Peut-on utiliser la dimension théâtrale pour penser les généalogies de Michel Foucault? Quelle est la valeur de vérité d’une histoire qui affirme être une « fiction » et procède par scènes, personnages, « dramatiques de la vérité »? Pour répondre à ces interrogations, le présent article utilise la notion de théâtre dans un sens anti-représentatif et expérientiel : comme un mouvement toujours recommencé d’action et de transformation. En questionnant les critiques de la méthode foucaldienne formulées par des historiens tels que (...) Carlo Ginzburg et Hayden White, nous montrerons comment Foucault mobilise dans ses textes une pensée-théâtre historique qui joue comme une arme de problématisation ironique des grands mythes de l’histoire elle-même. Le théâtre est pour Foucault un instrument pour mener une réflexion historico-politique sur la vérité en dehors des catégorisations et des moralisations traditionnelles de la philosophie et de la science occidentales. Mais la dramatisation philosophique du discours historique opérée par Foucault ne représente-elle pas alors le risque concret d’un dangereux relativisme intellectuel et politique : l’exemple parfait d’une « rhétorique » de l’histoire, qui sacrifie la vérité à l’efficacité de la parole? (shrink)

This article is a survey of familiar ground—those passages of the Poetics of Aristotle which throw light on the treatment of legend by the tragic poets. Although sweeping generalizations are often made on the use of the traditional stories in drama, our evidence on the subject is slight and inconclusive. We have little knowledge of the form in which most of the legends were known to the Attic playwrights, for the few we find in the Iliad and Odyssey appear there (...) in very different versions from those they take on in the plays, and the fragmentary remains of epic and lyric poetry between Homer and the fifth century B.C. present us with a wide field for speculation, but few certain facts; while vase paintings and other works of art supplement only here and there the scanty information gained from literature.The comments of ancient writers on this aspect of tragedy are surprisingly few, and carry us little farther. The Poetics stands out as the one source from which we can draw any substantial account of the matter. Even Aristotle, of course, is not directly concerned with the history of drama, and deals with it only incidentally in isolated passages; and in considering these it must constantly be borne in mind that he is discussing tragedy as he knew it in the late fourth century, for the benefit of fourth-century readers. But even so, his statements are the main foundation on which our view of the dramatists' use of legend must be built. (shrink)

This article is a survey of familiar ground—those passages of the Poetics of Aristotle which throw light on the treatment of legend by the tragic poets. Although sweeping generalizations are often made on the use of the traditional stories in drama, our evidence on the subject is slight and inconclusive. We have little knowledge of the form in which most of the legends were known to the Attic playwrights, for the few we find in the Iliad and Odyssey appear there (...) in very different versions from those they take on in the plays, and the fragmentary remains of epic and lyric poetry between Homer and the fifth century B.C. present us with a wide field for speculation, but few certain facts; while vase paintings and other works of art supplement only here and there the scanty information gained from literature.The comments of ancient writers on this aspect of tragedy are surprisingly few, and carry us little farther. The Poetics stands out as the one source from which we can draw any substantial account of the matter. Even Aristotle, of course, is not directly concerned with the history of drama, and deals with it only incidentally in isolated passages; and in considering these it must constantly be borne in mind that he is discussing tragedy as he knew it in the late fourth century, for the benefit of fourth-century readers. But even so, his statements are the main foundation on which our view of the dramatists' use of legend must be built. (shrink)

This article explores the ethical imperative to dramatise in the work of Georges Bataille and Gilles Deleuze, two of the most radical thinkers in twentieth-century philosophy, as a peculiar kind of askesis. Whereas askesis is often associated with asceticism or self-denial, in the sense of self-regulation and abstention, Bataille and Deleuze advocate training the self towards intensification of the liminal and extreme, which can rather be understood as a denial of self – its dissolution or laceration. Few attempts have been (...) made to compare their work, even though both share a commitment to resisting the closures that bind our desires and inhibit our full participation in and confrontation with the ebbs and flows of an impersonal, immanent life. Through careful consideration and comparison of their work, I argue that both offer important methods for engendering modalities of ecstatic being characterised by sensitivity to immanence, which have important ramifications for our ability to address phenomena of ethical indifference and resist the constrictions of social control mechanisms that decimate our political imaginations and inhibit our resolve to invent a different future. In the final sections, I interrogate the differences in their invocation of affect and art. (shrink)

How does Plato view his philosophical antecedents? Plato and his Predecessors considers how Plato represents his philosophical predecessors in a late quartet of dialogues: the Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Politicus and the Philebus. Why is it that the sophist Protagoras, or the monist Parmenides, or the advocate of flux, Heraclitus, are so important in these dialogues? And why are they represented as such shadowy figures, barely present at their own refutations? The explanation, the author argues, is a complex one involving (...) both the reflective relation between Plato's dramatic technique and his philosophical purposes, and the very nature of his late philosophical views. For in these encounters with his predecessors we see Plato develop a new account of the principles of reason, against those who would deny them, and forge a fresh view of the best life - the life of the philosopher. (shrink)

The documentary genre is one of the audiovisual mechanisms with the greatest media efficiency in the transmission of reality. However, depending on the nature of the story, the construction of the textual and audiovisual discourse is altered. In this article, we consider the following questions: Is the documentary a format that is faithful to reality? What modifications does the discourse undergo so that the story is enhanced? To go deeper into this aspect, we intend to analyse the different elements that (...) make up the documentary discourse in its transition from reality to fictionalised narrative. To this end, an inspection of the environmental dissemination documentary My Octopus Teacher (Netflix, 2020) will be carried out. An audiovisual proposal in which the coexistence between human and animal life turns environmental dissemination into a powerful instrument for transmitting scientific knowledge. (shrink)

