In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 269 severally through hearing, tasting, and smelling, so that we should have on our hands five spatially unrelated spaces. He can find no reason for abandoning the spontaneous commonsense conviction that the puffing I hear is that of the locomotive I am looking at, that the chocolate I am tasting is the one I have put in my mouth, that what I am smelling is the rose (...) I am seeing and also perhaps holding; and, to return to Berkeley, that I perceive the surface I am seeing to be the very one that I am touching with my finger. Mr. Armstrong seems to be laying down the basis of a general theory of perception, that no given perception can be reduced to the datum proper to the sense-organ used plus an associate, a guess, or an inference. To turn this negative statement into a positive one, to say what the activity is that grasps more than the presumed datum, and what makes it reliable, is, as the history of the theory of perception makes plain, desperately hard. Far from grumbling at Mr. Armstrong for not having gone forward to this task, I am grateful for his having given us a book that is so intelligent, acute, clear, stimulating, and blessedly concise--one that deserves to be read by anyone interested in Berkeley, or the theory of vision, or the theory of perception generally. T. E. Jzssov Hull, England Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume. A new edition. By Charles W. Hendel. (Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963. 14 x 21. Pp. li + 516.) Cette nouvelle 6dition des Studies a subi d'importants changements non seulement dans sa pr6sentation, mais aussi dans son esprit. Elle nous prouve combien la pens6e d'un homme se d6veloppe sans cesse et s'enrichit. L'interpr&ation d'un philosophe et la pens& m~me du philosophe ont connu et connaissent encore ces transformations. La pens& humaine ne consid~re jamais sa t$che comme achev&. C'est pourquoi nous ne devons jamais cesser d'ftendre le champ de nos &udes philosophiques pour provoquer la naissance de nouvelles comparaisons f&ondes. Nous y passons certes beaucoup de temps, en retour, nous discernons mieux les complexit6s de la nature humaine. Nous savions d6jh qu'il y avait plusieurs Platon, car le progr& de l'homme se poursuivait de dialogue en dialogue; nous savons maintenant qu'il y a plusieurs David Hume, et que le Hume de Kant ou le Hume du dernier siecle, ne peuvent plus 6tre les n6tres. Comme le remarque Charles Hendel, dans son introduction, vingt-cinq annfes ont suffi h renouveler l'interpr&ation que nous donnions de Hume. Aujourd'hui c'est l'imagination qui se forme l'habitude de repr&enter par un seul mot une collection d'id&s semblables et qui nous sugg~re d'user de l'id& de causalit~ pour interpr&er le retour de cons&utions analogues. C'est aussi l'imagination, plus que la raison, qui nous r&~le la probabilit~ d'un &6nement donn6. Hendel nous rapelle aussi que Buder pourrait bien avoir inspir6 ~t Hume l'importance morale de la sympathie, et que l'Alciphron de Berkeley aurait sugg6r6 le Cl~anthe des Dialogues sur la Religion Naturelle. Hendel a 6galement raison d'insister sur l'importance des interpr&ations de Norman Kemp Smith. Cette nouvelle et si 6rudite &ude de Hendel nous fait mieux comprendre ~ la fois les variations des pens6es de Hume, de Kemp Smith et de Hendel lui-m~me. Nous sommes ainsi mieux avertis des difficult6s de l'histoire de la philosophie, dues non seulement au d6veloppement des sciences, mais aussi du progr&s moral et spirituel, sujet h tant de fluctuations dans l'histoire et m~me, ~t une m~me epoque, d'homme h homme. Aussi cette nouvelle ~dition ne manquera pas d'apporter de nouvelles dart& h nombre de ses lecteurs. ANDV.a~ Lotas LEROY Sorbonne... