I argue that there exists a proportional relationship between degrees of moral culpability and degrees of probability, where the more an agent believes her actions will result in certain consequences, the more morally culpable she is for these consequences. I assert that this degree of probability is necessarily diminished by the existence of active supernatural powers. Consequently, agents who believe in such powers are less morally culpable than agents who do not.

Many widely divergent accounts of luck have been offered or employed in discussing an equally wide range of philosophical topics. We should, then, expect to find some unified philosophical conception of luck of which moral luck, epistemic luck, and luck egalitarianism are species. One of the attempts to provide such an account is that offered by Duncan Pritchard, which he refers to as the modal account. This view commits us to calling an event lucky when (...) it obtains in this world, but fails to obtain in a wide class of nearby possible worlds. In support of this account, Pritchard argues that a theory of luck ought to capture the fact that luck comes in degrees and that luck is closely associated with risk. I argue against this claim by suggesting that an understanding of luck grounded in considerations of probability is better able to satisfy these demands, and that the probability theory better explains exemplary cases of luck like those brought up by Pritchard. (shrink)

Clare, the titular character of The Time Traveller's Wife, reflects that "Everything seems simple until you think about it." This might well be a mantra for the whole of philosophy, but a fair few terms tend to stick out. "Knowledge", "goodness" and "happiness" for example, are all pervasive everyday terms that undergo significant philosophical analysis. "Luck", I think, is another one of these terms. Wishing someone good luck in their projects, and cursing our bad luck when success (...) seems so close to our reach or failure could have so easily been otherwise, happens so often that we rarely stop to reflect on what we really mean. Philosophical reflection on the nature of luck has a rich tradition, that is by no stretch confined to the Western philosophical canon. However, it has only very recently become one of the goals of philosophy to provide a clear account of what luck actually amounts to. This, in part, is the goal of this thesis. The thesis has two primary motivations. The first is to offer and defend a general account of luck that overcomes the problems faced by the current accounts of luck that are available in the current philosophical literature. The second is to apply this general account of luck to the areas of metaethics and epistemology where luck has been a pervasive and problematic concept, and demonstrate how this account of luck may resolve or further illuminate some of the problems that the notion has generated. The thesis is roughly split into two parts. The first half of the thesis focuses on the former objective of offering an account of luck. Chapter 1 offers a selected history of the philosophy of luck that spans from the Ancient Greeks to the present day, so that we might properly situate the current work on luck as part of the broader historical importance of the concept. Chapter 2 will set out the major rival to the theory of luck that I will offer - the lack of control account of luck. LCAL has various iterations across the literature, but is most clearly articulated by Wayne Riggs and E.J. Coffman. Both Coffman and Riggs add and adapt their own conditions to LCAL specifically so that the account may overcome several problems that have been levied against it. These further conditions are not incompatible so, to provide the strongest lack of control account possible, I have combined them to form a lack of control account I have called Combined LCAL - LCAL. The latter part of the chapter pits LCAL against some of the problems that have been raised against LCAL. However, despite the efforts of both Riggs and Coffman, even LCAL fails to counter some of these objections. For these reasons I have rejected LCAL has a viable candidate for an account of luck. Chapter 3 sets out a modal account of luck, as argued for by Pritchard, where an event is lucky only if it occurs in the actual world, but not in a relevant set of nearby possible worlds. Here I further elaborate on how we should understand the modal distances using Lewisian possible world semantics, and what worlds should be taken into consideration when fixing the relevant set of nearby possible worlds. I argue that these relevant sets of worlds should be fixed according to the domain of inquiry of which the luck is being applied - this I call the type of luck. Examples of this is the current literature are resultant luck - the type of luck concerned with the results of our actions, and veritic luck - the type of luck concerned with the modal safety of our belief formation. Due to the multitude of types of luck across disciplinary areas, a general modal