In this ambitious and highly original study, McCabe presents an intricately structured argument designed to demonstrate Plato’s concern with fundamental issues of rationality and personhood. In doing so, she pursues themes announced in her Plato’s Individuals and in Form and Argument in Late Plato, a collection she co-edited with Christopher Gill. The development of her position via consideration of the philosophical importance of characterization and the dialogue form in the Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus leads her to focus in particular (...) on Plato’s depiction of his predecessors. These include, firstly, the Theaetetus’s Protagoras and Heraclitean flux theorists and the Sophist’s Parmenides and materialist giants, all “mean-minded opponents” whose views threaten the very possibility of rational inquiry. Refutation of them, accordingly, is Plato’s means of establishing certain basic principles of reason. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 115-116 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Plato and His Predecessors: The Dramatisation of Reason Mary Margaret McCabe. Plato and His Predecessors: The Dramatisation of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 318. Cloth, $59.95. This book originated with the W. B. Stanford Memorial Lectures delivered at Trinity College, Dublin in 1996. In it Mary Margaret (...) McCabe considers a "late quartet" of Platonic Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus. Her main task is expressly to consider how Plato viewed his philosophical predecessors, particularly Protagoras, Parmenides, and Heraclitus. McCabe argues that the key to understanding how Plato viewed his predecessors lies in the way they are presented dramatically in her late quartet. There they appear as "shadowy figures" with no voice of their own, unable to defend themselves against the arguments put to them by the main speakers, and it is by dramatizing their self-refuting position (for that is what their inability to defend themselves reveals) that Plato develops his most mature account of the principles of reason. In this way, McCabe argues, the dialogue form remains significant to Plato even in his latest works. The dramatic presentation of the dialogues in the late quartet only appears unnecessary if we focus on the relation between the main speaker and interlocutor. If we focus instead on the discussions between Plato and his predecessors, and understand the dialectical role of self-refutation, we can see how the dialogue form remains important. McCabe thus shows how her three main themes--Plato's relation to Presocratic philosophy, his use of the dialogue form, and his views about the principles of reason--are interrelated. It is not clear, however, whether she achieves the full integration of these three themes. McCabe attends much more diligently and thoroughly to the theme about the principles of reason than to either of the other two themes. In this respect her work fits better into the context of philosophical analysis of Plato's views, rather than, say, into the context of historical or hermeneutical approaches.McCabe's analysis of the dramatic elements of the late quartet is, in fact, somewhat narrow. There are extant commentaries on all the dialogues of her late quartet that examine in far greater detail their settings, characterization, dramatic structure, dialectical development, and so on. To judge from these commentaries, it is not clear that the late quartet is dramatically inferior to Plato's early and middle dialogues or that the discussions between the main speaker and interlocutor take a back seat, aesthetically or philosophically, to the dialectic between Plato and his predecessors. But McCabe's aim is the more limited one of finding at least one philosophically compelling reason to favor the dialogue form. She finds it in the way that the "mean-spirited opponents" of Plato--Protagoras, Parmenides, and Heraclitus--show up holding theories that are incompatible with more general views they themselves hold about reason. The only way to defeat such an opponent, one might suggest, is dialectically, by getting them to refute themselves. This is indeed one of the things the late quartet of dialogues shows, and through it McCabe forces us to see the dialectical tactics of refutation that are prevalent in Plato's late dialogues.It is not clear, however, that the positive "principles of reason" Plato is reputed to be developing--"that we are persistent, continuant entities, whose intellectual concerns focus on consistency with oneself and thus disagreement with others; whose autonomy depends on our beliefs belonging to us... and whose best life is constituted by the proper structuring of those beliefs into the single and complete structure of systematic understanding" (289)--require a dramatic presentation, or why Plato should think they require such a presentation. Plenty of philosophical arguments have been made, and were made in ancient [End Page 115] times, about personal identity, rationality, autonomy, and eudaimonia entirely outside of the context of dialogue or drama. Here, in the case of positive advocacy of his principles of reason, it is more difficult to see a... (shrink)

Dramatisation d'un dialogue souhaite par Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz mais refuse par John Locke, les Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain mettent en scene Theophile et Philalethe: et Leibniz pouvait ainsi donner la replique a l'Essay concerning Human Understanding de Locke. Longtemps consideres comme la simple synthese de la philosophie leibnizienne, les Nouveaux Essais ne nous presentent-ils pas plutot le philosophe de Hanovre empruntant des pistes originales d'analyse et offrant des orientations epistemologiques plus marquees que dans toute autre de ses oeuvres? (...) S'interessant a l'Essay, Leibniz avait declare:...] j'ai fort medite moi-meme sur ce qui regarde les fondements de nos connaissances....] De toutes les recherches il n'y a point de plus importante, puisque c'est la clef de toutes les autres. Ce sont les tenants et les aboutissants de ce jugement de Leibniz, qui fixait ainsi - par anticipation - le propos des Nouveaux Essais, auxquels les auteurs ont ici consacre leurs analyses. (shrink)

This article revisits the case of Woody Allen’s mockumentary Zelig via Friedrich Nietzsche’s diagnostic of mimicry in The Gay Science. It argues that the case of the “human chameleon” remains contemporary for both philosophical and political reasons. On the philosophical side, I argue that the case of Zelig challenges an autonomous conception of the subject based on rational self-sufficiency by proposing a relational conception of the subject open to mimetic influences that will have to await the discovery of mirror neurons (...) in the 1990s in order to find an empirical confirmation. On the political side, I say that Zelig foregrounds the power of authoritarian leaders in the 1930s to cast a spell on both imitative crowds and publics in terms that provide a mimetic supplement to Hannah Arendt’s account of the “banality of evil”. The philosophical purchase of Zelig’s cinematic dramatization of a mimetic subject is that it reveals how the “inability to think” characteristic of the case of Eichmann rests on unnoticed affective principles constitutive of the all-too-human penchant for “mimicry” the film dramatises. Thus reframed, the human chameleon reflects the dangers of mimetic dispossessions that reached massive proportions in the past century and continue to cast a shadow on the present century. (shrink)

