has a prominent position, unlike Demosthenes, who is characterized by his ability to arouse emotions. In this judgement political reasons (promacedonian - antimacedonian) are also visible. (shrink)

The role of autobiographical memory is not just to relate us to our past self, but also to shape the future self of ours by helping us navigate the complex world we encounter in our every-day lives on a stable basis: some more or less vivid idea of who we really are as persons, as individual beings with distinct selves and unique identities. In this sense memory has also to do with being and becoming, and not just with having been. (...) The advances in the field of memory neuroscience have resulted in what is called memory reconsolidation, that is, techniques to suppress, modify, or enhance certain memories that have to do with our moral identity and moral status. In this presentation I will discuss certain potential implications of memory reconsolidation that are in my view of key importance for neuroethics, and especially for the debate concerning moral identity, agency and status in the brand-new landscape that has been shaped by the novel capabilities neuroscience has made available. (shrink)

The most plausible line of anti-doping argumentation starts with the fact that performance enhancing substances are harmful and put at considerable risk the health and the life of those who indulge in the overwhelming promises these substances hold. From a liberal point of view, however, this is not a strong reason neither to morally reject doping altogether, nor to put a blanket ban on it; on the contrary, allowing adult, competent and informed athletes to have access to performance enhancement drugs (...) is often showcased as a liberty-related right of noninterference. In this article I will first discuss doping from the liberal point of view, especially in the light of the harm principle as it was introduced by Mill and elaborated by his successors, most notably by Joel Feinberg. Then I will examine whether – and to what degree – one’s decision to receive performance enhancement drugs would mean to use humanity in one’s own person only as a means, which would be self-defeating in the light of Kantian ethics. From this I will move one step backwards to what I consider as the core question concerning the ethics of doping, the one that is logically prior to any other in my view, and concerns the consistency of the thesis that doping may be compatible with sport. I will argue that there is an inherent logical antinomy between doing sport and using performance enhancement drugs, one that presents any argumentation in favor of doping as essentially self-contradictory. (shrink)

In this short paper I will discuss the ambiguous and, even, controversial term ‘right to die’ in the context of the euthanasia debate and, in particular, in the case of passive euthanasia. First I will present the major objections towards the moral legitimacy of a right to die, most of which I also endorse myself; then I will investigate whether the right to die could acquire adequate moral justification in the case of passive euthanasia. In the light of the Kantian (...) tradition I will argue that since rights are understood as based upon duties, the right to die should also presuppose a corresponding duty, which to me could be either an imperfect, solidarity-related duty, or an autonomy-related one, at least as far as the unwanted prolongation of life is concerned. I will conclude with the view that the right to die could actually be considered a legitimate one in the case of passive euthanasia, when the application of life-supporting techniques is against the wishes and the best interests of the patient. (shrink)

Classical Greek philosophy in its struggle to grasp the material world from its very beginning has been marked by the – sometimes undercurrent, some others overt and even intense, but never idle – juxtaposition between the mind and the senses, logos and perception or, if the anachronism is allowed, between realism and idealism. Parmenides is reportedly the first philosopher to insistently assert that thought and being are the same by his famous aphorism τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστί τε καὶ εἶναι, (...) and that the “way of truth”, as opposed to the “way of opinion”, only runs through the intellect, since the truth is unattainable by the illusory senses. Thus, true may be only what our intellect can firmly grasp, and – by an easy, though not equally sound step – vice versa: that which our intellect can firmly grasp is necessarily true. In this paper I intend to set off Parmenides’ apparent influence on Anselm with regard to the latter’s celebrated ontological argument concerning the existence of God, and the influence of both on Spinoza’s Ethica, which is founded on the key tenet that not only does God necessarily exist – since God is intellectually conceivable –, but that God also by necessity is an utterly good one. (shrink)