account of luck requires flexibility in what factors should fix the relevant sets of possible worlds. I achieve this by providing a [TYPE] function for the general modal account of luck, which is used as a mean of inserting the relevant fixing conditions for any domain of inquiry. Chapter 3, in a similar vein to Chapter 2, pits the general modal account of luck against some of the problems that have been levied against MAL, specifically the Buried Treasure problem raised by Lackey and the agent causation problem as raised by Levy. More successfully, the modal account offered stands up against these criticisms. For these reasons, the modal condition understood with the [TYPE] function and Lewisian semantics concerning modal distances, will be adopted to make up one half of the conditions for my account of luck. Chapter 4 will look at the second condition for an account of luck - the significance condition. The chapter will set out the reasons for adopting a significance condition at all, and some of the ways in which the condition has been articulated by Rescher, Pritchard and Ballantyne. All of these current views of the significance condition will be found wanting due to their inability to make sense of certain kinds of luck in specific normative domains. For example, Ballantyne's account of significance focuses on the interests of an agent, yet for certain types of moral luck, the interests of the agent are irrelevant. Instead, I propose a relativised significance condition, where the value of the event is relative to the value of the normative domain in which the luck is being ascribed. Epistemic luck requires a focus on the epistemic significance of the event for the agent, moral luck requires a focus on the moral or ethical significance of the event for the agent, and so on. This I call the kind of luck. Similar to the [TYPE] function for the modal condition for luck, the significance condition requires a [NORMATIVE DOMAIN] function where the relevant normative domain can be inserted depending on the kind of luck. This version of the significance condition will be conjoined with the modal condition as set out in Chapter 3 to form the correct general account of luck. Chapter 5 is the first chapter of the second half of the thesis that concerns applying the account of luck set out in part 1 to more specific domains of inquiry. Chapter 5 concerns moral luck, more specifically, resultant moral luck. Moral luck has traditionally been understood in terms of lack of control. This chapter looks at how Pritchard and Driver have attempted to understand moral luck using modal conditions. However, it is argued that these attempts would be more successful if we adopted the account of luck that I have offered in previous chapters. The chapter will go on to look at two possible problems that may be faced by this modal account of luck, and how it may resolve these problems. Chapter 6, the final chapter, looks at epistemic luck, specifically how the adoption of the modal account I have offered resolves a particular problem targeted at anti-luck epistemology by Ballantyne. The problem, Ballantyne argues, is that given that luck requires a significance condition, the degree of significance affects the degree of luck and that the degree of luck involved in our belief formation affects whether we are in a position to know the target proposition, that the result is that degree of significance affects our ability to know. For at least some instances of this - such as the aesthetic significance that we assign to the target proposition - the result will be that non-epistemic factors that have no relevance at all whether an agent is in a position to know will affect that agent's position to know. The resolution to this problem can be found in a two part solution. The first part is to demonstrate that any degree of veritic epistemic luck results in the agent failing to know. The second is that through the relativisation of the significance condition, any type of value will not affect an agent's position to know, only the epistemic value. With these two considerations in mind, the latter of which that can only be held through the adoption of the modal account of luck I have offered, the problem may be resolved. (shrink)

The concept of luck is important in various areas of philosophy. In this paper I argue that two prominent accounts of luck, the modal and the probabilistic account of luck, need to be combined to accommodate the various ways in which luck comes in degrees. I briefly sketch such a hybrid account of luck, distinguish it from two similar accounts recently proposed, and consider some objections.

The concept of luck is important in various areas of philosophy. In this paper, I argue that two prominent accounts of luck, the modal and the probabilistic account of luck, need to be combined to accommodate the various ways in which luck comes in degrees. I briefly sketch such a hybrid account of luck, distinguish it from two similar accounts recently proposed, and consider some objections.