This paper begins with the lived accounts of emergency and critical care medical interventions in which an unhoused person is brought to the emergency department in cardiac arrest. The case is a dramatised representation of the extent to which biopolitical forces via reduction to bare life through biopolitical and necropolitical operations are prominent influences in nursing and medical care. This paper draws on the scholarship of Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, and Achille Mbembe to offer a theoretical analysis of the power (...) dynamics that influence the health care and death care of patients who are caught in the auspices of a neoliberal capitalist healthcare apparatus. This paper offers analysis of the overt displays of biopower over those individuals cast aside as generally unworthy of access to healthcare in a postcolonial capitalist system, in addition to the ways in which humans are reduced to ‘bare life’ in their dying days. We analyse this case study through Agamben's description of thanatopolitics, a ‘regime of death’, and the technologies that accompany the dying process, particularly in that of the homo sacer. Additionally, this paper illustrates the ways in which necropolitics and biopower are integral to understanding how the most advanced and expensive medical interventions make visible the political values of the healthcare system and how nurses and healthcare functions in these deathworlds. The purpose of this paper is to develop a greater understanding of biopolitical and necropolitical operations in acute and critical care environments, and to offer guidance to nurses in these spaces as they work to uphold ethical duties in a system that increasingly dehumanises. (shrink)

Rulers of all kinds, from feudal monarchs to democratic presidents and prime ministers, justify themselves to themselves through a variety of rituals, rhetoric, and dramatisations, using everything from architecture and coinage to etiquette and portraiture. This kind of legitimation - self-legitimation - has been overlooked in an age which is concerned principally with how government can be justified in the eyes of its citizens. In this book, Rodney Barker argues that at least as much time is spent by rulers legitimating (...) themselves in their own eyes, and cultivating their own sense of identity, as is spent in trying to convince ordinary subjects. Once this dimension of ruling is taken into account, a far fuller understanding can be gained of what rulers are doing when they rule. It can also open the way to a more complete grasp of what subjects are doing, both when they obey and when they rebel. (shrink)

The image-building of the political system through the public broadcasting corporation BRTn is analysed on the base of a content analysis of the political information in the television news during the period 1982-1991. The study shows that political coverage in the public television news is subject to actualisation, fragmentation, personifying, dramatisation and the introduction of entertainment-techniques. Political items are transferred to the back of the newsbroadcast and there is less room for interpretation of the facts. Journalists point out that (...) the attention for politics has diminished because the audience is less interested. However it is very likely that this is the result of the fact that the audience is uniformed because of the lack of information. In that way we enter a vicious circle that can only be broken through the media themselves. In order to achieve this, television shoud bring more interpretation and explanation of the facts. A parliamentary feature, incorporated in a current alfairs programme could attribute to this, but can do no miracles when commercial tendencies become stronger in the news itself. (shrink)

This article discusses the Australian government’s immigration policies in the context of the global refugee crisis in the years 2015–2016, as reflected and dramatised through the polemical novel b...

The current scientific and political discussion on the under‐representation of women within the Internet once again associates women with disinterest in technology in an essentialist manner. Gender‐specific attributions are unquestioningly transferred to the new media, and it is assumed that women behave in unfailing conformity with existing gender stereotypes. The intention of this paper is to show that gender research has to perform differentiated empirical studies of actual Internet use. Gender studies can then make a concrete contribution to the task (...) of overcoming the genderdifferentiated inequalities in the access to and the use of the Internet. I shall begin by briefly outlining the dilemma of gender studies in the technical area. In the second section I shall describe the reasons for the gender‐differentiated Internet access data, using quantitative Internet studies from the USA, calling for a de‐dramatisation of difference in this context. In the third section, I will overcome the dichotomous view of the digital divide and present a research framework for differentiated study of differing use habits and use requirements. This section illustrates that such an approach does not make the gender category superfluous, but challenges gender studies to present context‐related studies, in which individual behaviour may be interpreted in the context of gender symbols and structures. My fourth step will be to explain how the new possibilities of online research can and should be used to gain further understanding in the sense of differentiated study designs. Finally, I will finish with a short outlook where I am calling for an equal representation of all societal groups in the Internet and therefore for an empowerment particularly of women. (shrink)

The recent ‘nonhuman turn’ in the theoretical humanities and social sciences has highlighted the need to develop more ontological modes of theorising the ethical ‘responsibility’ of the human in its relational encounters with nonhuman bodies and materialities. However, there is a lingering sense in this literature that such an ethics remains centred on a transcendent subject that would pre-exist the encounters on which it is called to respond. In this essay, I explore how Gilles Deleuze's philosophy offers potential opening for (...) a more ontogenetic thinking of a ‘nonhuman ethics’. Specifically, I focus on how his theory of ‘individuation’ – conceived as a creative event of emergence in response to immanent ontological problems – informs his rethinking of ethics beyond the subject, opening thought to nonhuman forces and relations. I argue that if cinema becomes a focus of Deleuze's ethical discussions in his later work it is because the images and signs it produces are expressive of these nonhuman forces and processes of individuation, generating modes of perception and duration without ontological mooring in the human subject. Through a discussion of Verena Paravel and Lucien Castaing-Taylor's experimental film – Leviathan – I explore how the cinematic encounter dramatises different ethical worlds in which a multiplicity of nonhuman ‘points of view’ coexist without being reduced to a hierarchical or orienting centre that would unify and identify them. To conclude, I suggest that it is through the lens of an ethics of individuation that we can grasp the different sense of ‘responsibility’ alive in Deleuze's philosophy, one oriented not to the terms of the already-existing but rather to the nonhuman potential of what might yet come into being. (shrink)

Shows how Deleuze’s engagement with Stoicism produced many of his most singular and powerful ideas -/- Reveals a lasting influence on Gilles Deleuze by mapping his provocative reading of ancient Stoicism Unearths new possibilities for bridging contemporary philosophy and classics by engaging a vital yet recently rising area of scholarship: continental philosophy’s relationship to ancient philosophy Introduces the untranslated Stoic scholarship published by pre- and post-Deleuzian French philosophers of antiquity to the English-reading world -/- Deleuze dramatises the story of ancient (...) philosophy as a rivalry of four types of thinkers: the subverting pre-Socratics, the ascending Plato, the interiorising Aristotle and the perverting Stoics. Deleuze assigns the Stoics a privileged place because they introduced a new orientation for thinking and living that turns the whole story of philosophy inside out. -/- Ryan J. Johnson reveals Deleuze’s provocative reading of ancient Stoicism produced many of his most singular and powerful ideas. For Deleuze, the Stoics were innovators of an entire system of philosophy which they structured like an egg. Johnson structures his book in this way: Part I looks at physics (the yolk), Part II is logic (the shell) and Part III covers ethics (the albumen). Including previously untranslated French Stoic scholarship, Johnson unearths new possibilities for bridging contemporary and ancient philosophy. (shrink)