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:136 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY man felt two needs :"the theoretical need for guaranteeing a priori the subsistence of an ethical sphere against the Enlightenment's emphasis on happiness, and the political and practical need for guaranteeing individual freedom against an enlightened absolutism" (p. 71). Owing to this double need, Kant seems to be against himself and consequently the most critical and dialectical interpretation of Kant's thought is opposed to the (...) formalistic absolutism used by the Kantian jurists, who reject the most vital and profound critical philosophy for a metaphysical framework which confuses everything as though all were homogeneous. In fact, what appears more valid in Kant's philosophy is the continuous tension between formalism and dialectics, a tension which, even though it is never definitively overcome in a dialectical sense by Kant himself, nevertheless reveals the need for a legal dialectic rather than a formalism. It shows "the destiny of legal right to cease being a coercive apparatus, and of being transformed into rules for human society taken from civil society" (p. 390). Of course, this dialectical perspective suggests new horizons and also new problems and a wide plan of work. However, I agree with the author that the uncertainties which will inevitably emerge in this work must be met urgently and radically. For we know that "on the other scale-pan there are in fact the raw metaphysics of legal positivism, the conservatism of the jurists, and at best the formalistic, paralyzing ascetics" (p. 390). The merit of Negri's book seems to me to lie above all in the lively problematical tension with which he examines the Kantian thought. Following in the paths of G. Gurwitch, Metzger and Goldmann, as well as of Luk~s' History and Class Consciousness, he appreciates and understands the interpenetration of ethical motivations with the social and cultural environment. This historical and philosophical awareness of problems is particularly lively in the pages where the author notices the begging of principle in Kantian thought; a begging of principle consisting in the fact that "the definition of limit presupposes a limit to the principle itself, but the examination of this presupposition is neglected" (p. 77 ft.). Because of this critical and historical tension, Negri's book can be of great interest to the jurist, the philosopher and the historian. And if this ensues, it is because the conception of legal right which the author seeks to assert throughout his theoretical tension is deep-rooted humanly, dialectically, concretely. It is most needed by those who really want to make of law and right not a formal science but a human science. ANTONELLA GUARALDI Bari, Italy The Narrow Pass: Kierkegaard's Concept of Man. By George Price. (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963. Pp. 5-218.) Selon hombre de ses commentateurs, Kierkegaard seralt un ehrdtien passionnd; pour d'autres, il serait une sorte d'incroyant; pour George Price, nous devrions lui accorder une unitd complexe, unitd de production, qui s'exprime directement par la suite de ses oeuvres, unitd d'intention, une vue religicuse qui repose sur une certaine conception de l'homme, un th~me fondamental aussi qui est au centre des diverses discussions sur le pdchd, la foi, la raison, la morale, la subjectivitd et le "paradoxe", tous ces probl~mes qui paraissent se poser et se reposer sans cesse pour Kierkegaard, toujours de mani~re assez nouvelle. L'homme est i~la fois une synth~se de son corps et de son moi, des causes qui ont d'abord faeonnd son ~tre, et de qu'il y a en lui d'original et qui ne sera jamais rdpdtd, ce que son esprit a fait par un effort crdateur. Et d'abord une premiere remarque pour simplifier les vues de Kierkegaard. II n'y a pas ici de substances conjointes, il n'y a que des dvdnements corporels et spirituels. L'influence de Fichte apparait par l'importance accordde au devenir, un devenir qui se poursuit selon un module et qui reste fragile, si la volontd de se rdaliser ne se maintient pas. L'homme dolt se passionner pour son existence, it dolt devenir lui-m~me. La chute de l... (shrink)