Like many of his medieval successors, Peter Abelard offers principles for ranking sins. Moral self-knowledge, after all, requires that we recognize not justour sinfulness, but also the extent of our offense. The most important distinction among sins is that between venial and mortal sins: venial sinners show less contempt and may also be victims of bad moral luck, and so they are far less blameworthy. However, the subjective principle which Abelard uses to protect the venial sinner from blame appears (...) to have absurd consequences: some agents whom we intuitively find saintly turn out to be mortal sinners, while other agents whom we intuitively judge wicked turn out to be mere venial sinners. I argue that Abelard suggests promising replies to these objections, but these replies themselves depend on controversial views about moral psychology. (shrink)

Most people agree that murder is wrong. Yet, within computer games virtual murder scarcely raises an eyebrow. In one respect this is hardly surprising, as no one is actually murdered within a computer game. A virtual murder, some might argue, is no more unethical than taking a pawn in a game of chess. However, if no actual children are abused in acts of virtual paedophilia (life-like simulations of the actual practice), does that mean we should disregard these acts with the (...) same abandon we do virtual murder? In this paper I shall outline several arguments which attempt to permit virtual murder, whilst prohibiting virtual paedophilia. (shrink)

In this paper a new resolution to the gamer’s dilemma is presented. The first part of the paper is devoted to strictly formulating the dilemma, and the second to establishing its resolution. The proposed resolution, the grave resolution, aims to resolve not only the gamer’s dilemma, but also a wider set of analogous paradoxes – which together make up the paradox of treating wrongdoing lightly.

We prove that forp-optimal fields a cell decomposition theorem follows from methods going back to Denef’s paper [7]. We derive from it the existence of definable Skolem functions and strongp-minimality. Then we turn to stronglyp-minimal fields satisfying the Extreme Value Property—a property which in particular holds in fields which are elementarily equivalent to ap-adic one. For such fieldsK, we prove that every definable subset ofK×Kdwhose fibers overKare inverse images by the valuation of subsets of the value group is semialgebraic. Combining (...) the two we get a preparation theorem for definable functions onp-optimal fields satisfying the Extreme Value Property, from which it follows that infinite sets definable over such fields are in definable bijection iff they have the same dimension. (shrink)

In this paper I will evaluate Ali’s dissolution of the gamer’s dilemma. To this end the dilemma will be summarized and Ali’s dissolution formulated. I conclude that Ali has not dissolved the dilemma (at least not fully).

We study finitely generated free Heyting algebras from a topological and from a model theoretic point of view. We review Bellissima’s representation of the finitely generated free Heyting algebra; we prove that it yields an embedding in the profinite completion, which is also the completion with respect to a naturally defined metric. We give an algebraic interpretation of the Kripke model used by Bellissima as the principal ideal spectrum and show it to be first order interpretable in the Heyting algebra, (...) from which several model theoretic and algebraic properties are derived. In particular, we prove that a free finitely generated Heyting algebra has only one set of free generators, which is definable in it. As a consequence its automorphism group is the permutation group over its generators. (shrink)

Montefiore and Formosa (Ethics Inf Technol 24:31, 2022) provide a useful way of narrowing the Gamer’s Dilemma to cases where virtual murder seems morally permissible, but not virtual child molestation. They then resist the dilemma by theorising that the intuitions supporting it are not moral. In this paper, I consider this theory to determine whether the dilemma has been successfully resisted. I offer reason to think that, when considering certain variations of the dilemma, Montefiore and Formosa’s theory may not be (...) the most likely theory available to us. (shrink)

The Gamer’s Dilemma (Luck, 2009a) is a paradox concerning the moral permissibility of two types of acts performed within computer games. Some attempt to resolve the dilemma by finding a relevant difference between these two acts (Bartel, 2012; Patridge, 2013; Young, 2016; Nader, 2020; Kjeldgaard-Christiansen, 2020; and Milne & Ivankovic, 2021), or to dissolve the dilemma by arguing that the permissibility of these acts is not as they seem (Ali, 2015; Ramirez, 2020). More recently some have attempted to resist (...) the dilemma by undermining the intuitions supporting it (Montefiore & Formosa, 2022; Formosa et al., 2023). The purpose of this paper is to consider what might follow from such resistance. (shrink)