The only way to settle conclusively what any part of a language means is to discover the circumstances, both linguistic and non-linguistic, in which the speakers of the language are prepared to use it. This is not a new doctrine, but Wittgenstein gave it new life by dramatising the following question: If someone used an expression in a radically non-standard way, could anything he said about his state of mind convince us that he nevertheless meant it in a standard way? (...) To answer ‘No’ to this, and to generalize that answer, is to say that the last-resort criteria for what something means lie in the way in which it is used - a fairly plain statement which I shall call ‘the behavioural theory (of meaning)’ and with which I shall here have no quarrel at all. What I wish to do in the following pages is to consider the relationship between the behavioural theory and some aspects of the concept of proof. It is beyond dispute that one can be led, by one’s acceptance of certain premisses, to accept a certain conclusion. There is, though, a problem about the nature of this ‘leading’. On the one hand, it is usual to think of it as sometimes having the nature of a forcing: ‘If you say that, you are committed to admitting this also; you cannot accept the one and reject the other.’ On the other hand, the behavioural theory of meaning makes it difficult to see how there can possibly be such a relationship between the premisses and the conclusion of any proof. There are many ways of bringing out the apparent clash between the behavioural theory and the notion of logical forcing or committal. Perhaps the clearest of them arises from asking how there can be room for a concept of committal in a purely behavioural study. In this spirit, we might grant that our knowledge of some of the ways in which the parts of a language are used may lead us to expect to find certain sorts of further use and not others; and we could compare such expectations with those of an anthropologist who finds that a certain society has a matriarchal system of authority and then proceeds to investigate its inheritance laws.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Socrates' Trial and Conviction of the Jurors in Plato's ApologyDougal BlythI am going to argue in this paper that, in the three speeches constituting his Apology of Socrates, Plato presents the judicial proceedings that led to Socrates' execution as having precisely the opposite significance to their superficial legal meaning. This re-evaluation will lead to some reflections on the politics of Socrates' defence, and, similarly, on Plato's own aims in (...) writing the Apology. I want to show not only that the trial as portrayed demonstrates an inevitable dereliction of duty by the democratic jury, but also, more interestingly, that throughout the proceedings Socrates understands the meaning of the trial precisely in terms of his anticipation of the jurors' judicial incapacity.In the prooimion to his defence speech, Socrates requests that the jurors ignore his manner of speaking and concentrate on whether his case is just, "since this is a judge's virtue (), while that of a rhêtôr is to speak the truth" (18a5-6, cf. 35c2-5). We can gloss the expression "a judge's aretê" in this context as his function, or responsibility.1 Socrates claims that he, himself, fulfills his own responsibility as a defendant to tell the truth (17b4-c4, 33c1-2, cf. 34b5, 35b9-c2) in a speech that asserts his exemplary piety in Apollo's service and his beneficial influence on the Athenian youth. But if, in claiming that he is innocent of the charge, Socrates does tell the truth, then those jurors who thereupon convict him of impiety and corruption, and subsequently sentence him to death, have failed in their duty to judge rightly.My claim is that Socrates sees the trial as a test of the jurors' abilities. It is characteristic of Socrates to test people regarding their concern for virtue and justice, a habit to which he devotes extended discussion during his defence, even dramatising it provocatively in a central passage (29d7-e5) that I aim shortly to analyse in detail. Moreover, Socrates specifically withholds from the jury the title of dikastai or judges; he does finally award the title in his address following the sentence, but only to those who have voted [End Page 1] to acquit him (40a2-3).2 The possibility thus emerges that Socrates has treated the legal proceedings all along as a moral (and intellectual) test, or trial, of the empanelled jurors themselves, to see whether they are capable of the legal function to which they have been allotted. In that case, Socrates is putting on trial, not just those individual citizens, but the very legal system of democratic Athens.Socratic irony and truthfulnessBefore considering Socrates' own explicit judgement during those final remarks on the jurors' moral offence and punishment, I should first address briefly the issue of Socrates' irony. In the past, some writers have asserted that this irony involves him in not telling the truth about himself during his defence, in which case the jury might well have been justified in convicting him. Actually, there does seem to be a consensus among the more extended treatments of the Apology that have emerged during the last decade, at least on the point that Plato presents Socrates as committed to making as sincere an attempt at a defence of his case as is consistent with his philosophical commitment to virtue, and so to telling the truth.3I shall not re-argue this point in detail, but shall take it to be secured by two basic considerations: consistency with the Crito would require Socrates to recognise a legal obligation to make a sincere attempt at defence while his obligation to Apollo to continue his mission in Athens if possible would motivate that attempt with the goal of acquittal.4 Instead, I want to show what role irony does have in Socrates' defence, given that his principled law-abidingness requires him to attempt to persuade the jury, in accordance with truth and justice, that he is innocent (cf. 19a6-7, 18a7-b1, 18e5).Where Socrates acknowledges the obligation to defend himself, he remarks on the difficulty he faces, a difficulty that has resulted from the slander to which he has long... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Socrates' Trial and Conviction of the Jurors in Plato's ApologyDougal BlythI am going to argue in this paper that, in the three speeches constituting his Apology of Socrates, Plato presents the judicial proceedings that led to Socrates' execution as having precisely the opposite significance to their superficial legal meaning. This re-evaluation will lead to some reflections on the politics of Socrates' defence, and, similarly, on Plato's own aims in (...) writing the Apology. I want to show not only that the trial as portrayed demonstrates an inevitable dereliction of duty by the democratic jury, but also, more interestingly, that throughout the proceedings Socrates understands the meaning of the trial precisely in terms of his anticipation of the jurors' judicial incapacity.In the prooimion to his defence speech, Socrates requests that the jurors ignore his manner of speaking and concentrate on whether his case is just, "since this is a judge's virtue (), while that of a rhêtôr is to speak the truth" (18a5-6, cf. 35c2-5). We can gloss the expression "a judge's aretê" in this context as his function, or responsibility.1 Socrates claims that he, himself, fulfills his own responsibility as a defendant to tell the truth (17b4-c4, 33c1-2, cf. 34b5, 35b9-c2) in a speech that asserts his exemplary piety in Apollo's service and his beneficial influence on the Athenian youth. But if, in claiming that he is innocent of the charge, Socrates does tell the truth, then those jurors who thereupon convict him of impiety and corruption, and subsequently sentence him to death, have failed in their duty to judge rightly.My claim is that Socrates sees the trial as a test of the jurors' abilities. It is characteristic of Socrates to test people regarding their concern for virtue and justice, a habit to which he devotes extended discussion during his defence, even dramatising it provocatively in a central passage (29d7-e5) that I aim shortly to analyse in detail. Moreover, Socrates specifically withholds from the jury the title of dikastai or judges; he does finally award the title in his address following the sentence, but only to those who have voted [End Page 1] to acquit him (40a2-3).2 The possibility thus emerges that Socrates has treated the legal proceedings all along as a moral (and intellectual) test, or trial, of the empanelled jurors themselves, to see whether they are capable of the legal function to which they have been allotted. In that case, Socrates is putting on trial, not just those individual citizens, but the very legal system of democratic Athens.Socratic irony and truthfulnessBefore considering Socrates' own explicit judgement during those final remarks on the jurors' moral offence and punishment, I should first address briefly the issue of Socrates' irony. In the past, some writers have asserted that this irony involves him in not telling the truth about himself during his defence, in which case the jury might well have been justified in convicting him. Actually, there does seem to be a consensus among the more extended treatments of the Apology that have emerged during the last decade, at least on the point that Plato presents Socrates as committed to making as sincere an attempt at a defence of his case as is consistent with his philosophical commitment to virtue, and so to telling the truth.3I shall not re-argue this point in detail, but shall take it to be secured by two basic considerations: consistency with the Crito would require Socrates to recognise a legal obligation to make a sincere attempt at defence while his obligation to Apollo to continue his mission in Athens if possible would motivate that attempt with the goal of acquittal.4 Instead, I want to show what role irony does have in Socrates' defence, given that his principled law-abidingness requires him to attempt to persuade the jury, in accordance with truth and justice, that he is innocent (cf. 19a6-7, 18a7-b1, 18e5).Where Socrates acknowledges the obligation to defend himself, he remarks on the difficulty he faces, a difficulty that has resulted from the slander to which he has long... (shrink)