From Dawn till Dusk embraces the conceptual challenges often associated with Bioethics by taking the reader on a journey that embodies the circle of life and what it means to be human. The beginning and the end of life have always been an impossible riddle to humans. Bioethics does not aspire to unveil utter truths regarding the purpose of our existence; on the contrary, its task is to settle controversial issues that arise within this finite, very fragile and vulnerable life, (...) yet a life we still have to live. This book discusses thorny ethical issues that transcend time and are related to the dawn and the dusk of life: abortion and infanticide, genetic engineering, human reproductive cloning, the fear of death, rational suicide, and the right to die. The book's highest aspiration, though, is to both provide the reader with an opportunity to see the world from different perspectives and to showcase the irresistible charms of bioethical debates. (shrink)

Arguments concerning central issues of contemporary Medical Ethics often not only bear similarities, but also derive their sheer essence from notions which belong to the celebrated history of Ethics. Thus, argumentation pro euthanasia and assisted suicide which focus on the detainment of dignity and the ensuring of posthumous reputation on behalf of the moral agent is shown to echo stoic views on arête and the subordination of life to the primary human goal, namely the achievement of virtue. The progress made (...) in palliative care when seen alongside the — steadily increasing — requests for suicide, is indicative of the fact that, though pain now days can be effectively controlled, moral agents often consider the preservation of their life detrimental to the detainment of virtue or posthumous reputation. The stoic view is considered to justify elective death as a personal choice, but is deemed inadequate as well as inconsistent in the broader context of a coherent value theory. (shrink)

In the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, we created and implemented from November 2020 to February 2021 a monthly educational pilot program of philosophical management of stress based on Science, Humanism and Epicurean Pragmatism, which was offered to employees of 26 municipalities in the Prefecture of Attica, Greece. The program named “Philosophical Distress Management Operation System” (Philo.Di.M.O.S.) is novel and unique in its kind, as it combines a certain Greek philosophical tradition (Epicurean) that concurs with modern scientific knowledge. The (...) program was designed to be implemented in a period of crisis; therefore, it used a fast-paced, easy to learn and practice philosophical approach to stress management, based on cognitive psychotherapy. The philosophical approach to stress management has the advantage that it can be offered to most people, regardless of age and educational level. The pilot program was effective in achieving its objectives, shown by statistical comparisons of the trainees’ responses to anonymous questionnaires before and after the month-long training. The successful Philo.Di.M.O.S. program, thus, based on a solid scientific and philosophical basis, offers a paradigm of stress management during crises and could be useful in Greece and internationally. (shrink)

This article explores how Plato, in his “metaphysical” dialogues, sees the specific properties of motion (and especially of motion in music), which lend themselves to adaptation for the purposes of maintaining or restoring the health of the soul. Plato explores the property of regular or rhythmic motion in particular. The attention has been drawn to the analogy between the calming effect of music, at the human level, and the Demiurge’s achievement in willing the world into existence. The focus of the (...) article lays on the Laws, in which the principle of musical motion plays a central role in resolution of the contradictions between material and spiritual, natural and physiological, medical and educative. (shrink)

The organizational justice literature and the family business literature have developed independently, which limits our understanding of fairness and justice in the family business workplace. So far, the concepts of justice and fairness have been used interchangeably in the family business literature, as if objective measures that aim to increase justice in the workplace will automatically translate into fairness perceptions among family business employees. By integrating the organizational justice literature and the family business literature, we first differentiate between the two (...) concepts of justice and fairness and argue that a utilitarian conceptualization of justice may come into direct conflict with fairness perceptions in the family business workplace. Second, we shed light on the importance of incorporating socioemotional goals, particularly those that reveal a bright side of socioemotional wealth, into rules and regulations designed to increase justice in the workplace, which, we argue, contributes to increasing fairness perceptions among employees and to building and maintaining an ethical family business workplace. Theoretical and practical contributions are discussed at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Le dualisme de Braïlas (1812–1884) qui fut l’unique partisan de Victor Cousin (1792–1867) à avoir, après lui, constitué un système philosophique complet, est un dualisme modéré, du fait qu’en premier lieu, entre la matière et l’esprit, tout un groupe d’activités de la conscience humaine y est censé s’interpoler; qu’en deuxième lieu, le dogmatisme rationaliste braïlien est fondé sur une correspondance rigoureuse entre l’ordre universel et l’ordre rationnel, qui n’est guère dérangé que par l’intuition d’un ordre supérieur et plus parfait, conçu (...) et reproduit par l’imagination, grâce à des processus créationnels; et qu’en troisième lieu, la philosophie braïlienne, quant à ses caractères dominants, s’avère, surtout du point de vue épistémologique, non pas une application servile, mais, par contre, une considération critique des thèses de l’éclectisme cousinien. (shrink)