In this paper we consider whether Christopher Bartel has resolved the gamer’s dilemma. The gamer’s dilemma highlights a discrepancy in our moral judgements about the permissibility of performing certain actions in computer games. Many gamers have the intuition that virtual murder is permissible in computer games, whereas virtual paedophilia is not. Yet finding a relevant moral distinction to ground such intuitions can be difficult. Bartel suggests a relevant moral distinction may turn on the notion that virtual paedophilia harms women in (...) a way that virtual murder does not. We argue that this distinction is only in a position to provide a partial solution to the dilemma. (shrink)

Russell and Walker proposed different ways of constructing instants from events. For an explanation of "time as a continuum," Thomason favored Walker's construction. The present article shows that Russell's construction fares as well. To this end, a mathematical characterization problem is solved which corresponds to the characterization problem that Thomason solved with regard to Walker's construction. It is shown how to characterize those event structures (formally, interval orders) which, through Russell's construction of instants, become linear orders isomorphic to a given (...) (or, deriving, to some—nontrivial ordered) real interval. As tools, separate characterizations for each of resulting (i) Dedekind completeness, (ii) separability, (iii) plurality of elements, (iv) existence of certain endpoints are provided. Denseness is characterized to replace Russell's erroneous attempt. Somewhat minimal nonconstructive principles needed are exhibited, and some alternative approaches are surveyed. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 02, August 2022. Motivated by results of Bagaria, Magidor and Väänänen, we study characterizations of large cardinal properties through reflection principles for classes of structures. More specifically, we aim to characterize notions from the lower end of the large cardinal hierarchy through the principle [math] introduced by Bagaria and Väänänen. Our results isolate a narrow interval in the large cardinal hierarchy that is bounded from below by total indescribability and from above by subtleness, (...) and contains all large cardinals that can be characterized through the validity of the principle [math] for all classes of structures defined by formulas in a fixed level of the Lévy hierarchy. Moreover, it turns out that no property that can be characterized through this principle can provably imply strong inaccessibility. The proofs of these results rely heavily on the notion of shrewd cardinals, introduced by Rathjen in a proof-theoretic context, and embedding characterizations of these cardinals that resembles Magidor’s classical characterization of supercompactness. In addition, we show that several important weak large cardinal properties, like weak inaccessibility, weak Mahloness or weak [math]-indescribability, can be canonically characterized through localized versions of the principle [math]. Finally, the techniques developed in the proofs of these characterizations also allow us to show that Hamkin’s weakly compact embedding property is equivalent to Lévy’s notion of weak [math]-indescribability. (shrink)

Let p be prime number, K be a p‐adically closed field, a semi‐algebraic set defined over K and the lattice of semi‐algebraic subsets of X which are closed in X. We prove that the complete theory of eliminates quantifiers in a certain language, the ‐structure on being an extension by definition of the lattice structure. Moreover it is decidable, contrary to what happens over a real closed field for. We classify these ‐structures up to elementary equivalence, and get in particular (...) that the complete theory of only depends on m, not on K nor even on p. As an application we obtain a classification of semi‐algebraic sets over countable p‐adically closed fields up to so‐called “pre‐algebraic” homeomorphisms. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel view of the concept of cognitive enhancement by taking a population health perspective. We propose four main modifiable healthy lifestyle factors for optimal cognitive functioning across the population for which there is evidence of safety and efficacy. These include i) promoting adequate sleep, ii) increasing physical activity, iii) encouraging a healthy diet, including minimising consumption of stimulants, alcohol and other drugs including nicotine, iv) and promoting good mental health. We argue that it is not ethical (...) to promote or sanction the use of pharmaceutical drugs as putative cognitive enhancers without acknowledging the adverse effects on population cognitive health of failing to encourage the pursuit of healthy behaviours. We conclude with recommendations to increase the public health relevance of bioethical analyses of the cognitive enhancement debate. (shrink)