A l'automne de 1534, alors que le débat religieux en France est dominé par l'interférence des doctrines luthériennes et sacramentaires, et soudainement dramatisé par l'" affaire des Placards ", Guillaume Budé - tout en jetant sur son temps un regard lucide et souvent prophétique - écrit le livre qui couronne une quête spirituelle de plus de vingt années, justifiant ainsi (au sens théologique du terme) sa propre vie intellectuelle et l'humanisme dont il est le champion. Ce " livre-testament ", tout (...) vibrant d'une éloquence tendue, somptueuse et savante, opère dans sa complexe écriture le transfert de toutes les ressources des lettres profanes (dont le mot hellénisme est l'indice) au christianisme. Alchimie de la culture, alchimie du verbe. (shrink)

A l'automne de 1534, alors que le débat religieux en France est dominé par l'interférence des doctrines luthériennes et sacramentaires, et soudainement dramatisé par l'" affaire des Placards ", Guillaume Budé - tout en jetant sur son temps un regard lucide et souvent prophétique - écrit le livre qui couronne une quête spirituelle de plus de vingt années, justifiant ainsi (au sens théologique du terme) sa propre vie intellectuelle et l'humanisme dont il est le champion. Ce " livre-testament ", tout (...) vibrant d'une éloquence tendue, somptueuse et savante, opère dans sa complexe écriture le transfert de toutes les ressources des lettres profanes (dont le mot hellénisme est l'indice) au christianisme. Alchimie de la culture, alchimie du verbe. (shrink)

The period we are living through is one of restoration, reminiscent of the 1930s. In a bellicose atmosphere that has proved conducive to an unstable reassertion of imperialism, we have seen a renewed dramatisation of questions of demography and migration, leading to an ethnicisation of social and political relations. Though Europe actually has a structural need of a migrant labour-force, its States have instituted a differential management in dealing with questions of race, depending on the origins of the migrants (...) and the nature of the jobs involved. The result has been to reduce vast numbers of migrants to the condition of illegal, clandestine workers, while operating as a powerful factor in the aggravated exploitation of labour and, in some instances, as a factor in the collective criminalisation of migrants. What Europe’s former Nation-States are thus witnessing, is the emergence of a citizen-foreigner duality which both occludes and perverts the structure of class relations. (shrink)

A key moment in the development of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition is signaled by the introduction, during the discussion of the asymmetric synthesis of the sensible, of the concepts of spatium and intensive quantities. The description of the characteristics of this field of individuation and the type of entities that inhabit it is necessary for thinking the relationship between the differential elements that compose ideas and the state of affairs in which they become incarnated. In other words, in order to (...) define the passage between the virtual and the actual, it is necessary to make use of a “non-divisible transcendental principle” that works as a stage in which certain agents—the spatio-temporal dynamisms—play the role of the genetic principle behind extended reality and its quantitative and qualitative determinations. This dynamic process is what Deleuze calls “the method of dramatisation”. However, even if this reference to theater is crucial in the book’s conceptual economy, it is particularly obscure and elliptical. The aim of this article is to clarify the sense of this reference and the reach of the link between individuation and theater. To achieve this purpose, we will examine closely the use that Deleuze makes of some of Friedrich Hölderlin’s poetological categories in his description of the third passive synthesis of time. (shrink)

