Your session will time out in 5 minutes. Tip: Save your search strategies for future use at Recent Searches. Your APA PsycNET session timed out because it was inactive for 30 minutes. Ellis, Willis D. (Ed). (1938). A source book of Gestalt psychology. (pp. 210-216). London.

Retold of Kālajñāna mattu tatvabōdhāmr̥ta by Kaivāra Nārēyaṇa, active 18th century-19th century; on the philosophy of life. Kannada novels contributed to art and culture of Karnataka.

Exhaustive study of philosophy of Advaita Vedanta with reference to Bhāmatī of Vācaspatimiśra, active 976-1000.

A dialogic commentary on the ethics of the sages (tractate avot).

The article explores the Israeli Supreme Court main judgment regarding the legality of the use of special interrogation methods in order extract information concerning future acts of terror. The Judgment's main conclusion was that while there might be a justification for using exceptional interrogation measures in order to save lives, based on the concept of lesser evil as embedded in the criminal defense of necessity, the government is nevertheless not authorized to use such means in the absence of explicit legislation (...) to that effect. The article presents and evaluates the Judgment, particularly the relation between the substantive moral questions involved and the aspect of authorization. (shrink)

We study the Medvedev degrees of mass problems with distinguished topological properties, such as denseness, closedness, or discreteness. We investigate the sublattices generated by these degrees; the prime ideal generated by the dense degrees and its complement, a prime filter; the filter generated by the nonzero closed degrees and the filter generated by the nonzero discrete degrees. We give a complete picture of the relationships of inclusion holding between these sublattices, these filters, and this ideal. We show that the sublattice (...) of the closed Medvedev degrees is not a Brouwer algebra. We investigate the dense degrees of mass problems that are closed under Turing equivalence, and we prove that the dense degrees form an automorphism base for the Medvedev lattice. The results hold for both the Medvedev lattice on the Baire space and the Medvedev lattice on the Cantor space. (shrink)

We show that there exists a real α such that, for all reals β, if α is linear reducible to β then β≤Tα. In fact, every random real satisfies this quasi-maximality property. As a corollary we may conclude that there exists no ℓ-complete Δ2 real. Upon realizing that quasi-maximality does not characterize the random reals–there exist reals which are not random but which are of quasi-maximal ℓ-degree–it is then natural to ask whether maximality could provide such a characterization. Such hopes, (...) however, are in vain since no real is of maximal ℓ-degree. (shrink)

Definition and Development of Ethics The word 'ethics' comes from the Greek word 'ethos' which means customs or behaviour. The adjectival form in Greek is ...

Study with reference to philosophy of Joseph F. Fletcher on christian ethics.

The term doctors' orders or physicians' orders is endemic to nurses' work, to the degree perhaps that few nurses give the term much thought. The nursing profession has progressed over its historical trajectory, from a level of considerable dependence upon physicians' directives, in its beginning, to much greater professional autonomy. However, the term order remains a stronghold in nurses' professional reality, despite the fact that this term is laden with anachronistic ideological interests that are embedded within the historical, sociopolitical and (...) gendered contexts in which health care occurs. In this essay I consider the term order through multiple philosophical and semantic lenses. I explore the endowment of power within the word order and how this term disadvantages nurses. I examine how the word order demarcates roles and establishes perceived value of the item represented by the originator of the order. The concept of doctors' orders carries powerful meanings, affirms the power‐as‐knowledge hierarchy so entrenched in the nurse–physician relationship, and can inhibit nurses' full participation as partners in health care. (shrink)

According to an influential and intuitively appealing argument, morality is usually continuous, namely, a gradual change in one morally significant factor triggers a gradual change in another; the law should usually track morality; therefore, the law should often be continuous. This argument is illustrated by cases such as the following example: since the moral difference between a defensive action that is reasonable and one that is just short of being reasonable is small, the law should not impose a severe punishment (...) when the action is almost reasonable and no punishment at all when the action is reasonable. In this Article, I consider two doubts regarding this argument. First, the premise that morality is continuous in such cases is incompatible with the common view that the moral status of actions is not continuous since there is an important difference between actions that are permissible and actions that are wrong— even if this difference is due to a difference that is very small, such as the one between an action whose consequences are the best and an action whose consequences are just slightly less good. This view extends also to the overall moral status of agents given the common assumption that it depends on the moral status of their actions. This is an important challenge that the Continuity Argument should confront. However, I argue that the best account of morality is more scalar than the common view in these respects. Therefore, I conclude that the first premise of the Continuity Argument is correct in this regard, although it is based on a minority view. The second doubt concerns the scope of the second premise: since there are reasons both in favor and against legal continuity, and the applicability and force of these reasons depend not only on various moral propositions but also on contingent non-moral facts, we often lack the evidence to determine the degree to which the law, at a certain place and time, should be continuous, and specifically that it should often be continuous. (shrink)

According to influential view, using the criminal law against innocent actions or agents is wrong. In this paper, I consider four related arguments against this view: a debunking argument that suggests that the intuitive appeal of this view may be due to a conflation of different ideas; a counterexamples argument that points out that there are many cases in which using the criminal law against innocent actions ("non mala" actions that are not even "mala prohibita") or agents is justified; a (...) theoretical argument, according to which the force of the reasons for and against using the criminal law is a matter of degree and it is therefore implausible to hold that the latter always defeat the former; and an analogy argument, which holds that it is implausible to maintain that harming innocents is often justified in other contexts but (almost) never in the context of the criminal law. (shrink)