It is proposed that the rhetoric of the discourse on science and Buddhism exhibits an often non-deliberate predisposition to establish and perpetuate a kind of compartmentalization which consigns both science and Buddhism to two different and irrelevant to each other realms in the minds of the wider, general, and non-scientifically involved Western Buddhist population. This emerges non-deliberately, for the purpose of avoiding any essential influence between the two subjects, despite the sincerely expressed aims of the proponents of science— Buddhism complementarity (...) to avoid that separation. However, this paper will also argue for the importance of the continuation of science—Buddhism collaboration as this provides evidential instances of actually practicing the Buddhist emphatic belief in the importance of not separating the pursuit of knowledge from the aim of understanding, producing, and maintaining happiness. Indeed, it is the epistemological incompatibility between the two disciplines, and the compartmentalization effectuated by the notion of complementarity between them, that makes the Buddhist emphasis on attaching the aim of happiness to scientific pursuit all the more real, persuasive and potentially imitable. (shrink)

Reportedly ever since Pythagoras, but possibly much earlier, humans have been concerned about the way non human animals (henceforward “animals” for convenience) should be treated. By late antiquity all main traditions with regard to this issue had already been established and consolidated, and were only slightly modified during the centuries that followed. Until the nineteenth century philosophers tended to focus primarily on the ontological status of animals, to wit on whether – and to what degree – animals are actually rational (...) beings; accordingly they allowed – or denied – them some kind of moral standing. This modus operandi was for the first time seriously questioned by Jeremy Bentham, who put the issue on a different track. If the question, as Bentham suggested, is not if animals can think or speak, but if they can suffer1, then it seems plausible that moral agents ought to abstain from inflicting unnecessary suffering on animals; in other words, humans might have at least one – even limited – moral duty towards animals. And if this, in turn, is true, then animals should arguably be allowed the commensurate moral right, namely the right not to be inflicted unnecessary pain. Then, if animals possess this right, they could probably possess others, as well. This is how grosso modo the issue of animal rights became a pivotal part of the discussion concerning animal ethics. Bentham himself, of course, wouldn’t have gone that far; to him even the idea of human rights sounded like “simple… rhetorical nonsense upon stilts”.2 It was mostly due to his views, however, that the debate was moved from the way things actually are to the way things should ideally be – thus merging into what, in my view, should always have been: one primarily concerning ethics. (shrink)

I will discuss the prospect of pharmaceutically enhancing human morality and decision making in such a way as to eliminate morally unjustifiable choices and promote desirable ones. Our species in the relatively short period since it has emerged has enormously advanced in knowledge, science, and technical progress. When it comes to moral development, the distance it has covered is almost negligible. What if we could medically accelerate our moral development? What if we could once and for all render our species (...) totally immune to certain vices? I will examine whether pharmaceutically intervening in human morality would compromise the autonomy of moral agents. I will argue that the argument from the autonomy of the moral agent is neither stable nor convincing. In the light of Kantian ethics we might consider moral enhancement by pharmaceutical means to be a perfect duty for moral agents. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Ever since the debate concerning euthanasia was ignited, the distinction between active and passive euthanasia – or, letting die and killing – has been marked as one of its key issues. In this paper I will argue that a) the borderline between act and omission is an altogether blurry one, and it gets even vaguer when it comes to euthanasia, b) there is no morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if there is any, it seems to (...) favor active instead of passive euthanasia. Therefore, while the distinction between active and passive euthanasia might be meaningful in terms of description, if it is considered to be endowed with moral weight and used on purpose of justifying one type of euthanasia instead of the other, it becomes morally problematic and misleading. (shrink)