Fourteen enjoyable papers, from the Theoretical Archaeology Conference held in Oxford in December 2000, which reflect on the relationship between archaeology and the outside world' and investigate the meaning of archaeology to the general public and the relevance of archaeology to society. Essays examine the development of archaeology as a discipline through the medieval, Romantic and Post-Modern eras, looking, for example, at the treatment of archaeological themes in the works of Mary Shelley and Byron. Contributors also consider the impact of (...) Stonehenge on astronomical studies, the influence of Roman finds and sites, including Bath and Caerleon, on Edwardian jewellery and children's stories and the dramatisation of the Iceman's' discovery in a recent play. (shrink)

In Elephant , director Gus Van Sant dramatises a massacre at a suburban American high school in order to examine narrative cinema's ethical capacity to respond to that which resists being framed as a meaningful event. In the film, this stubborn stuff is experience shot through with contingency. Van Sant depicts acts of violence that are indiscriminate and, at best, ambiguously motivated, as well as school-day activities that appear coincidental and insignificant. This essay argues that the director aims to screen (...) contingency to mount a critique of conventional narrative film's terror of contingency, its anxious drive to convert all cinematic time to good, signifying use. It also argues that Van Sant complicates or crosses up this aim by constructing a self-reflexive text attuned to the inherent irresponsibility in assuming that radical contingency's dead time could be fully and faithfully animated on screen. While the film camera and a still camera used by a student photographer in the film shoot people with the ostensible aim of capturing contingency in all its otherness, both projects are, at the same time, linked, in complex ways, to the student killers who shoot people with the aim of eliminating all otherness. The film's recognition of its own drive to plot in a deadly fashion thus illustrates Van Sant's profound sensitivity to the challenges of responding responsibly to a time of terror and, more broadly, to the terrors of time. (shrink)

Silvio Berlusconi constitue un phénomène original, et même un cas unique, puisqu'il est le seul chef d'entreprise du secteur des médias qui accède, à deux reprises, aux fonctions de Premier ministre dans une grande démocratie. L'arrivée au pouvoir du dirigeant de la grande entreprise de la communication répond à la crise de la représentation politique et inaugure dans l'Europe latine, une «néo-politique». Comme toute figure symbolique, l'image de Berlusconi est ambivalente et ne peut laisser indifférente. Si Berlusconi suscite tant de (...) réactions d'adhésion ou de rejet, c'est parce qu'il inscrit toute son activité publique dans l'espace de l'image, de la séduction et de l'émotion, plus que dans le champ rationnel et traditionnel de la représentation politique. Il sait être l'ordonnateur du débat public en le dramatisant autour de clivages simplistes, notamment pour ou contre l'État, pour ou contre l'impôt... Il promeut ainsi une politique faite de passions et de croyances, comme dans une fiction télévisuelle. Le phénomène ne relève pas pour autant du populisme, voire du « télépopulisme ».Silvio Berlusconi represents an original phenomenon, or even a unique case, in that he is the only company manager from the world of media who twice rose to the office of Prime Minister in a major democracy. The coming to power of the manager of this large media firm is an answer to the crisis of political representation; it ushers in a "neo-policy" in Latin Europe. Like any symbolical figure, Berlusconi's image is ambivalent and cannot leave indifferent. If Berlusconi gives rise to so many reactions of support or rejection, that is because he places his whole public activity in the field of image, seduction and emotion rather than in the rational and traditional field of political representation. He knows how to organize public debate by dramatizing it around simplistic divides, such as for or against State, for or against taxes... Thus he promotes politics built on passions ans beliefs, as in a television fiction. For all that, the phenomenon does not fall into populism, nor even into "telepopulism". (shrink)

La philosophie de Souriau a pour objet ce qu’il appelle les existences virtuelles, un mode d’existence fragile et précaire qui concerne tout processus d’instauration. Ces virtualités sont en état d’abaliété, elles existent « en et par autre chose », de manière relationnelle et indéterminée. Ces particularités ontologiques posent un problème de connaissance : celui de connaître de telles singularités, aussi appelées « âmes ». De nouveaux outils, issus de l’esthétique, accompagnent la connaissance. La fiction et la dramatisation viennent jouer (...) un rôle épistémique. Les êtres de fiction, qui existent selon un mode spécifique d’existence, font naître un sentiment esthétique, qui devient la base créatrice de la philosophie et de la connaissance. (shrink)

Poetics of futurism: Zaum, shiftology, nonsense -- Poetics of Deleuze: structure, stoicism, univocity -- The materialist manifesto -- Shiftology #1: from performativity to dramatisation -- Shiftology #2: from metaphor to metamorphosis -- The see-sawing frontier: linguistic spatiotemporalities -- Concllusion: Suffixing, prefixing.

Gilles Deleuze tells us that philosophical problems ‘compelled’ him to look to the cinema for answers, but he doesn’t tell us what those problems are. In this thesis I argue that the problems in question turn on the foundational role that Henri Bergson’s critique of the cinematographic illusion plays in the development of Deleuze’s ontological conception of difference – specifically in his 1956 essay “Bergson’s Conception of Difference.” The consequence of Bergson’s characterisation of human thought, perception and language as cinematographic (...) in their orientation is that any philosophy that seeks to grasp being in its own terms must overcome or surpass the human to do so. This necessity plays itself out across the Deleuzian oeuvre in diverse formulations in relation to the Nietzschean themes therein. In doing so, however, the human is ‘left behind,’ such that Peter Hallward is able to contend that the human and properly human concerns have no place in Deleuzian philosophy. My argument is that Deleuze turns to the cinema to think through the question of the human relation to being, on the basis of difference as such. Deleuze argues that the essence of the cinema is to be free of the cinematographic illusion - it ‘thinks’ in terms of real difference first of all. On that basis, it is able deduce the genesis of that illusion, and of the cinematographic orientation of human being and thought. The classical cinema dramatises the history of philosophy insofar as it remains subject to the cinematographic illusion and subordinates time to movement, but the modern cinema reverses this subordination in terms that do not ‘overcome’ or ‘surpass’ the human, but rather constitute its exposure to being as real difference. The modern cinema dramatises in turn the experience of what Kant calls the “fractured I,” which experiences its own thought not as spontaneity or power, but as time as the form of change. Deleuze’s Cinema books can thus be read as a response to the demands laid out in Solomon Maimon’s critique of Kant, locating the Cinema books and their treatment of the history of philosophy firmly in the context of Deleuze’s post-Kantian project. At the same time, the Cinema books thereby map out the relation of the human and properly human concerns to the difference of being as a creative and productive force that bears on those concerns without being reduced to them – the thought of being as the event of thought. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how the idea of self-rule is dramatised and articulated in the Protagoras and the Gorgias with respect to the apparently different treatments of hedonism. Looking at the former dialogue, I describe how the hedonist premise develops from a dramatic image of disorder, specifically the absence of self-rule. I then consider whether the evidence from that dialogue has any bearing on the Gorgias’ discussion of hedonism. I conclude that the Socratic rejection of hedonism in that text (...) is about the Calliclean abandonment of any concern for self-rule, an abandonment that actually masquerades as a commitment to self-rule. This analysis is used to present a more general account of what Socrates considers to be the capacities required for good citizenship. (shrink)