Let [Formula: see text] be an expansion of either an ordered field [Formula: see text], or a valued field [Formula: see text]. Given a definable set [Formula: see text] let [Formula: see text] be the ring of continuous definable functions from [Formula: see text] to [Formula: see text]. Under very mild assumptions on the geometry of [Formula: see text] and on the structure [Formula: see text], in particular when [Formula: see text] is [Formula: see text]-minimal or [Formula: see text]-minimal, or (...) an expansion of a local field, we prove that the ring of integers [Formula: see text] is interpretable in [Formula: see text]. If [Formula: see text] is [Formula: see text]-minimal and [Formula: see text] is definably connected of pure dimension [Formula: see text], then [Formula: see text] defines the subring [Formula: see text]. If [Formula: see text] is [Formula: see text]-minimal and [Formula: see text] has no isolated points, then there is a discrete ring [Formula: see text] contained in [Formula: see text] and naturally isomorphic to [Formula: see text], such that the ring of functions [Formula: see text] which take values in [Formula: see text] is definable in [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to evaluate a potential resolution to the gamer’s dilemma that arises from Gary Young’s metaethical theory of constructive ecumenical expressivism. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the gamer’s dilemma is reformulated as a paradox and the potential resolution is evaluated in light of this new formulation. Findings The author argues that this resolution does resolve the dilemma, but CEE itself has limited appeal. Originality/value This paper contributes to the growing scholarship dedicated to resolving the gamer’s dilemma.

Philosophers have made numerous and varied attempts to analyse the concept of a miracle. To the end, an assortment of necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth an instantiation of a miracle have been offered. In this paper we discuss one of the most common of these conditions - the violation restriction. This restriction holds that all miracles involve a violation of a law of nature.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 6, Page 44-45, June 2012.

One response to the existential threat posed by a super-intelligent AI is to design it to be friendly to us. Some have argued that even if this were possible, the resulting AI would treat us as we do our pets. Sparrow (AI & Soc. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-023-01698-x, 2023) argues that this would be a bad outcome, for such an AI would dominate us—resulting in our freedom being diminished (Pettit in Just freedom: A moral compass for a complex world. WW Norton & Company, (...) 2014). In this paper, I consider whether this would be such a bad outcome. (shrink)

In his book The Concept of Miracle and his paper ‘For the Possibility of Miracles’ Swinburne claims that there are no logical difficulties in supposing that there could be strong historical evidence for the occurrence of miracles. This claim is based on three assertions; two of which I demonstrate are only true contingently. In this paper I identify several logical difficulties regarding the possibility of attaining historical evidence for the occurrence of miracles. On the strength of these logical difficulties I (...) hope to demonstrate that there is sufficient reason to doubt Swinburne’s central claim. (shrink)

Let k be an infinite cardinal. A subset of $(^k k)^n $ is a $\Sigma _1^1 $ -subset if it is the projection p[T] of all cofinal branches through a subtree T of $(lt;kk)^{n + 1} $ of height k. We define $\Sigma _k^1 - ,\Pi _k^1 $ - and $\Delta _k^1$ subsets of $(^k k)^n $ as usual. Given an uncountable regular cardinal k with k = k (...) there is a shrink)

Miracles and the problem of evil are two prominent areas of research within philosophy of religion. On occasion these areas converge, with God’s goodness being brought into question by the claim that either there is a lack of miracles, or there are immoral miracles. In this paper I shall highlight a second manner in which miracles and the problem of evil relate. Namely, I shall give reason as to why what is considered to be miraculous may be dependent upon a (...) particular response to the problem of natural evil. To establish this claim, I shall focus upon Aquinas’s definition of a miracle and a particular free-will defence, the Luciferous defence. (shrink)