Traditionally, philosophical inquiry into pedagogical issues has occurred far from the classrooms in which pedagogy materialises. However, an organised form of inquiry into issues of a normative nature and of an analytic nature, making use of ideas obtained in an empirical way in classroom and classroom-related situations, is both feasible and desirable. About desirability, this form of inquiry depends on the particularities of the local situations, and that helps to take them into account when deciding on how to improve pedagogical (...) practice. That is, it contextualises pedagogical decisions. About feasibility for normative issues, an analysis based on Donald Davidson’s philosophy of language shows that there is nothing that compels empirical observations to be descriptive and to not be normative. And normative occasional beliefs acquired empirically can serve as a general confrontation or testing field for ideas about the justification of pedagogical actions or strategies. About feasibility for analytic issues, as a consequence of giving up the analytic–synthetic distinction it is argued that they can also be explored by means of occasional beliefs acquired empirically, when confronted with the implications of the definition of any pedagogical concept. (shrink)

The current dominant approach on the assessment of critical thinking takes as a starting point a conception of criticality that does not commit to any substantive view or context of meaning concerning what issues are relevant to be critical about in society or in life. Nevertheless, as a detailed examination of the identification of assumptions shows, when going from the theory of critical thinking to the praxis of producing and evaluating arguments, the critical person will inevitably make such commitments from (...) particular perspectives, using particular contexts of meaning. But then she may fail to take notice of relevant ones and may end up using her critical powers in a mercenary way. It is then proposed, in the context of assessment of critical thinking, to choose and use some privileged contexts of meaning, while making them available for critical scrutiny and allowing for the possibility that new ones be brought up by those being assessed. (shrink)

Some authors have argued that consideration of alternative claims, theories, or worldviews is necessary for a proper or sound critical assessment of a claim or set of claims. However, an understanding of interpretation and beliefs as inherently holistic suggests that interpretation already involves the recogllition of alternatives, and that therefore assessment also necessarily involves their comparison. Starting from this idea, it will be argued that presuppositions can be regarded as limits to the range of alternatives that are considered by the (...) author of the claims, as seen by an interpreter making the assessment. However, a result of this consists in the fact that these assumptions can only be found in the conversational interaction between the author’s and the interpreter’s broader belief systems. Some implications for a conversational form of criticality will also be derived from here. (shrink)

Le rôle de David Hume dans la philosophie moderne, par A. L. Leroy.--The enlightenment of David Hume, by E. C. Mossner.--Hume and Jurieu: possible Calvinist origins of Hume's theory of belief, by R. H. Popkin.--Hume: philosopher or psychologist? A problem of exegesis, by T. E. Jessop.--L'astrazione nella filosofia di Hume, di M. Dal Pra.--Infinite divisibility in Hume's "Treatise," by A. Flew.--Note a "La rgola del gusto," di E. Migliorini.--Kant, Hamann-Jacobi and Schelling on Hume, by P. Merlan.--Bibliografia humiana dal 1937 (...) al 1966, di E. Ronchetti. (shrink)

"Une expérience qui réussit dans l'air ne réussit pas toujours dans le vide. C'est ainsi que s'achève le dialogue qui clôt l'Enquête sur les principes de la morale (1751). Dans cette oeuvre que Hume jugeait être le meilleur de tous ses écrits, le philosophe écossais. fidèle à sa méthode empirique et à son "scepticisme mitigé", part en quête des indices susceptibles de révéler L'origine de la morale. N'agissons-nous que par intérêt? L'approbation morale peut-elle faire abstraction de nos préférences? À suivre (...) les hommes dans leurs choix pour en dégager la constance, on ne peut qu'être frappé par la diversité des moeurs et des coutumes. La conclusion alors révèle la subtilité du détective: la morale de Hume joint l'utile à l'agréable et l'Enquête ne se fait pas faute de rappeler, dans sa forme même, que l'exercice philosophique doit lui aussi être un plaisir. (shrink)

In this article, we first review the development of clinical ethics in pediatrics in the United States. We report that, over the last 40 years, most children’s hospitals have ethics committees but that those committees are rarely consulted. We speculate that the reasons for the paucity of ethics consults might be because ethical dilemmas are aired in other venues. The role of the ethics consultant, then, might be to shape the institutional climate and create safe spaces for the discussion of (...) difficult and sometimes contentious issues. Finally, we report how pediatric clinical ethics has evolved differently in a number of other countries around the world. (shrink)

Le Foss ou logiciel libre, est un mouvement de fond qui valorise le partage de l'effort collectif dans la production logicielle et lutte ainsi contre l'appropriation intellectuelle de toute création humaine que les grandes industries de l'information cherchent à imposer. Le gouvernement brésilien a choisit de favoriser le Foss dans toute la société brésilienne.The Foss , or free software, is a fundamental movement that promotes the sharing of effort in software production and fight against and intellectual ownership of any human (...) creation that major information industries seek to impose. The Brazilian government has chosen to promote the Foss throughout Brazilian society. (shrink)

The sentential logic S extends classical logic by an implication-like connective. The logic was first presented by Chellas as the smallest system modelled by contraining the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for counterfactual conditionals such that the conditional is effectively evaluated as in the ternary relations semantics for relevant logics. The resulting logic occupies a key position among modal and substructural logics. We prove completeness results and study conditions for proceeding from one family of logics to another.