The landscape of sport shows conspicuous discursive and material disparities between the responses to openly violent on-field transgressors and the responses to other kinds of transgressor, most notably drug users. The former gets off significantly lighter in terms of ideological framing and formal punishment. The latter—and drug users in particular—are typically demonised and heavily punished, whilst the former are regularly lionised, dramatised, celebrated and punished less severely. The preceding disparities cannot be upheld from the standpoint of morality in general or (...) from that of a Broad Internalist sport ethic. Consideration of the consequences, actions, motives and vices involved in the respective categories fails to support them. Nor is support provided by the notion that sports are tests of the physical skills and virtues that the obstacles presented are designed to foster and promote, and behaviour that threatens the opportunity to exercise those excellences or have competitions determined by them should be the subject of critical moral scrutiny. Openly violent on-field transgression does not fare at all well by the yardstick of Broad Internalism. Robust investigation of and ultimate change in the values underpinning the disparities is warranted. (shrink)

Résumé Comment les institutions pensent-elles aujourd’hui ceux qu’elles administrent? Les discours de prévention en matière de santé depuis les années 1970 présupposent des capacités individuelles à l’autoévaluation : une introspection sans profondeur guidée par des représentants de l’État, et conjuguant jouissance du calcul et érotisation de l’autocontrôle. Mais, doublant cette gouvernementabilité libérale, l’intense dramatisation du récit de prévention depuis la fin des années 1990 signale le retour à une biopolitique plus impérieuse et plus conservatrice, axée sur une sacralisation laïque (...) de la vie. Celle-ci épaule une sédimentation de procédés gouvernementaux pourtant idéologiquement contrastés. (shrink)

Towards the end of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s fragment ‘The Triumph of Life’ there are some famous lines which raise most of the questions that will concern me in this essay. Never mind, for the moment, the context: the lines I have in mind are these: “I rose; and, bending at her sweet command, Touched with faint lips the cup she raised, And suddenly my brain became as sand “Where the first wave had more than half erased The track of deer (...) on desert Labrador, Whilst the fierce wolf from which they fled amazed “Leaves his stamp visibly upon the shore Until the second bursts—so on my sight Burst a new Vision never seen before.—1[…]Two kinds of things are happening here which I want to point out. The first is that even as the poem is attempting to represent the mind as passive and the experience of the mind as an empty succession of events, it is also making a quite contrary attempt to represent the mind as active and the succession as a structure. The lines dramatise how a play of mental events, as they are represented in language, may be reprocessed in such a way that some of them come to be classified as interruptions or breaks in the otherwise meaningful sequence composed by the others. As my first paraphrase suggested, it seems to make sense to recast Shelley’s narrative into the story of deer chased by a wolf, a story which is then interrupted by the wave which bursts on the shore and which threatens the coherence of the story by threatening to efface all sin that the deer have passed across the beach, have crossed the mind. 1. Percy Bysshe Shelley, ‘The Triumph of Life,’ in Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, ed. Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers , II. 403-11. The most illuminating reading of these lines is Paul de Man’s in The Rhetoric of Romanticism , pp. 99-100. John Barrell is professor of English at the University of Sussex and author of a number of books on literature and the visual arts, most recently Poetry, Language and Politics . The Infection of Thomas De Quincey and The Birth of Pandora will be published next year. (shrink)

Labor is both punishment and curse. At least this is what the mythical scenes of division and exclusion in Hesiod and in the Old Testament dramatise. At the same time they can be regarded as symptoms of misogyny. Without doubt, those two mythical scenes and the divine power to curse and sentence have held their spell over the economic tractates from antiquity to the modern period. How do the ancient writings of economic theory—and specifically Aristotle's Politics and Ethics —regulate female (...) Pleonexia on the one hand, and the limitless penal labor imposed on men on the other? How in turn do the economic tractates of the modern period—and here specifically John Locke's famous essays on the economy of labor—respond to the problem of female hybris on the one hand and the characteristical burden and suffering associated with labor on the other? What role does the differentiation and separation between free and unfree, productive and reproductive labor and, not least, the economic marginalisation of reproductive labor, play in this? And finally: In what way do »King Bee« and Queen Bee, Nurse Bee and Drone appear in this context as figures of an at once mythical and economic zoology, whose emblematic efficacy extends up to Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees ? (shrink)

Labor is both punishment and curse.At least this is what the mythical scenes of division and exclusion in Hesiod and in the Old Testament dramatise.At the same time they can be regarded as symptoms of misogyny.Without doubt, those two mythical scenes and the divine power to curse and sentence have held their spell over the economic tractates from antiquity to the modern period. How do the ancient writings of economic theory—and specifically Aristotle’s Politics and Ethics—regulate female Pleonexia on the one (...) hand, and the limitless penal labor imposed on men on the other? How in turn do the economic tractates of the modern period—and here specifically John Locke’s famous essays on the economy of labor—respond to the problem of female hybris on the one hand and the characteristical burden and suffering associated with labor on the other? What role does the differentiation and separation between free and unfree, productive and reproductive labor and, not least, the economic marginalisation of reproductive labor, play in this? And finally: In what way do »King Bee« and Queen Bee, Nurse Bee and Drone appear in this context as figures of an at once mythical and economic zoology, whose emblematic efficacy extends up to Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees? (shrink)