We study the influence of the existence of large cardinals on the existence of wellorderings of power sets of infinite cardinals κ with the property that the collection of all initial segments of the wellordering is definable by a Σ1‐formula with parameter κ. A short argument shows that the existence of a measurable cardinal δ implies that such wellorderings do not exist at δ‐inaccessible cardinals of cofinality not equal to δ and their successors. In contrast, our main result shows that (...) these wellorderings exist at all other uncountable cardinals in the minimal model containing a measurable cardinal. In addition, we show that measurability is the smallest large cardinal property that imposes restrictions on the existence of such wellorderings at uncountable cardinals. Finally, we generalise the above result to the minimal model containing two measurable cardinals. (shrink)

Philosophy of religion is focused chiefly on theism. Yet there are a growing number of new and alternative religious movements that would also benefit from philosophical scrutiny. This book is the first collection of philosophical essays, by a team of international authors, focusing on new and alternative religious movements. The book begins with an examination of the definition of new religious movements, before offering an introduction to, and an analysis of, core beliefs held by particular movements, including: Scientology, Raelianism, Siddha (...) Yoga, the Arica School, the Church of the Latter Day Saints, Pantheism, Digital Theology, New Atheism, and the Word of Faith movement. Contributors offer an analysis of one or more of the core tenets of the religious movement, providing readers with both an insight into the group, and the methodology of philosophy of religion. (shrink)

John Polkinghorne claims there are no real distinctions between general providence, special providence and miracle. In this paper I determine whether this claim could be true given Polkinghorne’s wider account of these types of divine action. I conclude that this claim could be true, but only given a particular reading of Polkinghorne. I then defend this reading in light of two potential objections.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to outline a case where people's intuitions regarding the ethical status of an action performed in a massively multiplayer online role‐playing game are divided, and provide an argument to resolve this division.Design/methodology/approachThis paper takes a philosophical approach, from the analytical tradition. It details the main arguments for each side and provides counter‐arguments in order to indicate the salient points.FindingsThe paper argues that, of the three arguments for the morality of particular virtual action outlined in (...) this paper, none are satisfactory. An argument for the immorality of the action in questions based upon the fairness/sportsmanship distinction is offered.Originality/valueThe development of case‐based ethical studies, which draw upon current and controversial events within popular virtual environments, are useful in the construction of a deeper understanding of moral action within such spaces. (shrink)

Explores the embodied aspects of ownership and private property as these emerge in a range of American literary texts across the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

Explores the embodied aspects of ownership and private property as these emerge in a range of American literary texts across the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

In a recent paper in Religious Studies, Clarke criticizes Mumford's definition of a miracle as it fails to recognize a supernatural agent capable of intent. Clarke believes that in order for an event to qualify as a miracle a supernatural agent must intend it. It is my aim to dismiss this qualification and demonstrate how Mumford's intent-neutral definition is less problematic. I will do this by examining each of the three cases against Mumford's definition and give reason to reject Clarke's (...) criticism and his own definition of a miracle. (shrink)

Case study as a teaching and research tool has an extensive history in health and social sciences. Despite its suitability for many of the research questions that face nurses, nurses have not fully embraced case study as a comprehensive approach for research. The vagaries of the real‐life clinical setting can confound methodologically purist researchers. Case study provides a milieu in which nurse researchers can respond to these vagaries and move towards a paradigmatic openness. In this paper, we argue that case (...) study offers, as yet, under‐explored and under‐utilised potential as a bridge across the traditional research paradigms. We argue that case study has broad research application and epistemological, ontological and methodological flexibility. When used as a research approach, case study is both the process and end product of research. It provides a delineated boundary for inquiry, and a structural process within which any methods appropriate to investigating a research area can be applied. (shrink)

In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly, I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive than Mumford’s causation-based definition.

Article 14 of the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child declares, “States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” In this paper I will consider whether signatory nation-states may be in breach of this article by permitting religious groups to communicate the concept of Hell to children in a particular way.