Philosophy and science fiction are two separate discourses that use counter-intuitive scenarios in two distinct ways. Where philosophy endeavours to ground counter-intuitive scenarios, science fiction as a transmedial fictional genre acts in a pragmatic and exploratory manner by seeking to imagine what it would be like if they were real. In this paper, I analyse David Cronenberg’s science fiction film eXistenZ, and defend two theses. The critical-theoretical thesis: Cronenberg thinks society is being gamified and seeks to dramatise the process of (...) gamification along with its pitfalls. The metaphysical thesis: Cronenberg’s diegetic world brings about a new articulation of the scepticism as an old philosophical problem. An attempt to excavate the metaphysical presuppositions of this work reanimates Cartesian interactionist dualism and Kantian transcendental idealism, as two well-known philosophical positions. (shrink)

The concept of suture has long been an important and controversial concept in investigations of the relationships between narrative, diegesis, character, and spectator. The dominant understanding of suture has paid more attention to its Lacanian derivation – and to the account given by Daniel Dayan – than to the work of Jean-Pierre Oudart which first introduced suture into Film Studies. This article, however, follows the recent work of George Butte, who argues that the way Oudart understands suture is very illuminating (...) for the study of the complex forms of intersubjectivity that cinema so readily, and so richly, dramatises – famously by means of shot/reverse shot figures. It argues that certain key moments in Ridley Scott's Alien activate ideas of corporeality, desire, and intersubjectivity in ways that contribute to a wider thematic and figurative nexus at work in the film directed at the exploration of impossible intersubjectivities. The article also proposes that, via this nexus, the film offers an intriguing instantiation of Nietzsche's notion of the “human, all too human”, thereby demonstrating that there is much more in Nietzsche of relevance to Alien than the xenomorph's superhuman “will-to-power”. The android Ash's admiration for the alien's lack both of conscience and consciousness ironically indicates his own all-too-human recognition of the superfluity but inescapability of his own consciousness. The article concludes by drawing briefly on the work of Stanley Cavell on acknowledgment, proposing that much of the horror of Alien lies not only in how bodies are ruptured but in the fact that some subjectivities cannot even be sutured. (shrink)

The narrated self: time and the dramatisation of historical agency -- The publication of the self: the sublimation of personal identity in publicity and art appreciation -- The disintegration of the self: the origins of abstraction and the de-objectification of the world -- The democratisation of the self: the integration of creative endeavour into the fabric of daily life and the death of art -- The trans-personalisation of the self: the material culture of communication and the communalisation of identity (...) -- The psychological self: the pathology of art and cinematographic modes of self-remembering -- The linguistic self: the de-verberation of the self and the end of meaning. (shrink)

The Magic of Unknowing is a unique philosophical and literary work. Cast in the dialogue form, it unfolds in the mood of soliloquy. Mervyn Sprung has created an imaginative meeting of the minds of great western philosophers: Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Pyrrho. All are brothers, the more skeptical sons of Aristotle. Later they hear as well from Chang, a Taoist, and Nagaraj, a Buddhist, both lately adopted into the family. The dialogue dramatises the erosion in modern times (...) of Aristotelian rationality under the pressures of its own logic. The two eastern thinkers throw the weight of their own skepticism into the discussion at the critical point. In the end the brothers realize that they have moved away from Western philosophy's faith in the singular power of reason to establish truth and sense in the human world. They discover the magic of unknowing that lies in the reciprocal penetration of knowledge and behavior, each receiving its sense from the other. They discover that philosophies are not the issue of reasoning alone but are themselves already inseparably thought and action. And they realise that this entails an unheard-of future for philosophy. (shrink)

Poetry of life in literature and through literature, and the vast territory in between - as vast as human life itself - where they interact and influence each other, is the nerve of human existence. Whether we are aware of it or not, we are profoundly dissatisfied with the stark reality of life's swift progress onward, and the enigmatic and irretrievable meaning of the past. And so we dramatise our existence, probing deeply for a lyrical and heartfelt yet universally valid (...) sense of our experience. It is in great works of literature that we seek those hidden springs that so move us. It is in honour of this search that this collection focuses on the creative imagination at work in literature and aesthetics. (shrink)

The late eighties and early nineties in Germany were not only marked by the fall of the Wall and German unification, but also by the dramatisation of the political issue of asylum, resulting in outbreaks of xenophobic violence. In the context of the asylum debate of the early nineties, a number of punk bands produced songs between 1991 and 1994 which criticise the xenophobic climate created by the asylum debate and undermine an exculpatory official discourse about the violent attacks. (...) The lyrics of these songs will be analysed as instances of counter-discourse emerging from a subcultural sphere that nurtures a critical distance from hegemonic public and political discourse, arguing that Critical Discourse Analysis should pay more attention to defiance of hegemonic discourse. (shrink)

The film Nosferatu (1922) has graffiti created by the character of the madman Knock on the walls of his cell. This motif, which I call the ‘madman’s wall’, has accompanied depictions of lunatics since the beginning of the eighteenth century. This article examines the origin, transformations and functions of this motif. The popularisation of the motif originates with the longitude diagram in the last plate of A Rake’s Progress (1735) by William Hogarth, which subsequently found its way into the works (...) of Hogarth’s plagiarists and influenced illustrations of asylum interiors in the first half of the nineteenth century. The madman’s wall also appears in literature, such as the popular novel The Father and Daughter (1801) by Amelia Opie, which was plagiarised and dramatised, and the legend of the poet Charles Smart, who allegedly wrote his poem on the walls of his cell. The main prerequisite for the madman’s wall is the dungeon-like image of the asylum—presenting it as a prison. It is usually the author of the graffiti who displays the signs of madness, not the wall itself. As society distanced itself from the image of the asylum as a dungeon, the madman’s wall disappeared after the 1850s. Paradoxically, many reports about the authentic wall art of asylum patients emerged in the press after the 1850s. The madman’s wall in Nosferatu is the first example after an approximately seventy-year absence and could be a product of the period interest of avant-garde artists in the art of the mentally ill. (shrink)